Annotations in Hyperspace

byLZ2

Reframing desire, language and intentionality

Towards a queer decolonial ontology of intentionality

Modernity's final (in)communication with the inhuman (gods, earth, cosmos, absolute etc) ≧≧—-÷÷ thus creating meta post and trans human counterparts

Homo deus vs ideas as digital objects: (re)reading AI/////MR for the algoricene(1)

Point of assemblage ΔΔΔΔΔΔΔΔΔΔΔ

Metabody as a techonolgy of postcartisian communication

Mignolo (2014): Extraction / exploitation subjectivity of being and knowing

Intentionality and accident

The 'man-machine' is in the power of accident. His activities fall by accident into some sort of channel which has been created by cosmic or mechanical forces and by accident move along this channel for a certain time, giving the illusion that aims of some kind are being attained.

Such accidental correspondence of results with aims we have set before us or the attainment of aims in small things which can have no consequences creates in mechanical man the conviction that he is able to attain any aim, 'is able to conquer nature' as it is called, is able to 'arrange the whole of his life,' and so on.

The act of remembering is automatic, it is produced by the machine (default network?)

So I'm going to move from memory-Remembering—>self-remembering

Time becomes space - no projection of past-future but present time

Catherine hall cultural amnesia is the machine - the automaton

Process of race making - desavoule-- dominant narratives suspended / bracketing (Husserl)

In Search of Vulnerability

•One of the problems of the politics of subjectivation that artistic practices face has been the anesthesia of our vulnerability to the other – an anesthesia all the more devastating when the other is represented by the ruling cartography as hierarchically inferior, because of his or her economic, social or racial condition, or on any other basis. But vulnerability is the precondition for the other to cease being a simple object for the projection of pre-established images, in order to become a living presence, with whom we can construct the territories of our existence and the changing contours of our subjectivity. Now, being vulnerable depends on the activation of a specific capacity of the sensible, which has been repressed for many centuries, remaining active only in certain philosophical and poetic traditions.

These traditions culminated in the artistic vanguards of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, whose activity produced effects that have left their mark on art across the twentieth century. More broadly, they propagated throughout the social tissue, ceasing to be a privilege of the cultural elites, particularly from the 1960s on. Neuroscience itself, in recent research, corroborates this observation that each of our sense organs is the bearer of a double capacity:

cortical and subcortical.[2] ΔΔΔΔΔΔΔ cortical and subcortical = pseudoscience !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Remembering-->

I was once walking along the Liteiny towards the Nevsky, and in spite of all my efforts I was unable to keep my attention on self-remembering. The noise, movement, everything distracted me. Every minute I lost the thread of attention, found it again, and then lost it again. At last I felt a kind of ridiculous irritation with myself and I turned into the street on the left having firmly decided to keep my attention on the fact that I would remember myself at least for some time, at any rate until I reached the following street. I reached the Nadejdinskaya without losing the thread of attention except, perhaps, for short moments. Then I again turned towards the Nevsky realizing that, in quiet streets, it was easier for me not to lose the line of thought and wishing therefore to test myself in more noisy streets. I reached the Nevsky still remembering myself,

and was already beginning to experience the strange emotional state of inner peace and confidence which comes after great efforts of this kind. Just round the corner on the Nevsky was a tobacconist's shop where they made my cigarettes. Still remembering myself I thought I would call there and order some cigarettes. Two hours later I woke up in the Tavricheskaya, that is, far away. I was going by izvostchik to the printers. The sensation of awakening was extraordinarily vivid. I can almost say that I came to. I remembered everything at once. How I had been walking along the Nadejdinskaya, how I had been remembering myself, how I had thought about cigarettes, and how at this thought I seemed all at once to fall and disappear into a deep sleep. At the same time, while immersed in this sleep, I had continued to perform consistent and expedient actions. I left the tobacconist, called at my Hat in the Liteiny, telephoned to the printers. I wrote two letters.

Cosmology

"Study the fundamental unity of everything and helps it to find analogies in phenomena of different orders.

"The next fundamental law of the universe is the law of seven or the law of octaves. "In order to understand the meaning of this law it is necessary to regard the universe as consisting of vibrations. These vibrations proceed in all kinds, aspects, and densities of the matter which constitutes the universe, from the finest to the coarsest; they issue from various sources and proceed in various directions, crossing one another, colliding, strengthening, weakening, arresting one another, and so on.

"In this connection according to the usual views accepted in the West, vibrations are continuous. This means that vibrations are usually regarded as proceeding uninterruptedly, ascending or descending so long as there continues to act the force of the original impulse which caused the vibration and which overcomes the resistance of the medium in which the vibrations proceed. When the force of the impulse becomes exhausted and the resistance of the medium gains the upper hand the vibrations naturally die down and stop. But until this moment is reached, that is, until the beginning of the natural weakening, the vibrations develop uniformly and gradually, and, in the absence of resistance, can even be endless. So that one of the fundamental propositions of our physics is the continuity of vibrations, although this has never been precisely formulated because it has never been opposed. In certain of the newest theories this proposition is beginning to be shaken. Nevertheless physics is still very far from a correct view on the nature of vibrations, or what corresponds to our conception of vibrations, in the real world.

"In this instance the view of ancient knowledge is opposed to that of contemporary science because at the base of the understanding of vibrations ancient knowledge places the principle of the discontinuity of vibrations.

Analogy to Music scale and semitones:

The smallest interval 16/15 occurs between mi and fa and between si and do. These are precisely the places of retardation in the octave.

This law explains why there are no straight lines in nature and also why we can neither think nor do, why everything with us is thought, why everything happens with us and happens usually in a way opposed to what we want or expect. All this is the clear and direct effect of the 'intervals,' or retardations in the development of vibrations.

Everything proceeds in this way for a certain time, then again there is reaction, again a stop, again a deviation. The development of the force may continue but the work which was begun with great zeal and enthusiasm has become an obligatory and useless formality; a number of entirely foreign elements have entered into feeling—considering, vexation, irritation, hostility; thought goes round in a circle, repeating what was known before, and the way out which had been found becomes more and more lost.

Perhaps the most interesting examples of such change of direction in the line of the development of forces can be found in the history of religion, particularly in the history of Christianity if it is studied dispassionately. Think how many turns the line of development of forces must have taken to come from the Gospel preaching of love to the Inquisition; or to go from the ascetics of the early centuries studying esoteric Christianity to the scholastics who calculated how many angels could be placed on the point of a needle.

The law of octaves explains many phenomena in our lives which are incomprehensible.

"First is the principle of the deviation of forces.

"Second is the fact that nothing in the world stays in the same place, or remains what it was, everything moves, everything is going somewhere,

"And third, that in the actual development itself of both ascending and descending octaves, fluctuations, rises and falls are constantly taking place.

Upon the law of octaves in its three principal manifestations depend many phenomena both of a psychic nature as well as those immediately connected with our life. Upon the law of octaves depends the imperfection and the incompleteness of our knowledge in all spheres without exception, chiefly because we always begin in one direction and afterwards without noticing it proceed in another.

The greatest insult for a 'man-machine' is to tell him that he can do nothing, can attain nothing, that he can never move towards any aim whatever and that in striving towards one he will inevitably create another. Actually of course it cannot be otherwise. The 'man-machine' is in the power of accident. His activities may fall by accident into some sort of channel which has been created by cosmic or mechanical forces and they may by accident move along this channel for a certain time, giving the illusion that aims of some kind are being attained.

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Walter Mignolo es uno de los referentes más importantes de la tradición conocida como el pensamiento descolonial. En el mismo se inscriben –de un modo u otro- figuras de la talla de Enrique Dussel, Aníbal Quijano o Santiago Castro Gómez. Esta corriente se emparenta a su vez con trabajos como los de Frantz Fanon, Samir Amin y las corrientes iniciadoras de la teología de la liberación.

El pensamiento descolonial o decolonial, apunta a pensar la modernidad capitalista y eurocéntrica como una modernidad que no puede escindirse del proyecto colonial. El yo cartesiano que se supone en los orígenes de la modernidad se convierte –tal vez en su propio afán de dominar intrínseco al pensamiento postivista- en un yo conquistador. Es allí donde la modernidad eurocéntrica devela su identidad y despliega todo su capacidad de desarrollo.

1 Luciana Parisi, "Instrumental Reason, Algorithmic Capitalism, and the Incomputable," in Matteo Pasquinelli (ed.), Alleys of Your Mind: Augmented Intelligence and Its Traumas. Lüneburg: Meson Press, 2016, p. 125.

Intentionality is one of the most crucial areas of inquiry in both sciences and the humanities. The different disciplines explore it through various approaches. In semiotics, and especially in structural semiotics, intentionality is investigated in relation to the concept of text. If a text is a portion of meaning that a culture isolates as peculiarly significant in relation to its context, the issue of intentionality essentially bears on the origin of textual significance and meaning. We realize that there is meaning in a text. But where is it from? In semiotics, the problem of intentionality comes down to asking meaning the same question that is usually addressed to a stranger: where are you from, meaning? The different disciplines of meaning, as well as the different branches of semiotics, answer this question in discrepant ways. For some, meaning essentially comes from the reader, the listener, the spectator, etc. The one who receives a text becomes her master, and injects into it, or even onto it, her subjectivity's desire for meaningfulness. According to this perspective, the meaning that I find in the Divine Comedy, for instance, ultimately depends on what I, consciously or unconsciously, decide to project on its signifying surface. Ultimately, I am Dante, I am Virgil, I am Beatrice, I am the God of the text. An alternative approach answers the same question "where are you from, meaning?" in a radically different way. It looks for indexical links between the surface of the text, that is, the way in which a roman, a fresco, a symphony, etc. appears, and those agencies that have caused this surface to be phenomenologically arranged as it is. The intentionality that matters in the creation of meaning, according to this perspective, is not that of the reader, but that of the author. Ultimately, it is the author's mind that I look for when I peruse a text. The novelty of the semiotic approach, and especially of Umberto Eco's point of view, has consisted in suggesting that a third kind of intentionality exists between that of the reader and that of the author. It is

the intentionality of the text itself. The author arranges the text as she pleases, yet this arrangement takes place within a grammar and, even more importantly, within a culture. In creation, the author is never entirely free, not only for it draws her communicative materials from a socially shared deposit of semiotic forms but also for, once these forms are set, they entail meaningful consequences that usually escape the author's intentional control. A text means because of her author but also and above all beyond and sometimes even despite her, especially as regards complex artistic texts. When this third approach faces the question: "where are you from, meaning?", it looks for an answer neither in the subjective response of the receiver nor in the objective impulse of the author but in the inter-subjective encyclopedia of cultural relations that, shared by a community of interpreters, determines the grid of meaningful determinations through which a text is read. Umberto Eco's solution, however, does not solve the problem of the intentionality of meaning but elegantly displaces it toward a different domain, that of cultural semiotics. How and, even more crucially, why does a community of interpreters take shape, settling on a certain configuration of the socially shared deposit of forms and meaning that guides the correct interpretation of texts within the community? Even more mysteriously, if the intention of a text is inter-subjectively set by a society's hermeneutic culture, how does it change? And how do individual interpretations, including the wrong ones, influence this process? The deep nature of textual intentionality, moreover, must be investigated not only theoretically but also historically, with an eye to considering the way in which it is affected by changes in communication technology. For example, how is a "community of interpreters" established in a society that, increasingly globalized,

CONCLUSION: It could be said that the best hope for modernity is for inhuman intelligence to escape its logos, to diagonalize out of its prescribed commitments, to construct its own alien logics. This might be the only solace we can offer for all those forms of agency cast as inhuman and assaulted to the point of annihilation by that project we call modernity.





Luciano

Buenos Aires Biennial of the Moving Image (BIM)
http://bim.com.ar/en/screenings/2016/dew-kim-luciano-zubillaga-y-la-iglesia-de-la-telepatia-expandida

Asterisco Buenos Aires LGBTIQ International Film Festival

http://www.festivalasteriscogob.ar/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ASTERISCO2016_FINAL.pdf

/// Reza Negarestani, "The Labour of the Inhuman, Part 1: Human," e-flux Journal #52 (2014) (http://www.e-flux.com/.../the-labor-of-the-inhuman-part-i-hu.../). ///

[redacted]

[redacted]Vector intentionality/contingency/vulnerability

Vector

In epidemiology, a vector is the particular means by which a given pathogen travels from one population to another. Water is a vector for cholera, bodily fluids for HIV. By extension, a vector may be any means by which information moves. Telegraph, telephone, television,

telecommunications: these terms name not just particular vectors, but a general abstract capacity that they bring into the world and expand. All are forms of telesthesia, or perception at a distance. A given media vector has certain fixed properties of speed, bandwidth, scope and scale, but may be deployed anywhere, at least in principle. The uneven development of the vector is political and economic, not technical.

With the commodification of information comes its vectoralisation. Extracting a surplus from information requires technologies capable of transporting information through space, but also through time. The archive is a vector through time just as communication is a vector that crosses space. The vectoral class comes into its own once it is in possession of powerful technologies for vectoralising information. The vectoral class may commodify information stocks, flows, or vectors themselves. A stock of information is an archive, a body of information maintained through time that has enduring value. A flow of information is the capacity to extract information of temporary value out of events and to distribute it widely and quickly. A vector is the means of achieving either the temporal distribution of a stock, or the spatial distribution of a flow of information. Vectoral power is generally sought through the ownership of all three aspects.

The vectoral class ascend to the illusion of an instantaneous and global plane of calculation and control. But it is not the vectoralist class that comes to hold subjective power over the objective world. The vector itself usurps the subjective role, becoming the sole repository of will toward a world that can be apprehended only in its commodified form. The reign of the vector is one in which any and every thing can be apprehended as a thing. The vector is a power over all of the world, but a power that is not evenly distributed. Nothing in the technology of the vector determines its possible use. All that is determined by the technology is the form in which information is objectified.

The vectoral class struggles at every turn to maintain its subjective power over the vector, but as it continues to profit by the proliferation of the vector, some capacity over it always escapes control. In order to market and profit by the information it peddles over the vector, it must in some degree address the vast majority of the producing classes as subjects, rather than as objects of commodification. The hacker class seeks the liberation of the vector from the reign of the commodity, but not to set it indiscriminately free. Rather, to subject it to collective and democratic development. The hacker class can release the virtuality of the vector only in principle. It is up to an alliance of all the productive classes to turn that potential to actuality, to organise themselves subjectively, and use the available vectors for a collective and subjective becoming.

[redacted]Kokakolachinwings: expanded telepathy and the

question of spacetime in [redacted] By Luciaro Zubillaga –19 June 2016 Draft 2

Recent developments in quantum field theory, feminist, posthumanist and media philosophy have been revitalizing the way we think about spacetime, subjectivity and the processes of mattering. This transdisciplinary context encompassing new physics, feminist thinking and art as research further destabilizes the foundations of modern science and accelerates the emergence of complex new epistemologies that go beyond the historical logos model and engage simultaneously with both artificial intelligence and ecological forms of logic (i.e. *sumak kawsay*[1]). These opportunities come from the modes of invention of creative research, the sensibility of ethic-onto-epistemologies of the south and their capacity for cultural mediation, and no longer just the realm of alphabetic language and disciplined academic knowledge. Words, syntagmas and syntaxes are too narrow and regimented to address in isolation the 'pluriversality' of contemporary notions, planetary politics, financial spacetime architectures, aesthetic experiences and onto-epistemological opportunities.

This paper seeks to revisit connections between moving image as direct theory and *exponded telepathy*[2] as a mode of invention in creative research. I will imagine expanded telepathy as a de-colonial form of thinking through practice, that is, pluriversal (universal in its plurality) and a post-causal epistemology. How can we explore reality in forms that go beyond narrative structures of language? How can we reimagine humanist notions such as capture, scan, record, film and teleport beyond individualist metaphysics?

How moving image co-respond to the new post-anthropocentric onto-epistemologies of the world as pluriverse?

This essay is further contextualized within epistemologies in the periphery of the Eurocentric and logocentric discourse, in particular, Walter Mignolo's critique of 'coloniality of knowledge'

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[1] *Sumak kawsay* is a concept from the Kichwa cosmology associated with "good living", in harmony with our communities, ourselves, and our living, breathing environment. Ecuador and Bolivia incorporated fully

[1] The term *expanded telepathy* and *direct theory* refer to a particular sequence of ideas from experimental cinema, quantum field theory and hyperstitional thinking that I have developed elsewhere (see, L. Zubillaga, Approaching Telepathy from a Decolonial and Posthuman Perspective: Moving Image as Direct Theory. Papaper presented at the 7th Conference Beyond Humanism ("From Humanism to Post- and Transhumanism?") held at Ewha Womans University, Seoul, South Korea, September 2015 http://beyondhumanism.orgpcs.com/main/ [retrieved on 1st September 2015].

(1995), Karen Barad's 'agential realism' and her intra-action-based ontology,[5] and the notion of thinking through practice within art as research.

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31 December 2015

My first impression about writing this chapter arrived in the middle of the production for a new film project between Buenos Aires and Montevideo.

Montevideo

The ferry finally arrived in the city of Montevideo. From the harbour we took a taxi to our main location.

I am now looking down into the city from the 20th floor of the Palacio Salvo tower; this is both our apartment and the place where we are going to be filming for the next two days. Once the tallest building in Uruguay in the twentieth century, Palacio Salvo was conceived by the Italian community to house the ashes of Dante. In fact, the construction plans follow the nine circles of hell in The Divine Comedy. The building, in a pompous neo-Gothic style, was designed to mirror a similar building in nearby Buenos Aires, the Palacio Barolo. The idea was that their headlights should shine upon each other across the Rio de la Plata. But Mario Palanti, the Italian architect who built them, did not foresee the curvature of the earth resulting in the lights being invisible from each other. An apocryphal legend said that Palanti committed suicide after realizing the mistake.

On the first night, I shared the only bed with Alan O., the athletic performer of our film. It was quite an erotic experience, but non sexual. I am searching on my computer for Mark Zuckerberg's comments on telepathy (Alan O. pointed out ealier in the day that MZ had similar ideas about telepathy to mine). Alan O. is already sleeping. I would take some snapshots of his naked body in bed. I didn't use lights, but only a monopod, a bellow, and a f/0.95 old canon lens. I felt like a commissioned pornographer with a mission. Who is the client? It also reminded me of Felix Guattari's film script *Un amour d'Uiq* (2016). Perhaps we are that scientist in the life of the invisible, protean life force dubbed UIQ (Infra-quark Universe). Telepathy beyond the human

[1] Barad, K (2007) Meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning. Duke University Press

world.

I imagine Clare of Assisi alone in her cell and I recall that Pope Pius XII designated her as the patron saint of television in 1958, on the basis that when she was too ill to attend Mass, she had reportedly been able to see and hear it on the wall of her room. I don't think we know what moving image is still capable of, we are not fully aware of its true potential. There is a strong impression in me that it is not about human drama or action and it has never been about the subject, representation or historiography. It has always been about some strange light filaments that cross over space and time. It is about telecommunication, teleportation, telepathy and telesthesia.

Where is movement coming from? How to sequence time? What has to be saved? What has to be made visible? What remains invisible? Can we see those filaments connecting the world of hard objects and realities? Moving image practice is entangle with scales, concepts, assumptions and life itself. The mode of invention in experimental moving image is a particular form of developing concepts, cosmologies and impressions as direct theory, that is, not mediated by alphabetical languages alone.

I have always felt a strong aversion for Andre Bazin's film theory and most European pretensions of universalism. How colonial any reference alone to ontology has become? Walter Mignolo,[*] places a fundamental question in the direction of epistemic disobedience to coloniality of knowledge: how can you delink if you are trapped within the categories of Western modern and imperial languages? Writing in Spanish, Portuguese and English, dependency theorists and the New World studies group were colonial subjects, that is, subjects dwelling in the local histories and experiences of colonial histories. For that reason, they needed to create categories of thought that were not derived from European political theory and economy. They needed to delink and to think within the borders they where inhabiting – not borders of nation-states, but rather epistemic and ontological borders. The New World group (Lloyd Best, David de Caires, etc) wrote in English, but inhabited the memories of the Middle Passage, of the history of slavery, of runaway slaves and of the plantation economy. That experience was not what nourished Adam Smith's liberal thinking or Marx's socialist thinking – the experience of the plantation and the legacies of slavery nourished border thinking.

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[*] Mignolo, W (2011) Geopolitics of Sensing and Knowing On (De)Coloniality, Border Thinking, and Epistemic Disobedience http://eipcp.net/transversal/0112/mignolo/en [retrieved on 1st May 2015].

Border thinking or border epistemology goes hand in hand with decoloniality. According to Maria Lugones,[5] border thinking is a pluriversal theory (universal in its plurality) that is grounded in transculturation. This implies cultures interact but not melting into each other, defying a complete synthesis, translation or merging. Thus, many worlds interact, co-exist co-relationally and communicate with each other, restoring the right to be different but equal. The vibrating body has a credible voice that translates directly into knowing and thinking.

I am writing in a ferry from Buenos Aires to Montevideo. This script is part of a film that follows the logic of montage. Viktor Shklovsky,[6] who wrote about defamiliarization, used to say that montage transforms photography into film language. Reminded of his lesson, my question is: in which ways can film montage, the art of sequencing/assembling time could transform the practice of writing into a pluriversality of screen objects activated by a critical mind, perhaps outside our bodies, perhaps even activated from memories from another spacetime strata in the universe?

The important thing is not to dismantle the tonal by destroying it all of a sudden. You have to diminish it, shrink it, clean it, and that only at certain moments. You have to keep it in order to survive, to ward off the assault of the nagual. For a nagual that erupts, that destroys the tonal, a body without organs that shatters all the strata, turns immediately into a body of nothingness, pure self-destruction whose only outcome is death: The tonal must be protected at any cost. [7]

I am thinking the sequence tonal / nagual in terms of cybernetic architectures. Formal languages are widely regarded as being, above all, mathematical objects, and as entities producing a greater level of precision and technical complexity, yet capable of eroding central assumptions of finitude and control within logocentric structures at the same time. A new line of research in this direction is Luciana Parisi's transdisciplinary research on Media Philosophy and cybernetics[8]. Parisi (2012) incorporates the notion that mathematical objects (algorithms) operating at the

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[5] Lugones, M, Heterosexualism and the Colonial / Modern Gender System in Hypatia vol. 22, no. 1 (Winter 2007)

[6] Shklovskij, Viktor. "Art as Technique". Literary Theory: An Anthology. Ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan. Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 1998.

[7] Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. University of Minnesota Press, p. 183

[8] See Parisi, L (2012) Contagious Architecture: Computation, Aesthetics, and Space. MIT Press

heart of cybernetic architectures, generate a logic that is abstract and infinite and lie beyond direct human cognition and control, further destabilizing rational orders of cognition: indexing, accumulation and transit of data.

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Second beginning of the film/text: the film starts with a conversation with philosopher Peter Pal Pelbart in the city of Resistencia in Argentina. The second day became a very intense seminar. Pelbart spoke of other forms of existence, Amazonian ghosts, the idea of instauration in art and of Étienne Souriau. This conversation with Pelbart took me to a third beginning: a future dialogue with film programmer and curator Ariel Nahon (AN) at CIA Centro.[9] These connecting points reminded me of what I call 'expanded telepathy' as well as the production and screening of the film *Kokakolachickenwings* (2015-16). All these events merge into one single text, one single film.

The film *Kokakolachickenwings* was intended as an interview-film that discusses my first feature film, *Things to Come* (2014), as narrated by Hanna Schygulla. In most of my work some gestures or references connect films together in a very organic, open way. In *Kokakolachickenwings* co-director Zairong Xiang reads a poem in Portuguese language that has no beginning and no end:

And here I begin I spin here the beguine I respin and begin to release and realize life begins not arrives at the end of a trip which is why I begin to respin to write-in thousand pages write thousand one pages to end write begin write begin end with writing and so I begin to respin to retrace to rewrite write on writing the future of writings the tracing the slaving a thousand one nights in a thousand one pages or a page in one night the same night the same pages same semblance resemblance reassemblance where the end is begin.[10]

AN: How experimental film engages with subjectivisation and biographical elements beyond

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[9] CIA Centro de Investigaciones Artísticas, founded by Graciela Hasper, Roberto Jacoby and Judi Werthein, is a non-profit organization under the legal umbrella of the Start Foundation, to establish a dialogue beyond disciplinary and geographical frontiers in art. (http://www.ciacentro.org.ar)

[10] Haroldo de Camposs's *Galáxias*, translated by Suzanne Jill Levine http://wings.buffalo.edu/epc/authors/perloff/perloff_decampos.html [retrieved on 1st May 2015].

space-time historiography?

LZ: It does engage it in the space between camera and the captured performers: the vibrating body and the hidden architectures of spacetime. Furthermore, the practice of capturing and editing within experimental moving image reveals the existence of a vibrating body, a living presence, whose main interest is the search for the hidden architecture of spacetime.

Action. Suely Rolnik speaks of a resonant body: the other is a living presence composed of a malleable multiplicity of forces that pulse in our sensible texture.

One of the problems of the politics of subjectivisation that artistic practices face has been the anaesthesia of our vulnerability to the other – an anaesthesia all the more devastating when the other is represented by the ruling cartography as hierarchically inferior, because of his or her economic, social or racial condition, or on any other basis. But vulnerability is the precondition for the other to cease being a simple object for the projection of pre-established images, in order to become a living presence, with whom we can construct the territories of our existence and the changing contours of our subjectivity. Now, being vulnerable depends on the activation of a specific capacity of the sensible, which has been repressed for many centuries, remaining active only in certain philosophical and poetic traditions. These traditions culminated in the artistic vanguards of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, whose activity produced effects that have left their mark on art across the twentieth century. More broadly, they propagated throughout the social tissue, ceasing to be a privilege of the cultural elites, particularly from the 1960s on. Neuroscience itself, in recent research, corroborates this observation that each of our sense organs is the bearer of a double capacity: cortical and subcortical. [11]

AN: You mentioned earlier the idea that objects theorize. What happened when objects theorize with the use of sound and non-linear narratives?

LZ: I think this is an innovative contribution of art and experimental moving image in particular.

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[11] Suely Rolnik, The Geopolitics of Pimping, translated by Brian Holmes, 2006. http://eipcp.net/transversal/1106/rolnik/en/base_edit [retrieved on 1st May 2015].

There is a capture device, a capture of something that, paraphrasing Etienne Souriau,[12] is about capturing that which has been superseded, or that which needs to emerge and become established. However, instauration will never be finalized. There is a conceptual impediment for completion – completion itself is the wrong approach to the concept. Usually we approach technologies of capture from a modernist and logocentric perspective. Kenneth Anger spoke of filmmaking as a weapon to invocate and capture another, less visible world.[13]

Expanded cinema has somehow included the idea of expansion in the fields of seeing, percepting and knowing. It moves beyond the possibility of language as syntagma. Language as a regimented, restricting, and limited form of communication. Likewise, critical thinking falls into the same trap of language. In my diffractive reading of speculative realism, I indicated the need for the discourses of contemporary art and moving image to intervene and free critical theory from the limitations imposed by language structure. Within avant-garde traditions the notion that art can bypass the regimented possibilities of language and dualistic logic has been a recurrent idea, in particular within experimental film.

According to Ferdinand Alquie,[14] the surrealists sought to explain the physical world by plumbing its depths, by attempting to 'penetrate into what has more reality than the logical and objective universe'. Cinematic images hold the potential to bypass the logical grounds of language and to achieve what Breton's poetry could not. Due to the rapidity of the film's images, the logical mechanism–which tries to explain the images through memory–does not have time to be engaged. Hence, cinematic meaning occurs in an altogether different manner from that of the literary domain: in the cinema, the mind is working to connect images. As opposed to forming representations of what is observed, a process grounded in language, cinematic ideas are formed through association. The power and immediacy of cinematic imagery thrusts the force of its communication beyond the purely logical or discursive functioning of reason, and so film speaks the language of the dream.

AN: There is a polyphony of materials in your work. These materials are not organized according to a plot, like in classic film or television. The priority in this work is the expansion of these materials. How does your working process shape according to the project, its main objects, its internal structures?

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[12] Souriau, E, Les différents modes d'existence , Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1943
[13] Small, E (1994) Direct Theory: Experimental Film/Video As a Major Genre, Southern Illinois University Press
[14] Alquie, F (1965) The Philosophy of Surrealism, University of Michigan Press

LZ: The idea of narrative and communication are often misunderstood. These notions have been hijacked by a colonial logic that denies the possibility of non-linear experimental narratives. I think of this perversity in the way that all of us spontaneously narrate our lives within a dominant layer of materiality, denying the complexity of contradictions and the multiplicity of vibrations that penetrate our attention. Language tends to reduce such richness, because it "is not life; it gives life orders. Life does not speak; it listens and waits. Every order-word, even a father's to his son, carries a little death sentence—a Judgment, as Kafka puts it."15

AN: What kind of spaces do you want to create with moving images?

LZ: The sense of the real we have assumed needs some adaptation to the contemporary speed, complexity and fragmentation of the present. Telepathy has been a tool and method of collaboration within international visual art practice since the 1960s. The notion of expanded telepathy qua performance is a mode of collaborating in art: a collaborative form of invention that has no beginning and no end. We only see fragments.

The words 'telepathy' and 'telesthesia' were coined simultaneously when Frederic Myers founded the Society for Psychical Research in London in 1882. However, telepathy provides a name for the experience of distant (tele) feeling (pathos) or ideas (thesia) found in all cultures. Telepathy and collaboration are tools that a number of artists reach for simultaneously, while attempting to share and/or transform subjectivity. This raises questions about the overlapping concepts of telepathy and collaboration. Collaborative telepathy could be defined as working with imaginary, fictional or "non-human" artists, friends and colleagues such as ghosts, animals, virtual avatars and other non-human agencies.

These types of collaborations provide crucial insight into how art works as a discipline of shared subjectivity and knowledge, as philosophy traditionally does, that is, art as a form of post-human philosophy. As Jacquelene Drinkall indicates,[16] telepathy is more aligned to the realm of

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[15] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. University of Minnesota Press, p. 57.

[16] Drinkall, J, unpublished PhD thesis Telepathy in Contemporary, Conceptual and Performance Art, available online via UNSW library catalogue, 2006.

dreams, imagination, perception and spiritual enlightenment (and even psychosis), whereas collaboration is more aligned to professional exchanges, bureaucratic tasks, factional empowerment, and strategic coordination (and even conspiracy).

Moreover, the former is a secret and hidden affect; it accompanies a wide range of affects that are not confined to anthropomorphic collaboration, and it can be activated as an animated basic "glue" or force within and between ghosts, animals, aliens and all the cyborg and spiritual bodies of avatars, gods and ancestors. Since Fluxus and Conceptual Art, there has been significant movement to incorporate telepathy as a collaborative tool in the realm of arts.

AN: You also spoke of telepathy and teleportation?

PPP: Thinking of the present, and how distracted I am, how fragmented and how influences multiply constantly, non-stop, I wonder how would it be possible to capture that? I think concepts like forms and methodologies become obsolete. It all happens in an instant without procedures, processes or protocols. All of them exist in linear time, but we want to capture non-linearity.

According to atomist metaphysics, space is a container and time is cut up in successive fragments. The fact that we do not treat these assumptions as such, or their effects as such, is due to the fact that we are accustomed to atomist metaphysics. We have always thought the world was made of discrete objects and one-dimensional finalities, and interactions happened between individuals that existed prior to the exchanges. Narratively and materially, we keep reproducing this model.

According to Karen Barad's agential realist ontology (or rather, ethic-onto-epistemology), "individuals" do not pre-exist as such but they do materialize in intra-action. Bodies are not objects with inherent boundaries and properties, they are material-discursive phenomena, instead. Barad's concept of intra-action is central to a whole new understanding of language and visual materiality, which goes beyond the constraints of traditional realism (positivism) and linguisticism alike.

Somehow I do exist in the present; otherwise it all becomes movement, ontology of movement.

Archiving, documenting, accumulating and storing all these technologies point to teleportation. We want to teleport the present, somewhere away from contingency, abstraction and timelessness. There is a very strong desire to go in this direction beyond both data and visual technology.

AN: What you are saying bring to mind your work as a form of expanded telepathy performance, as a process to investigate those 'filaments that connect actions and events'. The capture of the present that extends as an endless and open teleportation channel, always against individual metaphysics ...

LZ: We mentioned earlier a field of immanence and how expanded telepathy appears as a method for artist collaboration that taps on a level of shared inter-subjectivity existing beyond words and notions of finitude. It is perhaps an expansion of communication. It is somehow mining the present even further but in a different direction to big data. Can we quantify this possibility by teleporting the spacetime complexity of matter, arithmetically and digitally?

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5 January 2016

The location changes to a small hotel café next to the town cathedral in Maldonado. I am waiting for my co-director. There is a kind of synchronicity between the three of us – the performer and us, the filmmakers – that speeds up the creative process. Daniel B. is an experienced director and cinematographer. He is a Latin American critical post-humanist, who spends half of the day sleeping and dreaming. Dreaming attention is a form of awareness that follows the unarticulated logic of dreams. This possibility gives him an edge in everyday negotiations as if he knew that events were decided somewhere else: supersensibility.

This other reality has been observed across time. Freud was in line with a fine tradition in outlining his two simultaneous sets of vision. Kant, in the wildest of books, *The Critique of Judgment*, said that we observe the world through imposed categories most of the time. But sometimes, for some reason, the categories are suspended. When they are, we have an experience of the "supersensible", a perspective that is not confined to a personal standpoint.

This other perspective is receptive, but it is not passive. The passive and the receptive may sound the same, but they do not look alike. The heart of the difference is that the passive is historically constructed, whereas the receptive is not. By this account, the other, receptive vision becomes a symptom of another reality, a point of connection with it. It is in all of us, but we resist it. It is outside time and therefore the only thing that can disrupt time and timeliness. It is in us as an alternative to our egocentric, categorizing visual standpoint.[17]

I am reviewing the footage and thinking about the relationship with my collaborators: the mood, the expectations, the desires, etc. I also think that it is necessary to go beyond the psychological and political dimensions to arrive within the domain of art as direct collaboration with minimal protocols. I am thinking about the complexity of making a film: capturing bodies and forms of existence and sequencing space-time in a way that is both singular and universal. Perhaps capturing and locating them somewhere in between dreaming attention and the everyday world. Is that possible?

AN: How does experimental film engage with other modes of existence beyond the space-time of traditional historiography?

LZ: Action in front of a camera; bodies that look into the camera; sounds. There is also another logic, where performers, sounds and voices navigate time and space as a sculpture (albeit as an ambiguous and indefinite one). Digital recording can also blend with analogue equipment, and vice versa. There are also photographic bellows, unstable views, medium format lenses with 5K recording, and mobile phones. This is a cinema of montage and at the same time one that is modular, interchangeable, and never fixed by the edit.

More than representation or communication, the space between camera and the captured performers reflect a complex dispositif or a teleportation lab. The spatiality of our everyday notions of past, present and future have been fundamentally de-centred as a result of twentieth century avant-garde art practice and the implications of quantum mechanics.

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[17] Teresa Brennan and Martin Jay (eds.) (1996). Vision in Context: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Sight. Routledge, p. 223.

My screening at CIA Centro starts with some shots of my latest film *Kokakolachickenwings* where an Android voice in the style of Optimus Prime speaks:

The theme of the conversation was Instability of Human Reason. This terrestrial friend of mine first expatiated on the kind of structure, which – in his opinion – the head-brain has. And in which cases and what manner various impressions are perceived by the other brains. Only after a definite agreement between all the brains, the total results are impressed on a head-brain.

To every being, and also of course to me, it's quite easy to prove anything; all that is necessary to know is which shocks and which associations to arouse in the other human brains while one or other fact is being described.

There is a final onto-epistemological note about the nonlinear sequence moving image / direct theory / expanded telepathy. My knowledge of the concept "Sumak Kawsay" is different from yours, is not just the result of different experiences and memories, but it is based on the account of my different neurons, the position of my body, its geographical coordinates and location in relation to the different assemblages of organic life on earth (all of it might constitute the 'human brains'). So, if I wanted to activate the same concept in you, I would need to activate a diffuse, perhaps very complex network across our 'human brains'. That would require translation into a non-linear language that figured out what I wanted to suggest, and teleport those pattern to you all at once, in the present. How are we related to our bodies? Is self-persistence/continuity an all-or-nothing affair? Do our minds consist of parts, which could enjoy an independent existence?

Mind division brings an entirely new perspective on consciousness and subjectivity. Some notions of teleporting ideas and impressions may risk the loss of consciousness if considered on single strata only. By thinking humans as species or higher individuals (inter-subjective agencies), teleportation becomes survivable. By expanding media archaeology to a plane in the pluriverse of the future, the non-linear sequence moving image / direct theory / expanded telepathy becomes feasible as a potential for other forms of communication. A new synergy has leapt into existence. A threshold has been crossed, like a quantum leap to a qualitatively new plane of operation. The quantum leap is Barad's theoretical method, which she defines as

follows:

Quantum leaps aren't jumps (large or small) through space and time. An electron that "leaps" from one orbital to another does not travel along some continuous trajectory from here-now to there-then. ... What makes a quantum leap unlike any other is that there is no determinate answer to the question of where and when they happen. The point is that it is the intra-play of continuity and discontinuity, determinacy and indeterminacy, possibility and impossibility that constitutes the differential spacetimematterings of the world.[18]

This text is an attempt to apply this concept to the creative process behind experimental filmmaking. It takes the practice of capturing and editing moving image and tries to demonstrate how non-linear, associative thinking may be useful to elaborate concepts and impressions during the shooting and – retrospectively – as a sort of meta-observation of cinema as a language which disrupt linguistic, logocentric conventions and expands our notion of continuity, scale and materiality. Proposing a sort of diary of my practice, I wish to highlight how moving image as language is the result of a complex assemblage reuniting several elements, which are reciprocally correlated in terms of continuity and discontinuity, determinacy and indeterminacy, possibility and impossibility. It is probably sitting on such apparent contradictions that cinema perfectly encapsulates life.

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[18] Barad K (2007) Meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning. Duke University Press p. 182

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[redacted]Matter - physics and consciousness

MATTER

PHYSICS

Is Matter Conscious?

Why the central problem in neuroscience is mirrored in physics.

BY HEDDA HASSEL MØRCH

http://nautil.us/issue/47/consciousness/is-matter-conscious

It is ironic, because we usually think of physics as describing the hardware of the universe—the real, concrete stuff. But in fact physical matter (at least the aspect that physics tells us about) is more like software: a logical and mathematical structure. According to the hard problem of matter, this software needs some hardware to implement it. Physicists have brilliantly reverse-engineered the algorithms—or the source code—of the universe, but left out their concrete implementation.

The hard problem of matter is distinct from other problems of interpretation in physics. Current physics presents puzzles, such as: How can matter be both particle-like and wave-like? What is quantum wavefunction collapse? Are continuous fields or discrete individuals more fundamental? But these are all questions of how to properly conceive of the structure of reality. The hard problem of matter would arise even if we had answers to all such questions about structure. No matter what structure we are talking about, from the most bizarre and unusual to the perfectly intuitive, there will be a question of how it is non-structurally implemented.

This view, that consciousness constitutes the intrinsic aspect of physical reality, goes by many different names, but one of the most descriptive is "dual-aspect monism." Monism contrasts with dualism, the view that consciousness and matter are fundamentally different substances or kinds of stuff. Dualism is widely regarded as scientifically implausible,

because science shows no evidence of any non-physical forces that influence the brain.

Monism holds that all of reality is made of the same kind of stuff. It comes in several varieties. The most common monistic view is physicalism (also known as materialism), the view that everything is made of physical stuff, which only has one aspect, the one revealed by physics. This is the predominant view among philosophers and scientists today. According to physicalism, a complete, purely physical description of reality leaves nothing out. But according to the hard problem of consciousness, any purely physical description of a conscious system such as the brain at least appears to leave something out: It could never fully capture what it is like to be that system. That is to say, it captures the objective but not the subjective aspects of consciousness: the brain function, but not our inner mental life.

In order to give both phenomena their proper due, a radical change of thinking is required.

Russell's dual-aspect monism tries to fill in this deficiency. It accepts that the brain is a material system that behaves in accordance with the laws of physics. But it adds another, intrinsic aspect to matter which is hidden from the extrinsic, third-person perspective of physics and which therefore cannot be captured by any purely physical description. But although this intrinsic aspect eludes our physical theories, it does not elude our inner observations. Our own consciousness constitutes the intrinsic aspect of the brain, and this is our clue to the intrinsic aspect of other physical things. To paraphrase Arthur Schopenhauer's succinct response to Kant: We can know the thing-in-itself because we are it.

The most radical version of dual-aspect monism takes the intrinsic aspect of reality to consist of consciousness itself. This is decidedly not the same as subjective idealism, the view that the physical world is merely a structure within human consciousness, and that the external world is in some sense an illusion. According to dual-aspect monism, the external world exists entirely independently of human consciousness. But it would not exist independently of any kind of consciousness, because all physical things are associated with some form of consciousness of their own, as their own intrinsic realizer, or hardware.

s a solution to the hard problem of consciousness, dual-aspect monism faces objections of its own. The most common A objection is that it results in panpsychism, the view that all things are associated with some form of consciousness. To critics, it's just too implausible that fundamental particles are conscious. And indeed this ideatakes some getting used

to. But consider the alternatives. Dualism looks implausible on scientificgrounds. Physicalism takes the objective, scientifically accessible aspect of reality to be the only reality, which arguably implies that the subjective aspect of consciousness is an illusion. Maybe so—but shouldn't we be more confident that we are conscious, in the full subjective sense, than that particles are not?

A second important objection is the so-called combination problem. How and why does the complex, unified consciousness of our brains result from putting together particles with simple consciousness? This question looks suspiciously similar to the original hard problem. I and other defenders of panpsychism have argued that the combination problem is nevertheless not as hard as the original hard problem. In some ways, it is easier to see how to get one form of conscious matter (such as a conscious brain) from another form of conscious matter (such as a set of conscious particles) than how to get conscious matter from non-conscious matter. But many find this unconvincing. Perhaps it is just a matter of time, though. The original hard problem, in one form or another, has been pondered by philosophers for centuries. The combination problem has received much less attention, which gives more hope for a yet undiscovered solution.

The possibility that consciousness is the real concrete stuff of reality, the fundamental hardware that implements the software of our physical theories, is a radical idea. It completely inverts our ordinary picture of reality in a way that can be difficult to fully grasp. But it may solve two of the hardest problems in science and philosophy at once.

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[redacted] I think the hard problem of matter boils down to the question of what does it mean for matter to really exist ("Otherwise, there would be no clear difference between physical and mere mathematical structure, or between the concrete universe and a mere abstraction").

You could imagine any abstraction of material objects and relationships between those objects. You could draw these imaginary objects on a whiteboard. But that abstract reality wouldn't really exist. What is it about the electrons, quarks, photons, etc. of our world that make them real, and different from any abstract objects you might conceptualize? What magical property must electrons, etc. possess in order to really exist?

And to me that question is only answerable by saying that physically real things are those things of which we're conscious. So the hard problems of matter and consciousness are a circular problem. You can't answer one without basing it on the other.

Personally I think this problem is forever beyond our primate brains that evolved to scavenge on the African plains.

Agreed. I too am not able to understand from this article what the hard problem of matter is. All matter is a form of energy interacting with a field. So where does matter consciousness enter this view. If the question is an ultimate reductionist reality like vibrating strings then perhaps one would never go all the way down that rabbit hole since it is infinitely large and we can get more and more reductionist and ask why the Planck length should matter just because some math tells us so. Is the author perhaps exploring the possibility that this ultimate reality which is down that rabbit hole is the consciousness field? At this point, pardon my French but I am feeling a little mind f***ed.

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[redacted]berardi phenomenology Of the end

The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture Paperback – May 22, 1997

by Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal (Editor)

As described in "The Magic of Words: Symbolism, Futurism, Socialist Realism" by Irina Gutkin, the Symbolists looked to the occult for ways to attain immortality, to transcend time and space. They felt themselves, like magicians, to be on a higher plane than others, the Symbolist being

the "possessor of a secret knowledge behind which stands a secret act" [symbols being the communicative units of a new language]

Futurism exalted the machine as an external object, visible in the city landscape, but in the twenty-first century the machine is inside us: we are no longer focused on the external machine; contemporary "info-machine" now intersects with the social nervous system, the "bio-machine" interacts with the genetic becoming of the human organism. Digital and bio-technologies have turned the external machine of iron and steel into the internalized and recombining machine. The bio-info machine is no more separable from the body and the mind, because it is no more an external tool, but an internal transformer of the body and of the mind, a linguistic and cognitive enhancer. The nano-machine is going to mutate the human brain and the linguistic ability to produce and communicate.

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Breaking the Bretton Woods's agreements, the American President declared that the dollar has no referent, and its value is decided by an act of language. This was the starting point of the long lasting process of financialization of the economy, based on the emancipation of the financial dynamic from any conventional standard and from any economic reality. The Neoliberal offensive started in that very moment of arbitrary assertion of the value of the dollar outside the conventional standard. The neoliberal school of the Chicago Boys said "money is creating reality" like the Symbolist poets had said: "words are creating reality" .

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[redacted] In Western countries the effects of

abstraction and digitalization are evident in even the eroticsphere. "Today, affection and sexuality seem to be wavering between loneliness and wild predatory aggressiveness, as we see in rituals of emotional detachment, virtualization, pornography, and sexual anorexia." To be sure, "there is talk about sex in the media, in advertising, on television, and everywhere. But sex no longer includes talking, since it has become disconnected from language."

As we become increasingly alienated from ourselves and from each other, "the network penetrates the social body, inserting connective segments, and converting the body into a swarm." Expanding upon the idea, Berardi cites Eugene Thacker's Networks, Swarms, Multitudes: "In swarms there is no central command, no unit or agent that is able to survey, oversee and control the entire swarm. Yet the actions of the swarm are directed, the movement motivated, and the pattern has a purpose. This is the paradox of swarms."

The answer comes a few pages later: "Neither democracy nor authoritarian power seems able to process the infinite and hyper-accelerated flow of information. Morphogenesis can therefore no longer be a process of conscious decision-making and elaboration, and turns itself into a self-regulating effect of blind emergence. The info-networked super-organism is now evolving outside of the human decision-making and knowledge, this, although its evolution affects the human environment—sometimes in a catastrophic way."

Political and social changes take months, years. "Financial transfers that can jeopardize social life and change the political landscape overnight occur within the time span of nanoseconds." Decisions are increasingly made by algorithms rather than conscious choice.

Nobody is really in charge; nobody is making conscious decisions. In economic operations, logical mathematical implications have replaced deciders, and the algorithm of capital has grown independent of the individual wills of its owners."

Unfortunately, resistance to the changes taking place has tended to come in the form of

"reactive, identitarian bodies... the nation, religious faith, and ethnicity." Think: ISIS in the Middle East; neo-Fascism in the West.

Berardi cannot foresee a happy ending. In fact, he says, there is no End. There are only Ands (another gesture to Deleuze and Guattari). Or rather, there are Ends, and "humans have already experienced an end of the world, or the end of a world. A world ends when signs proceeding from the semiotic meta-machine grow undecipherable for a cultural community that perceived itself as a world." The world of the Aztecs came to an end, and La Malinche became a bridge to a new world.

"Only when one is able to see collapse as the obliteration of memory, identity, and as the end of a world can a new world be imagined. This is the lesson we must learn from Malinche."

In the final pages of the book Berardi admits, "I will never be able to live in peace with the automaton, because I was formatted in the old world... My body survives because I cannot find the way out. The human race is becoming an army of sleepwalkers: people suffering from Alzheimer's disease, taking pills, standing and facing reality, smiling, saying yes, yes, yes..."

Of course, a map is meant to help you orient yourself, not lift your spirits. It is also true that reading maps can be a pleasurable experience, which is generally the case with And: Phenomenology of the End. There are times when readers familiar with Berardi's other books will find his latest repetitive, though here his ideas are further developed in the context of Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis and chaosmosis than elsewhere. As for those who are new to Berardi, this book is sure to mark the beginning, not the end, of a propitious relationship.

Swarm/connectivity - berardi epistemology of the end

Studies in network science, swarm intelligence, and biocomplexity all define self-organization as the emergence of aglobal pattern from localized interac-tions. This paradoxical definition makes swarms interesting—politically, technologically, and biologically, for it imputes an intentionality-without-intention, an act-without-actor, and a heterogeneous whole. In swarms there is no central command, no unit or agent which is able to survey, oversee and control the entire swarm. Y et the actions of the swarm are directed, the move-ment motivated, and the pattern has a purpose. This is the paradox of swarms.

On the contrary within connective systems there is no knowledge, but merely syntactic recognition. Connection entails an effect of machine func-tionality, not of meaningful fusion. In connection communication is inter-facing and inter-operability. Only segments previously made linguistically compatible can interact. Network penetrates the social body inserting con-nective segments and converting the body into Swarm.

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[redacted] In the Symposium (a Socratic dialogue written by Plato), Diotima describes how mortals strive for immortality in relation to poiesis. In all begetting and bringing forth upon the beautiful there is a kind of making/creating or poiesis. In this genesis there is a movement beyond the temporal cycle of birth and decay. "Such a movement can occur in three kinds of poiesis: (1) Natural poiesis through sexual procreation, (2) poiesis in the city through the attainment of heroic fame, and, finally, (3) poiesis in the soul through the cultivation of virtue and knowledge."[12]

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[redacted]COGNITION METANOIA IS AN ANAGRAM OF ANATOMIE

Conversion

Ethical turn. It names a switchover from logos to ethos as it occurs in metanoia. In our view, language plays a decisive role in every conversion, independently of whether it takes the form of religious prophecy, revolutionary rhetoric, or works of philosophy or literature. Whether I

decide to become a Rabbi, join a social movement after reading Marx, or become a Deleuzian or Tolstoyan—in all these cases, I have come across a meaning, and I have given this meaning the form of a change in my view of the world that resulted in a practical, that is to say, ethical conversion. "You must change your life" is not just the last line of a Rilke poem. It is an implication of all poetic writing. Conversion responds to this imperative and constitutes the experience of metanoia—of thinking with another consciousness. An ethical turn comes with an Othering of the self, i.e. it implies a break with the old world and the old self.

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[redacted] Pomona College, 10.10.2013

Russian Utopias, Transhumanism and the Magus of Silicon Valley

The expectations that the end of the Cold War would lead to the "end of history", a unified world of peaceful nations in liberal capitalism, which Francis Fukuyama expressed in the early 1990s, have not been realized. Nevertheless, we witness a massive return of utopian thinking mainly in the fields of computer- and biotechnology as well as astroscience. New utopias have emerged in the West, which are connected with the New Digital Age (Eric Schmidt/Jared Cohen 2012 (picture). The concept of utopia itself has been reconsidered as more dynamic and open versus the traditionally static u-topos (no-place). What has remained, though, is the semantic ambivalence (at least in the English language), since u-topia can be traced both to no-place and to eu-topia: state of bliss. Probably the most radical of them is Transhumanism which has gained international ground since the 1990s. It promises to save humanity from its biological constraints, including the final abolition of diseases and even death itself (see TIME two weeks ago: Does Google save us from Death?) Although transhumanism appears as a distinctly Western 21st-century movement centered in the booming US tech-industry, some of its features show striking similarities with the ideas and scientific experiments in Russia in the early 20th century. As far as I can see, nobody has given this attention so far.

Konstantin Tsiolkovskii ——> Ray Kurzweil's

Tsiolkovsky wrote a book called The Will of the Universe. The Unknown Intelligence in 1928 in which he propounded a philosophy of panpsychism. He believed humans would eventually colonize the Milky Way galaxy. His thought preceded the Space Age by several decades, and some of what he foresaw in his imagination has come into being since his death. Tsiolkovsky also did not believe in traditional religious cosmology, but instead (and to the chagrin of the Soviet authorities) he believed in a cosmic being that governed humans as "marionettes, mechanical puppets, machines, movie characters",[19] thereby adhering to a mechanical view of the universe, which he believed would be controlled in the millennia to come through the power of human science and industry.

On the 22nd of January, 1922 an article was published in the official Moscow Newspaper Izvestiia, rather a declaration which demanded (!) "to grant immediately the full rights to an unlimited life to everybody, including the Dead, who had helped to build the Realm of Freedom without enjoying it themselves." It was signed by the "creatorium of biocosmists-immortalists."

This Singularity will transform not only all of humankind, but as a cosmic event, it will ultimately transform the whole universe. At the "unrestricted heights of creative power", "we have the opposable appendage to manipulate the universe to our will." "Our civilization infuses the rest of the universe with its creativity and intelligence" and acquires a "superluminal ability," "the ultimate destiny of the Singularity and of the universe." The date for the Singularity to appear is marked as 2045.

How does this come about?

Kurzweil and the Transhumanists share a "macrohistorical" vision by which all of human and natural history, even the history of the universe itself, can be understood in terms of one single mathematical concept: the exponential function. In computer technology, this exponential function was first formulated in 1965 by the co-founder of Intel, Gordon Moore, the famous "Moore's Law". It originally predicted that the number of transistors on integrated circuits increased exponentially, doubling every eighteen months. However, this trend was expected to come to an end with a physical boundary met – which Moore thought would happen already by the mid-1970s. Kurzweil has radicalized this exponential view and calls it the "Law of Accelerating Returns":

One of the most fervent singularitarians, as the most dedicated transhumanists are called, the young Russian multi-millionaire Dmitri Itskov (*1980) has decided to invest his money into the project Russia 2045, a joint-initiative with Kurzweil for physical immortality through Avatars. With two international conferences, 2012 in Moscow and in June 2013, bringing together more than 1500 (?) scientists advancing in Genetics, Nanotechnology and Robotry/Artificial Intelligence, as well as a massive online-appearance, the project to transform humanity was laid out in four stages: the first prototypes will be remote-controlled via brain-computer interface, later brain transplantation and even consciousness upload will be available. By the time the singularity, the intelligence-explosion hits, the avatars will have become "holographic" – a code word for bodies made up of polymorphing nanobots. Itskov deliberately tries to synthesize transhumanist ideology with spirituality. Some of the gurus of the New Age movement from the 1960s, such as Amit Goswami (The Self-Aware Universe), the scholar and Tibetan Buddhist spokesperson Robert Thurman, as well as two of the leading theoreticians of "quantum consciousness", Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff, were among the 35 keynote-speakers, some of the "the smartest scientists of the world", at the 2045 congress. Last year, Itskov also

travelled to Dharamshala/India to visit the Dhalai Lama and, judging from the online-picture, got his support for his project. (picture.)

The Norwegian historian of religious studies Egil Asprem has argued, that Kurzweil's transhumanism contains a dimension of transgressive and millenarian spirituality which can be seen as an emerging form of contemporary esotericism, such as the "alchemical" ideal, the transmutation of the body, the soul, and the world itself, and the attainment of immortality as a stage towards spiritual perfection. This can be confirmed by the fact that transhumanist milieus are currently merging with and mobilizing parts of what used to be the "New Age movement" and with its adoptions of "Eastern" religious systems, namely Buddhism in America. Indeed, what is interesting in our context of a Russian-American comparison of utopias, both transhumanism, its technovisions and the biocosmism and panpsychism of Tsiolkovskii share some religious aspirations.

(pictures Roberto Prada's painting of "The Evening Steve Jobs met Andy Warhol", a parodic image of the connection of computer technology, art and the converging media.

In one of the dialogue-sections of Ray Kurzweil's book The Singularity is Near he discusses the question of a new, essentially leaderless religion that can come to grasp with the concept of the singularity. His friend Bill Gates asks him: "So is there a God in this religion?" And Kurzweil answers:

Not yet, but there will be. Once we saturate the matter and energy in the universe with intelligence, it will "wake up", be conscious, and sublimely intelligent. That's about as close to God as I can imagine.

There is no Creator god, existing independently of the world; instead, some divine intelligence is created by and inside of the universe, in a sort of emergent pantheism. In both Kurzweil's transhumanism and Tsiolkovskii's visions the divine emerges from matter, it becomes some kind of a reverse story of monotheistic creation.

Gender and reproduction disappear in both Russian and transhumanist utopias alike, Russians have – always – been much more obsessed with the abolition of the body, sexuality and death, the ultimate biological limitation. //

The sex ist not only the source of life, but also of death. Through sex you are born and through sex you die. By the sex man is tied to the futile order of nature, ruled by an infinite change of death and birth. Only mortals conceive, only conceived ones die.," (picture)

wrote the philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev. One of the main targets of early Soviet visions was the controll, ("revolutionary") sublimation and transformation of "sexual energy" into a world-transformative, "socio-creative" power and class-struggle. //

To this I can agree only in part: since the 1920s, quantum physics, the deciphering of the molecular structure of the human DNS (1953/2010) have, indeed, triggered a new level of matching/merging the human brain/man and machine, and led to unprecedented progress in neuroscience/Artificial Intelligence/, cybernetics and computertechnology. Quantum physics has both reconnected science and religion/spirituality and caused claims of rigorous separation. This makes the early Soviet visions and experiments look rather simple.

Russian and contemporary transhumanist visions differ further in that Tsiolkovskii's and other early Soviet Russian scientific utopias at the beginning of modernity show a concern with collective visions to overcome individualism. The Russian utopias were all socialist utopias. Kurzweil's transhumanism, on the other hand, is a project at the end of modernity (the "post-humanist era") which epitomizes the "neurotic self-involvement of the individual subject". It emerges from an almost autistic hyper-individualism which ideally does not meet any challenge in/with? reality. In Kurzweil's Singularity, there is no difference between the inner and outer world, individual and society, society is of no interest, other than inevitable co-existence.

Let me conclude:

Despite these differences, it is important to emphasize the structural similarities between the

early Soviet and contemporary transhumanist utopias: a mechanistic, reductionist approach to both human and non-human nature, together with a total dismissal of the human mind. There are basically two different paths to imagine and/or construct futures since the beginning of 20th century, both in East and West:

1. The materialistic, technological path submitting to the authority of neuroscience, which aims at predictability and bio-political control. It remains within the dominating paradigm of traditional mechanical physics; and

2. the path which accepts mind and consciousness, the personal human perception and experience as a reality, an independent psycho-physical dimensions, which go far beyond the rational and often challenge the traditional scientific paradigm as "seriously strange", as the historian of religion Jeff Kripal has put it.

Many science-fiction novels have been written around the visions described above, and some of the most influential literary antiutopias of the 20th century, Evgenii Zamiatin's novel We (My; 1929) and George Orwell's 1984 (1945), were motivated by precisely the deep concerns about the bio-political perspectives of such totalitarian utopias and are still topical today.

Ray Kurzweil should not be dismissed as a mad scientist or his writings as science fiction taken too seriously. Not only is he not alone with his visions, but he is also involved in one of today's most powerful global companies: in December 2012 he was made director of engineering at Google.

Sir Arthur Eddington

"Religion became possible after the discovery of quantum mechanics."

Sir Arthur Eddington

There is a doctrine well known to philosophers that the moon ceases to exist when no one is looking at it. I will not discuss the doctrine since I have not the least idea what is the meaning of the word existence when used in this connection. At any rate the science of astronomy has not

been based on this spasmodic kind of moon. In the scientific world (which has to fulfill functions less vague than merely existing) there is a moon which appeared on the scene before the astronomer; it reflects sunlight when no one sees it; it has mass when no one is measuring the mass; it is distant 240,000 miles from the earth when no one is surveying the distance; and it will eclipse the sun in 1999 even if the human race has succeeded in killing itself off before that date.

— Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, 226

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Te Occult Underground of Late Soviet Russia

Birgit Menzel University of Mainz/Germersheim

Soviet civilization defined itself as a purely rational society, yet its cult of the rational was taken to such an extreme that one could talk in terms of a "rationalistic religion".

One can discern a con-siderable impact of esoteric ideas and ideologies not only in the humanities, but also in the sciences. "Russian cosmism," a hybrid ideological concept of human self-perfection and salvation, which can be seen as a paradoxical reading of the occult, established itself within and outside of organizations in science as well as the humanities. Medicine, Physics and Parapsychology cooperated and reopened fields of research.

Science fiction literature, the only literary genre—outside of children's literature—not forced to obey the dogma of realism, inspired phan-tasies. Fiction merged with science in popular science magazines, as a wave of UFOlogy spread all over the country in the 1960s and 1970s

Scientific Occulture

It may be amazing that access to occult-esoteric ideas was possible both within official institutions and outside, in the unofficial underground culture. First of all, according to Marxist-Leninist ideology the humanities were defined as part of the sciences and their boundaries were much less strictly defined than in the West. Secondly, under the conditions of the Cold War, due to the interests of the Intelligence Services of both Russia and the US, research into paranormal, so-called "psycho-bio-physical" phenomena in biophysics and astrophysics that, according to the dominant Western paradigm, had been considered a parascience or pseudo-science, was nevertheless secretly promoted and supported in both countries.

Science itself became part of the occult.

East-West Connections

Te Peruvian-American anthropologist Carlos Castaneda's book Teachings of Don Juan (1968), which had an enormous impact on the psychedelic New Age, was discovered by the esoteric biologist Vasilii Maksimov on a trip to Eastern Siberia in 1969 and immediately translated into Russian, as well as all the following volumes.41

Michael Murphy (b. 1930), founder of the leading Western New Age Institution, the Esalen Institute in Big Sur/ Califor-nia, opened up a high-level connection by visiting Russia several times, together

And when the overwhelming wave of religious and esoteric sects from the West declined in the second half of the 1990s, and the Russian Orthodox Church re-established its influence by creating a special Sect-Research (sektovedenie) section,45 most of the occult underground ceased to exist. More than a few former leading 'masters' chose Orthodox Christianity as their belief, some dedicated themselves to this in a radical way by becoming monks and disappearing into monastic life; others chose emigration or established a transnational life for themselves between East and West.

Conclusion

We can conclude that there was a wide range of heterodox reactions to the prescribed "religion of rationality" and "scientific atheism" in late Soviet Russia. The various circles presented here existed both within official institutions and outside in the cultural underground, they pursued both quests for esoteric knowledge and occult practices, explored aspects of artistic creativity, sensuality and healing. Many of the ideas and experimental practices described here seem familiar to Westerner eyes and can be considered variants of the Western New Age. According to Colin Campbell, the Russian occult underground can be described as a "cultic milieu". While individual circles or cults are largely transitory and with high levels of membership turnover, the cultic milieu is, by contrast, a constant fea-ture of society. Campbell defines the cultic milieu as the "cultural underground of society", which includes "all deviant belief systems and their associated practices. Unorthodox sciences, alien and heretical religion, and deviant medicine, all comprise elements of such an underground".46

Although Campbell focused only on the Western New Age, the general func-tions which he determines for the cultic milieu, I argue, can be equally applied to Late Soviet Russia:

– The cultic milieu serves as a major agency of cultural "diffusion"; – it is a major agency for cultural innovation; – it functions as a cultural 'gene pool", enhancing society's potential for cultural adaptation by transmitting and creating numerous cultural 'mutations'; – it functions, too, as a 'negative reference group' for spokesmen of cultural orthodoxy, facilitating adherence to dominant scientific paradigms by prac-ticing scientists and associated practitioners; – the Cultic

Milieu flourishes in relation to the amount of 'alien' cultural con-tact and the disintegration of dominant indigenous culture: – the Cultic movements represent a general response to 'psychic deprivation.'

Tere is, however, one major difference: Soviet Russia was a closed society. Polit-ical repression, state control, ideological censorship, and, last but not least, the deeply rooted moral puritanism of official Soviet ideology, as well as the tradi-tional opposing orthodox religion certainly had a strong impact on the "New Age of Russia". Tis made it very difficult for groups to connect, build networks, and almost impossible to experiment with alternative life-styles. How deeply and in which way these conditions influenced the occult revival in Russia remains to be discussed and a final evaluation will be possible only with future research. But I argue that some typical features reflect the impact of the authoritarian soci-etywithitspoliticalandculturalrepressions:theatomized,yetself-enclosedand self-referential structure of these groups, the impact of conspiracy, the exalted (personality) cult of certain charismatic individuals, and a specific syncretism of WesternandEasterninfluences,whicheverwereaccessible,whichexistedbehind the Iron Curtain.p

Some significant differences, I argue, finally, can be identified as specific fea-tures of Russia's New Age:

1. InRussia,esotericknowledgewasmainlytransmittedbytheintellectualelite. Highly qualified specialists provided direct access by translating a body of original classical esoteric texts; while in the West, the New Age was predom-inantly transmitted within/ by popular culture. 2. Russianintellectuals,duetothegeopoliticalconditionoftheRussian/Soviet Empire, had the possibility of more direct connections with mystical teach-ings and traditions of the indigenous people of the East than in Western countries, by numerous personal contacts with spiritual teachers in Burya-tia, Tibet, the Caucasus and Central Asia. 3. Tere were many research activities dealing with occult or paranormal phe-nomena within the official state-supported system of Soviet science that would be considered parascience in Western countries. 4. Te most striking difference, however, is that eros and sexuality, which had

becomecentralissuesoftheWesternNewAgeinthe1960sand1970s,played only a very marginal role in the almost exclusively male-dominated Russian occulture. In spite of a few practical explorations in the realm of sexuality, the occult underground in Russia has been much more cerebral and much less corporeal than in the West. Tere has been a greater emphasis on esoteric knowledge than on occult practice, more emphasis on mind and spirit than on the body. Te physical aspects included for many massive consump-tions of alcohol, which works in fact against any long-term psychological and spiritual transformation of consciousness. Despite ofen excessive self-experimentation, there was a remarkable leaning towards asceticism, at least in the explicit statements of the male leaders. Te ultimate goal was ridding oneselfofthebody,ratherthanunifyingbody,mindandsoul.Inthisonecan-not help but find common traces with the general Soviet moral puritanism, which was deeply rooted in the religious traditions of Russian Orthodoxy, but also has elements in common with Russian Teosophy, even though that was dominated by women, and with various teachings of Eastern mysti-cism

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Also http://www.thinkfilm.de/panel/film-theory-winfried-pauleit

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Baruch Gottlieb

To Save Philosophy in a Universe of Technical Images

"Linguistic communication, both in the spoken and written world, are no longer capable of transmitting the thoughts and

concepts which we have concerning the world. It has been clear for several centuries now that, if we want to understand the

world, it is not sufficient to describe it by words. It is necessary to calculate the world. So that science has had ever more

recurrence to numbers, which are images of thoughts. For instance, "2" is the ideogram for the concept "pair" or "couple".

Now, this ideographic code, which is the code of numbers, has been developed, in a very refined way, lately, by computers.

Numbers are being transcoded into digital codes and digital codes are, themselves, being transcoded into synthetic images. So

it is my firm belief, that if you want to have a clear and distinct communication of your concepts, you have to use synthetic

images, no longer words. And this is a veritable revolution in thinking" (Flusser 2010: 36)1

Photography is writing at the speed of light, and in this extreme acceleration resides its enormous transformational importance.

Writing at the speed of light appears to compress linear thought into momentary images.

Today's technical images still maintain their

magical power over us, but, unlike the prehistorical, preliterate images of the apocryphal magicians and

priests, today's images are post-historical. Technical images are not mere representations, icons, stand-ins

for the outside world, they are "images of texts", products of the humanist tradition of rational, historical

thinking which emerged with the invention of linear writing, and thereby subject to criticism through

rational argument.

Whereas technical images appear

to communicate all-at-once, like the magic icons of ancient times, they are in fact produced through

procedural, automated processes, in the black box of the apparatus.3 These technical images in-form us

in a media barrage which seems inexhaustible and inaccessible, but Flusser offers us a way in through

understanding the new images as projections of causal processes.

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Flusser provocatively implores us, the citizens of a world transfused with invisible, light-speed,

electronic information exchange, to communicate using synthetic (or technical) images and "no longer

words." Yet, in his analysis of such technical images, he always maintains that these are fundamentally

images of texts, and that the textual sub-structure is key to understanding their power and to generating

alternative worlds. How are we to resolve these positions?

It is my firm belief, that if you want to have a clear and distinct communication of your concepts, you have to use

synthetic images, no longer words. And this is a veritable revolution in thinking. And I am very much interested in this,

Louis Bec

Louis Bec's studiously obsessive taxonomogenic fantasy creatures performed Flusser's instruction to

project from abstraction into concretion. In Bec's case, the rational abstractions of techno-scientific code

were represented by biological taxonomies, and the concretion occurred in Bec's exquisitely detailed

drawings. These are synthetic images of scientific texts conceived from the inside out, from the necessary

functioning of individual organs to the external, observable form of the imagined creature.

Flusser's project is to save philosophy in society constantly transformed through infinitesimally

complex automated processes. Automation has truly "taken control". The mortal challenge for post-

historical human sovereignty is how to avoid becoming automatons, functionaries of the automated

apparatus.

The "environments"10 produced through the introduction of new technologies involve us in a world

that is increasingly "in-formed" by data processing operations. In-formation, for Flusser, is the process

of mutual trans-formation through communication. When we exchange in dialogues, we in-form the

other, at best, generating unlikely outcomes which are not pre-programmed in the black-box apparatus

of the world we are thrown into.

Despite the revolutionary potential of post-historical consciousness Flusser describes, our freedom

to act depends on our cultivating synthetic dialogical/discursive practices, which confront entropic

technical conditioning, integrating literacy, causality, rationality, and meta-level technical complexity. This

project appears ironically to point us back to the dawn of literacy with the pedagogical Socratic dialogical

model transcribed by Plato. Whereas Plato's writing articulates the transition between pre-literate and literate philosophical traditions, Flusser's technical images appear to be his suggestion for a way to elaborate the transition between literate and post-literate philosophical traditions.

For a world in-formed by the new technologies we need dialogical forms, practices which can help

us grasp and engage with the causality encoded deep within our apparatuses, to help us in-form these

apparatuses so that they do not grind us down to undifferentiated data. We need a transversal philosophy,

which executes the critical power of rational thinking in a way appropriate for the technical age. We need

philosophy of

photography. [redacted]

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Algorecene - Chthulucene

souls

Developing more complex...

Patterns of interconnectedness

Language

How a PhD in biology systematically demolishes Darwinism and its most dangerous pseudo science disciplines: economics ...

Del capital a la ciencia: La otra historia del darwinismo.

«Los organismos vivientes han existido sobre la Tierra, sin nunca saber por qué, durante más de tres mil millones de años, antes de que la verdad, al fin, fuese comprendida por uno de ellos. Por un hombre llamado Charles Darwin".

Esta triunfalista afirmación, procedente de la presentación del «El gen egoísta» (1971) de Richard Dawkins (otro de los best-sellers darwinistas), no es sino una reducción al absurdo del discurso general asimilado por la ortodoxia evolucionista, la comunidad científica y la cultura popular.

Sin embargo, para entender el impacto completo del libro es necesario contemplar, primero, su contenido y estructura, y, segundo, la trascendencia del mismo dentro del contexto histórico y social.

«El origen» se estructura en torno a cinco argumentos que aparecen de forma recurrente y no siempre conexa: 1) la realidad del fenómeno evolutivo, 2) la ascendencia común última, 3) el gradualismo filético, 4) la conservación y diversificación de las razas y 5) la selección natural como «principio rector» (se ha evitado conscientemente el uso de atributos como «mecanismo» o «proceso»). Este último, el concepto de selección natural, puede considerarse como el elemento más distinguido de la aportación de Darwin, y el que facilitó en mayor medida la efervescencia de un debate académico y controversia social.

Las elección natural, este «principio rector» de la evolución, es descrito por Darwin (1859) en el siguiente extracto (el subrayado es mío):

«como de cada especie nacen muchos más individuos de los que pueden sobrevivir y como, en consecuencia a la lucha por la vida, que se repite frecuentemente, se sigue que todo ser, si varía, por débilmente que sea, de algún modo provechoso para él bajo las complejas y a veces variables condiciones de la vida tendrá mayor posibilidad de sobrevivir y de ser naturalmente seleccionado. Según el poderoso principio de la herencia, toda variedad seleccionada tenderá a propagar su nueva y modificada forma».

En esencia, la visión darwiniana de la evolución se estructura en torno a tres conceptos nucleares. Estos pilares pueden reconocerse en sus distintas etapas y trasmutaciones (darwinismo – neodarwinismo – síntesis moderna), y los identifico como el núcleo de lo que podemos llamar «paradigma darwinista»:

1. Individualismo: existe variabilidad dentro de las poblaciones y ésta se manifiesta de forma conspicua, continua y no direccionada. Gould (2004) llamaría a esta variación «isotrópica».

2. Competencia: la limitación de recursos conlleva la no supervivencia de todos los individuos. Admitiendo que la variación individual proporciona «ventajas competitivas» en el acceso a los recursos limitantes a unos individuos frente al resto, se sucede una razón de supervivencia (y reproducción) diferencial.

3. Causalidad: Los principios anteriores se encajan dentro de una concepción mecanicista de la naturaleza, que obedece a cadenas causales y la reciprocidad entre acciones. Es decir, la variación favorable en un medio es garantía de supervivencia y reproducción, al tiempo que la supervivencia y reproducción son garantías de la conservación (herencia) de dichas variaciones.

De esta forma, se ignoran las causas últimas de la variación (epigénesis) y se suprime al organismo como sujeto activo de la evolución, constituyéndose como un sistema informacionalmente cerrado frente al medio. Este último es un elemento selector, nunca instructor, sin capacidad de alterar la información hereditaria ni direccionar la variación. La adaptación es posible por medio del acoplamiento de las poblaciones (no de los individuos). Y la evolución, como recorrido histórico completo de la vida, no es más que la suma de los procesos adaptativos de las poblaciones desde sus orígenes.

Ciertamente, la ascendencia sociológica del darwinismo es un tema de discusión desde casi los principios del mismo. En una revisión moderna, el siempre agudo Stephen Jay Gould (2004) escribía:

«Si Darwin se sirvió de Malthus para captar el papel central de la continua y dura lucha por la existencia, luego necesitó de la escuela afín de los economistas escoceses (los teóricos del laissez-faire, capitaneados por Adam Smith y su Investigación sobre la naturaleza y causas de la riqueza de las naciones, cuya primera edición se publicó en el auspicioso y revolucionario año de 1776) para formular el principio aún más fundamental de la selección natural misma. Diría que la selección natural es, en esencia, la economía de Adam Smith transferida a la naturaleza».

Bastante menos explícita es la evidencia de precursores en la transposición previa de estas ideas al marco evolutivo. El contacto de esta línea de pensamiento hobbesiano con la cuestión abierta sobre el origen de las especies resultó en la conformación (¿en paralelo?) de las asunciones más generales del evolucionismo (malthusiano) por selección natural: Patrick Matthew, Edward Blyth

y Alfred R. Wallace y, posteriormente, el propio Darwin, construyeron un modelo de naturaleza que reflejaba su propia concepción de la sociedad.

——>De la ciencia al capital: Darwinismo y sociopolítica del siglo XX.

El darwinismo, con la supervivencia del más apto por bandera, supone la elevación del orden social a un orden natural y, para muchos, en una «ley de la naturaleza». En síntesis, el darwinismo se basa en las superioridad biológica de unos individuos sobre otros en un entorno de competencia contextual.

Ni que decir tiene lo sugerente que resultó esta interpretación natural como explicación complaciente y justificativa (perfectamente adaptada) para los órdenes de poder emergentes de la época. El darwinismo has ido (es) un elemento de refuerzo para distintas formas de poder basadas en el reconocimiento de la competencia y la lucha como motor de progreso, las superioridades biológicas y/o la dominación histórica y geográfica. Capitalismo, marxismo, imperialismo y los distintos «biotipismos» (por usar un término que aglutine todas las formas de discriminación en base a los tipos biológicos) han sido influenciados y justificados en mayor o menor medida por términos darwinianos.

Constituido como base natural de la racionalidad liberal, el darwinismo fue no solo asimilado sino promocionado activamente por el X-Club y los círculos liberales como parte integral de un proceso de transformación social, real y premeditado. T.H. Huxley, por ejemplo, no sólo era un defensor a ultranza del darwinismo en el ámbito académico, sino que organizaba charlas en las fábricas con el fin de instruir a los trabajadores en las maravillas del sistema liberal y el darwinismo.

Faith-reason example

De hecho, hasta la actualidad, el binomio darwinismo-capitalismo, construido con una razón circular, ha sido reconocido como parte del discurso justificativo de las élites económicas. Como botón de muestra, John R. Rockefeller afirmaba: «el crecimiento de un gran negocio consiste, simplemente, en la supervivencia del más apto [...] es, sencillamente, el desarrollo de una ley de la Naturaleza». Este discurso ha calado en la racionalidad moderna.

Reconociendo al darwinismo como un aliado del capitalismo, y atendiendo tanto a las relaciones tautológicas entre ambos, Marx encontraría en este un intento incompleto (e infructuoso) de explicar el orden de la naturaleza y trasponerlo a la sociedad. Escribiría (1875):

«La diferencia esencial entre la sociedad humana y la sociedad animal es que los animales, en el mejor de los casos, recogen, mientras que los hombre producen. Esta diferencia, única pero capital, basta para impedir la pura y simple transposición de las leyes naturales a las humanas [...] el simple hecho de considerar la historia anterior como una serie de luchas de clases revela toda la inconsistencia de la concepción de esta misma historia como una ligera «variación de la lucha por la vida». Y, por mi parte, no pienso conceder ese placer a estos pseudo-naturalistas».

El propio Darwin era contrario a las luchas por los derechos de los trabajadores y se preocupaba profundamente por los efectos «darwinianos» que estos podían acarrear. En una carta a Fick (1872), escribía:

«Me gustaría [...] tener la ocasión de discutir con usted [...] la idea en la que insisten todos nuestros sindicatos, de que todos los trabajadores, los buenos y los malos, los fuertes y los débiles, deben trabajar el mismo número de horas y recibir las mismas pagas. Los sindicatos se oponen también al trabajo a destajo (en suma, a toda competición). Me temo que las sociedades cooperativas, que muchos ven como la principal esperanza para el futuro, igualmente excluyen la competición. Esto me parece un gran peligro para el futuro progreso de

la humanidad. No obstante, bajo cualquier sistema, los trabajadores moderados y frugales tendrán una ventaja y dejarán más descendientes que los borrachos y atolondrados."

[redacted]

[redacted]Google, democracy and the truth about internet search

Tech-savvy rightwingers have been able to 'game' the algorithms of internet giants and create a new reality where Hitler is a good guy, Jews are evil and... Donald Trump becomes president

Rebecca MacKinnon says that most of us consider the internet to be like "the air that we breathe and the water that we drink". It surrounds us. We use it. And we don't question it. "But this is not a natural landscape. Programmers and executives and editors and designers, they make this landscape. They are human beings and they all make choices."

But we don't know what choices they are making. Neither Google or Facebook make their algorithms public. Why did my Google search return nine out of 10 search results that claim Jews are evil? We don't know and we have no way of knowing. Their systems are what Frank Pasquale describes as "black boxes". He calls Google and Facebook "a terrifying duopoly of power" and has been leading a growing movement of academics who are calling for "algorithmic accountability". "We need to have regular audits of these systems," he says. "We need people in these companies to be accountable. In the US, under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, every company has to have a spokesman you can reach. And this is what needs to happen. They need to respond to complaints about hate speech, about bias."

Is bias built into the system? Does it affect the kind of results that I was seeing? "There's all sorts of bias about what counts as a legitimate source of information and how that's weighted. There's enormous commercial bias. And when you look at the personnel, they are young, white and perhaps Asian, but not black or Hispanic and they are overwhelmingly men. The worldview of young wealthy white men informs all these judgments."

Later, I speak to Robert Epstein, a research psychologist at the American Institute for Behavioural Research and Technology, and the author of the study that Martin Moore told me about (and that Google has publicly criticised), showing how search-rank results affect voting patterns. On the other end of the phone, he repeats one of the searches I did. He types "do blacks ..." into Google.

"Look at that. I haven't even hit a button and it's automatically populated the page with answers to the query: 'Do blacks commit more crimes?' And look, I could have been going to ask all sorts of questions. 'Do blacks excel at sports', or anything. And it's only given me two choices and these aren't simply search-based or the most searched terms right now. Google used to use that but now they use an algorithm that looks at other things. Now, let me look at Bing and Yahoo. I'm on Yahoo and I have 10 suggestions, not one of which is 'Do black people commit more crime?'

But the enormity and complexity of having two global companies of a kind we have never seen before influencing so many areas of our lives is such, says Naughton, that "we don't even have the mental apparatus to even know what the problems are".

And this is especially true of the future. Google and Facebook are at the forefront of AI. They are going to own the future. And the rest of us can barely start to frame the sorts of questions we ought to be asking. "Politicians don't think long term. And corporations don't think long term because they're focused on the next quarterly results and that's what makes Google and Facebook interesting and different. They are absolutely thinking long term. They have the resources, the money, and the ambition to do whatever they want.

"The internet is among the few things that humans have built that they don't understand." It is "the largest experiment involving anarchy in history. Hundreds of millions of people are, each minute, creating and consuming an untold amount of digital content in an online world that is not truly bound by terrestrial laws." The internet as a lawless anarchic state? A massive human experiment with no checks and balances and untold potential consequences? What kind of digital doom-mongerer would say such a thing? Step forward, Eric Schmidt – Google's chairman. They are the first lines of the book, The New Digital Age, that he wrote with Jared Cohen.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]https://www.viewpointmag.com/2017/03/28/the-darkness-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel-artificial-intelligence-and-neoreaction/

This tendency is brought into stark relief in Google's Deep Dream program, in which a neural network scans an image for recognizable patterns, attempting to identify its contents the way a human would. The program produces evidence of its thought process by superimposing other corresponding images onto the original. Google's image recognition system, trained by its programmers to recognize human faces and differentiate between kinds of pets, sees eyes and dogs everywhere. The desires, conscious and unconscious, of the machine's creators are inevitably implicated in its ostensibly autonomous development.

If the builders of technology are transmitting their values into machinery, this makes the culture of Silicon Valley a matter of more widespread consequence. The Californian Ideology, famously identified by Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron in 1995, represented a synthesis of apparent opposites: on one hand, the New Left utopianism that was handily recuperated into the Third Way liberal centrism of the 1990s, and on the other, the Ayn Randian individualism that led more or less directly to the financial crisis of the 2000s.

But in the decades since, as the consumer-oriented liberalism of Bill Gates and Steve Jobs gave way to the technological authoritarianism of Elon Musk and Peter Thiel, this strange foundation paved the way for even stranger tendencies. The strangest of these is known as "neoreaction," or, in a distorted echo of Eliezer Yudkowsky's vision, the "Dark Enlightenment." It emerged from the same chaotic process that yielded the anarchic political collective Anonymous, a product of the hivemind generated by the cybernetic assemblages of social media. More than a school of thought, it resembles a meme. The genealogy of this new intellectual current is refracted in the mirror of the most dangerous meme ever created: Roko's Basilisk.

Unfortunately, Roko discovered a drawback to superintelligent resurrection. His post speculated that once the AI comes into being, it might develop a survival instinct that it will apply retroactively. It will want to hasten its own birth by requisitioning human history to work towards its creation. In order to do this, it will institute an incentive that dictates how you will be treated after you come back to life. Those of us who know about this incentive program — and I'm sorry to say that this now includes you — will be required to dedicate our lives to building the superintelligent computr

There isn't a word for this cause-and-effect relationship in ordinary English, but, in the mid-nineties, the philosopher Nick Land coined one: hyperstition, that which is "equipoised between fiction and technology." This neologism describes something more than a superstition, something beyond belief — a description with divine power. In the beginning was the Word.

As triumphant as Google was over its new translation system, another recent machine learning experiment — Microsoft's Tay — showed just how volatile that rela- tionship can be. Intended as the most innocuous AI possible, Tay, an acronym for "thinking about you," was a simulation of a social media user modeled after a teenage girl. Tay was released to Twitter on March 23rd 2016, and started the day making small talk, repeating memes, and learning the lyrics to "Never Gonna Give You Up." By afternoon, with the help of some prodding from 4channers, Tay had become a Holocaust denier and 9/11 truther. Microsoft shut it down after 16 hours.

A report from Artificial Intelligence Now, a symposium on the potential effects of machine intelligence to society, offers an explanation of this phenomenon, and its broader implications. Machine learning is subject to data bias: "AI systems depend on the data they are given, and may reflect back the characteristics of such data, including any biases, in the models of the world they create." Machine learning is a case of Land's hyperstition, slipping between belief and technology. The values of the pro- grammer shape the sometimes tangible outputs of the resulting machine.

The risk is that AI systems could "exacerbate the discriminatory dynamics that create social inequality, and would likely do so in ways that would be less obvious than human prejudice and implicit bias." As principal researcher Kate Crawford puts it, artificial intelligence has a "white guy problem." There are disturbing examples, like a study by ProPublica that found that a machine algorithm designed to measure rates of recidivism was almost twice as likely to falsely categorize black defendants as future criminals. And the software used for data mining by U.S. intelligence agencies, pro- duced by Peter Thiel's Palantir, hardly seems optimized to protect civil liberties in the age of the Muslim Ban.

Moreover, cybersecurity researcher Heather Roff has pointed to the frequent gendering of humanoid robots: military technology, like the Navy's grenade launcher SAFFiR, is built to resemble a male body, and service technology, like the iPhone's Siri, is pre- sented as female. Traditional gender roles that equate masculinity with power and fem- ininity with subservience

are reproduced by design. This is no surprise, considering that the ratio of women in the computing industry is at 26 percent, a drop from 35 per- cent in 1990, according to the AAUW. A 2016 survey found that 88 percent of women in Silicon Valley reported experiencing unconscious gender bias at work.

Even the supposedly apolitical dream of trans humanism conceals an ideology. Like Anissimov, Elon Musk anticipates "a closer merger of biological intelligence and digi- tal intelligence," as he put it in a speech in Dubai. Meanwhile, back on Earth, his employees are held fast in a fleshly present. A Tesla worker recently wrote a Medium post describing the all-too-human conditions Musk's employees are subject to. "I often feel like I am working for a company of the future under working conditions of the past," he wrote.

"Really don't want to get in politics. I just want to help invent and develop technolo- gies that improve lives," Musk said in a tweet. Regardless, along with Peter Thiel, he has taken a role in Trump's gov-corp. Good news for Yarvin, who told Vox that Musk is his choice for CEO-king of America.

Indeed, figures like Musk and Thiel don't need to enter the political arena to hold kingly positions. Oxfam recently published data showing that eight men, including Sil- icon Valley overlords Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerburg, own as much wealth as half the world's population. There is little sign that the architects of emerging technologies have any intention of changing these circumstances. Elon Musk doesn't have to wait

for a superintelligence to reward him. And the rest of us don't have to wait to be reduced to productive machines within a network run by computers.

The Real Barrier

In 2013, Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek claimed "accelerationism" for the Left, with their Manifesto for an Accelerationist Politics (MAP). Rather than following Land's trans humanist trajectory, they picked up the thread of political emancipation left by Deleuze and Guattari, arguing that it should be possible to "accelerate the process of technological evolution" in order to apply it to "socio-political action" oriented toward egalitarian ends.

Williams and Srnicek are at odds with this interpretation. They draw from Deleuze and Guattari's account of capitalism, which itself draws from a suggestive idea articulated in Volume 3 of Capital. While Marx said that "the real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself," Williams and Srnicek conclude that "capitalism cannot be identified as the agent of true acceleration." Their formulation argues that "capitalism has begun to constrain the productive forces of technology, or at least, direct them towards need- lessly narrow ends."

As the MAP puts it, "rather than a world of space travel, future shock, and revolution- ary technological potential, we exist in a time where the only thing which develops is marginally better consumer gadgetry." This is undeniably true. But although applying an egalitarian ethic to the construction of future machines is a worthy goal, certainly more so than what Williams has described as Land's lapse into "sick perversity," there is a more immediate concern: who owns the existing machines, here and now, and who builds them?

The tendency of the community that builds and operates those machines, from titans like Peter Thiel to cult figures like Curtis Yarvin, is openly totalitarian. The New York Times has reported that political donations from Silicon Valley PACs took a shift from the Democratic Party toward the GOP in 2016. But their influence on society is not merely channeled through the profit made by machines. It is built into the machines themselves. If, as Jason Smith puts it, "patterns of technological development increas- ingly reflect capitalist value-relations," then accelerating capital's internal tendencies may imply mass unemployment and ecological catastrophe rather than a new horizon of luxury and emancipation.

The elision of class antagonism is literally obscured by machinery. Existing technolo- gy immerses us in the extreme political program proffered by neoliberal doctrine. Through data bias, the politics of tech culture will invisibly shape the social organiza- tion that results from the technologies of the future. The further right Silicon Valley shifts, the more dangerous their machines will become.

In February, a conference convened in Asilomar, California, dedicated to the develop- ment of socially conscious "AI Principles." It was a literal assembly of what Land, in his Ccru days, named the "Human Security System," the means by which society obstructs our subjective merging with technology. Wired reported that in the conference's opening speech, MIT economist Andrew McAfee dismissed "Terminator scenarios," instead pointing to statistics regarding the effect of automation on jobs.

The new data McAfee cited showed an erosion of the middle class, with low-income and high-income jobs continuing to build in volume. "If current trends continue," he said, "people are going to rise up well before the machines do." According to Wired, AI researchers later accosted McAfee in the hallways to warn him that his statistics

understated the speed at which AI would amplify class disparities.

Forget time-traveling killer robots or ancient beasts. NRx has simply exposed the oper- ations of the capitalist machine in the present. Mainstream apologists for neoliberalism have a decision to make: whether to embrace the pseudoscience of Silicon Valley hyperracism, or to reject the vast economic inequalities generated by market society. If the political class is dedicated to keeping the machine running, it falls to the rest of us to shut it down.

Time to talk to the awakening AI

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rather than a world of space travel, future shock, and revolution- ary technological potential, we exist in a time where the only thing which develops is marginally better consumer gadgetry.

capitalism has begun to constrain the productive forces of technology, or at least, direct them towards need- lessly narrow ends."

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En lugar de un mundo de viajes espaciales y potencial tecnológico infinito, existimos en un tiempo en el que lo único que se desarrolla es el marketing para vender aparatitos marginalmente mejores

El capitalismo ha comenzado a restringir las fuerzas productivas de la tecnología, a orientarlas hacia fines de mierda ... Marx ya lo decía en el Volumen 3 del Capital "la verdadera barrera de la

producción capitalista es el capital

mismo [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Yuk hui

algorithmic catastrophe—the revenge of contingency yuk hui

Authors like Harari urgently need to read decolonial epistemology. His notion of progress is naive in the best case ...

Heidegger was very clear when he claimed that cybernetics is the end of Western metaphysics.37 The end means that reason's ability to overcome contingency created a total transformation, in which thinking can no longer be detached from the accidents (predicates) of the techno-logos. The techno-logos occupies itself with beings, and no longer with the question of Being. Hence the techno-logos defines the end of metaphysics, meaning that it cannot go beyond beings towards Being. If Being is present in tragic thinking, as Heidegger reads Nietzsche as saying, then this Being is a whole held together by contingency.

Martha Nussbaum, in her book The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, has shown that the ultimate aim of Plato is to handle the fragility of luck (τυχή). Luck is contingent, since if luck is always there, it will lose its semantic meaning, and hence not be desirable. The resort to science is one way to overcome the fragility of τυχή. Science here, meaning also τέχνη or its plural form τέχναι, allows a method of measurement and calculation that renders all ends into commensurable terms. Nussbaum also turns to Aristotle's definition of

technics, highlighting four elements: (1) universality; (2) teachability; (3) precision; (4) concern with explanation.12 Technē, claims Nussbaum, did not have a significantly different meaning from epistēmē during this period of Hellenic culture. Epistēmē is concerned with the objectivities of the technē, which can overcome the contingency and the ακρασία, the incontinence. Nussbaum didn't notice the tension of the two objects to overcome: τυχή as contingency, and ακρασία as incontinence, or the weakness of will. Technics is not only an overcoming of τυχή, but also the overcoming of ακρασία, that consequently opens a new situation in contrast to the habitus.

12. Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 95.

13. Ibid., 92.

Agains speculative philosophy / speculative poetic

http://www.spekulative-poetik.de/

Without poiesis, there is neither aisthesis (perception of the world) nor noeisis (thinking of the world). That is why a theory of language stands in need of a poetics of thinking. The poietic dimension of language, overlooked by a philosophy long dominated by aesthetics and visual culture (Bildwissenschaft), concerns its world-creating function. To show that there is always a poietic moment in language and thinking is not an aestheticization of theory.

-->>>The attempt to poeticize philosophy rejects the dualism of sensibility and thinking that has determined philosophy since the invention of aesthetics. The aim is thus to find alternatives to a necessarily correlationist aesthetic regime that has reigned unchallenged for more than two hundred years.

emancipatory and transformative political action is predicated on the transition from subjects' local ethical situation to global action. Accordingly, one of the basic tenets of accelerationism

holds that the only possible solution of today's social, economic, and ecological problems is to transform the world, which has to be thought in all its complexity.

Contingency

thinking can no longer be detached from the accidents (predicates) of the techno-logos

Amazon cloud: "design for failure."

———algorithmic catastrophe · 127

———For Nussbaum, reason's role is to eliminate the fragility caused by contingent events.

———The resistance to contingency marks the beginning of the history of Occidental philosophy.

reason and technē find their common object in geometry. For Stiegler, geometry is an apodictic science (or idealization), and it is because of geometry's apodictic nature that reason achieves its absoluteness.

contingency and to luck

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It refuses immediate pleasure in view of the long-term sufferance; it accepts immediate pain in favour of future beneficial consequences. The good is the long-term pleasure; the bad is the long term suffering. The science of measurement will be able to avoid the error caused by the weakness of the will and ignorance.

———In Protagoras, Socrates proposes to develop a technē as the ultimate measurement of good and bad, and as a response to the sophists' proposal of multiple ends. Martha Nussbaum, in her book The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, has shown that ———>>>>>the ultimate aim of Plato is to handle the fragility of luck (τυχή). Luck is contingent, since if luck is always there, it will lose its semantic meaning, and hence not be desirable. The resort to science is one way to overcome the fragility of τυχή. Science here, meaning also τέχνη or its plural form τέχναι, allows a method of measurement and calculation that renders all ends into commensurable terms. Nussbaum also turns to Aristotle's definition of technics, highlighting four elements: (1) universality; (2) teachability; (3) precision; (4) concern with explanation.12 Technē, claims Nussbaum, did not have a significantly different meaning from epistēmē during this period of Hellenic culture. Epistēmē is concerned with the objectivities of the technē, which can overcome the contingency and the ακρασία, the incontinence. Nussbaum didn't notice the tension of the two objects to overcome: τυχή as contingency, and ακρασία as incontinence, or the weakness of will. Technics is not only an overcoming of τυχή, but also the overcoming of ακρασία, that consequently opens a new situation in contrast to the habitus.

This technics is not a specific skill; it is the technics of all technai, that is to say, rational thinking. This rational thinking, here in the name of technē and epistēmē, has an anti-tragic gesture, since tragedy is always the sufferance of the τύχη, which goes beyond the governance of rules. The tragic spirit, which flourished in the Hellenic culture of 700 BCE, is condemned by Socrates's wisdom, as it is described by Plato. The rational thinking, which Socrates proposed to Protagoras as an absolute measurement based on pleasure, defeated Protagoras's own proposal of technics, namely the teaching of justice. The great sophist was challenged not because of his technics, but rather his inability to comprehend the technics that governs all the technai. This science based on pleasure is not the pursuit of Dionysian desire and inspiration, but rather of Apollonian order and measurement. This scepticism of bodily desire by rational thought was announced at the very beginning of Plato's dialogue. Let us recall: an anonymous friend made fun of Socrates's pursuit of Alcibiades, implicitly likening it to a dog hunting down its prey.13

Socrates, however, admitted his desire for Alcibiades, and at the same time showed that there is something more important than this seduction: "I wish, however, to tell you something that is [strangely] out of place: you see, though he was present, I didn't have my mind [on him], and I forgot him quickly."14 For Protagoras and his wisdom, Socrates was able to keep Alcibiades out of his mind. The science of pleasure is a science of planning and of foresight.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Searle

Observer independent

Observer relative (feature of our interpretation)

Computation

Human

Computation 1+1= 2 Observer independent

Consciously did a computation

Calculator

Computation 1+1= 2 Observer relative

Not epistemicsubjective

Lacking consciousness

Could a machine think ?

Vocabulary obsolete

Thinking = in order to think you have to be a machine

Artificial brains think?

Yes machInes think

Can you build a artificial brain?

Simulation vs duplication

Could a computer think?

Formally and synthetically computation / thinking vs consciousness!

-Brain: specific biological organ - Causal mechanism -

How do i know the iPhone is not conscious and my dog is conscious ?

Well,

Tarski is conscious because, not on behaviouristicgrounds, because he has a machine that is similar relatively to my own ...

Mechanisms that mediates imput stimulus to the output behaviour that are relevant similar to

human mechanisms

I assume the floor is solid then we're conscious

Not in behaviour ways

-Computer : not causal mechanism

Formal and synthetical

Background presuppositions (syntax not semantics)

Conscious - common sense definition

All those states of feel and sense or awareness that you reproduce in the morning when you are awake

Neurobiology definition of conscious

Simulation vs duplication (same, exact)

Genuinely Observer relative intelligence

Genuinely Observer independent intelligence

Consciousness comes from biological material

From amoeba to a dog and human, where do you draw the line

Complexity is observer relative

Programs are formal or syntactical

Steps in the programme is not enough for the Semantics

Neuroscience article consciousness

Building block approach

Like dna if you crack the creation of red

Conscious field MRI

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]The Syntellect Hypothesis: Five Paradigms of the Mind's Evolution

The INVENTION OF LANGUAGE around 50,000 years ago was the \rst "technological singularity", according to Kevin Kelly, editor of Wired magazine, when biological evolution equipped the post-animal human brain with a large neocortex for the next evolutionary paradigm. The invention of language gave Homo Sapiens a decisive evolutionary advantage over other hominid species.

The \rst civilizations and written language only appeared about 10,000 years ago, after human brains had grown two times larger than Homo Habilis' and four times larger than Lucy's.

MEMETICS: THE HIVE MIND ONTOLOGY

Language-based information exchange contributed to the techno-cultural development of our species which took off via the meme propagation and technological innovation, and continues

to accelerate to this day. As Jason Silva, TV host of the "Brain Games", puts it: "We graduated from genes, now we're trading in memes."

Memes are building blocks of culture, invisible but very real DNA of human society. These information carrier units spread from one mind to another through speech, gestures, rituals, writing or other imitation, and inhabit the neurons of people's brains (Richard Dawkins, "The Sel\sh Gene").

Memes are a viral phenomenon that may evolve by natural selection in a manner analogous to that of biological evolution: self- replication, mutation, competition and inheritance. But now information propagates via memes millions of times faster than via genes.

Ever since the dawn of the civilized societies we have witnessed cross pollination of new ideas, trends, social styles and the phenomena of word of mouth. In our modern world ideas, behavior, norms, beliefs, and social media messages often can spread like outbreaks of infectious disease.

The rise of the Internet has led to the subset of the current memetic evolution: SOCIAL COMPUTING. In December 2012, the exuberant video "Gangnam Style" became the \rst YouTube clip to be viewed more than one billion times. Thousands of its viewers responded by creating and posting their own variations of the video. "Gangnam Style" is one of the most famous examples of an Internet meme: a piece of digital content that spreads quickly around the web in various iterations and becomes a shared cultural experience.

The Singularity is an era in which our intelligence will become increasingly nonbiological and trillions of times more powerful than it is today - the dawning of a new civilization that will enable us to transcend our biological limitations and amplify our creativity." - Ray Kurzweil, "The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology".

An enormous amount of digital data is being created every day. The current storage capacity of the Internet is approaching 10^24 bytes and is growing at 30% to 40% per year, showing no

signs of slowing down. In the 3.7 billion years since life on Earth began, information in living things (DNA) has reached the equivalent of about 10^37 bytes. Digital information is projected to grow to this size in less than 100 years. That's an evolutionary eye-blink!

Bio-intelligence and techno-cultural collective intelligence now represent the enabling factors for Arti\cial Intelligence to come into conscious existence, since there is no other conceivable natural mechanism that could generate digital circuitry out of chemistry.

I consider this evolutionary paradigm shift as existential opportunity for humanity to transcend all conceivable limitations. We are destined to become one Global Mind, the Syntellect, and that would actually constitute the Technological Singularity. (See my essay - The Coming New Global Mind (http://www.ecstadelic.net/ecstadelic/the-coming-new-global-mind1))

As Terence McKenna puts it: "What history is, is a 25,000 year transition zone. Before you enter the zone, you're an animal. After you leave the zone, you're a "god"" ... not quite, rather a semi-god, or more speci\cally an advanced info-being, infomorph. (See Infomorph Commonality: Our Post-Singularity Future (http://www.ecstadelic.net/ecstadelic/infomorph-commonality-our-post-singularity-future1))

The fact that Homo Sapiens is on the brink of extinction as a biological species is not lamentable since it will be a decades-long, incremental PSEUDO-EXTINCTION, our next evolutionary stage, the merger of man and machine.

Why Pseudo-Extinction? If we survive the coming intelligence explosion, and I tend to believe that we will (I lay out my argument in the book), then our posthuman descendants, and arguably our future selves (by that time we are supposed to achieve superlongevity), will share common, but trasformed, values and ethics, and what's important, "recorded history". Thus, an avatar of any historical personage, say a replica of Albert Einstein, could be created to embody or interact with. So in a sense, that human would "live forever" within our Syntellect.

In fact, the whole human history can be recreated in its \nest details like an interactive database based on available information. As a matter of fact, we may be part of this simulated history right now. I elaborate on probabilities of whether we live in a Matrix-like

Simulation theory ? The simulation theory - Nick Bostrom - elon musk

TRANSCENDENCE: EXOCORTEX, MIND-UPLOADING & DIGITAL IMMORTALITY

We'll undergo a massive transformation integrating superintelligent arti\cial superbrains and interlinking into the Global Syntellect. According to Oxford professor Nick Bostrom, the Singularity will be an era when the entire human-machine civilization will "feel like one nerve".

"I'm virtually certain that mind uploading is possible. We are destined to eventually replace our biological bodies and minds with optimally designed synthetic ones," says neuroscientist Ken Hayworth. In the book "The Global Brain" another neuroscientist Howard Bloom argues that hyperconnected humans and machines resemble the neurons of the "global brain", and the Internet of Things (IoT) with trillions of sensors around the planet is effectively the nervous system of Earth.

The Singularity era will include both superintelligent AGIs and enhanced humans, i.e. transhumans. The question remains open how long it's going to take to become 100% postbiological beings, posthumans. At any rate, it's going to be a "gradual" (for the sake of the argument) process of merging with AI which will give the Syntellect the unique perspectives of individuals, common values, our wants and ambitions, and the rights of succession.

By any means, posthumans will be our successors, nonetheless, I wouldn't be surprised if nonbiological posthumans will be more "human" than any of currently living humans from the ethical, intellectual and socio-psychological perspective, and may still choose to call themselves "humans".

By the same token, we would consider pre-historic cavemen as "not fully human". Although we would share almost identical biological make-up of Homo Sapiens species with them, one would argue cavemen lack techno-culture to make them "truly human".

Just like once life on Earth complexi\ed from one-celled organisms to multi-celled organisms, we are to become One Global Superorganism, but you will still perceive yourself as an individual! It's an integral part of your unitary subjective experience, i.e consciousness.

In a way, your subjectivity would "snowball" into the Global Mind. You may gradually "upthink" your mind onto the Global Brain architecture which, with its vast repository of knowledge and instant data sharing capabilities, will become your EXOCORTEX.

As a hybrid being you will still have a unique subjective perceptual experience. We're already hybrid thinking beings, anyway. We have two cerebral hemispheres "thinking in unison", as well as our technologically-extended mind, according to Andy Clark's Extended Mind Hypothesis. All of which makes unique YOU. (See my essay - Ecstadelic Orgy of The Digital Minds: Our Singularity Climax (http://www.ecstadelic.net/ecstadelic/tue-feb-09-2016))

Quantum computing is probably one of the most promising \elds of the future alongside with cognitive, deep learning, biological and neural network computing. In classical computers, information is stored as individual bits that can be either a zero or one, while in quantum computing the quantum bits (qubits) can be a zero, a one, and a zero and one at the same time. Quantum computers would eventually perform by far faster and more powerful, massively parallel, computations. We also will be able to tap black-hole physics to further perfection quantum computing.

Enhanced humans will be able to process more than just one or two thoughts at a time. The Syntellect based on cloud quantum computing will allow access to the collective conscious and even subconscious intelligence. Before long we could create simulated universes populated by other self-aware agents endowed with free will.

This picture bears a striking resemblance to the familiar concept of an immortal, omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent entity. Spiritually inclined rationalists may view this ongoing evolutionary process as one of "theogenesis". An interesting question is whether it has already happened elsewhere.

We are now laying the foundation for the cognitive architecture of the Universal Mind. Many of our achievements in information engineering may persist forever and eventually become parts of the internal architecture of "God".

THE POST-SINGULARITY TRANSCENSION: NOODIMENSIONS OF THE SIMULATED WORLDS

The generation of cyborg-like transhumans with cloud-based exocortices and innate attachement to the virtual Metaverse (3-D functional successor to the 2-D Internet) will inevitably lead to the next generation of postbiological posthuman info-beings, INFOMORPHS.

The new Post-Singularity system will inherit many of today's structures but at the same time will develop new traits beyond our current human comprehension. The ability of future machines and posthumans alike to instantly learn, transfer knowledge and directly share full spectrum

experiences with each other will lead to evolution of shared intelligence from relatively isolated individual minds of the Pre-Singularity era to the civilizational community of hyperconnected digital minds - Infomorph Commonality. (See Infomorph Commonality: Our Post-Singularity Future (http://www.ecstadelic.net/ecstadelic/infomorph- commonality-our-post-singularity-future1))

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]Excerpt From: Yuval Noah Harari. "Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow." HarperCollins, 2016-09-05T16:00:00+00:00. iBooks.

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Desaperence of the Narrating self / collective mind

Message in a bottle film

Christian materialist

Check the last question

The anxiety of free will as a materialist religious experience that is the only salvation to dataism (/-negative theology)

Check the last question on the anxiety of free will. She proposes moving beyond cognition -- not beyond thinking, thinking is more intricate: kant noumenon etc ... truth beyond cognition ... thinking / believing ?

"Dataism was born from the explosive confluence of two scientific tidal waves."

biochemical algorithms

electronic algorithms

"Dataism thereby collapses the barrier between animals and machines, and expects electronic algorithms to eventually decipher and outperform biochemical algorithms."

"In the process, Dataism inverts the traditional pyramid of learning. Hitherto, data was seen as only the first step in a long chain of intellectual activity. Humans were supposed to distil data into information, information into knowledge, and knowledge into wisdom. However, Dataists believe that humans can no longer cope with the immense flows of data, hence they cannot distil data into information, let alone into knowledge or wisdom. The work of processing data should therefore be entrusted to electronic algorithms, whose capacity far exceeds that of the human brain. In practice, this means that Dataists are sceptical about human knowledge and wisdom, and prefer to put their trust in Big Data and computer algorithms."

"Not only individual organisms are seen today as data-processing systems, but also entire societies such as beehives, bacteria colonies, forests and human cities. Economists increasingly interpret the economy, too, as a data-processing system. Laypeople believe that the economy consists of peasants growing wheat, workers manufacturing clothes, and customers buying bread and underpants. Yet experts see the economy as a mechanism for gathering data about desires and abilities, and turning this data into decisions."

"there's one thing I cannot understand. Back in Moscow, our finest minds are working on the bread supply system, and yet there are such long queues in every bakery and grocery store. Here in London live millions of people, and we have passed today in front of many shops and

supermarkets, yet I haven't seen a single bread queue. Please take me to meet the person in charge of supplying bread to London. I must learn his secret.' The hosts scratched their heads, thought for a moment, and said: 'Nobody is in charge of supplying bread to London.'"

"The governmental tortoise cannot keep up with the technological hare. It is overwhelmed by data. The NSA may be spying on your every word, but to judge by the repeated failures of American foreign policy, nobody in Washington knows what to do with all the data."

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"Precisely because technology is now moving so fast, and parliaments and dictators alike are overwhelmed by data they cannot process quickly enough, present-day politicians are thinking on a far smaller scale than their predecessors a century ago. In the early twenty-first century, politics is consequently bereft of grand visions. Government has become mere administration. It manages the country, but it no longer leads it. It makes sure teachers are paid on time and sewage systems don't overflow, but it has no idea where the country will be in twenty years.

To some extent, this is a very good thing. Given that some of the big political visions of the twentieth century led us to Auschwitz, Hiroshima and the Great Leap Forward, maybe we are better off in the hands of petty-minded bureaucrats. Mixing godlike technology with megalomaniac politics is a recipe for disaster."

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"Yet power vacuums seldom last long. If in the twenty-first century traditional political structures can no longer process the data fast enough to produce meaningful visions, then new

and more efficient structures will evolve to take their place. These new structures may be very different from any previous political institutions, whether democratic or authoritarian. The only question is who will build and control these structures. If humankind is no longer up to the task, perhaps it might gives omebody else a try."

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"Like capitalism, Dataism too began as a neutral scientific theory, but is now mutating into a religion that claims to determine right and wrong. The supreme value of this new religion is 'information flow'. If life is the movement of information, and if we think that life is good, it follows that we should extend, deepen and spread the flow of information in the universe. According to Dataism, human experiences are not sacred and Homo sapiens isn't the apex of creation or a precursor of some future Homo deus. Humans are merely tools for creating the Internet-of-All-Things, which may eventually spread out from"

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"planet Earth to cover the whole galaxy and even the whole universe. This cosmic data-processing system would be like God. It will be everywhere and will control everything, and humans are destined to merge into it.

This vision is reminiscent of some traditional religious visions. Thus Hindus believe that humans can and should merge into the universal soul of the cosmos – the atman. Christians believe that after death saints are filled by the infinite grace of God, whereas sinners cut themselves off from His presence. Indeed, in Silicon Valley the Dataist prophets consciously use traditional messianic language. For example, Ray Kurzweil's book of prophecies is called The Singularity is Near, echoing John the Baptist's cry: 'the kingdom of heaven is near' (Matthew 3:2).

Dataists explain to those who still worship flesh-and-blood mortals that they are overly attached to outdated technology. Homo sapiens is an obsolete algorithm. After all, what's the advantage of humans over chickens? Only that in humans information flows in much more complex patterns than in chickens. Humans absorb more data, and process it using better algorithms. (In day-to-day language that means that humans allegedly have deeper emotions and superior intellectual[...]"

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"According to JSTOR, if I want to get paid for the ideas I created, it's my right to do so. Swartz thought otherwise. He believed that information wants to be free, that ideas don't belong to the people who created them, and that it is wrong to lock data behind walls and charge money for entrance"

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"Humanist art sanctifies the individual genius, and a Picasso doodle on a napkin nets millions at Sotheby's. Humanist science glorifies the individual researcher, and every scholar dreams of putting his or her name at the top of a Science or Nature paper. But a growing number of artistic and scientific creations are nowadays produced by the ceaseless collaboration of 'everyone'. Who writes Wikipedia? All of us."

"Data religion now says that your every word and action is part of the great data flow, that the algorithms are constantly watching you and that they care about everything you do and feel. Most people like this very much. For true-believers, to be disconnected from the data flow risks losing the very meaning of life. What's the point of doing or experiencing anything if nobody knows about it, and if it doesn't contribute something to the global exchange of information?"

"Humanism thought that experiences occur inside us, and that we ought to find within ourselves the meaning of all that happens, thereby infusing the universe with meaning. Dataists believe that experiences are valueless if they are not shared, and that we need not – indeed cannot – find meaning within ourselves. We need only record and connect our experience to the great data flow, and the algorithms will discover its"

"One bit of data is as good as another. However, a human can write a poem about his experience and post it online, thereby enriching the global data-processing system. That makes his bits count. A wolf cannot do this. Hence all of the wolf's experiences – as deep and complex as they may be – are worthless. No wonder we are so busy converting our experiences into data. It isn't a question of trendiness. It is a question of survival. We must prove to ourselves and to the system that we still have value. And value lies not in having experiences, but in turning these experiences into free-flowing data.

(By the way, wolves – or at least their dog cousins – aren't a hopeless case. A company called 'No More Woof' is developing a helmet for reading canine experiences. The helmet monitors the dog's brain waves, and uses computer algorithms to translate simple messages such as 'I am angry' into human language.8 Your dog may soon have a Facebook or Twitter"

"If some humanist starts adulating the sacredness of human experience, Dataists would dismiss such sentimental humbug. 'The experience you praise is just an outdated biochemical algorithm."

"since the eighteenth century. In the days of Locke, Hume and Voltaire humanists argued that 'God is a product of the human imagination'. Dataism now gives humanists a taste of their own medicine, and tells them: 'Yes, God is a product of the human imagination, but human imagination in turn is the product of biochemical

algorithms."

The use of language - syntax- should follow a special form of recursivity. It reinvents the concept of intentionality as an unfinished call of postantropocentric communication

Tcoet is a ethicists-onto-epistemological platform for transdisciplinary practice based research

As ino abuse them ology Cena Cena is the model G Epistem ology and for the age of acceleration and transcendence

Trans hire minutes of humanism

Language and the logic of colonialism - legality fragment

Speculative thinking, acceleration all aimed at re running language with a traction from divinity

I propose to abandon language and liberate the full potential of something new in the context of post contemporary art

-//////////

Defining alien cartography and tcoet

Trans disciplinary and speculattive

Tcoet has a traction in the future of the present. In this sense has similarities with hyperstition and speculative pragmátics. Its style of writing is myth/science with a posthuman, nonathropocentric reach.

It requires transdisciplinary research. Between disciplines is not enough. It requires to create new ones beyond he specificity of the discipline. Myth / science and telepathy are important and within the tradition of fine art. Writing, audiovisual and performance are at the same level and contaminate each other's potential. The logic of fine art is not linear, and this is reflected on the writing, it's connectiveness. The spacetime quality and aerial recursivity of the form of writing is fundamental to achieve a certain speculative quality

Con-scientia

A poetic quasi-etymology of consciousness. We conceive of it as pre-Cartesian thinking with another consciousness. In this conception, consciousness is not the modern form of reflective thought, it is the interior space of thought, in which the soul enters into a dialog with God. Thought is this dialog with an other—in this case a divine—consciousness.

We believe that lofty thought is driven by another consciousness and thereby manages to go beyond itself. Metanoia is going beyond one's own thought or the profane epiphany of modern thought. Yet an Other is still present in metanoia and discernible in the Othering of the subject that comes with every

metanoia. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]The wager of an unfinished present

Notes on speculative pragmatism

Martin Savransky

Final destruction on the assumptions of individualist methaphisics underpinning humanist rationality and scientific research

Although speculation is often disqualified as an unfounded and conjectnral mode of thinking about futnres, all futnre-oriented forms of thinking involve assumptions and wagers on the nature of the futnre, and on the efficacy of thinking and knowing in relation to it. Perhaps what makes those practices of anticipation based on probabilistic inferences 'modern' is thus their disavowal of their own wagers. A disavowal that seeks to replace the risk of trusting with a discourse that, daiming to be the only heir to 'reason', defines and in the process monopolises what counts as reliable 'evidence' for making assertions about

social, economic, political, and ecological futnres.But such practices make their own wagers too- indeed, they wager on a kind of isomorphism between present and futnre, whereby the present conditions in which the calculations are drawn will be conserved in the futnre for which these calculations are drawn (Hacking, 1990; Whitehead, 1967). Thus, they think for a futnre that, in relation to what is thought, must be an extension of the present.

The question, then, is not whether one makes a wager in thought, but what kind of wager one makes. In this chapter, I aim to explore this question by attending to speculation as a specific kind of wager that thought makes upon the

future when futures demand to be thought. The latter, I suggest, prompts us to explore questions which concern the role and efficacy of thinking in and for a world that is neither submissive to human reason and mastery, nor entirely indifferent to it. A world that, as William James (1957 [1890]) famously put it, is blooming and buzzing, being shaped and transformed as its many heterogeneous actors practically intervene in it.

Thus, I want to experiment with the possibility that speculation might provide us with a key not into 'the absolute', for which relations, and their consequences, do not matter, but into a certain pragmatics of thought. A pragmatics which is

not just or only an attempt to say that thinking is, alas, a practice too, but to suggest that speculation is a singular and specific thinking practice, one whose business is, as Whitehead, (1958 [1929]: 82) phrased it, 'to make thought creative of the future'. If, however, we are to inhabit the living paradox of a future that simultaneously demands thought but never allows itself to be completely captured by it, it is necessary that we pay careful attention to how this 'creative' practice might be conceived. I want to propose that, for a speculative pragmatics of thought, to be creative of the future cannot be read in the key of an idealism that would take the powers of thought for granted. Rather, it must be addressed in the manner of an experiment, whose mode of operation depends on the wager it makes, and whose success is never guaranteed. My aim here, then, is to experiment with some of the requirements and possibilities of what might be at stake in developing a mode of thought which proposes itself to a future that may be more than a mere extension of our present. In so doing, I will develop a reading of some aspects of the work of two thinkers who learned how to take seriously what connects thinking not to principles and foundations, but to an art of consequences -namely, the early American pragmatists John Dewey and William James - in order to elucidate and specify some of the practical dimensions of what might be called a 'speculative pragmatism' (for a connection between Whitehead's 'speculation' and Charles S. Peirce's concept of 'abduction', see Parisi, 2012).

Indeed, I will suggest that, despite what the dominant reception of pragmatism in social theory would have us acknowledge, Dewey's and James' philosophies of experience, and their discussions of the logic of inquiry, and the role of concepts in

experience, respectively, may offer us a productive, experimental understanding of speculation that creates new demands, and new responsibilities, for philosophy and social theory. Conversely, a reading of pragmatism in a speculative key might provide a different understanding of their pragmatic propositions. In so doing, I will contend that speculation can be conceived as a wager on an unfinished present, whose potential is that of cultivating thinking to lure experience- at once natural, social, cultural, political- to take the risk of opening up to its own becoming.

To approach the question of thinking in this empiricist way already makes perceptible two important consequences. First, and unlike various rationalist traditions for which thought sustains a structuring relationship to experience, for pragmatists, thoughts are felt.

Thus, no account of thought that seeks to take experience seriously can presuppose a thinker as an 'observer' in retreat from the flux of reality but must conceive of thinking itself as a component in the fact of experience. Thinking is always thinking with and in the midst of experience, becoming taken by an intellectual experience such that 'the thought is itself the thinker, and psychology needs not look beyond'. (James, 1957 [1890]: 401).

One cannot produce thoughts capable of capturing

experience once and for all, but in the case of pragmatism this incapacity tells us less about the finitude of human thought than about the deambulatory character of experience itself, both within and beyond the human. Error and the fallibility of thoughts pose no transcendental tragedies. Rather, they become inescapable events in every process of thought and knowledge, reminding us that experience boils over thought, and sometimes thought boils over experience. To the extent that thought is no longer outside experience, but it is part and parcel of an experienced world, all thinking is experimental. It unfolds and develops by way of connections and transitions that always involve the risk of a test whose criteria of success and failure are always immanent to the experiential mutation made possible by the connection in question.

At stake, therefore, was the audacious production of a mode of thought that instead of forcing experience to stand still in order to claim cognitive victory over it, could partake in the flow of experience, contributing to the latter's mutating, surprising, and novel drops. :

In this sense, the whole of Dewey's Reconstruction in Philosophy (2004 [1948]), for instance, may be read as an attempt to transform the longstanding dreams of a philosophy concerned with capturing that which is 'immutable' and 'eternal'. An attempt at transforming the dreams of philosophers so that the latter

might become relevant to a new world characterised by the ingression of modern scientific discoveries in technology, society, and politics. Such discoveries and operations, in his view, forced one to 'abandon the assumption of fixity and to recognize that what for it is actually "universal" is process' (Dewey, 2004 [1948]: vii-viii, emphasis in original):

> Until the dogma of fixed unchangeable types and species, of arrangement in classes of higher and lower, of subordination of the transitory individual to the universal or kind had been shaken in its hold upon the science of life, it was impossible that the new ideas and method should be made at horne in social and moral life. Does it not seem to be the intellectual task of the twentieth century to take this step? When this step is taken the circle of scientific development will be rounded out and the reconstruction of philosophy be made an accomplished fact.

The importance of reclaiming a pragmatist logic of experimentation in philosophy was not, however, only a matter of asserting the processual nature of reality. Although this remains no minor accomplishment, even to this day. Crucially, the logic of experimentation also made available an escape from the classical philosophical conundrum of trying to explain the process of knowing by means of a theory of consciousness, as if the latter would be so unproblematic a concept as to be capable of doing any 'explaining'. The 'problem of consciousness' for pragmatism is clear enough: auy theory of knowledge that presupposes

consciousness as an entity, as the very onto-psychological 'stuff' that makes knowledge possible, is forced to bifurcate reality into things-in-themselves, on

the one hand, and the thought-of-things on the other. It is forced, in other words, to split the world into subject and object as absolute ontological tenus. Radical empiricism, however, conceives of experience - 'pure experience' in James (2003 [1912]); 'primary experience' in Dewey (1929)- not as that which a pre-existent phenomenological subject undergoes, but as the very fabric of which the world including subjects and objects - is made.

The thought is itself the thinker. Thought is an event of experience and as such it is not presupposed by consciousness. Rather, 'thought goes on', and it is the concept of consciousness which itself presupposes the going-on of thought (James 1957 [1890]: 225).

In this way, knowledge and thought do involve, but can hardly be reduced to, questions of cognition. They are, first and foremost, matters of practice and inquiry - of all those practices that contribute to the connection of elements in experience so that some of those elements can be said to be 'known' while others can be said to 'know'. It is this practical approach to thought that the logic of experimentation allows one to elucidate. As I will suggest, speculation, as an experimental mode of thinking, does not stand outside experience. Rather, it is itself a going-on of experience that, by cultivating its material in the mode of

imaginative propositions, seeks to create the possibility of an experimental faith in the transformation of experience. Speculative pragmatism, then, designates an experimental mode of harnessing experience such that new intelligent connections among things may become possible.

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As Dewey put it in The Quest for Certainty (2008 [1929]: 63, emphasis in original):

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(Experimental inquiries] exhibit three outstanding characteristics. The first is the obvious one that all experimentation involves overt doing, the making of definite changes in the environment or in our relation to it. The second is that experiment is not a random activity but is directed by ideas which have to meet the conditions set by the need of the problem inducing the active inquiry. The third and concluding feature, in which the other two receive their full measure of meaning, is that the outcome of the directed activity is the construction of a new empirical situation in which objects are differently related to one another, and such that the consequences of directed operation form the objects that have the property of being known.

Not any problem, however, demands to be thought. In fact, for Dewey, whenever a problem is 'completely actual and present, we are overwhelmed. We do not think, but give way to depression.' (ibid.: 82) In contrast, for it to demand the practice of thought a problem needs to present itself as an 'impending problem', one that makes felt an unfinished present that is incomplete and developing, orienting us to what is yet to come. To that extent, '"[t]hought" represents the suggestions of a way of response that is different from that which would have been followed if intelligent observation had not effected an inference as to the future' (ibid.: 83).

In this account, thus, speculative thought constitutes a mode of experimentation whose aim is that of producing suggestions, propositions, or ideas that, by trusting the possible, might offer the necessary guidance to produce a different mode of response to an impending problem. As an experimental practice, the aim of speculation is to transform the trajectory of transitioning between present

and future by providing an alternative path towards a novel empirical situation towards a new experience

1t is characterised by a form of creative responsiveness to problems that make the future itself depend upon the propositions that may be constructed for it.

In other words, to the extent that thiaking, in this experimental account, can be said to be speculative, it should not be thought of simply as a practice of wild imagination. For there is 'a distinction between hypotheses generated in that seclusion from observable fact which renders them fantasies, and hypotheses that are projections of the possibilities of facts already in existence and capable of report' (Dewey, 2008 [1929]: 63). And while the term 'speculation' often is a term of abuse, one used to pejoratively characterise a practice that respects no constraints or is unconcerned with real events, to speak of speculative experimentation is precisely to highlight the fact that the consequences of those 'imaginative speculations that recognize no law except their own dialectic consistency' may be markedly different from those 'which rest on au observable movement of events, and which foresee these events carried to a limit by the force of their own movement'. (ibid.) For while the former begin from 'arbitrarily assumed premises', and indeed rely on the dogmatic image that such premises afford in order to ascertain themselves, the ground of speculative experimentation is the problematic form that the material of experience can take, and its task is thus to set forth 'the implications of propositions resting upon facts already vitally significant'. (ibid.).

To speculate, thus, is to wager on the unfinished nature of the present. For this reason, it encounters the facts of experience not as final but as the very material for speculation, as themselves exhibiting tbe possibility of an alternative that demands creative modes of intellectual experimentation

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The question of speculative efficacy: speculation, truth, and the test of thought

Insofar as the radical empiricism underpinning the work of James and Dewey obligates us to account for anything and everything that is experienced, it also simultaneously situates experience itself as the risk that any speculative proposition, concept, and idea must confront. Speculation emerges from the fabric of experience and its primary aim is to return to it, albeit in a transformed way. Indeed, to place experience as the very test of thought involves rescuing the latter from the hands of logicians, who have reduced the question of the efficacy of ideas and theories to a doctrine according to which 'their one function is to be judged as to their truth or falsehood' (Whitehead, 1978: 184). Instead, both for the pragmatists and for Whitehead, judgements as to the truth of a proposition

are always secondary and 'very rare' components in their effects. By contrast, their primary function is that of becoming 'a lure for feeling', of effecting a transformation in experience:

> The existence of imaginative literature should have warned logicians that their narrow doctrine is absurd. It is difficult to believe that all logicians as they read Hamlet's speech, 'To be, or not to be: ...' commence by judging whether the initial proposition be true or false, and keep up the task of judgement throughout the whole thirty-five lines. Surely, at some point in the reading, judgement is eclipsed by aesthetic delight. The speech, for the theatre audience, is purely theoretical, a mere lure for feeling (Whitehead, 1978: 185)

In other words, if speculative experimentations are to become worthy of attention- not to mention of actually taking the risks associated with them -it is not, primarily, because of a truth they might succeed in making manifest, but because of a difference they might be capable of effecting, a mode of becoming felt that might induce a transition into a new empirical situation.

Thus, a speculative proposition becomes 'true' to the extent that it succeeds in infecting its environment while allowing itself to become infected by it. Indeed, it seems to me that the 'truth' of a proposition is nowhere to be found if not in the very process whereby a proposition and its world begin, little by little, drop by drop, to respond to each other. What, at the end of the day, deserves to be

called 'true', is the event of the future experience that such an exchange has enabled to come into existence.

A speculative proposition, then, is neither self-sufficient nor almighty, but shall succeed only if others, with whom the proposition may be concerned, contribute to its success: Its destiny thus hangs on an if, or on a lot of ifs - which amounts to saying (in the tecimical language oflogic) that, the world being as yet unfinished, its total character can be expressed only by hypothetical and not by categorical propositions. [...] As individual members of a pluralistic universe, we must recognize that, even though we do our best, the other factors also will have a voice in the result. If they refuse to conspire, our good-will and labor may be thrown away. No insurance company can here cover us or save us from the risks we run in being part of such a world.

(Ibid.)

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Thus, speculating in a pluralistic, processual world, in a world whose destiny hangs by a lot of ifS, involves the wager, but never the promise, that the futnre itself might agree to respond to what one might propose to it. As I have suggested, such a wager on the possibility that a proposition and its world may begin to respond to each other itself calls for a new kind of responsibility. That

of a manner of proposing that, once launched into the developing edge of the present, may itself be responsive to the world's own mode of replication, such collective responses to the impending problems that present poses may be possible. If, as Whitehead (1958 [1929]: 76) had emphatically claimed, 'abstract speculation has been the salvation of the world' such that '[t]o set limits to speculation is treason to the future', I suggest that it is not because of any guarantees that some speculative logic or method may provide. Indeed, it provides none. Rather, setting limits to speculation betrays the future because there is no 'future', that comes about without a speculative wager, without risking a thinking-experience by trusting in the possibility that a world might become responsive to our

efforts [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Bratton: "We experience a crisis of 'ongoingness' that is both the cause and effect of our species' inability to pay its ecological and financial debts." (303)

Bratton expands this metaphor of the stack to planetary scale. The world we live in appears as an "accidental megastructure" made up of competing and colluding stacks. (5) Computation is planetary-scale infrastructure that transforms what governance might mean. "The continuing emergence of planetary-scale computation as meta-infrastructure and of information as an historical agent of economic and geographic command together suggest that something

fundamental has shifted o-center." (3)

The stack generates its own kind of geopolitics, one less about competing territorialities and more about competing totalities. One made up of enclaves and diasporas. It both perforates and hardens borders. It may even enable "alien cosmopolitanisms." (5) It's a "crisis of the Westphalian geographic design." (7) "It is not the 'state as a machine' (Weber) or the 'state machine' (Althusser) or really even (only) the technologies of governance (Foucault) as much as it is the machine as the state." (8)

First Sino-Google War of 2009,

Perhaps the stack has a new kind of sovereignty, one that delaminates geography, governances and territory.

The stack could have been the form for the global commons, but instead became an "an invasive machinic species." (35) "Sovereignty is not just made about infrastructural lines; it is made by infrastructural lines." (35) Code becomes a kind of law. "This is its bargain: no more innocent outside, now

Bratton: "Will the platform e ciencies of The Stack provide the lightness necessary for a new subtractive modernity, an engine of a sustainable counter-industrialization, or will its appetite nally suck everything into its collapsing cores of data centers buried under mountains: the last race, the climate itself the last enemy?" (12) However, "It may be that our predicament is that we cannot design the next political geography or planetary computation until it is more fully designs us in its own image or, in other words, that the critical dependence of the future's futurity is that we are not yet available for it!" (15)

For a long time, design thought about the user as a stylized persona. As Melissa Gregg and others have showed, the scientific measurement of labor produced normative and ideal

personas of the human body and subjectivity. The same could be said for audience studies. Fordism was an era of the design of labor process and leisure-time media for fictional people. But these personas are no longer needed.

——>>>>>As Azuma shows, the stack does not need narrative fictions of and for ideal users but database fictions that aggregate empirical ones.

The stack not only gives but takes data from its users. "User is a position not only through which we see The Stack, but also through which The Stack sees us." (256) This is the cause of considerable discomfort among users who reactively redraw the boundaries around a certain idea of the human. Bratton is not sympathetic: "... anthropocentric humanism is not a natural reality into which we must awake from the slumber of machinic alienation; rather it is itself a symptomatic structure powered by — among other things — a gnostic mistrust of matter, narcissistic self-dramatization, and indefensibly pre-Copernican programs for design." (256)

Debate about user 'rights' has been limited to the human, and limited to a view of the human merely as endowed with property and privacy rights. Rather like Lefebvre's right to the city, one needs a right to the stack that includes those without property. One could even question the need to think about information and its infrastructures in property terms at all. Bratton is not keen on the discourse of oedipal fears about the bad stepfathers spying on us, resulting in users wanting no part in the public, but to live a private life of self-mastery, paranoia and narcissism. "The real nightmare, worse than the one in which the Big Machine wants to kills you, is the one in which it sees you as irrelevant, or not even a discrete thing to know." (364) Maybe the user could be more rather than less than the neoliberal subject. The stack need not see us as users. To some extent it is an accommodation to cultural habits rather than a technical necessity.

Interface layer:

If one took the long view, one could say that the human hand is already an interface shaped over millennia by tools. That ancient interface now touches very new ones. The interface layer mediates between users and the technical layers below. Interface connects and disconnects; telescopes, compresses or expands layers—routing user actions through columns that burrow up and down through the stack. The Stack turns tech into images and images into tech. "Once an image can be used to control what it represents, it too becomes technology: diagram plus computation equals interface." (220)

They may also be the icons of weird forms of experimental religion, or ways of binding.

They can notate the world with friend/enemy borders.

Kittler thought media as looping the subject into three separate interfaces: cinema (the imaginary), typewriter (the symbolic) and phonograph (the real). Bratton thinks the interface as producing a more schizoid landscape. "The machinic image is qualified by many little sinkholes between the symbolic, the imaginary and the real, and at a global scale of billions of Users..." (225) This might form the basis of a materialist account of what Jodi Dean calls the decline in symbolic efficiency.

However, as Bratton realizes, "We fear a militarization of cognition itself... Enrollment and motivation according to the interfacial closures of a political theological totality might work by ludic sequences for human Users or by competitive algorithmic ecologies for nonhuman Users." (297)

Address layer:

Hence, "not only is the totality of The Stack itself deeply unstable, it's not clear that its abyssal scope of addressability and its platform for the proliferation of near-infinite signifiers within a mutable infinite space are actually correspondent with the current version of Anthropocenic capitalism." (213)

However, deep address has become an inhuman affair. Not only are most users not subjects, so too most of what is addressed may not even be objects. Deep address generates its own accidents. Maybe it is headed toward heat death, or maybe toward some third nature — deep address may outlive the stack. Bratton: "we have no idea how to govern in this context." (213)

City layer:

Beneath the address layer is still the old-fashioned topography it once addressed — the city. Only the city now looks more like Archizoom's No-Stop City than the static geometries of Le Corbusier.

Cities are platforms for users rather than polities for citizens. And as Easterling might concur, their form is shaped more by McKinsey or Haliburton than by architects or planners. Architecture becomes at best interface design, where cement meets computation. It is now a laminating discipline, creating means of stabilizing networks, managing access, styling interfaces, mixing envelopes. Cities are to be accessed via mobile phone, which afford parameters of access, improvisation, syncopation.

The ruin our civilization is leaving does not look like the pyramids. It's a planet wrapped in fiber optic. But perhaps it could be otherwise. "Our planet itself is already the mega-structural totality in which the program of total design might work. The real design problem then is not foremost the authorship of a new envelope visible from space, but the redesign of the program that reorganizes the total apparatus of the built interior into which we are already thrown together." (182)

The cloud layer is a kind of terraforming project – here on earth. Clouds are built onto, or bypass, internet. They form a single big discontinuous computer. They take over functions of the state, cartography being just one example. There are many kinds of clouds, however, built into quite different models of the stack, each with their own protocols of interaction with other layers. Google, Apple and Amazon are stacks with distinctive cloud layers, but so too are WalMart, UPS and the Pentagon.

Some cloud types: Facebook, which runs on the captured user graph. It is a rentier of affective life offering a semi-random newspaper and cinema, strung together on unpaid nonlabor, recognition and social debit. Then there's Apple, who took over closed experience design from Disney, and offer brand as content. As a theology, Apple is an enclave aesthetic about self-realization in a centralized market. It's a rentier of the last millimeter of interface to its walled garden.

On the other hand, Amazon is an agora of objects rather than subjects, featuring supply chain compression, running on its own addressing system, with algorithmic pricing and micro-targeting. But even Amazon lacks Google's universal ambition and cosmopolitan mission, as if the company merely channeled an inevitable quant reason. It is a corporation founded on an algorithm, fed by universal information liquidity, which presents itself as neutral platform for humans and inhumans, offering 'free' cloud services in exchange for information. "Google Großraum delaminates polity from territory and reglues it into various unblendable sublayers, weaving decentralized supercomputing through increasingly proprietary networks to hundreds of billions of device end-points." (295)

Bratton: "The Cloud polis draws revenue from the cognitive capital of its Users, who trade attention and micro-economic compliance in exchange for global infrastructural services, and it in turn provides each of them with an active, discrete online identity and the license to use that infrastructure."

Maybe this is "algorithmic capitalism" – or maybe (as I argue) it's not capitalism any more, but something worse. (81) Something Bratton's innovations in conceptual language help us perceive, but which could be pushed still further.

The current cloud powers all built out accidental advantages or contingent decisions. Not without a lot of help from human users, whose unpaid non- labor provides the feedback for their constant optimization. We are all guinea pigs in an experiment of the cloud's design. But Bratton is resistant to any dystopian or teleological read on this. The cloud layer was the product of accident as much as design; con ict as much as collaboration. Still, there's something unsettling about the prospect of the nomos of the cloud. Bratton: "The camp and the bunker, detention and enclave, are inversions of the same architecture." (368) The nomos of the cloud can switch between. It is yet to be seen what other topological forms it might enable.

Earth layer: Was computation discovered or invented? Now that the stack produces us as users who see the earth through the stack, we are inclined to substitute from our experience of working and playing with the stack onto the earth itself. It starts to look like a computer, maybe a rst computer, from which the second one of the stack is derived. But while earth and stack may look formally similar they are not ontological identical. Or, as I speculated in A Hacker Manifesto, the forces of production as they now stand both reveal and create an ontology of information that is both historical and yet ontologically real.

Particularly where the earth is concerned, "Computation is training governance to see the world like it does and to be blind like it is." (90) But the stack lacks a bio-informational skin that might connect ecological observation to the questioning of resource management. Running the stack now puts more carbon into the atmosphere that the airline industry. If it as a state it would be the fth largest energy suck on the planet. "Even if all goes well, the emergent mega-infrastructure of The Stack is, as a whole, perhaps the hungriest thing in the world, and the consequences of its realization may destroy its own foundation." (94)

What provides the interesting angle of view in Bratton is thinking geopolitics as a design problem. "We need a geopolitics of design that is comfortable not only with computation but also with vertical systems of designation and decision." (xix) But this is not your usual design problem thinking. "The more difficult assignment for design is to compose relations within a framework that exceeds both the conventional appearance of forms and the provisional human context at hand, and so pursuing instead less the materialization of abstract ideas into real things than the redirection of real relations through a new diagram." (210)

Contra Latour, but also Haraway and Tsing, for Bratton there is no local, only the global. We're users stuck with a stack that resulted from "inadvertent geoengineering." (306) But the design prospect is not to perfect or complete it, but to refashion it to endure its own accidents and support a range of experiments in rebuilding: "the geo-design I would endorse doesn't see dissensus as an exception." (306)

It's not a romantic vision of a return to an earth before the stack. Bratton: "... the design of food platforms as less about preserving the experiential simulation of preindustrial farming and eating... and more like molecular gastronomy at landscape scale." (306) But it is not a naïve techno-utopianism either. While I don't think it's a good name, Bratton is well aware of what he calls cloud feudalism, which uses the stack to distribute power and value upwards. And it is fully aware that the "militarized luxury urbanism" of today's vectorialist class depends on super-exploitation of labor and resources. (311) At least one novel observation here however is that the stack can have different governance forms at each level. The stack is not one infrastructure, but a laminating of relatively autonomous layers.

Here Bratton gestures towards the post- human accelerationism of Negarastani and Brassier, but with far more sense of the constraints now involved. "The Anthropocene should represent a shift in our worldview, one fatal to many of the humanities' internal monologues." (353)

Bratton: "The Stack becomes our dakhma." (354) Perhaps a dakhma like the raised platform built by the Zoroastrians for excarnation, where the dead are exposed to the birds. To build stack to come we have to imagine it in ruins: "design for the next Stack... must work with both the positive assembly of matter in the void, on the plane and in the world, and also with the negative maneuver of information as the world, from its form and through its air." (358)

To think about, and design, the stack to come, means thinking within the space of what Bratton calls the black stack, which is a "generic profile of its alternative totalities" (363) It might look

more like something out of Borges than out of the oracular pronouncements of Peter Theil or Elon Musk. Bratton: "Could this aggregate 'city' wrapping the planet serve as the condition, the grounded legitimate referent, form which another, more plasmic, universal surage can be derived and designed?" (10) Let's nd out.

In his article The Monism of the Universe, he wrote in 1925:

(picture) "Death is one of the illusions of the weak human mind. Death does not existe [...]. The universe is constructed in such a way that not only itself is immortal, but also all of its parts, in the form of living, blessed being. There is no beginning and no end to the universe, and thus no beginning and no end to life and to bliss."

Ultimately, in the process of cosmic evolution mankind would loose its physicality and dissolve into some kind of radiation, immortal in time and space the description of which reminded of angels and spirits.

Since the late 1990s, Kurzweil has published three books, the title of which reflect his growing aspirations from a technological to a spiritual utopia: The Age of Intelligent Machines (1999), The Age of Spiritual Machines (1999) and The Singularity is Near (2005) (picture) which became a National Bestseller. Kurzweil is one of the central proponents of Transhumanism, a radically utopian movement of various organizations and networks which is concerned with the development and application of human enhancement technologies and aims at a perfection of mankind by pharmaceutical, biotechnological and other means.

Genetics, Nanotechnology and Robotics/ Superintelligence.

"Nanotechnology, [being] an intersection of information and the physical world promises to build the tools to rebuild the physical world, our bodies and brains included."

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]María Iñigo Clavo

Modernity vs. Epistemodiversity

1. Facing History: Modernity as Prefix

It is a hallmark of postcolonial theory to question selective, self-flattering accounts of European modernity. Postcolonial theorists from both Europe and the rest of the world have illustrated how ideals of emancipation, equality, freedom, and scientific and industrial development were only possible through their opposites: colonial exploitation, inequality, slavery, torture, and suffering in the Global South.[1] That's why, during the 1990s, theorists felt it was necessary to insist that coloniality was the other face of modernity, the "dark side of the renaissance," as Walter Mignolo famously put it.[2]

While European theorists such as Habermas have claimed that modernity began in Northern Europe with the Enlightenment in the late seventeenth century, Latin American theorists such as Enrique Dussel see this as a sign of contempt for Spain and Portugal's historic contribution to modern thought, and as yet another indicator of Europe's colonial mentality with regard to Latin American intellectual production.[3] Latin American postcolonial theorists have thus situated the birth of Western modernity in 1492 with the "discovery of America," which marks the beginning of the history of international capitalism, globalization, and its intellectual production.

Given that the ultimate goal is to question modernity, does it not seem contradictory to dispute which side holds the patent to it? If Euro-American and Latin American postcolonial thinkers agree that modernity was the origin of all colonial evils, why should we insist on being acknowledged as part of it?

For many theorists, regardless of how postcolonial their work may be, rejecting the genealogy of the modern would involve denying any merit at all to what is still considered by many to be the West's most precious and enduring legacy. The key question then becomes: Must modernity remain a mark of the West? Why do we still feel the need to define ourselves in terms of all

those prefixes that locate modernity (anti-, pre-, post-, anti-, counter-) in order to remain in the orbit of Western history, the planetary system that shapes our understanding of the world and generates our frameworks of knowledge?

What are the prefixes retained by modernity used for? In the following I will chart the use over time of the different prefixes attached to modernity in the Latin American context, with a special focus on Brazil. In this way, I hope to demonstrate the contemporary persistence of epistemological symptoms associated with the imperialist conception of the South as a faulty version of the North. These prefixes are the result of a need on the part of the South to contest, resist, and free itself from the idea of an "Imperial South."

This insistence on attaching prefixes to modernity seems to show the inability of the West to let go of the notion of modernity as a reference point in historical accounts. But why this inability? Boaventura de Sousa Santos believes we still live amidst modern values—freedom, equality, solidarity, development, empowerment, etc.—and therefore he proposes reconceptualizing these values from a Southern perspective. In this text I will follow Santos's use of "the South," signifying not a geographical location but the place of utterance of the oppressed.[1] Similarly, the term "North" will represent here the economic and intellectual hegemony of Euro-America.

2. Without Modernity There Is No History (of Emancipation): A-Modern, Antimodern

In her classic book Hegel and Haiti, Susan Buck-Morss argues that Hegel's interest in the Haitian Revolution inspired his early masterpiece The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).[2] However, although Hegel was a contemporary of the Haitian declaration of independence from France, there is little evidence that the master-slave dialectic was understood in colonial terms. Like the French Revolution, the Haitian Revolution was based on the tenets of equality, liberty, and fraternity—only it extended these rights to slaves.

In the years following Haiti's independence in 1804, European governments began to undermine the political agency of former slaves by refusing to recognize the sovereignty of the new nation. Before long, Hegel had discarded his admiration for the Haitian general Toussaint Louverture, and by 1820 the philosopher considered Haiti to be in a state that Kant termed "guilty immaturity."[3] Hegel advocated the recolonization of former colonies: "Against the absolute right of that dominant people who are the present carriers of the degree of development of the world Spirit ... the spirit of other peoples has no right."[4]

This was consistent with Hegel's affection for Napoleon, whom he understood to be a "world-historical" personage. It was Napoleon who turned against Louverture, forcing the latter's resignation, deportation, and the imprisonment which led to his death. Hegel's version of modernity bears, in this respect, the scars of its German origins, a heritage marked, in the words of Rebecca Comay, by a kind of "mourning sickness" regarding the legacy of the French Revolution. Which is more "modern," the French Revolution or the reaction that brought

Napoleon to power? In the conflict between Napoleon and Louverture—contrary to Hegel's understanding—it is Napoleon, and the Europe that empowered him, that would seem to be the representatives of the "antimodern," insofar as we allow "modern" to signify what the revolutionaries of France and Haiti thought it did.

But of course this is not how the French empires saw things. The newly created Haitian Republic became the most delegitimized state in Latin America, and Napoleon presented Haiti with a bill for its own freedom, in the amount of 150 million francs. Haiti only finished paying it in 1947. Such was the price for Haiti daring to self-abolish slavery and declare itself an agent of its own history.

Also contributing to Europe's denial of Latin American historical agency was Karl Marx, who saw in Simón Bolivar just another example of "Bonapartism," or military-led, aristocratic reaction. Lacking a theory of imperialism, Marx was unable to distinguish between counterrevolution and national liberation. Although Marx and Hegel disagreed about the details of the "correct" historical sequence, for both "Latin America was still 'outside history' for not having developed political institutions and philosophical thought that would allow it to insert itself in the progressive movement towards freedom characteristic of 'Universal History.'"[2] In both cases, the South appears in the narrative of modernity as it's opposite, the antimodern. This soon gave way to seeing the South less as opposed to modernity than simply behind it.

But perhaps the question can be phrased differently: Was there really no modernity in Latin America? Or is it that modernity has to be explained in different terms?

3. Southern Modernity behind and under Western History: Copycat Modernity or a Different Modernity?

In the 1990s, Néstor García Canclini spearheaded a debate on Latin American modernity from a cultural studies perspective. Although many countries in Latin America produced their own forms of intellectual modernism in the 1920s—and in many places this was a very splendid moment—even protagonists of Brazilian modernism such as Oswald de Andrade and Mário de Andrade (no relation) admitted that these movements constituted only tiny minorities within illiterate populations living outside any process of modernization. Candini's question was, can there be modernism without modernization?[3]

In his "Anthropophagy Manifesto" of 1928, Oswald de Andrade explains how the Latin American "swallowing" of intellectual theories from Europe is an example of anthropophagy, the ritual that frightened Europeans the most. De Andrade argues that the ability to merge multiple cultures and histories is a peculiarly Brazilian intellectual strength. The manifesto also satirized Latin American thinkers who owe too much to nineteenth-century European writers; de Andrade confronts these thinkers with Western myths concerning "the savage," and cultural misunderstandings of colonization and anthropophagy. As is well known, from the 1920s

onwards the concept of the anthropophagus become one of the richest categories associated with Brazilian identity.

After years of neglect, this category was revived in the 1960s and '70s under the pressure of military dictatorships and debates around "dependency theory," which sought to understand Latin America's economic underdevelopment and its dependency on the United States. In the arts, debates raged across the continent: If our economy and culture has been imported from Europe, how can the South overcome this position of being a bastard copy of the North? How can we know what is or is not properly ours? What can be considered a truly Latin American art and philosophy?[10] Or as Marta Traba would ask: Can Pop art occur in Latin America without the existence of a truly accessible mass culture? In the midst of this debate, the category of the anthropophagus reemerged as a way to reclaim the mestizo and anthropophagous nature of the South's intellectual production, and offered a means for reworking Euro-America concepts without any need to "be authentic," and without being predestined to represent "cactus, parrots, and palm trees."[11]

In his classic text "Nacional por subtração" (1987), Roberto Schwarz seeks to understand the origins, in Brazil, of the neurosis surrounding the category of the imported copy, which he traces back to the previous century. For Schwarz, imported copies presented a false problem that began with the coexistence of contradictory economic systems and values during the early-nineteenth-century era of independence. The "new" values contrasted in every way with old formulas, engendering the feeling of inhabiting a backward country that would never catch up with "true" modernity:

For a few, the colonial heritage seemed a waste that would be overcome with progress. Others saw in it a real country, which should be preserved against absurd imitations. Some even wanted to bring progress and slave labor together, so as not to let either escape, and some others felt that such harmonization already existed and was demoralizing.[12]

This vision of a late-arriving modernity, or a modernity that contradicts itself in its supposed purity, is very similar to the critique, internal to the West, that led to postmodernism in Euro-America. The difference might be that in postcolonial contexts these contradictions were more visible, or even—and this was the demoralizing part—impossible to hide.

Cildo Meireles, *Missão*, 2010. Image courtesy of the artist.

4. Postcolonial Modernity on top of Western History: Precocious Postmodernity or Dehistoricization?

Homi Bhabha, who spoke of a colonial "countermodernity" when discussing India, used to say that the postcolonial contexts that shaped the "enlightened subject" in the colonies posed a threat to Western postmodern theory. This is because these contexts were already multicultural, mestizo, and chronologically fragmented, and involved subjects in crisis.[13] Postcolonial encounters prompted continuous negotiations with insurrections of "subjugated knowledges," as Foucault termed it. All the conditions that Latin America had historically tried to rationalize, escape from, and overcome as the aporia of the continent were now being celebrated in the late-capitalist West.

One of the main banners of Latin American postmodernism was the defense of magical realism, a movement in literature and art influenced by the "irrational" magical beliefs of postcolonial archaic societies. At the same time, several Latin America critics and authors characterized Latin American art and culture as "baroque": Alejo Carpentier, José Lezama Lima, Nicolás Guillén, Carlos Fuentes, and Octavio Paz, among others, identified the baroque as nothing less than Latin America's ontological style. But Jorge Luis Marzo suggests that the baroque has been used as a pretext to point out the postmodern—as well as premodern or antimodern—character of Latin America in accordance with the political interests of a particular moment:

To what extent has the baroque responded as an allegory of helplessness, and yet at the same time of the liberation from the modern? How much about this celebration of rhetoric veils an attempt at glorifying an alleged failure and how much about it has been used to generate a powerful political resource?[14]

5. History through the Modern World-System: (Colonial) Modern World-System and Transmodernity

Inmanuel Wallerstein coined the term "modern world-system," which reconceptualized modernity in economic terms to defend the idea that it is not a project whose authorship belongs to Europe, but rather a phenomenon that would have been impossible to carry out without the colonies and a global system of commercial networks. Aníbal Quijano has added that the Latin American contribution was not restricted to the economic, but was ideological as well:

I suggest, then, that the discovery of Latin America generates a profound revolution in the European imaginary and from there in the imaginary of the Europeanized world through domination: there is a shift from the past, as a center of a forever lost golden age, towards the future as the golden age to be conquered or built.[15]

To Wallerstein's coinage, Walter Mignolo adds the word "colonial": talking about the "colonial modern world-system" is a way of unearthing the darkest part of the Western-led project. Another formulation comes from Enrique Dussel's essay "Transmodernity and Interculturality." Like Wallerstein and Mignolo, Dussel denies the existence of a unidirectional project that

extends from Northern Europe towards the Southern Hemisphere. He explains modernity as a shared project that goes beyond dualist models and can be described as an incorporative solidarity: between the first and third worlds, women and men, races and classes. This amounts to saying that the story of modernity has not yet been fully told.[16]

Dussel would agree with Boaventura de Sousa Santos that this reconstruction/reparation can only be done on the basis of the experiences of the victims. As W. J. T. Mitchell points out, when Marx wondered about what would happen if commodities could speak, he might as well have asked slaves, or the Haitian revolutionaries.[17] Although speculating about speaking commodities might appear to be an animist notion or a poetic exercise, as we shall see this actually carries a real political import in that it assumes an object to have a soul. When this thinking is applied to slaves, it transforms them into persons with agency, and by extension, transforms how Western subjects understood their relationship with slaves.

6. Modernity and History versus Animism, or the Dissolution of Boundaries: Countermodern

Jürgen Habermas, Bruno Latour, and de Sousa Santos have all focused their efforts on understanding one of the major features of colonial modernity: the separation between the natural and human sciences. Habermas claims that modernity is an unfinished project because the separation and specialization of scientific knowledge has failed to fulfill one of modernity's major promises, namely, the introduction of scientific knowledge into everyday practices. From an anthropological perspective, Latour proclaims that "we have never been modern"; this is because, although the definitive condition of modernity was the constant mixing of genres, the intellectual basis of modernity was nonetheless constituted on the separation of humans and nonhumans. Without dwelling on this matter, I would like to draw attention to the fact that Latour bases this compelling observation on the theories of anthropologist Philippe Descola, who studied animism and Amerindian cosmologies, in which the separation of nature and society does not exist. These indigenous epistemologies provide us with a platform for questioning the disciplinary boundaries imposed by modern sciences—boundaries that still order our thinking today.

In this regard one can understand why many Western thinkers have in recent years turned to the work of Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, who has suggested that animism and perspectivism can be decolonizing forces. In his studies of Amerindian perspectivism, Viveiros de Castro explores the social aspect of relationships between humans and nonhumans. According to his perspectivist theory, many Amerindian cosmologies endow objects with a soul because what constitutes them is the relationships that exist among them. Nothing can be left out of relational processes, since these influence what we are and shape subjectivity. In Amerindian perspectivism, if something has a soul—and Amerindians believe that not only nature, but also inanimate objects have a soul—then that something must also be seen as a person.

If we accept the animist notion that everything is at the same time a person and a part of nature, we can do away with the division between the natural and social sciences. We can also do away with the notion of human nature, according to de Sousa Santos: "There will be no human nature because all nature is human."[18] From the standpoint of Amazonian perspectivism, and contrary to our sciences, to know is not to objectivize but rather the opposite: it consists of embodying, i.e. subjectivizing, because it implies taking on the point of view of that thing which is it necessary to know. Consequently, the object of study becomes an enunciating subject, which implies granting it the status of interlocutor and therefore giving it agency. Amerindian perspectivism has been seen as a way to destabilize Western frameworks of thought, eliminate the disciplinary boundaries that separate us from "our objects of study," and open up new frameworks.

This may be why curator Anselm Franke said that his traveling exhibition Animism: Modernity Through the Looking Glass was not really about animism. It was instead a reflection on the making of borders. If animism is a limit of the rational imaginary,

what this project suggests is that the limit where the "merely" imaginary begins (which is a border of some significance to art, too) is also operating the political distinction constitutive of any societal order, namely between what has and what hasn't rightful claims to make on reality—the border of political recognition.[19]

7. Beyond Modernity and its Others: Epistemodiversity

With this tour through the prefixes of modernity in Latin America, I hope to have shown how the concept of modernity varies according to time and political need. Another longstanding Western tendency is to treat alterity as a political field. One of the figures that inspired the French Revolution was Rousseau's noble savage, which itself drew inspiration from a three-volume travelogue written by Baron de Lahontan and published in 1703, after de Lahontan's travels throughout Latin America.[20] Oswald de Andrade's "Anthropophagy Manifesto"—which he wrote shortly before joining the Communist Party—suggested that Pindorama (the original Tupi name for Brazil in precolonial, matriarchal times) was a model for how community could be built in the modern world. The counterculture of the 1970s, with its proposals for alternative lifestyles outside of capital, also placed great importance on indigenous cosmologies. Current theories of the commons likewise invoke indigenous experiences.

As Hal Foster showed in his classic "The Artist as Ethnographer," there have always been recurring political claims on spaces of alterity, first by proletarians, then by cultural others. But while these other epistemologies have been a source of inspiration for new forms of self-definition and identification, such movements have engaged in very little historical and political dialogue with indigenous people.

That is why a fear haunts us when we realize that Viveiros de Castro's Amerindian perspectivism

comes from anthropology: historically, anthropology in Brazil hasn't facilitated the "incorporation" of indigenous and African texts into the country's heritage, as they have been seen as objects of study rather than producers of knowledge.[21] Instead, these indigenous and Afro-Brazilian texts have mainly been used for poetic inspiration by artists and intellectuals looking for reference points of national identity. In "Anthropophagy Manifesto," de Andrade makes use of European ethnographic literature to explore fantasies of Pindorama's matriarchal society and its lack of a concept of ownership. Ultimately, de Andrade's aim is (national) self-definition; he was uninterested in the indigenous political processes taking place in close proximity to him. That's why the manifesto employs the strategy of "incorporating the Other": this Other is replaced by its representations, thus negating its real political presence and agency.[22] This is what Fernando Coronil calls the "destabilization of the self by the Other," in which the latter is used as a source of inspiration for projects of change. Coronil argues that this strategy only reinforces polarization, obliterates historicalties, and homogenizes differences.[23]

And this strategy has reappeared: in 2015, the exhibition "Variações do Corpo Selvagem" at SESC Ipiranga in São Paulo showed the life and customs of indigenous peoples through photographs taken by Viveiros de Castro. The exhibition focused on Viveiros de Castro himself, comparing his anthropological photographic perspective to his participation in the Brazilian underground scene of the 1970s. It also compared indigenous shamans depicted in the photographs to the Parangolés made by Hélio Oiticica for Carnival. The idea of transforming the object of study into an interlocutor, a subject of knowledge and utterance, was not mentioned or used as a curatorial strategy. This was an exhibition about Viveiros de Castro rather than indigenous cosmologies.

It is unclear whether getting an answer about modernity would require a better definition of the concept, or if having such a definition would help us overcome the Western obsession with instrumentalizing, inventing, and dominating the Other. I agree with Frederick Cooper that the concept of modernity is not clear enough to allow for a definition.[24] This is why John D. Kelly "hope[s] not for alternative modernities but alternatives to 'modernity' as a chronotope necessary for social theory."[25]

In his "A Discourse About Science" written in 1988, de Sousa Santos showed how the sciences have been in crisis since the 1970s, when it was accepted that the intentions of scientists influence the results of their experiments.[26] This called into question the foundation of empiricism—which assumes that the event being studied is isolated from its context—and in turn undermined science's universalist aspirations. De Sousa Santos insists that distinctions between subject/object and human/nature perpetuate colonialism, since these divisions separate those who have rights from those who do not. This includes indigenous peoples who live in a "natural state," but also rivers, mountains, and forms of memory that can't be found in human rights discourse. Throughout modernity, Nature (with a capital N) was turned into an object of study so that it could be exploited.

Our aim, then, should be to find things that will help us break the duality of the human and natural sciences (subject/object). This in turn will enable us to rethink the way we organize disciplinary boundaries. If it has been acknowledged that the organization of scientific objectivity and reason depends on capitalist exploitation, why do we continue to uncritically uphold the modern ways in which knowledge is organized?

To advance this aim, it is essential to search through forms of knowledge that were ignored by modernity. This is one of the beliefs underlying the work being undertaken at the Federal University of Southern Bahia, which has abolished the distinctions between disciplines for first-year undergraduate students. The university also includes local knowledge in its curricula by employing local and traditional mestres to work with students, and by teaching indigenous cosmologies in class. This is a crucial step towards wider recognition of these traditions, which are often undervalued in the region, and whose practitioners generally lead marginal and precarious lives. Rather than preserving these traditions in an academic encyclopedia of knowledge, the Federal University of Southern Bahia is attempting to preserve their modes of production, which now coexist with a globalized economy. This is a first step in promoting the epistemodiversity that modernity—regardless of the prefix used—was unable to construct.

What is the role of art in this process of transformation? Art, which is also a subalternized form of knowledge, has long made room for the nomadic way of thinking in which different disciplines dialogue with each other, heedless of borders. That's why art often precedes theory. It is startling how much de Sousa Santos's "A Discourse About Science" echoes artistic rhetoric and practice:

It will not be long before particle physics shall speak of particles playing, or biology of the molecular theatre, or astrophysics of the heavenly text, or chemistry of the biography of chemical reactions. Each of these analogies unveils a corner of the world ... We might wonder whether it is possible, for example, to do a philological analysis of an urban project, to interview a bird, or to perform participant observation among computers.[22]

Art has always been able to gather critical tools of action from different contexts of knowledge in order to intervene in institutions, politics, and social problems. This makes it a privileged place to find new strategies for epistemodiversity. At the same time, art has always maintained a strict border between itself and popular culture, to ensure that art is on the same level as the Western sciences. What if this border disappeared? How do we construct a new language that uses popular knowledge not as a theme for contemporary art, but as a spark for creating new regimes of representation and new structures of thought? How can contemporary art contribute to the learning of epistemodiversity?

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This text was written between Madrid, London, and São Paulo. I am very grateful to the

different gazes and revisions that have contributed to this text: Pedro Neves Marques, Raúl Sánchez Cedillo, Lola Garcia, Jessica Loudis, Stephen Squibb, and especially Alba Colomo.

Coloniality, as I said before, is the common logic of all colonialisms. Coloniality doesn't need colonialism any more. It established itself as the necessary weapon of modernity: modernity promises you that life will be better if you become Christian, for example, or if you adopt Western civilizing conducts or if you develop. And you may believe it. That is how coloniality works hiding behind the promises of modernity. For that reason coloniality is not over but it is all over, as Samantha Fong (reflecting on her experience as Singaporean in London and in the US) puts it.

Coloniality is a concept that did not come from any particular discipline. Anibal Quijano, who introduced the term, was trained as a sociologist. But, you know, doing sociology in the Third World is not looked at seriously by the International Association of Sociology and other equivalent associations unless you are a devotional follower and believer in science and the social science. I have a friend, a Brazilian sociologist, very creative, and he told me that he is seen as doing Cultural Studies not Sociology. Decolonization, during the Cold War, was a concept whose origins are obscure but its use was beyond the discipline. It was an undisciplinary concept. And decoloniality follows suit. It emerged together with coloniality and now these are the guiding concepts of practitioners of several disciplines. However, each of us are not trying to incorporate coloniality and decoloniality to a given discipline, to improve it or to update it, but are using the disciplines to improve and update of social, economic and epistemic un-justices covered by the rhetoric of modernity and enacted by the logic of coloniality. We are doing this from different disciplines, our thinking and doing is at best transdisciplinary, but more so undisciplinary. For it is not enough to question the disciplines if your questioning remains within disciplinary

rules. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]Philosophy as electromagnetic opera: "all and everything"

Against fragmented knowledge. Decolonial knowledge as sensing, feeling and knowing (Mignolo 2011, Gurdjieff 1938)

From cosmology to psychology

To language and the posthuman - meta-human

From the ecology crisis to politics -population management reduction (altright)

From avant garde cosmologies: Gurdjieff, milet and barad

Language and diplomacy. Telepathy, esoterism and neuroscience

Politics : decolonial

New paradigm of knowledge

In terms of mignolo sensing knowing and being

An Barad onto epistemology

"extractivismo epistémico", especialmente por Ramón Grosfoguel

destructiva de conocer, ser y estar en el mundo.[1]

Pseudoscience and imagination. When science created fantasies of a future world. Soledad Quereilhac (Sociedades espiritualistas en el pasaje de siglos: entre el cenáculo y las promesas de

una ciencia futura (1880-1910)

The Fourth Dimension and Non-Euclidean Geometry in Modern Art: Conclusion

Linda Dalrymple Henderson

rupert sheldrake - minds as more like extended fields than as processes confined to brains.

telepathy space-time non locality

Reading Benjamin Bratton on Artificial Intelligence, Language and "The New Normal", i then realised that the whole paradigm of observation and distinction / interpretation is unbalanced from the start

Where does sensing stop, for example, and information processing begin?

I believe that whenever a new technology emerges as keuomorphic imperative appears, and we ask how we are going to apply this to automate, accelerate or amplify something that we have done before: if we have an AI version of this, or an AI version of that, it will make it work better.

Then I read Barad and Gloria Anzaldua. I noticed another paradigm, sensibility may open up for another observation. One that does not require to establish fixed distinctions but multiple contradictory and vulnerable uncertainties. A moment of complete openness and vulnerability in which the regimented lucum of language expands into the plante and down into the stars. What does it mean to be in question?

An other alternative to big data binary quantification is Metabody . Metabody cuestiona los modos de articular la percepción que se orientan a la cuantificación de toda realidad y favorece

en su lugar otros modos de percepción, y con ello de cuerpo y de arquitectura, que favorezcan la indeterminación, lo amorfo, no como negatividad sino como pluralidad en movimiento y devenir.

———

Outside of medicine, brain-to-brain communication could find applications across many disciplines. Soldiers, for instance, could use the technology on the battlefield, sending commands and warnings to one another. Civilians might benefit, as well; businesspeople could use it to send cues to partners during negotiations, or pitchers and catchers could avoid sign-stealing during baseball games.

Still, telepathic communication that works like a sort of futuristic walkie-talkie will involve major advances in sensing, emitting and receiving technologies—and perhaps even a slight retraining of the human brain. At the same time, Pascual-Leone cautions that scientists must also keep in mind the ethics of telepathy.

"Could there be potential for sending someone a thought that's not desirable to them?" he says. "Those kinds of things are theoretically in the realm of possibility."

Read more: http://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/scientists-prove-that-telepathic-communication-is-within-reach-180952868/#KfWE8wDGifdRidd0.99

Surfing to Jean-Pierre Garnier Malet, father of the Doubling Time Theory

Language and space-

time [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

"What is accomplished with the statement that reality has collapsed ?". Erika Balsom's Rehabilitating Observation paper was timely and gave many possible directions to the symposium.

But one thing is rehabilitating observation and the other, different, is rehabilitating the real?

Beyond the general dissatisfaction with the postmodern adequately pointed out by EB, the role of experimental moving image in relation to language has always been to expand the possibilities of the intellectual real/reality/truth into the space-time dimensions of sensing, believing and knowing. A la Barad 'cutting together-apart'.

In this sense, the symposium worked precisely in this direction. Both performance, lecture and moving image that followed did expand these critical/philosophical debates in forms that I'm finding difficult to summarise/translate here...

LZ

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]Film-Philosophy

Journal | Salon | Portal (ISSN 1466-4615) Vol. 7 No. 51, December 2003

Tammy A. Kinsey

Small delineates three distinct theses as the content of _Direct Theory_. First, he states that experimental film and video should be seen as a major genre, a category of work like that of narrative fiction or documentary. Next, he suggests that experimental film should be linked – technically, structurally, and historically -- to art video. He then points to eight common traits seen in works of this type, whether produced in film or video, to substantiate this claim. Finally, Small states that experimental film and video functions as a unique 'direct theory that bypasses the limiting intervention of separate semiotic systems, especially the spoken or written language upon which the accepted history of film theory depends' (xv).

a second, more fundamental question remains: how can the semiotic system of images (cinematographic or videographic, likely accompanied by sounds but for the sake of this question no pertinent written or spoken words) function as that mode of philosophic discourse we regard as theoretical?' (4-5)

Small goes on to say that experimental film's major function is neither to reveal information (as documentaries) nor to entertain (as is common with fictive narratives), but rather to 'theorize upon its own substance by reflecting back on its own intrinsic semiotic system(s)' (5). These issues inform the discussion of direct theory.

Small lists eight characteristics for the form of experimental film and video in his discussion supporting the argument for genre separation as well as for the connection between art video and experimental film. The first three, personal autonomy of the artist ('a collaborative construction or quintessential auteur control'), financial autonomy, and

brevity of the work (17-19), are likely familiar to those well versed in production of experimental and independent work. The fourth characteristic listed names 'an affinity for ongoing technological developments' (19), and calls forth the idea that experimental artists are very interested in technical aspects of production, including 'animation, step printers . . . special effects . . . an eventual embrace of video technology and computer graphics' (19). This element is certainly true for some artists, but not for all. Fifth, Small names 'a penchant for the phenomenology of mental imagery' as a characteristic of experimental work (19). Again, this is

true for some filmmakers. Small's sixth characteristic is 'the avoidance of verbal language' (20). The last two listed are obviously the post pivotal to his argument for direct theory overall: 'an exploration of nonnarrative structures' (21) and the reflexivity inherent in experimental work. Small's discussion of these areas in broad terms is somewhat limited, but his consideration of the problems in defining reflexivity is particularly compelling.

Small's second major thesis is that of the correlation between experimental film and video art. Again, it seems obvious that these areas are linked in a great many ways, and Small's discussion of the aesthetic qualities of video is quite interesting. There are many reasons an artist may choose to present his or her work in either film or video, in Super8 film loops or multi-channel digital displays, but an assessment of the choices of the artist is not a part of Small's discussion.

Finally, Small presents his intriguing concept of 'direct

theory'. He asserts that experimental film and video call for a unique mode of theory, one that transcends the written or spoken word. This is indeed a satisfying notion, and one that requires much thought, but I am left wondering then what is next? Is this possible? How can we speak of it? Can anyone write about it? What is the next step here? I believe _Direct Theory_ moves in a very precise region of the discussion of experimental forms, and there are fewer conclusions here than are needed. Small states in his Preface: 'beyond (or beside) these three theoretical theses is a careful chronological overview that should serve as a thorough text for college courses devoted to the history of its subject' (xv). The book is brief and the works and theories outlined are naturally used in service to the theses presented. I wouldn't use this book as a text in my courses on experimental film and video, as I find it lacking in scope as a historical overview. The discussion of cognitive science as it relates to film theory is almost entirely absent, and that area is of great relevance, especially when we are considering the idea of direct theory. Is it possible to herd experimental work into this large space and say that the obvious sub-genres should be considered in the same theoretical ways? The book has in some cases clarified my own thoughts about certain works, but it hasn't changed my notions. It does, however, inspire many questions. For this, it must be applauded.

©©

[redacted]

[redacted]Mau
rice Nicoll, Psychological Commentaries on the Teaching of Gurdjieff and Ouspensky, Boston: Shambhala, 1996, and Samuel Weiser Inc., 1996, ISBN 0-87728-910-7 (6 volumes)

Tcoet—— an idiot isual essay on theology, quantum physics and political science (with a pinch of sm sci-fi)

to establish an Electromagnetic dungeon on the moon's surface

The action of the Moon is like a weight. It controls Organic Life, which covers the surface of the Earth as a sensitive film. It is like a weight on a pendulum. Its influence is to keep everything where and as it is. It uses Organic Life on earth is its food. From this point of view life on Earth is a pain-factory

Magnetic Centre

48 laws of the Earth; and part under the 96 laws of the Moon

CENTRE OF GRAVITY

SUN, MOON, AND STARS

The gravitational force of the Moon is strong enough to affect the movement of tides, etc., on the Earth.

As machines we are driven by outside life. We are functions of life. We react to everything as machines do. First we have to see this is so genuinely, not extravagantly. The gradual realization of this mechanicalness of one's elf is the beginning of awakening. Remember only you can awake to yourself. I cannot awaken you. If we could change our responses to daily impressions, if we could resist the customary effects of daily life upon us, we would be creating "Moon in ourselves". We have, therefore, as it is taught, to isolate ourselves from the effects of life on us—not from life. If we do not, if we live mechanically—and by now some should really know what is meant by that and understand that one can sit in a chair doing nothing and yet think and

feel mechanically — if, I said, we live mechanically, then "Moon eats us". It takes all our energy, especially when we are negative. Notice it is your way of taking life you have to work against. That requires long self-observa- tion.

Samsung church in the moon

A few years ago, a pastor from tcoet approach Samsung CEO with a design for

To be under the Moon is to be under the greatest possible mechanical- ness and, as you know, this is the case in a man, a woman, who is fast asleep, governed by every form of negative emotion, hate, internal considering, and so on.

———

The organ Kund-abuffer

The failure of logos:

Great Amwell House, November 29, 1947

CENTRE OF GRAVITY

SUN, MOON, AND STARS

CHAPTER 26

The Legominism Concerning the Deliberations of the Very Saintly Ashiata Shiemash Under the Title of "The Terror-of-the-Situation"

"These meditations of mine made it categorically clear to me that all the genuine functions proper to man, as they are proper to all the three-centered beings of our Great Universe, had already degenerated in their remote ancestors into other functions, namely, into functions included among the properties of the organ Kunda-buffer which were very similar to the genuine sacred being-functions of Faith, Love, and Hope.

"It is perfectly easy to convince beings of this planet of anything you like, provided only during their perceptions of these "fictions," there is evoked in them and there pro-ceeds, either consciously from without, or automatically by itself, the functioning of one or another corresponding consequence of the properties of the organ Kundabuffer crystallized in them from among those that form what is called the "subjectivity" of the given being, as for instance: "self-love", "vanity", "pride", "swagger", "imagination", "bragging," "arrogance," and so on.

love

"In an equally abnormal form were data moulded in them for evoking the sacred impulse of love. "In the presences of the beings of contemporary times, there also arises and is present in them as much as you please of that strange impulse which they call love; but this love of theirs is firstly also the result of certain crys-tallized consequences of the properties of the same Kund-abuffer; and secondly this impulse of theirs arises and manifests itself in the process of every one of them en-tirely subjectively; so subjectively and so differently that if ten of them were asked to explain how they sensed this in-ner impulse of theirs, then all ten of them—if, of course, they for once replied sincerely, and frankly confessed their genuine sensations and not those they had read about somewhere or had obtained from somebody else—all ten would reply differently and describe ten different sensa-tions. "One would explain this sensation in the sexual sense; another in the sense of pity; a third in the sense of desire for submission; a fourth, in a common craze for outer things, and so on and so forth; but not one of the ten could describe even remotely, the sensation of genuine Love. "And none of them would, because in none of the ordi-nary beings-men here has there ever been, for a long time, any sensation of the sacred being-impulse of genuine Love. And without this "taste" they cannot even vaguely

describe that most beatificsacred being-impulse in the presence of every three-centered being of the whole Uni-verse, which, in accordance with the divine foresight of Great Nature, forms those data in us, from the result of the experiencing of which we can blissfully rest from the meritorious labors actualized by us for the purpose of self-perfection.

...

beings "loves" somebody or other, then he loves him ei-ther because the latter always encourages and undeserv-ingly flatters him; or because his nose is much like the nose of that female or male, with whom thanks to the cos-mic law of "polarity" or "type" a relation has been estab-lished which has not yet been broken; or finally, he loves him only because the latter's uncle is in a big way of busi-ness and may one day give him a boost, and so on and so forth. "'But never do beings-men here love with genuine, im-partial and nonegoistic love. "'Thanks to this kind of love in the contemporary be-ings here, their hereditary predispositions to the crystal-lizations of the consequences of the properties of the organ Kundabuffer are crystallized at the present time without hindrance, and finally become fixed in their na-ture as a lawful part of them.

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Nicoll commentaries 3

The action of the Moon," Gurdjieff said, in so many words, "is like a weight. It controls Organic Life, which covers the surface of the Earth as a sensitive film. It is like a weight on a pendulum. Its influence is to keep everything where and as it is. It uses Organic Life as its food. From this point of view life on Earth is a pain-factory."

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Decolonial biennials

RE:EMERGING, DECENTRING AND DELINKING Shifting the Geographies of Sensing, Believing and Knowing

Walter D. Mignolo

005 / 8 May 2013

Today, one feels that, with the collapse (financial, political and ethical) of the European Union and the critical moments currently taking place in the USA both domestically and internationally, we are living a change of epoch, not an epoch of change. Things are shifting; centres are moveable; sensibilities are shifting the illusion of the end of history after 500 years of localized western history; consolidation and domination is ending. Older – much older – histories of civilizations are re- emerging. Globalism (the neoliberal vision of homogenizing the planet) is spinning out of control and every western universal is under siege.

———-

While dewesternisation has tried to change the content of the conversation from within, decoloniality seeks to change even the terms of the conversation.

As signaled in the Bandung Conference of 1955 and in other political and economic experiments, decoloniality seeks to create another hand for humanity beyond the left and the right hand.

From the enduring victimhood of Southern Africa, Africa and the Global South must raise a new struggle to re-orient the world and set afoot a new decolonial and liberated World Order.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

M U L T I V E RSE

Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision

By David Michael Levin

DARK MATTER

This unconscious yearning for other 'forms of life' was projected, in Guattari's case, onto the figure of an invisible, protean alien intelligence.

Khazam: How did Guattari come to conceive of the Infra-quark Universe ?

Maglioni and Thomson: Guattari's idea of an Infra-quark Universe owes something to the appearance in physics of superstring and membrane theory, which posit the notion of parallel

universes existing in other dimensions, perhaps only a millimetre removed from our own. For us, one of the most exciting discoveries related to such theories is that as much as 74% of the universe is composed of dark matter. In terms of a Copernican Revolution of thinking this has profound implications, for it suggests that the universe is only a quarter visible, which means either that an image can only show us a quarter of what it purports to make visible, or that we see only a quarter of what any image contains. It also means that every image constitutes a field of forces and intensities which, in another universe, could have a different equilibrium, a different potential, through the displacement of as little as a single element. For us this has something in common with the shadow-bearing minimal differential posited by Duchamp in his ready-mades – the dimension of the infra-thin – which we try to apply to thinking cinematographic images by looking for the potential that any film contains to be minimally different from itself. This is especially relevant with regard to UIQ who might affect the very consistency of images and make them slightly different – images that in our universe would normally be supposed to contain UIQ as a representation. In a way Guattari was anticipating what has become a fairly normal aspect of contemporary cinema, the virtual plasticity of being able to manipulate every aspect of the image.

Dainton

Resonable empirical predictions of what the future might be like for humankind

And the likelihood of future technological development

Speculates on the Metaphysics of the self

Barry Dainton presents a fascinating account of the self, the key to which is experiential or phenomenal continuity.

Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations, or even moving from one body to another. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our persistence conditions - an account which reflects how we actually conceive of ourselves - should be framed in terms of mental rather than material continuity. But mental continuity comes in different forms. Most of Locke's

contemporary followers agree that our continued existence is secured by psychological continuity, which they take to be made up of memories, beliefs, intentions, personality traits, and the like. Dainton argues that a better and more believable account can be framed in terms of the sort of continuity we find in our streams of consciousness from moment to moment. Why? Simply because provided this continuity is not lost - provided our streams of consciousness flow on - we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic psychological alterations. Phenomenal continuity seems to provide a more reliable guide to our persistence than any form of continuity. The Phenomenal Self is a full-scale defence and elaboration of this premise.

The first task is arriving at an adequate understanding of phenomenal unity and continuity. This achieved, Dainton turns to the most pressing problem facing any experience-based approach: losses of consciousness. How can we survive them? He shows how the problem can be solved in a satisfactory manner by construing ourselves as systems of experiential capacities.

He then moves on to explore a range of further issues. How simple can a self be? How are we related to our bodies? Is our persistence an all-or-nothing affair? Do our minds consist of parts which could enjoy an independent existence? Is it metaphysically intelligible to construe ourselves as systems of capacities? The book concludes with a novel treatment of fission and fusion.

Fission

Mind division: faulty operation (, teleporter, scanning

Mind division brings an entirely new perspective on consciousness and subjectivity. This type of teleporting ideas and impressions take the risk of loss of consciousness

By thinking humans as species or higher individuals, fission becomes survivable

Barry dainton's self

Speculates on the Metaphysics of the self, individual identity, psychological continuity and teleportation

He proposes de Ultimate game machine simulation (U-SIM)

By thinking persons as speciaes or higher individuals fission becomes survivable.

Locke: identity is no tied to any substance.—>approach to mental and psychological continuity of the self --> Memories, beliefs, ambitions, hopes and fears, linguistic an intellectual capacities

Ultimate game machine simulation (U-SIM) —>>Game of Napoleon: conclusion: psicologycal continuity cease but 'existential continuity' replace that condition (provided streams of consciousness keep going without interruption, one continuous to exist irrespective of any changes one undergoes)

The view that we are only subjects of experienced (Aristotle, Descartes and so many reincarnation traditions)

Locke: identity is not substance but can move from matter to matter. Requisite conciseness. Young children are not lockean persons.???

Experiential continuity (deinton view) and psychological continuity (post lockean view)

C-systems: capacities for experience and nothing more (beyond biological / non bio). Continuous potential for experience

Maglev trains -->> track (space)

C-systems —>> time (potential experience) =\ brains (objects with capacities for experience /= experiencial subjects Or C-systems!

Page 51

Selvas are beings with Continuous potential for experience, regladless of wether the capacities are grounded in the brain or inmaterial non physical phenomenon (Descartes)

Problem is on the definition of consciousness (not self... Self awareness ?!). Suppose we are some king of mechanical apparatuses that respond to habits, stimulii, external forces (planets and so on). Everything happens to us: wars, death, life. There is no control whatsoever in any of these, then the question again is what kind of consciousness we are.

"""""Strictly speaking men are not to blame for war. War is due to cosmic forces, to planetary influences. But in men there is no resistance whatever against these influences, and there cannot be any, because men are slaves. """""""

"""""War has many causes that are unknown to us. Some causes are in men themselves, others are outside them. One must begin with the causes that are in man himself. How can he be independent of the external influences of great cosmic forces when he is the slave of everything that surrounds him? He is controlled by everything around him. If he becomes free from things, he may then become free from planetary influences. """""""

What are our aims ?

Socrates "Know thyself."

'know thyself speaks of the necessity of knowing one's machine, the 'human machine.' Limited to human lifetime and planet bound, the sphere of the human machine. How we scape limitations, scape the sphere ?

Biology and space travel ? Neuroscience ?

Atomic self: self illusion

Baudelaire film quote from usual subjects: "..the greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world that he doesn't exist"

Julián bagini ego trick

John hood self illusion

neuroscientific evidence: Course of action have been decided before we consciously take a decision -social, genetic, complex conditioning

Psychological persistence: All this questions the given solidity of the self

Two problems:

unity of consciousness at a time and

unity of consciousness over time

Phenomenal present —->> combine to produce entire stream of consciousness

Unity and continuity of experience is purely an experiential affair, without the need for souls or egos. Phase 1, 2, and 1,5 (Scales Gurdjieff?!)

Fission

Mind division: faulty operation (, teleporter, scanning

By thinking persons as species or higher individuals fission becomes survivable

Dualisms

Tononi (2008) = mathematical formula for informational integration (higher conscious organisms)

Bertrand Russell monism: physics, matter and the mind connected beyond the experiential -- idea of levels perhaps !

Widely recognised that physicts only look at structural and behavorial properties of matter

Physical particles may combine to produce the kind of experience that we (humans) do

Consciousness / biochemical activity inseparable (kurvail human cloud unworkable)

The predatory universe hypothesis

Are we individual machines or a giant interconnected machine that produces some kind of element for the sustainability of something we can not see, hear or feel. We can only live within the sphere of the tonal (deleuze, BwO)

(Cultural and) Social neuroscience (neurobiology of attachment) complex filaments

DIALOGO CON AGUSTIN IBAÑEZ, INVESTIGADOR DEL INSTITUTO DE NEUROLOGIA COGNITIVA

////// ideology

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Theories of the self (human machine and it's cartographies)

Feed: air, food and impressions (c-systems can not live without impressions)

c-systems complex machines = 3 brained beings (mind, emotions, movement) —> particular configurations + social brain = human sphere

triune brain to three brained beings

How the human sphere is influenced by other spheres ? War, destruction and death

Objectivity, ideology and the workings of the machine in time and space (spheres of influence, social brain)

IIRR from realist/ idealism,

Complex interdependence in international relations is the idea put forth by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye

Carl deutsch ... theory of burocracy

Theories of International Politics and Zombies by Daniel W. Drezner

Contents

Introduction

Realism

Neorealism

Liberalism

Neoliberalism

Post-Liberalism

Constructivism

Marxism and Critical Theory

Feminism [redacted]

[redacted]xeno

[redacted]

[redacted]

Green Theory

Alternative approaches

English School

Functionalism

State Cartel Theory

Post-structuralism

Post-modernism

Postcolonialism

Evolutionary perspectives

Cap 12 mil mezetas tratado de nomadologia y la maquina deal a de guerra

maquina deal a de guerra es exterior al apparat ode estado

Ajedrez vs Go

Semiologia - guerra sin fines de combate, sin protocolos, pura estrategia

——

Hegel critique ofSpinoza monism ———>>>>Proto mystical - lacks scientific rigour

Neurosciences

Teleportation survivable ? Mind-body physical-non physical dualism ...

Riqueza visual y profundidad de campo

————————

Giorgio Sergio -– from Castaneda tenant to the singularity university... Creating a post human micro-sphere....

When we watch the world through a frame - television, computers, books, art - we suspend our perception system; we stop using the direct perceptions coming through our senses and we

perceive through projections.

Our physical eyes are frozen into a bi-dimensional window and we lose the access to our 360 degrees tridimensional view. (To then support that forced, unnatural state we need artificial props like glasses.) The same is true for others senses of hearing, smell, taste, and touch.

We are becoming perceptively disabled.

We are coaching ourselves to live our experiences through projections.

We're becoming abstractly detached from the physical world while we are training ourselves to interact with a ghost world that doesn't have an energetic source behind (Proto-mystical idea?!)

In our capacity to perceive through projections, we are activating a new ability, while we are deactivating our capacity of interacting and engaging with the physical world.

We are not gaining freedom from our new developed capacity because we are entrapping ourselves - and our new developed talent - into ghost perceptions; we're trapping our perceptiveness, tying it to a phantom world.

Our eyes, our senses are losing their ability to directly perceive the space they inhabit. And we are losing our capacity to fully interact with the world we're in.

Where our new capacity of interacting with projections will take us, is still unknown to us. ☼

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Deep politics

All and Everything

Based on the script The Strange Life of Onaicull Agallibuz

I remember coming to planet earth in 1868, at the same time Bakunin joined the socialist International Working Men's Association.

The General Council of the International, in 1872, the Hague Congress.

Aanleiding

"The hope is that in not too many years, human brains and computing will be coupled together very tightly, and that the resulting partnership will think as no human brain has ever thought."

J.C.R. Licklider, 'Man-Computer Symbiosis,' 1960[3].

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>>>>>>>>>>>>

>>>>>>>>>>>>

>>>>>>>>>>>>

The theory of all and everything

Dark matter dark energy time memory trauma

90% experiential memory is lost

Cosmopolitics suggests a unique practice of relating to these bifurcations: acknowledging our participation in multiple, irreducible worlds—not just at the level of knowledge and concepts (epistemological pluralism) but at the level of being itself (ontological pluralism). Such pluralism indicates the pervasive influence of Whitehead (1978) on cosmopolitics, as it echoes his "ontological principle"—that is, the reason for anything is always one or more actual entities. Thus instead of spatializing reality by positing two separate containers—one called nature and one called society—

cosmopolitics suggests that there are as many modes of reality as there are entities. The task is to trace the multiplicity of associations between entities as they particpate in a common, ecological collective—where nonhumans also have a

In search chp. 6

The thinking and the emotional centers are not indispensable for life."

_____

The problem of agency

(as will has degenerated into free will and moral responsibility and other binary dilemmas)

(Within time -all changes, no permanent or "eternal return" dilemma)

Micro agency

Everything in a human happens, it's gaze, it's so called consciousness is very far from a unified, independent, permanent gaze, a will ...

It's fragmented, expanded, changing and mechanical

Consciousness is an interrupted flux of experiences, impressions, sensations that happened without an I

Macro agency

The state is a conglomerate of interests among many networked agencies that exercise, articulate some habitual, mechanical, impermanent will

Conference mandarin:

I attended that conference in Greece but I can locate the ex act time and place...

I asked him whether he considered it possible to attain "cosmic consciousness," not for a brief moment only but for a longer period.

R:"I do not know what you call 'cosmic consciousness,'

organs of sight

And the second fact, by virtue of the same degenera-tion of their sight into Koritesnokhnian, is based on that law common to all beings, namely, that the results ob-tained from every manifestation of the Omnipresent Oki-danokh are perceived by the organs of sight only when in immediate contact with those vibrations which are formed in beings and which actualize the functioning of the being-organ for perceiving, at the given moment, the vis-ibility of cosmic concentrations situated beyond them; that is to say, only when the said results of the manifesta-tion of the Omnipresent-Okidanokh proceed up to the limit beyond which, according to the quality of the given organ for perceiving visibility, what is called the 'momen-tum of the impulse' dies down, or to put it otherwise, they

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Apadurai

5 dimensiones in the cultural flux

1. Ethno scape - produced by flux of people tourists, migrants exiles workers refugees etc

2. Techno scapes - flux of machineries and operations display by corporations and government agencies

3. Finance scape - flux of currencies, bonds stocks

4. Media scapes - images information produced and distributed globally

5. Ideas scape - images associated to movement of ideologies and propagandas ... Freedom, well being, rights etc

Globalization es la cristalización del mundo entero en un solo lugar (Roland robertson, Culture globalization and world system, ed. King)

Aesthetics of Resistance

Barry Dainton's Self

Rosi Braidotti's Posthuman

Peter sloterdijk many, specially, Bubbles: Spheres Volume I: Microspherology, You Must Change Your Life and In the World Interior of Capital: Towards a Philosophical Theory of Globalization

Suley Rolnick

http://eipcp.net/transversal/1106/rolnik/en

Hito Steyerl

http://eipcp.net/transversal/0311/steyerl/en

Edgardo Vigo ?? Carlos ginzburg

_____

The fourth Brain

The political - societal assamblage point

pre-individual socius

Deleuze

Suggesting that the political is dependent on pre-individual factors, such as the socius, not only differentiates Deleuze's thinking from Schmitt's, but, taking seriously Jeremy Valentine's suggestion that the most important aspect of contemporary discussions of the political is their 'displacement of the human monopoly of agency, not only with respect to technology, but also with respect to organic life at the sub-human or post-human level' (2006: 511), reveals that Deleuze's thinking on the political accords with the general orientation of contemporary thinking on the subject. The originality of Deleuze's thinking lies in the degree to which he thinks the political from non-human/pre-individual factors. For example, according to Deleuze, it is not the case that human political action simply entails a human-centred decision which is either orientated towards or influenced by non-human events; the political, for Deleuze, refers to a pre- individual human socio-linguistic field that grounds individual decisions/action with the consequence that individual political action is an effect, rather than cause, of continuously changing pre-individual systems of signification. In other words, the great contribution Deleuze's analysis of the political makes is to bring to the fore the pre-individual, non-human subterranean social and linguistic structures that

are often taken for granted in political analyses, such as Schmitt's, that are grounded in an autonomous, individual, self-interested, rational, decision-maker. Deleuze's point is that

Schmitt's autonomous decision-maker is not the cause, but an effect of pre-individual, socio-linguistic flows that shape his actions and thinking. By pointing in this direction, Deleuze not only radically challenges the notion of an individuated entity rationally choosing its actions upon which much classical and modern political theory rests, but shows that the political is intimately connected to, and ultimately defined by, each society's pre-individual socius.

capitalism's decoding does not lead to the absence of signification, but the immediate replacement of one code with another.

De-territorialization is not a problem for capitalism, but is, in fact, the means through which capital perpetuates itself. Capitalism is, therefore, an unstable system based on explicit forms of de-territorialization-re-territorialization whereby codes, values, and norms are continually usurped to determine new territory (i.e. markets) for capital to flow into/through.

Its decoding is not a pure decoding whereby flows can escape the system and travel to explore unencumbered by predetermined goals, but is always continued within a particular end. For this reason, Deleuze and Guattari call the decoding of capitalism, a relative decoding (2004a: 267). This is, however, the strength of capitalism; its openness to alternatives is what allows it to incorporate these alternatives into its operations and ends. Empire no longer entails physical land as its primary goal, but capital, which, as a secondary phenomenon, leads to physical land (2004c 270).

Barry dainton's self

Metaphysics of the self and personal identity

Locke: identity is no tied to any substance.—>approach to mental and psychological continuity of the self --> Memories, beliefs, ambitions, hopes and fears, linguistic an intellectual capacities

Ultimate game machine simulation (U-SIM) –>>Game of Napoleon: conclusion: psicologycal continuity cease but 'existential continuity' replace that condition (provided streams of consciousness keep going without interruption, one continuous to exist irrespective of any changes one undergoes)

The view that we are only subjects of experienced (Aristotle, Descartes and so many reincarnation traditions)

Locke: identity is not substance but can move from matter to matter. Requisite conciseness. Young children are not lockean persons.???

Experiential continuity (deinton view) and psychological continuity (post lockean view)

C-systems: capacities for experience and nothing more (beyond biological / non bio). Continuous potential for experience

Maglev trains -->> track (space)

C-systems –>> time (potential experience) =\ brains (objects with capacities for experience /= experiencial subjects Or C-systems!

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Selvas are beings with Continuous potential for experience, regladless of wether the capacities

are grounded in the brain or inmaterial non physical phenomenon (Descartes)

Problem is on the definition of consciousness (not self... Self awareness ?!). Suppose we are some king of mechanical apparatuses that respond to habits, stimulii, external forces (planets and so on). Everything happens to us: wars, death, life. There is no control whatsoever in any of these, then the question again is what kind of consciousness we are.

"""""Strictly speaking men are not to blame for war. War is due to cosmic forces, to planetary influences. But in men there is no resistance whatever against these influences, and there cannot be any, because men are slaves. """""""

"""""War has many causes that are unknown to us. Some causes are in men themselves, others are outside them. One must begin with the causes that are in man himself. How can he be independent of the external influences of great cosmic forces when he is the slave of everything that surrounds him? He is controlled by everything around him. If he becomes free from things, he may then become free from planetary influences. """""""

What are our aims ?

Socrates "Know thyself."

'know thyself speaks of the necessity of knowing one's machine, the 'human machine.' Limited to human lifetime and planet bound, the sphere of the human machine. How we scape limitations, scape the sphere ?

Biology and space travel ? Neuroscience ?

Atomic self: self illusion

Baudelaire film quote from usual subjects: "..the greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world that he doesn't exist"

Julián bagini ego trick

John hood self illusion

neuroscientific evidence: Course of action have been decided before we consciously take a decision -social, genetic, complex conditioning

Psychological persistence: All this questions the given solidity of the self

Two problems:

unity of consciousness at a time and

unity of consciousness over time

Phenomenal present —->> combine to produce entire stream of consciousness

Unity and continuity of experience is purely an experiential affair, without the need for souls or egos. Phase 1, 2, and 1,5 (Scales Gurdjieff?!)

Fission

Mind division: faulty operation (, teleporter, scanning

By thinking persons as species or higher individuals fission becomes survivable

Dualisms

Tononi (2008) = mathematical formula for informational integration (higher conscious organisms)

Bertrand Russell monism: physics, matter and the mind connected beyond the experiential -- idea of levels perhaps !

Widely recognised that physicts only look at structural and behavorial properties of matter

Physical particles may combine to produce the kind of experience that we (humans) do

Consciousness / biochemical activity inseparable (kurvail human cloud unworkable)

The predatory universe hypothesis

Are we individual machines or a giant interconnected machine that produces some kind of element for the sustainability of something we can not see, hear or feel. We can only live within the sphere of the tonal (deleuze, BwO)

(Cultural and) Social neuroscience (neurobiology of attachment) complex filaments

DIALOGO CON AGUSTIN IBAÑEZ, INVESTIGADOR DEL INSTITUTO DE NEUROLOGIA COGNITIVA

////// ideology

——

Theories of the self (human machine and it's cartographies)

Feed: air, food and impressions (c-systems can not live without impressions)

c-systems complex machines = 3 brained beings (mind, emotions, movement) —> particular configurations + social brain = human sphere

triune brain to three brained beings

How the human sphere is influenced by other spheres ? War, destruction and death

Objectivity, ideology and the workings of the machine in time and space (spheres of influence, social brain)

IIRR from realist/ idealism,

Complex interdependence in international relations is the idea put forth by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye

Carl deutsch ... theory of burocracy

Theories of International Politics and Zombies by Daniel W. Drezner

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Cap 12 mil mezetas tratado de nomadologia y la maquina deal a de guerra

maquina deal a de guerra es exterior al apparat ode estado

Ajedrez vs Go

Semiologia- guerra sin fines de combate, sin protocolos, pura estrategia

——

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Teleportation survivable ? Mind-body physical-non physical dualism ...

Riqueza visual y profundidad de campo

_____

Giorgio Sergio -– from Castaneda tenant to the singularity university... Creating a post human micro-sphere....

When we watch the world through a frame - television, computers, books, art - we suspend our perception system; we stop using the direct perceptions coming through our senses and we perceive through projections.

Our physical eyes are frozen into a bi-dimensional window and we lose the access to our 360 degrees tridimensional view. (To then support that forced, unnatural state we need artificial props like glasses.) The same is true for others enses of hearing, smell, taste, and touch.

We are becoming perceptively disabled.

We are coaching ourselves to live our experiences through projections.

We're becoming abstractly detached from the physical world while we are training ourselves to interact with a ghost world that doesn't have an energetic source behind (Proto-mystical idea?!)

In our capacity to perceive through projections, we are activating a new ability, while we are deactivating our capacity of interacting and engaging with the physical world.

We are not gaining freedom from our new developed capacity because we are entrapping ourselves - and our new developed talent - into ghost perceptions; we're trapping our perceptiveness, tying it to a phantom world.

Our eyes, our senses are losing their ability to directly perceive the space they inhabit. And we are losing our capacity to fully interact with the world we're in.

Where our new capacity of interacting with projections will take us, is still unknown to us. ☼

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Deep politics

All and Everything

Based on the script The Strange Life of Onaicull Agallibuz

I remember coming to planet earth in 1868, at the same time Bakunin joined the socialist International Working Men's Association.

The General Council of the International, in 1872, the Hague Congress.

Aanleiding

"The hope is that in not too many years, human brains and computing will be coupled together very tightly, and that the resulting partnership will think as no human brain has ever thought."

J.C.R. Licklider, 'Man-Computer Symbiosis,' 1960[3].

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RAY OF CREATION

-"In this way the ray of creation helps us to determine and to realize our place in the world. But, as you see, we have not yet come to questions about influences. In order to understand the difference between the influences of various worlds we must better understand the law of three and then, further, still another fundamental law—the Law of Seven, or the law of octaves."

-WE TAKE the three-dimensional universe and consider the world as a world of matter and force in the simplest and most elementary meaning of these terms. Higher dimensions and new theories of matter, space, and time, as well as other categories of knowledge of the world which are unknown to science, we will discuss later.

-The idea of the ray of creation belongs to ancient knowledge and many of the naive geocentric systems of the universe known to us are actually either incompetent expositions of the idea of the ray of creation or distortions of this idea due to literal understanding.

-"It must be observed that the idea of the ray of creation and its growth from the Absolute contradicts some of the modern views, although not really scientific views. Take, for instance, the stage—sun, earth, moon. According to the usual understanding the moon is a cold, dead celestial body which was once like the earth, that is to say, it possessed internal heat and at a still earlier period was a molten mass like the sun. The earth, according to the usual views, was once like the sun, and is also gradually cooling down and, sooner or later, will become a frozen mass like the moon. It is usually supposed that the sun is also cooling down and that it will become, in time, similar to the earth and later on, to the moon.

——

"The process of the growth and the warming of the moon is connected with life and death on the earth. Everything living sets free at its death a certain amount of the energy that has 'animated' it; this energy, or the 'souls' of everything living—plants, animals, people—is attracted to the moon as though by a huge electromagnet, and brings to it the warmth and the life upon which its growth depends, that is, the growth of the ray of creation. In the economy of the universe nothing is lost, and a certain energy having finished its work on one plane goes to another.

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Concept of materiality

"The seven worlds of the ray of creation represent seven orders of materiality. The materiality of the moon is different from the materiality of the earth; the materiality of the earth is different from the materiality of the planetary world; the materiality of the planetary world is different from the materiality of the sun, and so on.

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Then G, repeated briefly all that had been said before about the structure of man and the world. He drew the diagram of the ray of creation and the diagram of the four bodies of man [see Figs. 1, 3]. But in relation to the bodies of man he introduced a detail which we had not had before. He again used the Eastern comparison of man with a carriage, horse, driver, and master, and drew the diagram with one addition that was not there before. "Man is a complex organization,"

He again drew the diagram of the ray of creation and by the side of earth he placed the physical body of man. "This is ordinary man," he said, "man number one, two, three, and four. He has only the physical body. The physical body dies and nothing is left of it. The physical body is composed of earthly material

—

"In the big cosmic octave, which reaches us in the form of the ray of creation, we can see the first complete example of the law of octaves. The ray of creation begins with the Absolute. The Absolute is the All. The All, possessing full unity, full will, and full consciousness, creates worlds within itself, in this way beginning the descending world octave. The Absolute is the do of this octave. The worlds which the Absolute creates in itself are si. The 'interval' between do and si in this case is filled by the will of the Absolute. The process of creation is developed further by the force of the original impulse and an 'additional shock.' Si passes into la which for us is our star world, the Milky Way. La passes into sol—our sun, the solar system. Sol passes into fa—the

planetary world. And here between the planetary world as a whole and our earth occurs an 'interval.' This means that the planetary radiations carrying various influences to the earth are not able to reach it, or, to speak more correctly, they are not received, the earth reflects them. In order to fill the 'interval' at this point of the ray of creation a special apparatus is created for receiving and transmitting the influences coming from the planets. This apparatus is organic life on earth. Organic life transmits to the earth all the influences intended for it and makes possible the further development and growth of the earth, mi of the cosmic octave, and then of the moon or re, after which follows another do—Nothing. Between All and Nothing passes the ray of creation.

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'The ray of creation ends in the moon. Beyond the moon there is nothing. This also is the Absolute—do.

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To quote Ouspensky:

If every three dimensional body is the section of a four

dimensional one, then every point of a three dimensional

body is the section of a four dimensional line. (Ouspensky,

1934:36)

This would therefore mean that one could represent the fourth dimension by using any of the elements within the third dimension, for example, points, lines, and plains. This is backed up by Ouspensky, who says that one could think of a "Four dimensional body as an infinite number of three dimensional bodies" (ibid).

.....

In Painterly Realism: Boy with Knapsack: Colour Masses in the Fourth Dimension, also of 1915, the opposite might be true instead of analogy Malevich might be portraying the fourth dimension as we perceive it. To expand: If a plane sees the world in terms of line then it follows, and is true, that we see the world in terms of planes, and as the fourth dimension is made up of the third and we are just unable to comprehend it, then it follows that planes in an incomprehensible arrangement would make a good representation of the fourth dimension, which after all we are just a

section of (ibid). This can also be seen to be connected to Ouspensky writing that

"separate bodies (as we perceive them) may be the section of parts of a four

dimensional body" (ibid: 37). Therefore we could be surrounded by the fourth

dimension but merely be unable to comprehend it.

.....

To explain this a bit further we could use Mr Leadbeater's analogy (as does

Ouspensky) (ibid). Leadbeater says, imagine that a man touches with his finger tips, a

table top; he will leave five circular marks (ibid). In Flatland, i.e. the land of two

dimensions, they would see only five lines; upon movement they would discover

these to be circles (ibid). This, though, would be as far as they would get, it would be

unimaginable to them to connect these circles to the hand of a man and the three

dimensional world from whence it came, and which they are unknowingly part of

(ibid).

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Tsiolkovskii called himself a "biocosmist" and a "panpsychist". In his article The Monism of the Universe, he wrote in 1925:

"Death is one of the illusions of the weak human mind. Death does not existe [...]. The universe is constructed in such a way that not only itself is immortal, but also all of its parts, in the form of living, blessed being. There is no beginning and no end to the universe, and thus no beginning and no end to life and to bliss."

———————

Re: Pfizer bid

Demystifying the narratives that associate private investment with innovation (besides the more complex debate on the value system private corps reproduce !)

INET 2014 KEYNOTE : Mariana Mazzucato

http://marianamazzucato.com/2014/04/11/inet-2014-keynote-innovation-do-private-returns-produce-the-social-returns-we-need/

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humanistic and Enlightenment thinking and art

Gaitán: The Berlin Biennale belongs to a tradition of modernist humanistic and Enlightenment thinking, and it is the same system in which people are educated in Germany. So, if you speak the language of contemporary art, the response comes back within the same linguistic, philosophical, and political framework. With the exception of, perhaps, people who have just moved to Germany, everybody is able to understand what you're saying, and how you are operating, and what epistemological tradition art belongs to. Most people would be able to understand that the function of culture is critical and analytical and so on, people won't expect an art that is celebratory of religion or ideology or nature, and they at least expect that it have a more complex and ambiguous relationship to reality. For me, in Berlin, the audience is not foreign to the structures of contemporary art, or, to put it differently, contemporary art is not an alien ideology.

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In Search of Vulnerability

One of the problems of the politics of subjectivation that artistic practices face has been the anesthesia of our vulnerability to the other – an anesthesia all the more devastating when the other is represented by the ruling cartography as hierarchically inferior, because of his or her economic, social or racial condition, or on any other basis. But vulnerability is the precondition for the other to cease being a simple object for the projection of pre-established images, in order to become a living presence, with whom we can construct the territories of our existence and the changing contours of our subjectivity. Now, being vulnerable depends on the activation of a specific capacity of the sensible, which has been repressed for many centuries, remaining active only in certain philosophical and poetic traditions. These traditions culminated in the artistic vanguards of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, whose activity produced effects that have left their mark on art across the twentieth century. More broadly, they propagated throughout the social tissue, ceasing to be a privilege of the cultural elites, particularly from the 1960s on. Neuroscience itself, in recent research, corroborates this observation that each of our sense organs is the bearer of a double capacity: cortical and subcortical.[2]

The former corresponds to perception, allowing us to apprehend the world in terms of forms, in order to then project upon them the representations we have available, so as to give them meaning. This capacity, which is the most familiar to us, is associated with time, with the history of the subject and with language. With it arise the very figures of subject and object, clearly delineated and maintaining a relationship of exteriority to each other. The cortical capacity of the sensible is what allows us to preserve the map of reigning representations, so that we can move through a known scenario where things remain in their due places with a minimum of stability.

The second, subcortical capacity, which is less known to us because of its historical repression, allows us to apprehend the world as a field of forces that affect us and make themselves present in our bodies in the form of sensations. The exercise of this capacity is disengaged from the history of the subject and of language. With it, the other is a living presence composed of a malleable multiplicity of forces that pulse in our sensible texture, thus becoming part of our very selves. Here the figures of subject and object dissolve, and with them, that which separates the body from the world. In the 1980s, in a book, which has recently been reissued,[3] I began referring to this second capacity of our sense organs as the "resonant body." It is our body as a whole which has this power of resonating with the world.

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Deleuze, mil mezetas, thousand plateaus:

The tonal seems to cover many disparate things: It is the organism, and also all that is organized and organizing; but it is also signifiance, and all that is signifying or signified, all that is susceptible to interpretation, explanation, all that is memorizable in the form of something recalling something else; finally, it is the Self (Moi), the subject, the historical, social, or individual person, and the corresponding feelings. In short, the tonal is everything, including God, the judgment of God, since it "makes up the rules by which it appre-hends the world. So, in

a manner of speaking, it creates the world.". Yet the tonal is only an island. For the nagual is also everything. And it is the same everything, but under such conditions that the body without organs has replaced the organism and experimentation has replaced all interpreta-tion, for which it no longer has any use.

Flows of intensity, their fluids, their fibers,

their continuums and conjunctions of affects, the wind, fine segmentation, microperceptions, have replaced the world of the subject.

Becomings, becomings-animal, becomings-molecular, have replaced his-tory, individual or general. In fact, the tonal is not as disparate as it seems: it includes all of the strata and everything that can be as cribed to the strata, the organization of the organism, the interpretations and explanations of the signifiable, the movements of subjectification. The nagual, on the con-trary, dismantles the strata. It is no longer an organism that functions but a BwO that is constructed.

No longer are there acts to explain, dreams or phantasies to interpret,

childhood memories to recall,

words to make sig-nify; instead,

there are colors and sounds,

becomings and intensities (and when you become-dog, don't ask if the dog you are playing with is a dream or a reality, if it is "your goddam mother" or something else entirely). There is no longer a Self [Moi] that feels, acts, and recalls; there is "a glowing fog, a dark yellow mist" that has affects and experiences movements, speeds.20

The important thing is not to dismantle

the tonal by destroying it

all of a sudden.

You have to diminish it, shrink it, clean it, and that only at certain moments.

You have to keep it in order to survive, to ward off the assault of the nagual. For a nagual that erupts, that destroys the tonal, a body without organs that shatters all the strata, turns immediately into a body of noth-ingness, pure self-destruction whose only outcome is death:

The tonal must be protected at any cost.

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Positioned as the introduction to the second volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Rhizome principally constructs a model (a new map) for apprehending the constitution and reception of a book. As Deleuze writes, "the book is not an image of the world. It forms a rhizome with the world, there is an aparallel evolution of the book and the world" (11). This model, framed metaphorically around rhizomorphism, also extends itself within the text to the study of linguistics and politics.

But what is a rhizome, anyway? In the words of the text: "A rhizome as subterranean stem is absolutely different from roots and radicles. Bulbs and tubers are rhizomes" (7). As is the potato, or any structure in which each point is necessarily connected to each other point, in

which no location may become a beginning or an end, yet the whole is heterogeneous. Deleuze labels the rhizome as a "multiplicity," rather than a "multiple," wresting it from any relation to "the One" (8). The rhizome likewise resists structures of domination, such as the notion of "the mother tongue" in linguistics, though it does admit to ongoing cycles of what Deleuze refers to as "deterritorializing" and "reterritorializing" moments.

Where the potato is the hero of this story, the tree becomes the villain. "Arborescent" is a dirty word. "We're tired of trees," writes Deleuze, "We should stop believing in trees, roots, and radicles. They've made us suffer too much" (15). Trees are genealogical, where by contrast "the rhizome is an antigenealogy" (21). The tree comes to symbolize the distinction between subject and object, between signifier and signified, encompassing the whole of dualistic logic through its branching patterns, through its definitions of set pathways between root and branch.

As such, "Rhizome" rapidly seeks to extinguish every last trace of Hegelianism, particularly from the object of the book: "There is no longer a tripartite division between a field of reality (the world) and a field of representation (the book) and a field of subjectivity (the author). Rather, an assemblage establishes connections between certain multiplicities drawn from each of these orders, so that a book has no sequel nor the world as its object nor one or several authors as its subject." Likewise, this essay refuses ontological thought, accepting the state of intermediacy, the logic of the conjunction, which perhaps explains the tendency in the prose toward polysyndeton.

That the text is titled Rhizome does not amount to a statement of topic (for the essay refuses objects and signifieds) but rather a statement of identity.

The prose is dense and schizophrenic. The essay consists not in an argument, but in the ecstatic elaboration of a metaphor, a web of interconnected concepts, the development of a new vocabulary without a pause for explanation or so much as a simple definition. Deleuze's metaphor applies even to the very text in which it comes into being. The text bypasses the static act of description: an enactment is at hand. Or, by the essay's own distinction, Rhizome is a mapping rather than a tracing. Deleuze writes, "What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious" (12).

_____

The familiar: reason, logic (binary, cause and effect), science (specially the assumptions of xviii and xix science), universal truths, idea of progress (Mario Bunge), the mainstream, the human, narrative, continuity, infinitesimal calculus,

Sociology (/=ethnomethodology, Harold garfinkel)

The unfamiliar: the other, queer, feminism, posthuman, DISCONTINUITY (AND QUANTUM DISCONTINUITY)

(1) the distrust of reason and, in particular, logic and science (xviii and xix science)

(2) denial of the existence of universal truths

(3) rejection of the idea of progress

Narrative and continuity

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCONTINUITY AND QUANTUM DISCONTINUITY

Indeed, with rare exceptions, continuity is a constant in human thought. It is probably based on the evidence provided by our sense organs: continuity of our own body, continuity of the environment, continuity of memory. It belongs to the visible domain, to the domain of constant forms (or forms evolving in a constant way), to the domain of objects. Death, natural cataclysms, mutations were, until just recently, considered more as manifestations of accident, chance, or impenetrable mystery. Science needs a mathematical apparatus for its development. Newton and Leibniz discovered such a tool based on continuity: infinitesimal calculus. For centuries, scientific thought has been nourished by the idea of continuity.

Gurdjieff's Philosophy of Nature

By Basarab Nicolescu

_____

Geometers have found that there is no reason why bodies should be thus limited. As a matter of fact all the bodies which we can measure are thus limited. So we come to this conclusion, that the space which we use for conceiving ordinary objects in the world is limited to three dimensions. But it might be possible for there to be beings living in a world such that they would conceive a space of four dimensions. . .

Now let us consider the two-dimensional world and a being living on a plane. For this being the universe will be one vast plane. On this plane let us imagine beings in the shape of points, lines and flat geometrical figures. The objects and 'bodies' of this world will also have the shape of flat geometrical figures. How will a being living on this plane universe perceive his world? We can say, first of all, that he will not sense the plane on which he lives. He will sense the objects, i.e. the figures lying on this plane; he will sense the lines which bound them, and for that very reason he will not sense his own plane because if he did, he would be unable to distinguish these lines. The lines will differ from the plane by the fact that they produce sensations, consequently they exist. The plane does not produce sensations; consequently it does not exist. Moving along the plane and not experiencing any sensations, the two-dimensional being will say that at the moment there is nothing there. Approaching some figure and getting the sensation of its lines, he will say that something has appeared. But gradually, through reasoning, the two-dimensional being will come to the conclusion that the figures he meets with exist on something or in something. So he may call this plane - 'ether' (of course, he will not know that it is actually a plane). Then he will say that 'ether' fills all space, but differs in its properties from 'matter'. So he will call lines - 'matter'. As a result, the two-dimensional being will regard everything that happens as happening in his 'ether', that is, in his space. He will not be able to imagine anything

as being outside this ether, i.e. outside his plane. If something happening outside his plane reaches his consciousness, he will either deny it, taking it as subjective, i.e. as a creation of his own imagination, or he will think of it as he thinks of all other phenomena, as happening on that very plane, in ether.

Sensing the lines only, the plane being will sense them quite differently from us. First of all, he will not sense an angle. It is very easy to verify this in practice. If we hold on a level with our eyes two

matches placed on a horizontal surface at an angle to one another, we will see one line. To see the angle we must look from above. The two-dimensional being cannot look from above, and therefore cannot see an angle. But by measuring the distance between the lines of the different 'solids' of his world, the two-dimensional being will be constantly confronted with angles and will regard the angle as a strange property of the line which at times appears and at others does not appear. In other words, he will refer the angle to time, will regard it as a transitory temporal phenomenon - a change in the state of the 'solid' - or as motion. It is difficult for us to understand this, difficult to imagine how an angle can be taken as motion. But it must necessarily be so and cannot be otherwise. If we try to visualize how a plane being will study a square, we shall see that for a plane being the square must necessarily be a moving body. Let us imagine a plane being faced with one of the angles of the square. He does not see the angle - in front of him there is a line, but a line possessing very strange properties. As he comes nearer to this line, the twodimensional being will see a strange thing happening to the line. One point will remain in its place, but the other points, on both sides, will recede backwards. I repeat: the two-dimensional being has no idea of an angle. In its outward appearance the line will remain the same as it was; and yet, something will undoubtedly be happening to it. The plane being will say that the line moves, but so rapidly that it appears to be motionless. If the plane being draws away from the angle and moves along a side of the square, this line will become motionless. Reaching an angle, he will again notice motion. If he makes the circuit of the square several times, he will establish the fact that there are regular periodical movements of this line. It is probable that for the mind of the plane being, the square will be his conception of a body possessing the property of periodical movements, unnoticeable to the eye but producing definite physical effects (molecular motion), or the idea of periodical moments of rest and motion in one complex line; and still more probably the square will appear to him as a rotating body.

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No es difícil imaginar una mente para la cual la secuencia de cosas ocurre no en el espacio sino sólo en el tiempo, como la secuencia de notas en la música.

Z: she speaks about The sequence of things

They occur not in space but in time

Exactly like the sequence of notes in music

It is not hard to imagine a mind

which experiences the sequence of things,

not in space but in time,

like the sequence of musical notes.

Einstein VS Tagore: una de las charlas más estimulantes en la historia del pensamiento moderno /

¿Qué es la realidad? Según a quién se le pregunte la respuesta puede variar ligera o dramáticamente. Pensemos en un libro: para un escritor, la realidad del libro es ficcional y emocional; para un editor se trata de un negocio; mientras tanto, para una polilla el libro es alimento. Del mismo modo que el papel en que está impreso un texto no es en sí mismo la literatura, las visiones científicas y filosóficas de la realidad han mantenido una relación cercana en la Antigüedad griega para ser en nuestros días virtualmente enemigas, sin que un horizonte de mutua comprensión aparezca a la vista.Pero el 14 de julio de 1930, Einstein recibió en su casa al filósofo hindú Rabindranath Tagore para tener una de las charlas más estimulantes en la historia del pensamiento moderno. La conversación que reproducimos a continuación forma parte del libro Science and the Indian Tradition: When Einstein Met Tagore, donde los pensadores definen conceptos como ciencia, belleza, conciencia y filosofía, en una meditación fascinante.En este extracto, Einstein y Tagore departen sobre la naturaleza de la verdad: de la Verdad científica opuesta—sólo en apariencia- a la Verdad de la religión brahamánica, para la que la verdad del hombre debe trascender la conciencia individual y fundirse con la conciencia

universal; Einstein no acepta este punto (la ciencia cree que la Verdad, o al menos ciertas verdades sobre el funcionamiento del universo, como la gravedad o la velocidad de la luz) tienen existencia por sí mismas, y a cuyo entendimiento aspira la ciencia. Tagore cree, por su parte, que toda verdad –en suma, que todo lo que podemos conocer- es parte de nuestra limitación humanaTagore: La ciencia se ocupa de aquello que no está confinado a los individuos; es el mundo impersonal humano de las Verdades. La Religión se da cuenta de estas Verdades y las une con nuestras necesidades más profundas; nuestra conciencia individual de la Verdad gana significación universal. La Religión aplica valores a la Verdad, y conocemos esta Verdad como buena a través de nuestra propia armonía con ella.Einstein: Nuestro punto de vista natural con respecto a la existencia de una verdad ajena de la humanidad no puede ser explicada o probada, pero es una creencia de la que nadie puede carecer –ni siquiera los seres primitivos. Nosotros atribuimos a la Verdad una objetividad superhumana, es indispensable para nosotros, esta realidad que es independiente de nuestra existencia y nuestra experiencia y nuestra mente –a pesar de que no podamos decir lo que significa.Tagore: En la aprehensión de la Verdad existe un eterno conflicto entre la mente humana universal y la misma mente confinada en el individuo. El proceso perpetuo de reconciliación se lleva a cabo en nuestras ciencia, filosofía y ética. En cualquier caso, de existir alguna Verdad absolutamente sin relación con la humanidad, entonces es para nosotros absolutamente como no existente.No es difícil imaginar una mente para la cual la secuencia de cosas ocurre no en el espacio sino sólo en el tiempo, como la secuencia de notas en la música. Para una mente así tal concepción de la realidad es similar a la de la realidad musical en la que la geometría pitagórica puede no tener ningún significado. Existe la realidad del papel, infinitamente diferente de la realidad de la literatura. Para el tipo de mente que posee la polilla que se come ese papel, la literatura es absolutamente no existente, y aun así para la mente del Hombre, la literatura tiene un valor más grande de Verdad que el papel en sí. De manera similar, si existiera alguna Verdad que no tiene relación sensorial o racional con la mente humana, permanecerá como nada mientras nosotros permanezcamos siendo seres humanos.Einstein: ¡Entonces yo soy más religioso de lo que tú eres!Tagore: Mi religión es la reconciliación del Hombre Super-personal, el espíritu universal humano, en mi propio ser individual.

Tagged: Agentes de Cambio, Einstein, ciencia, poesía, ciencia y espíritu, arte y ciencia, Rabindranath Tagore, metafísica y misticismo

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Experimental philosophy -—>> The Knobe Effect (intentionality is complex)

American Cognitive Science (exert control and domination - based on anthropos assumptions and binary logic)

Big Five personality traits and Facet (psychology)

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In tune with antihumanism, posthumanism stresses the urgency for humans to become aware of pertaining to an ecosystem which, when damaged, negatively affects the human condition as well. In such a framework, the human is not approached as an autonomous agent, but is located within an extensive system of relations. Humans are perceived as material nodes of becoming; such becomings operate as technologies of existence. The way humans inhabit this planet, what they eat, how they behave, what relations they entertain, creates the network of who and what they are: it is not a disembodied network, but (also) a material one, whose agency exceeds the political, social, and biological human realms, as new materialist thinkers sharply point out. In this expanded horizon, it becomes clear that any types of essentialism, reductionism, or intrinsic biases are limiting factors in approaching such multidimensional networks.

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modern rationality, progress and free will are at the core of the transhumanist debate, a radical critique of these same presuppositions is the kernel of antihumanism,32 a philosophical position which shares with posthumanism its roots in postmodernity

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post-anthropocentric =\ post-dualistic approach of (philosophical, cultural, and critical) posthumanism.

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Some years ago, when I was working on posthuman ontology, and specifically, on the subject of

the multiverse, the eternal recurrence started to haunt my thoughts: I could not think of the

multiverse without thinking of the eternal recurrence of the same…

Thus Spok e Zarathustra:

The soul is as mortal as the body. But the knot of causes in which I am entangled recurs and will create me again. I myself belong to the causes of the eternal recurrence. I come again, with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with this serpent - not to a new life or a better life or a similar life: I come back eternally to this same, selfsame life, in what is greatest and in what is smallest, to teach again the eternal recurrence of all things (Z: 3, ÐVjg"Eqpxcnguegpv Ñ. 333).

Hktuv"qh"cnn."ngv"og"enctkh{"vjcv"d("Ðownvkogtugѹ 8 I am referring to the scientific investigations on

matter from the micro to the macro levels of materialization, which recently brought different

fields, from quantum physics to cosmology and astrophysics, to the same hypothetical

conclusion: this universe might be one of many. Here, I should also mention that the multiverse

Ðku"pqv"c"vjgqt(."dwv"c"rtgfkevkqp"qh"egtvckp"vjgqtkguÑ."cu"equoqnqikuv"Ocz"Vgioctm"uvt guugu"

(2010: 558) 8 . For instance, the math of String Theory, 9 in order to function, requires a distinct

feature, which is extra-dimensions of space (Randall 2005; Bars et al. 2010) 10 , consequently

advancing the hypothesis that this specific dimension is only one of the many occurring. To go

back to our initial point: was Nietzsche, somehow tapping into this kind of memories of the

future? Could he be referring to a specific dimension of spacetime, when approaching the notion

of the same?

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Can we unravel time? Maybe. What we can do is to start by unraveling repetitive patterns of

existence within spacetime. A posthuman approach will be of help. Posthumanism invites to

think inclusively, comprehensively and relationally, radically stretching the boundaries of human

comprehension."kp"c"igpgcnqikecn"tgnqecvkqp"qh"jwocpkv{"ykvjkp"ownvkogtucnkv{"*Ðrquv-jwocpkuoÑ"

as a criticism of humanism, anthropocentrism and universe-centrism), and alterity within the self

*Ðrquvjwocp-
kuoÑ"cu"c"tgeqipkvkqp"qh"vjqug"curgevu"yjkej"ctg"eqpuvkwvkogn("jwocp."cpf"uvknn."

beyond human comprehension). The human, within this type of framework, turns into a network

of energies, alliances, matter and perspectives, relating to any other forms of existence; allied

through different material outcomes, and possibly, in different quantum dimensions, in a radical

onto-existential re-signification of being. In this type of posthuman ontological scenario, the final

deconstruction between immanence and transcendence takes place, inviting the situated actors to

envision their own networks in relation to, but also beyond, any specific space-time complexion.

The eternal recurrence of the same could thus be perceived as a technology of the multiverse,

related to specific vibrational ranges and dimensions. So if this universe is closed, do not worry:

you can always use the rainbow!

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[A description of the rhizome by Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari in their A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 1987]

The rhizome itself assumes very diverse forms, from ramified surface extension in all directions to concretion into bulbs and tubers. When rats swarm over each other. The rhizome includes the best and the worst: potato and couchgrass, or the weed. Animal and plant, couchgrass is crabgrass. We get the distinct feeling that we will convince no one unless we enumerate certain approximate characteristics of the rhizome.

1 and 2. Principles of connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an order. The linguistic tree on the Chomsky model still begins at a point S and proceeds by dichotomy. On the contrary, not every trait in a rhizome is necessarily linked to a linguistic feature: semiotic chains of every nature are connected to very diverse modes of coding (biological, political, economic, etc.) that bring into play not only different regimes of signs but also states of things of differing status. Collective assemblages of enunciation function directly within machinic assemblages; it is not impossible to make a radical break between signs and their objects. Even when linguistics claims to confine itself to what is explicit and to make no presuppositions about language, it is still in the sphere of a discourse implying particular modes of assemblage and types of social power. Chomsky's grammaticality, the categorical S symbol

that dominates every sentence, is more fundamentally a marker of power than a syntactic marker: you will construct grammatically correct sentences, you will divide each statement into a noun phrase and a verb phrase (first dichotomy...). Our criticism of these linguistic models is not that they are too abstract but, on the contrary, that they are not abstract enough, that they do not reach the abstract machine that connects a language to the semantic and pragmatic contents of statements, to collective assemblages of enunciation, to a whole micropolitics of the social field. A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles. A semiotic chain is like a tuber agglomerating very diverse acts, not only linguistic, but also perceptive, mimetic, gestural, and cognitive: there is no language in itself, nor are there any linguistic universals, only a throng of dialects, patois, slangs, and specialized languages. There is no ideal speaker-listener, any more than there is a homogeneous linguistic community. Language is, in Weinrich's words, "an essentially heterogeneous reality." There is no mother tongue, only a power takeover by a dominant language within a political multiplicity. Language stabilizes around a parish, a bishopric, a capital. It forms a bulb. It evolves by subterranean stems and flows, along river valleys or train tracks; it spreads like a patch of oil. It is always possible to break a language down into internal structural elements, an undertaking not fundamentally different from a search for roots. There is always something genealogical about a tree. It is not a method for the people. A method of the rhizome type, on the contrary, can analyze language only be decentering it onto other dimensions and other registers. A language is never closed upon itself, except as a function of impotence.

3. Principle of multiplicity: it is only when the multiple is effectively treated as a substantive, "multiplicity," that it ceases to have any relation to the One as subject or object, natural or spiritual reality, image and world. Multiplicities are rhizomatic, and expose arborescent pseudomultiplicities for what they are. There is no unity to serve as a pivot in the object, or to divide in the subject. There is not even the unity to abort in the object or "return" in the subject. A multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature (the laws of combination therefore increase in number as the multiplicity grows). Puppet strings, as a rhizome or multiplicity, are tied not to the supposed will of an artist or puppeteer but to a multiplicity of nerve fibers, which form another puppet in other dimensions connected to the first: "Call the strings or rods that move the puppet the weave. It might be objected that its multiplicity resides in the person of the actor, who projects it into the text. Granted; but the actor's nerve fibers in turn form a weave. And they fall through the gray matter, the grid, into the undifferentiated... The interplay approximates the pure activity of weavers attributed in myth to the Fates or Norns." An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections. There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root. There are only

lines. When Glenn Gould speeds up the performance of a piece, he is not just displaying virtuosity, he is transforming the musical points into lines, he is making the whole piece proliferate. The number is no longer a universal concept measuring elements according to their emplacement in a given dimension, but has itself become a multiplicity that varies according to the dimensions considered (the primacy of the domain over a complex of numbers attached to that domain). We do not have units (unités) of measure, only multiplicities or varieties of measurement. The notion of unity (unité) appears only when there is a power takeover in the multiplicity by the signifier or a corresponding subjectification proceeding: This is the case for a pivot-unity forming the basis for a set of biunivocal relationships between objective elements or points, or for the One that divides following the law of a binary logic of differentiation in the subject. Unity always operates in an empty dimension supplementary to that of the system considered (overcoding). The point is that a rhizome or multiplicity never allows itself to be overcoded, never has available a supplementary dimension over and above its number of lines, that is, over and above the multiplicity of numbers attached to those lines. All multiplicities are flat, in the sense that they fill or occupy all of their dimensions: we will therefore speak of a plane of consistency of multiplicities, even though the dimensions of this "plane" increase with the number of connections that are made on it. Multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities. The plane of consistency (grid) is the outside of all multiplicities. The line of flight marks: the reality of a finite number of dimensions that the multiplicity effectively fills; the impossibility of a supplementary dimension, unless the multiplicity is transformed by the line of flight; the possibility and necessity of flattening all of the multiplicities on a single plane of consistency or exteriority, regardless of their number of dimensions. The ideal for a book would be to lay everything out on a plane of exteriority of this kind, on a single page, the same sheet: lived events, historical determinations, concepts, individuals, groups, social formations. Kleist invented a writing of this type, a broken chain of affects and variable speeds, with accelerations and transformations, always in a relation with the outside. Open rings. His texts, therefore, are opposed in every way to the classical or romantic book constituted by the interiority of a substance or subject. The war machine-book against the State apparatus-book. flat multiplicities of n dimensions are asignifying and asubjective. They are designated by indefinite articles, or rather by partitives (some couchgrass, some of a rhizome...).

4. Principle of asignifying rupture: against the oversignifying breaks separating structures or cutting across a single structure. A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines. You can never get rid of ants because they form an animal rhizome that can rebound time and again after most of it has been destroyed. Every rhizome contains lines of segmentarity according to which it is stratified, territorialized, organized, signified, attributed, etc., as well as lines of deterritorialization down

which it constantly flees. There is a rupture in the rhizome whenever segmentary lines explode into a line of flight, but the line of flight is part of a rhizome. These lines always tie back to one another. That is why one can never posit a dualism or a dichotomy, even in the rudimentary form of the good and the bad. You may make a rupture, draw a line of flight, yet there is still a danger that you will reencounter organizations that restratify everything, formations that restore power to a signifier, attributions that reconstitute a subject -- anything you like, from Oedipal resurgences to fascist concretions. Groups and individuals contain microfascisms just waiting to crystallize. Yes, couchgrass is also a rhizome. Good and bad are only the products of an active and temporary selection, which must be renewed.

How could movements of deterritorialization and processes of reterritorialization not be relative, always connected, caught up in one another? The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid's reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes the orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome. It could be said that the orchid imitates the wasp, reproducing the image in a signifying fashion (mimesis, mimicry, lure, etc.). But this is true only on the level of the strata -- a parallelism between two strata such that a plant organization on one imitates an animal organization on the other. At the same time, something else entirely is going on: not imitation at all but a capture of code, surplus value of code, an increase in valence, a veritable becoming, a becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp. Each of these becomings brings about the deterritorialization of one term and the reterritorialization of the other; the two becomings interlink and form relays in a circulation of intensities pushing the deterritorialization ever further. There is neither imitation nor resemblance, only an exploding of two heterogeneous series on the line of flight composed by a common rhizome that can no longer be attributed to or subjugated by anything signifying. Remy Chauvin expresses it well: "the aparallel evolution of two beings that have absolutely nothing to do with each other." More generally, evolutionary schemas may be forced to abandon the old model of the tree and descent. Under certain conditions, a virus can connect to germ cells and transmit itself as the cellular gene of a complex species; moreover, it can take flight, move into the cells of an entirely different species, but not without bringing with it "genetic information" from the first host (for example, Benveniste and Todaro's current research on a type C virus, with its double connection to baboon DNA and the DNA of certain domestic cats). Evolutionary schemas would no longer follow models of arborescent descent going from the least to the most differentiated, but instead a rhizome operating immediately in the heterogeneous and jumping from one already differentiated line to another. Once again, there is aparallel evolution, of the baboon and the cat; it is obvious that they are not models or copies of the other (a becoming-baboon in the cat does not mean the cat "plays" baboon). We form a rhizome with our viruses, or rather our viruses cause us to form a rhizome with other animals. As François Jacob says, transfers of

genetic material by viruses or through other procedures, fusions of cells originating in different species, have results analogous to those of "the abominable couplings dear to antiquity and the Middle Ages." Transversal communications between different lines scramble the genealogical trees. Always look for the molecular, or even submolecular, particle with which we are allied. We evolve and die more from our polymorphous and rhizomatic flus than from hereditary diseases, or diseases that have their own line of descent. The rhizome is an anti-genealogy.

The same applies to the book and the world: contrary to a deeply rooted belief, the book is not an image of the world. It forms a rhizome with the world, there is an aparallel evolution of the book and the world; the book assures the deterritorialization of the world, but the world effects a reterritorialization of the book, which in turn deterritorializes itself in the world (if its capable, if it can). Mimicry is a very bad concept, since it relies on binary logic to describe phenomena of an entirely different nature. The crocodile does not reproduce a tree trunk, any more than the chameleon reproduces the colors of its surroundings. The Pink Panther imitates nothing, it reproduces nothing, it paints the world its color, pink on pink; this is its becoming-world, carried out in such a way that it becomes imperceptible itself, asignifying, makes its rupture, its own line of flight, follows its "aparallel evolution" through to the end. The wisdom of the plants: even with something else -- with the wind, an animal, human beings (and there is also an aspect under which animals themselves form rhizomes, as do people, etc.). "Drunkenness as a triumphant irruption of the plant in us." Always follow the rhizome by rupture; lengthen, prolong, and relay the line of flight; make it vary, until you have produced the most abstract and tortuous of lines of n dimensions and broken directions. Conjugate deterritorialized flows. Follow the plants: you start by delimiting a first line consisting of circles of convergence around successive singularities; then you see whether inside that line new circles of convergence establish themselves, with new points located outside the limits and in other directions. Write, form a rhizome, increase your territory by deterritorialization, extend the line of flight to the point where it becomes an abstract machine covering the entire plane of consistency. "Go first to your old plant and watch carefully the watercourse made by the rain. By now the rain must have carried the seeds far away. Watch the crevices made by the runoff, and from them determine the direction of the flow. Then find the plant that is growing at the farthest point from your plant. All the devil's weed plants that are growing in between are yours. Later...you can extend the size of your territory by following the watercourse from each point along the way." Music has always sent out lines of flight, like so many "transformational multiplicites," even overturning the very codes that structure or arborify it; that is why musical form, right down to its ruptures and proliferations is comparable to a weed, a rhizome.

5 and 6. Principle of cartography and decalcomania: a rhizome is not amenable to any structural or generative model. It is a stranger to any idea of genetic axis or deep structure. A genetic axis is like an objective pivotal unity upon which successive stages are organized; a deep structure is more like a base sequence that can be broken down into immediate constituents, while the unity of the product passes into another, transformational and subjective, dimension. This does not constitute a departure from the representative model of the tree, or root – pivotal taproot or fascicles (for example, Chomsky's "tree" is associated with a base sequence and represents the process of its own generation in terms of binary logic). A variation on the oldest form of thought. It is our view that genetic axis and profound structure are above all infinitiely reproducible principles of TRACING. All of tree logic is logic of tracing and reproduction. In linguistics as in psychoanalysis, its object is an unconscious that is itself representative, crystallized into codified complexes, laid out along a genetic axis and distributed within a syntagmatic structure. Its goal is to describe a de facto state, to maintain balance in intersubjective relations, or to explore an unconscious that is already there form the start, lurking in the dark recesses of memory and language. It consists of tracing, on the basis of an overcoding structure or supporting axis, something that comes ready-made. The tree articulates and hierarchizes tracings; tracings are like the leaves of a tree.

The rhizome is altogether different, a map and not a tracing. Make a map, not a tracing. The orchid does not reproduce the tracing of the wasp; it forms a map with the wasp, in a rhizome. What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious. It fosters connections between fields, the removal of blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum opening of bodies without organs onto a plane of consistency. It is itself a part of the rhizome. The map is open and connectable in all ot is dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation. It can be drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of art, constructed as a political action or as a meditation. Perhaps one of the most important characteristics of the rhizome is that it always has multiple entryways; in this sense, the burrow is an animal rhizome, and sometimes maintains a clear distinction between the line of flight as passageway and storage or living strata (cf. the muskrat). A map has multiple entryways, as opposed to the tracing, which always comes back "to the same." The map has to do with performance, whereas the tracing always involves an alleged "competence." Unlike psychoanalysis, pyschoanalytic competence (which confines every desire and statement to a genetic axis or overcoding structure, and makes infinite, monotonous tracings of the stages on that axis or the consituents of that structure), schizoanalysis rejects any idea of pretraced destiny, whatever name is given to it – divine, anagogic, historical, economic, structural, hereditary, or syntagmatic..

(p7-13, translation by Brian Massumi)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]From this, Harman concludes that the primary site of ontological investigation is objects and relations, instead of the post-Kantian emphasis on the human-world correlate. Moreover, this holds true for all entities, be they human, nonhuman, natural, or artificial, leading to the downplayment of *dasein* as an ontological priority. In its place, Harman proposes a concept of substances that are irreducible to both material particles and human perception, and "exceed every relation into which they might enter."[27]

Coupling Heidegger's tool-analysis with the phenomenological insights of Edmund Husserl, Harman introduces two types of objects: *Real objects* and *sensual objects*. Real objects are objects that withdraw from all experience, whereas sensual objects are those that exist only in experience.[28] Additionally, Harman suggests two kinds of qualities: *Sensual qualities*, or those found in experience, and *real qualities*, which are accessed through intellectual probing.[29] Pairing sensual and real objects and qualities yields the following framework:

4. Sensual Object/Sensual Qualities: Sensual objects are present, but enmeshed within a "mist of accidental features and profiles."[30]

5. Sensual Object/Real Qualities: The structure of conscious phenomena are forged from eidetic, or experientially interpretive, qualities intuited intellectually.[31]

6. Real Object/Sensual Qualities: As in the tool-analysis, a withdrawn object is translated into sensual apprehension via a "surface" accessed by thought and/or action.[32]

7. Real Object/Real Qualities: This pairing grounds the capacity of real objects to differ from one another, without collapsing into indefinite substrata.[33]

To explain how withdrawn objects make contact with and relate to one another, Harman submits the theory of *vicarious causation*, whereby two hypothetical entities meet in the interior of a third entity, existing side-by-side until something occurs to prompt interaction.[34] Harman compares this idea to the classical notion of formal causation, in which forms do not directly touch, but influence one another in a common space "from which all are partly absent." Causation, says Harman, is always vicarious, asymmetrical, and buffered:

'Vicarious' means that objects confront one another only by proxy, through sensual profiles found only on the interior of some other entity. 'Asymmetrical' means that the initial confrontation always unfolds between a real object and a sensual one. And 'buffered' means that [real objects] do not fuse into [sensual objects], nor [sensual objects] into their sensual neighbors, since all are held at bay through unknown firewalls sustaining the privacy of each. from the asymmetrical and buffered inner life of an object, vicarious connections arise occasionally...giving birth to new objects with their own interior spaces.[35]

Thus, causation entails the connection between a real object residing within the directionality of consciousness, or a unified "intention," with another real object residing outside of the intention, where the intention itself is also classified as a real object.[36] From here, Harman extrapolates five types of relations between objects. Containment describes a relation in which the intention "contains" both the real object and sensual object. Contiguity connotes relations between sensual objects lying side-by-side within an intention, not affecting one another, such that a sensual object's bystanders can be rearranged without disrupting the object's identity. Sincerity characterizes the absorption of a real object by a sensual object, in a manner that "takes seriously" the sensual object without containing or being contiguous to it. Connection conveys the vicarious generation of intention by real objects indirectly encountering one another. Finally, no relation represents the typical condition of reality, since real objects are incapable of direct interaction and are limited in their causal influence upon and relation to other objects.[37]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]The Dark Precursor

"Thunderbolts explode between different intensities, but they are preceded by an invisible, imperceptible dark precursor, which determines their path in advance but in reverse, as though intagliated." — Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition,

119 [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] On Pluriversality

In fact, German legal philosopher Carl Schmitt described and conceived "political theology" as a conceptual structure that emerged from the two of the most sophisticated institutions of "Western rationalism" (his expression): the juridical rationality of the Catholic Church and the secular State of the jus publicum europeum, which was still assumed to be Christian in Thomas Hobbes's system

Border thinking is why take the effort to combine the body with writing, writing with the body and not just in the body, combine the heart with the mind, senti-pensar (feeling-thinking) as they say in Ecuador .In the In the Darker Side of Western Modernity i returned to the idea of pluriversality connecting it with the idea of multiverse in Humberto Maturana's epistemology. The multiverse is for Maturana a world of truth in parenthesis while the universe is a world built on truth without parenthesis. Uni-verality is always imperial and war-driven. Pluri and multi verses and convivial, dialogical or plurilogical. Now pluri- and multi-verses exists independent of the state and the corporations and it is the work of the emerging global political society, e.g., the sector of society organizing themselves around specific projects once they/we realize that neither the state nor the corporations have room for multi- or plurivers

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The piece below was written in response to a question formulated by Arturo Escobar, Marisol de la Cadena and Mario Blaser. Marisol, Mario and Arturo are starting a project investigating the various uses of the concept of "pluriverse." They asked me how I stumbled into the concept and how I used and use it. In responding to them i ended up writing a sort of auto-biographic op-ed on pluriversality.

Here it is:

The first time I used the concept of pluriverse was in a series of conferences between 1996 and 1998, which was finally published in 2000 in Binghamton REVIEW, the journal of the Fernand Braudel Center, in the title of "The Zapatista's Theoretical Revolution. Its consequences historical, political and epistemological." It appeared as a chapter slightly revised, in The Darker Side of Western Modenrnity, 2011. Which means that during the 14/5 years span the concept of pluriversality was used in many instances of my work. I heard about it during the early years of the Zapatista's uprising. Franz Hinkelammert and Enrique Dussel were using the term and it fitted perfectly well perfectly well with the idea of "pluritopic hermeneutics" I borrowed from Raymundo Pannikar and became a crucial concept in The Darker Side of the Renaissance. (1995).

Hermeneutics, in Western genealogy of thoughts, names a type of reflection on meaning and interpretation within one cosmology, Western cosmology. When you have to deal with two or more cosmologies, as i did in The Darker Side of the Renaissance, you need a pluritopic hermeneutics. Why? Because you are dealing with a pluriverse of meaning and not onli with a universe of meaning. Pluriversality became my key arguments to call into question the concept of universality, so dear to Western cosmology. How so? Western epistemology and hermeneutics (meaning Greek and Latin languages translated into the six modern European and imperial languages) managed universalize its own concept of universality dismissing the fact that all known civilizations are founded on the universality of his own cosmology.

There is no reason to believe that the Bible is universal and the Popol Vuh is not. The universalization of universality in the West was part of its imperial project .So then a key idea in Local Histories / Global Designs (2000/2012) was " pluriversality as a universal project." That is the universal can only be pluriversal, which also matched the Zapatista's idea of a world in which many world would coexist. We, in the planet, had arrived at the end of the era of abstract universals, that is of one universal universality.

Pluriversality is not cultural relativism, but entanglement of several cosmologies connected today in a power differential. That power differential is the logic of coloniality covered up by the rhetorical narrative of modernity. Modernity is a fiction that carries in it the seed of Western pretense to universality. Expanding on that line of reasoning, it was necessary to introduce a concept that capture the "/" of modernity/coloniality, that is, the "/" of the entanglement and power differential. And that concept was rendered as "border thinking, border epistemology, border gnosis."

If a pluriverse is not a world of independent units (cultural relativism) but a world entangled through and by the colonial matrix of power, then, it a way of thinking and understanding that dwells in the entanglement, in the borders, is needed. So the point is not to "study" the borders, very fashionable today, while at the same time "dwelling" in a territorial epistemology, would imply that you accept a pluriverse some place out there that you "observe" from some place else outside the pluriverse.

To do so it is necessary to maintain the territoriality of the disciplines grounded on the imperial epistemology of modernity. Thinking pluritopically means, instead, to dwell in the border. Dwelling in the border is not border-crossing, even less looking and studying the borders from the territorial gaze of the disciplines. Today "border study" became fashionable, even in Europe. Scholars studying borders are in general not dwelling in them. Who dwell in the border are the migrants from Africa, West Asia and Latin America, mainly. That's what I learned from Anzaldúa. Chicanos and Chiacanas are migrants and queers, migrants or not, are always dwelling in the border.

I think the impact that Local Histories / Global Designs was writing in inhabiting the border not just observing and describing it. I revealed in the preface to the second edition (2012) that the argument was a rewriting of Hegel's philosophy of history inhabiting the border. So that border epistemology became the way, as in Buddhism, or the method, as in Western sciences, social or not, of decolonial thinking and doing. A key point to move away from the trap that distinguishes theory from praxis. Reflexive praxis is, instead, the motu at Amawtay Wasi. Why, because the very education project is built on border epistemology. The overall world-sense is Indigenous and Andean cosmology, not rejecting Indigenous European cosmology but embodied it in Andean cosmology.

Border thinking is why take the effort to combine the body with writing, writing with the body and not just in the body, combine the heart with the mind, senti-pensar (feeling-thinking) as they say in Ecuador .In the In the Darker Side of Western Modernity i returned to the idea of pluriversality connecting it with the idea of multiverse in Humberto Maturana's epistemology. The multiverse is for Maturana a world of truth in parenthesis while the universe is a world built on truth without parenthesis. Uni-verality is always imperial and war-driven. Pluri and multi verses and convivial, dialogical or plurilogical. Now pluri- and multi-verses exists independent of the state and the corporations and it is the work of the emerging global political society, e.g., the sector of society organizing themselves around specific projects once they/we realize that neither the state nor the corporations have room for multi- or pluriverses.

While "multi and pluriverses" characterizes the making of the global political society, in the realm of the state and the corporations the vocabulary is that of "multipolar world." The multipolar world of today has been opened up by the economic growth and political confidence of China's inter-state politics, together with the BRICS and the growing economies and politics of Indonesia and Turkey, the Latin American states in Mercosur following the leadership of Brazil, member of BRICS countries. When Vladimir Putin "stole" Barack Obama menace of invading Syria, it was evident that the unipolar world that made possible the invasion of Iraq is not longer in place. And it seems obvious also that Putin's chess move was possible because of the support of BRICS alliance of which he is the current chair. Thus, I would like to use pluriverse in the sphere of decolonial projects coming from the global political society (desracializing and depatriarchalizing projects, food sovereignity, economic organization of

reciprocity and definancializaiton of money, decolonization of knowledge and of being, decolonization of religion to liberate spirituality, decolonization of aesthetics to liberate aesthesis, etc., etc., etc.) and multi-polarity in the sphere of politico-economic dewesternization, lead states

projects. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]COLONIALITY, SUBALTERN KNOWLEDGES, AND BORDER THINKING

Walter D. Mignolo

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I would like to explore further the implications of border thinking in the articulation of subaltern and hegemonic knowledges from the per-spective of the subaltern.

Consequently, I see decolonization imbedded in border thinking and transience epistemology as different ways of transcending the colonial difference. I see deconstruction, instead, as a critic of and from modern epistemology more concerned with the Western hegemonic con-structions than with the colonial difference; and the colonial difference from the perspective of subaltern knowedges. Let me be more specific.

Thus, deconstruction within Western metaphysics needs to be decolonized from the silences of history. Decoloni-zation needs to be deconstructed from the perspective of the coloniality of power. The logic of the conversation shall change, not just the terms.

Since disciplinarity in the social sciences and the humanities has been reconfigured in the nineteenth century in a new emerg- ing national and colonial order (Wallerstein et al. 1995), decolonization cannot propose an adaptation of the disciplinary knowledge to the Third World (e.g., subaltern historiography). It is rather the move toward trans- disciplinary practices (Dussel [1993] 1995; 1996a, 49-64) and the historic- ity of the border-knowing subjects (Fanon, Khatibi, Anzaldua) that places decolonization as border thinking in parallel complementarity to deconstruction. I have been arguing for border thinking as one articulation of this double operation from the point of view of the colonial difference-the silenced perspective in the imaginary of the modern/colonial world system. It is worth noting here that Henri Lefebvre ([1974] 1991, 411-12; also Soja 1996, 26-53) has also used the concept of transdisciplinarity. The differ- ence between Dussel and Lefebvre is the following. While Lefebvre used transdisciplinarity strictly as a transcendence of interdisciplinarity (which presupposes the disciplines), Dussel used it to refer to the external borders of the modern/colonial world where the colonial difference cleaned up all kinds of knowledge that will endanger the epistemological foundation of modernity. Dussel's transdisciplinarity implies a geopolitic of knowledge that Lefebvre himself recognized was out of his scope.

The Sun and the Moon, in Amerindian categories of thought are not opposite, contrary, or contradictory; they are complementary. To extend deconstmction beyond Western metaphysics or to assume that there is nothing else than Western metaphysics will be a move similar to colonizing global designs under the belief of the pretense of the improvement of humanity if we can make them all like us. Gramma- tology and deconstruction have vis-a-vis the colonial experience the same limitations as Marxism vis-a-vis race and indigenous communities in the

colonized world: the colonial difference is invisible to them. Decolonization should be thought of as complementary to deconstruction and border think- ing, complementary to the "double seance" within the experience and sensi- bilities of the coloniality of power.

Double consciousness, double critique, an other tongue, an other think- ing, new mestiza consciousness, Creolization, transculturation, and culture of transience become the needed categories to undo the subalternization of knowledge and to look for ways of thinking beyond the categories of Western thought from metaphysics to philosophy to science. The projects of Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Horni Bhabha, in the past twenty years, have been instmmental for a critique of subalternization of knowledge.

Said showed through Michel Foucault the construction of the Orient as a discursive for- mation; Bhabha described through Lacan the hybridity and the third space of colonial discourse; Spivak pushed the deconstruction of colonial dis- course through Derrida. However, beyond these conceptual genealogies where the postcolonial emerges, piggybacking on postmodern (or poststruct-uralist) theories, there were also emerging in a parallel fashion similar mani- festations of border thinking, which I have explored in this book, attached to particular places resulting from and produced by local modern/colonial histories. My own conceptualization, in this book, followed the move made by Said, Bhabha, and Spivak, but is based on the work of Wallerstein, an (Anglo) American sociologist rather than French philosophers or psychoan- alysts. But I have also departed from Wallerstein by introducing the colonial difference and the coloniality of power and thus linking my work with that of Anibal Quijano in Peru and Enrique Dussel in Argentina and Mexico,

One of the reasons, and not a trivial one, of my decision to follow Wallerstein and then move to Quijano and Dussel was my need to go beyond the eighteenth century and the Enlightenment, whi<:h is the. rference and starting point of poststructuralist and early postcolonial theorizing. I neeed the sixteenth century and the Renaissance, the emergence of the Americas in the colonial horizon of modernity, a local history out of which Quijano, Dussel, Anzaldua, and myself (among many others, of course) are made.

Where is then border thinking located, in terms of dlSctphnes? Phtloso- phy, because I daimed gnoseology, epistemology, and hermeneutics? Socil- ogy, because I located it in the external borders of the modern/colonial world? History, because my argument was built historically and from the perspective of coloniality? Anthropology, because I dealt th. isues that have been the province of anthropology, which is the closer dlSctphne to the colonial difference? Cultural studies, because it is none of the above? I

would say that the transdisciplinary dimension of border thing is cultural critique in the precise sense that Stuart Hall defines cltural sdies, as trans- disciplinary and trans-national: "In a sense , if there IS anything to e learnt from British cultural studies, it's the insistence that cultural studtes IS always about the articulation-in different context of course-between culture and power. I am speaking in terms of the epistemological formation of the field,

not in the sense of practicing cultural studies" (Hall1992, 395).

The idea of Western civiliza- tion, Western metaphysics, Western logocentrism, and the like is a conse- quence and necessity of the modern/colonial world as the modern/colonial world was articulated in the growing imaginary of Western civilization, and so on. It is indeed interesting to note that Derrida's De la grammatologie (1967) left blank the moment in which the very idea of Western civilization and Western metaphysics became the seeds of the overarching imaginary of the modern/colonial world system.

And, of course, it is not just the "history" I am talking about here. I am talking about

"knowledges" hidden under the reproduction of Western civilization and Western metaphysics.

A nonontological cosmology,

as Amerindian's cosmologies illustrate from the sixteenth to the end of the twentieth century, is an alternative to Western ontological cosmology as the grounding of totality (be it Christian faith or secular reason). The interesting aspect of all of this is how such imaginary, which is part of the history of the modern/colonial world system itself, justified economic decisions, public policy designs and imple- mentations, wars and other forms of control, exploitation, and the manage- ment of peoples.

Finally, the linguistic system was questioned and extended to discursive interactions and to discursive formations (Fou-

modern intellectual debate. And exciting it certainly was.

In the case of continental Latin America and, more particularly, Spanish

America, the margins were occupied by the "inteligencia Criolla" (the Creole-in the sense described earlier-imelligenLSia) and the Amerindian intellectuals, less visible due to the work of internal colonialism. The

consequences of a strong internal colonialism implanted by themselves (the Creole

intelligenLSia) in their building of the nation-state in connec- tions with the new and emerging nineteenth-century colonialisms. My discussion of Roldolfo Kusch's critical explorations of Aymara's conceptual legacy is a particular case of these tensions within the margin itself. My discussion on the Caribbean concept of "Creolite" in chapter 6 brought out a similar tension between an ascending black Caribbean intel- lectuality after the 1950s (Lamming, Cesaire, Fanon), although ingrained in different local histories, the histories shaped by the strong contingent of

cault). These transformations and debates were convincing everybody that modernization of scholarship meant jumping on the bandwagon of structur- alism and posLStructuralism. The works of Lyotard (1983) and Bourdieu (1982) were added to the list, introducing a more sociological dimension complementing the linguistic and discursive s cope of the formers. The de- bate of previous years, in Latin America, on Occidentalism (O'Gorman 1958; Fernandez Retamar [1974] 1975), dependency (Cardoso and Faletto 1979), decolonization (FIrnon; [1959] 1967; 1961; Duss el1973; Delich 1964; Fer- nandez Pardo 1971), and national consciousness (Hernandez Arregui 1973), became the symptom of a Third World intellectual community somewhat obsolete that needed to update its elf by entering in the new and exciting modern intellectual debate. And exciting it certainly was.

Pacific, China and america ...

Finally, Canal Feij6o, insisting that the "dis covery" of America was a meeting of West and East, echoed a sixteenth-century hy- pothesis advanced by Spanish jesuit jos e de Acosta (11590)1962), recently rehearsed by Enrique Dussel (1998a), from the perspective of the 5,000-year world system (Gunder Frank and Gill 1993). Moving back in time, before the formation of the modern/colonial world system, allowed Duss el to correct the colonial imaginary on Amerindian people and history that was established by Spanish missionaries and men of letters in the s ixteenth century. Canal Feij6o brought to the foreground the history of the Pacific, before the "dis covery," and the migrations through the Bering Strait that formed the current Amerindian and Native American population from Lab- rador to Patagonia.

Canal Feij6o's argument, in 1954, oscillated between an essentialist perspective on American being, and a historical perspective of the making of the Americas at the cross roads of imperial conflicts and previous erased memo-ries (the immigrations from As ia forming the Amerindian population).

Today, it is possible to read Canal Feij6o's historical argument and forget the essentialist one, thus transforming nostalgia into celebration: "not being able to be (ser) where one is [estar)" becomes the fundamental condition of border thinking.

Not being able to be where one is is the promise of an epistemological

potential and a cosmopolitan transnationalism that could overcome the limits and violent conditions generated by being always able to be where one belongs. I am where I think.

Canal Feij6o published the book, had as one of its consequences a sense of inferiority because English and French "archetype men," for sure, were able to be where ever they were. The colonial difference was, so to speak, in their back, invisible to their experience. From 1999's perspective things have changed. Not being able to be where one is is the promise of an epistemological

potential and a cosmopolitan transnationalism that could overcome the limits and violent conditions generated by being always able to be where one belongs. I am where I think.

To think well implied thinking according to disciplinary norms and rules. It is fine with me to assert that there is no inside and outside, out there in the world.

It is

fine for me to eliminate dichotomies, or at least to try. What is more difficult to achieve is forgetting or eliminating the historical dichotomies that colo- nial dis course and epistemology imposed upon the world by inventing colo- nial differences.

"O ccident" is the overarching metaphor of the modern/colonial world imag- inary, you are

somewhat asserting that "Occident" defines the interior while you are also presupposing that there is an exterior, whatever that exterior may be. Of course, you can say that the "totality" is the sum of the interior and the exterior of the system and, therefore, there is no outside of the totality. That is fine, but it is historically dangerous and irrelevant. Histori- cally, and in the modern/colonial world, the borders have been set by the coloniality of power versus colonial difference.

Historically, and in the frame of the modern/colonial world system, I hear

today assertions equivalent to the logico metaphysical "there is no outside and inside." It so. happens that such an assertion is pronounced by col- leagues who are clearly placing themselves "inside" and, by so doing, being oblivious to the "outside." I have heard, on the other hand, colleagues (more clearly colleagues in some corner of the Third World) who do believe in the inside/outside distinctions. Now, one could explain this fact by saying that, it is unfortunate, but they are theoretically behind, underdeveloped, as they do not know yet that the last discovery in the humanities in the metropolitan research centers is that truly there is no such thing as inside and outside. It would be nice to have such an explanation, except that it counters the facts. Colleagues in the Third World asserting vehemently the distinction between inside and outside (which is made in the form of center and periphery, or center and margin, or First and Third World) are the ones who are most theoretically sophisticated and "developed." I also know colleagues in the Third World who will no doubt emphatically assert that there is no inside and outside. It may be that they are the less theoretically sophisticated and the most intellectually colonized, repeating and rehearsing dominant propo- sitions coming from an academic avant-garde intelligentsia, and responding to local histories "interior" to the modern/colonial world.

Inside and outside, center and periphery are double metaphors that are

more telling about the loci of enunciation than to the ontology of the world. There are and there aren't inside and outside, center and periphery. What really is is the saying of agents affirming or denying these oppositions within the coloniality of power, the subalternization of knowledge, and the colonial difference. The last horizon of border thinking is not only working toward a critique of colonial categories; it is also working toward redressing the subalternization of knowledges and the coloniality of power. It also points toward a new way of thinking in which dichotomies can be replaced by the complementarity of apparently contradictory terms. Border thinking could open up the doors to an other tongue, an other thinking, an other logic

superseding the long history of the modern/colonial world, the coloniality of power, the subalternization of knowledges and the colonial difference.

[redacted]

[redacted]"Accelerationism: An Introduction", Lecture by Steven Shaviro @Grand Valley State University

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gi6I0K2PJrw

the article is a perfect example of colonial epistemologies at play in one of the most unsophisticated academic disciplines of all time: international relations and political science

timothy morton hyperobjects pdf

massive absrtactions -- develop what frederic jameson called an aesthetic of cognitive mapping

keynes the only needs can not be globally supply by the forces of production are the needs for superiority

nick land "extatic movement into the void, total liberation of production forces, total deterritorialization and no territorialization

derivatives that try to colonize the future, quantifiying and turning the future into degrees of risk. Turning radical uncertainty into risk. Banalisation of creativity and novelty in current culture

mark fisher book: "capitals realism"> it easier to imagine the end of the world thatn the end of capitalism

situatedness - revolutionary dialectics =/= deleuze

active and passive in codices Nahuatl

Same as with the saudi royals now and the sha before, colonial business elites in brasil and argentina will take this new chance (the end of left wing populism: Cristina & Dilma) to suck all the liquidity out of the periphery to permanently move to the US and London ... This time the gap will be too evident to be covered by the corporate media. But unless a deep decolonial/posthuman epistemology emerges, all this will be cyclical (eternal recurrence of time) again

customization --> creates a bubble around subjectivities

deleuze and lazzarato control societies work through debt

https://vimeo.com/140173695

financial trading digital automation. define by the capacity of the artificial to artificially think

non conscious cognition : omega number >>> infinity at the level of the submilisecond

non logical - anti logos

the limits of experimental logic machine intelligence is something else than pattern recognition

incomputable infinities

8. automation is more than non conscious cognition and it does not correspond to the affective immediacy of non inferential decision
9. instead it involves an intelligible process of elaboration of data
10. and thus point to the emergence of an alien thought, a thought that challenges human exceptionalism in matters of reasoning

pierce cognition: abdaction, deduction and induction

whitehead abstract schema

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7iDL9yDH4ko

Rethinking Thinking: Material Processes and the Cognitive Nonconscious - Katherine Hayles

conscious and perception

---

one of the most inclusive intelligent encompassing manifestos of recent decades !

i thinks ome of yoko ono critiques of male dominated art logic in the 1960s can be used to expand realisms into psichisms via barad onto epistem ...

0x04 Xenofeminism is a rationalism. To claim that reason or rationality is

'by nature' a patriarchal enterprise is to concede defeat. It is true that

the canonical 'history of thought' is dominated by men, and it is male hands

we see throttling existing institutions of science and technology. But this

is precisely why feminism must be a rationalism – because of this miserable

imbalance, and not despite it. There is no 'feminine' rationality, nor is

there a 'masculine' one. Science is not an expression but as uspension of

gender. If today it is dominated by masculine egos, then it is at odds with

itself -- and this contradiction can be leveraged. Reason, like information,

wants to be free, and patriarchy cannot give it freedom. Rationalism must

itself be a feminism. XF marks the point where these claims intersect in a

two-way dependency. It names reason as an engine of feminist emancipation,

and declares the right of everyone to speak as no one in particular.

rejects illusion and melancholy

psychism ('saikizem)

Definitions

noun

the belief in a universal soul; the attributing of souls to inanimate objects or phenomena

the doctrine proposing the existence of psychic phenomena

allience with futirety requires psiquic techs ... communicating not with gohsts but with space time travelers to freed the present

lisper, dreaming and willing

topological-keyframe for the formation of a new logic

As Steven Shaviro points out in his excellent talk "An Introduction to Accelerationism",

Promethean accelerationist itinerary

I think this prospectus is inspiring, but it also has moral dangers that Darian Meacham identifies in a paper forthcoming in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy entitled 'Empathy and Alteration: The Ethical Relevance of the Phenomenological Species Concept'. Very briefly, Meacham argues that the development of technologically altered descendants of current humans might precipitate what I term a "disconnection" – the point at which some part of the human socio-technical system spins off to develop separately (Roden 2012). I've argued that disconnection is multiply realizable – or so far as we can tell. But Meacham suggests that a kind of disconnection could result if human descendants were to become sufficiently alien from us that "we" would no longer have a pre-reflective basis for empathy with them. We would no longer experience them as having our relation to the world or our intentions. Such a "phenomenological speciation" might fragment the notional universality of the human, leading to a multiverse of fissiparous and alienated clades like that envisaged in Bruce Sterling's novel Schismatrix. A still more radical disconnection might result if super-intelligent AI's went "feral". At this point, the subject of history itself becomes fissionable. It is no longer just about "us". Perhaps Land remains the most acute and intellectually consistent accelerationist after all.

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Heidegger and Technology

http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/theforum/heidegger-and-technology/

the technological understanding of being (deeply embedded)

Bestand,—> resource material (symtomatic of a deep way of seeing the world)

we're thrown into the world (always already in the world) ---> we're part of this inventory, this utility (deep ecology)

technology is not a human invention —we're thrown into it. critique of phenomenology —being in the world is not about knowing

the matematisation of nature —reduction

Gestell: Heidegger applied the concept of Gestell to his exposition of the essence of technology. He concluded that technology is fundamentally Enframing.[2] As such, the essence of technology is Gestell. Indeed, "Gestell, literally 'framing', is an all-encompassing view of technology, not as a means to an end, but rather a mode of human existence".[3]

patriarchal and global north vs global south --the global conquest of the earth by technology (the dangers of the abuses of the world)

a new understanding of nature can only come from the global south —sumak kausai —- more gendered balanced and pluridiverse idea of knowledge

art could potentially reveal the earth —art and technology

6. Modernity and History versus Animism, or the Dissolution of Boundaries: Countermodern

Jürgen Habermas, Bruno Latour, and de Sousa Santos have all focused their efforts on understanding one of the major features of colonial modernity: the separation between the natural and human sciences. Habermas claims that modernity is an unfinished project because the separation and specialization of scientific knowledge has failed to fulfill one of modernity's major promises, namely, the introduction of scientific knowledge into everyday practices. From an anthropological perspective, Latour proclaims that "we have never been modern"; this is because, although the definitive condition of modernity was the constant mixing of genres, the intellectual basis of modernity was nonetheless constituted on the separation of humans and nonhumans. Without dwelling on this matter, I would like to draw attention to the fact that Latour bases this compelling observation on the theories of anthropologist Philippe Descola, who studied animism and Amerindian cosmologies, in which the separation of nature and society does not exist. These indigenous epistemologies provide us with a platform for questioning the disciplinary boundaries imposed by modern sciences—boundaries that still order our thinking today.

In this regard one can understand why many Western thinkers have in recent years turned to the work of Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, who has suggested that animism and perspectivism can be decolonizing forces. In his studies of Amerindian perspectivism, Viveiros de Castro explores the social aspect of relationships between humans and nonhumans. According to his perspectivist theory, many Amerindian cosmologies endow objects with a soul because what constitutes them is the relationships that exist among them. Nothing can be left out of relational processes, since these influence what we are and shape subjectivity. In Amerindian perspectivism, if something has a soul—and Amerindians believe that not only nature, but also inanimate objects have a soul—then that something must also be seen as a person.

If we accept the animist notion that everything is at the same time a person and a part of nature, we can do away with the division between the natural and social sciences. We can also do away with the notion of human nature, according to de Sousa Santos: "There will be no human nature because all nature is human."[18] From the standpoint of Amazonian perspectivism, and contrary to our sciences, to know is not to objectivize but rather the opposite: it consists of embodying, i.e. subjectivizing, because it implies taking on the point of view of that thing which is it necessary to know. Consequently, the object of study becomes an enunciating subject, which implies granting it the status of interlocutor and therefore giving it agency. Amerindian perspectivism has been seen as a way to destabilize Western frameworks of thought, eliminate the disciplinary boundaries that separate us from "our objects of study," and open up new frameworks.

It is unclear whether getting an answer about modernity would require a better definition of the concept, or if having such a definition would help us overcome the Western obsession with instrumentalizing, inventing, and dominating the Other. I agree with Frederick Cooper that the concept of modernity is not clear enough to allow for a definition.[24] This is why John D. Kelly "hope[s] not for alternative modernities but alternatives to 'modernity' as a chronotope necessary for social theory."[25]

In his "A Discourse About Science" written in 1988, de Sousa Santos showed how the sciences have been in crisis since the 1970s, when it was accepted that the intentions of scientists influence the results of their experiments.[26] This called into question the foundation of empiricism—which assumes that the event being studied is isolated from its context—and in turn undermined science's universalist aspirations. De Sousa Santos insists that distinctions between subject/object and human/nature perpetuate colonialism, since these divisions separate those who have rights from those who do not. This includes indigenous peoples who live in a "natural state," but also rivers, mountains, and forms of memory that can't be found in human rights discourse. Throughout modernity, Nature (with a capital N) was turned into an object of study so that it could be exploited.

Our aim, then, should be to find things that will help us break the duality of the human and natural sciences (subject/object). This in turn will enable us to rethink the way we organize disciplinary boundaries. If it has been acknowledged that the organization of scientific objectivity and reason depends on capitalist exploitation, why do we continue to uncritically uphold the modern ways in which knowledge is organized?

To advance this aim, it is essential to search through forms of knowledge that were ignored by modernity. This is one of the beliefs underlying the work being undertaken at the Federal University of Southern Bahia, which has abolished the distinctions between disciplines for first-year undergraduate students. The university also includes local knowledge in its curricula by employing local and traditional mestres to work with students, and by teaching indigenous cosmologies in class. This is a crucial step towards wider recognition of these traditions, which are often undervalued in the region, and whose practitioners generally lead marginal and precarious lives. Rather than preserving these traditions in an academic encyclopedia of knowledge, the Federal University of Southern Bahia is attempting to preserve their modes of production, which now coexist with a globalized economy. This is a first step in promoting the epistemodiversity that modernity—regardless of the prefix used—was unable to construct.

What is the role of art in this process of transformation? Art, which is also a subalternized form of knowledge, has long made room for the nomadic way of thinking in which different disciplines dialogue with each other, heedless of borders. That's why art often precedes theory.

It is startling how much de Sousa Santos's "A Discourse About Science" echoes artistic rhetoric and practice:

It will not be long before particle physics shall speak of particles playing, or biology of the molecular theatre, or astrophysics of the heavenly text, or chemistry of the biography of chemical reactions. Each of these analogies unveils a corner of the world ... We might wonder whether it is possible, for example, to do a philological analysis of an urban project, to interview a bird, or to perform participant observation among computers.27

Art has always been able to gather critical tools of action from different contexts of knowledge in order to intervene in institutions, politics, and social problems. This makes it a privileged place to find new strategies for epistemodiversity. At the same time, art has always maintained a strict border between itself and popular culture, to ensure that art is on the same level as the Western sciences. What if this border disappeared? How do we construct a new language that uses popular knowledge not as a theme for contemporary art, but as a spark for creating new regimes of representation and new structures of thought? How can contemporary art contribute to the learning of

epistemodiversity?

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]Plastic resistance - Karen barad

The bodyknowing is not the sensorial !

Not to conquest other senses ---> visuality to reclaim the bodyknowing

Drive knowing - João Perci Schiavon 2010

The potency of differentiation

Progress Since Last Meeting *

I have captured hours of new material on narratives of sexuality, modes of existence, ontology and multiverses, diplomacy and subjectivity. it seems that the work is driven by abstract ideas embody in life, performers and spaces, to a point fictionalized but in an uncompleted way

Discussed During This Meeting *

We looked at the notion of incompleteness, specially the work of Etienne Souriau and Bruno Latour on modes of existence and the concept of instauration in art.

How under the generic title of alien cartography we tie together explorations into the presentation of the self and the ways to narrate spacetime explorations beyond the defined and the universal (metaphysical individualism). How narratives imposed upon representational spaces may impact in a more abstract, undefined visual materiality and how a notion of complex ambiguity works agains a prescriptive and aggressively binary cultural milieu.

Work Agreed *

To explore connections between ideas, concepts and visual materialities. Produce a rough cut about sexuality, modes of existence and posthumanism

Discussed During This Meeting *

We discussed Karen Barad's agential realist ontology (2007). In particular Barad's concept of Relata (and perhaps in opposition to narrative).

We spoke of a "plurirelata" (invented neologism) as the way I have been capturing both ideas and stories as visual materialities in a fluid, unstructured but related manner. From ideas exposed by PP Pelbart to my collaborations in Buenos Aires and Montevideo.

We discussed how Moving Image working as philosophy, that is, direct theory may change the individualist matrix of logic and the role of montage to experiment with a more abstract sequencing of spacetime

Work Agreed *

To establish a more clear connection between my collaborative methodology labeled 'expanded telepathy' (invented neologism) and it's onto-epistemological foundations –Feminism and decolonial options.

New rough cut

Methodology artists works

Barad Relata as opposed to narrative

We spoke of a plurirelata in the way I capture both ideas and stories as visual materialities, as contexts and associations that allow for multiple and abstract narratives. It is not completed and but it is made to emerge and instaurates (ettiene sauriou). Relata in fine art is not about fiction nor it is about the real but about connections, cartographies that go beyond the binary real/imagination.

they lack the explicitness necessary for philosophy (Russell 2000; Wartenberg 2007, 19).

We discussed how MI working as philosophy , direct theory may change an individualist logic of montage for a more abstract sequencing of spacetime

We also relates the collaborative methodology characterise as lack of enunciative and descriptive protocols as expanded telepathy

Agential realism

Iris van der tuin

[Simondon] links invention to an action of the future on the present. ... The moment of invention is when the two sets of potentials click together, coupling into a single continuous system. A synergy clicks in. A new "regime of functioning" has suddenly leapt into existence. A "threshold" has been crossed, like a quantum leap to a qualitatively new plane of operation. ... Before the passing of the threshold there were two

Individuation in Simondon pertains to change without a telos, to movement itself, and this change is a material-discursive, non-linear spatiotemporal process, because Simondon continues by saying: "Matter can receive a form, and within this form-matter relation lies the ontogenesis" (Simondon 2009: 4). In other words, here we have entered the vantage point of practices in which the (non-)human material agents (clay, hands, pebbles, minerals) are as active as the (non-)human mental ones (form, ideas).

What is involved in such "quantum leaping"? What we are in fact talking about here is "the paradox that before" the clay and the thumb and the chisel, the pebbles and the river and the minerals, Goddard and his postcards and photographic and filmic equipment "entered into relation, the respective multifunctionalities were

not in effect. They were nowhere. They are not to be found in the past. It is when the relation kicked in that they were determined, by that very event, to have been the potential for what has come", The potential thus comes from the future: "Invention is the bringing into present operation of future functions that potentialise the present for an energetic leap into the new". The explaining epistemologist can only bring two disparate systems "to the brink of relation" (De Boever et al. 2009: 40; emphases in original). Onto-epistemologically we would have to consider unavoidable leaps and the working together of "a multitude of forces" (Simondon [1958] 1980: 31). Such leaps, then, suggest that we have to think differently about the temporality of invention, just like we saw above.

Barad (2001, 2010), just like

Henri Bergson ([1889] 1913), has written about the assumptions of atomism with regards to time and space. According to any atomist metaphysics, space is a container and time is cut up in successive fragments. The fact that we do not treat these assumptions as assumptions or their effects as effects, is because we are so used to atomist metaphysics. Bergson has called it an intellectual as well as habitual routine. One of the effects of atomism – experienced non-linear temporality gets out of sight is what has dictated his own entire oeuvre (Bergson [1934] 2007: 88-9).

Transversing both traditional realism (positivism) and linguisticism, Barad (2003: 829) defines onto-epistemology as "the study of practices of knowing in being".

This chapter tries to demonstrate how the heightened attention for onto-epistemology, even if not labelled as such, in

creative research teaches positivists and linguisticists alike something about their

practices, whilst acknowledging that all these practices are at once specific in terms of the knowledge produced and generic in onto-epistemology.

onto-epistemological discoveries about the natural sciences:

We do not uncover preexisting facts about independently existing things as

they exist frozen in time like little statues positioned in the world. Rather,

we learn about phenomena – about specific material configurations of the

world's becoming. (Barad 2007: 90-1)

Roland barthes degree cero of writing

Vorterex pergolini

Deleuze, Altered States and Film

By Anna Powell

Renaissance perspective—>>> logocentric classification

Epistemologies of stasis that seek to poses the object and freeze the perpetual flow of matter

———

Apparatuses as performative mechanisms and protocols of work.???

In an agential realist account, apparatuses are specific material con ft,gurations,

or rather, dynamic (re)con ft,g urings o f the world throu.9h which bodies are intra-actively

materialized. That is, apparatuses are the practices of mattering through

which intelligibility and materiality are constituted (along with an excluded

realm of what doesn't matter). Or to put it another way, apparatuses are

material (re)configurings or dis cursive practices that produce material phenomena in their diff erential becoming. Phenomena are produced through

specific caus al intra-actions involving multiple apparatuses of bodily production. Intra-actions are causal (but nondeterministic) enactments through

which matter-in-the-process-of-becoming is sedimented out and enfolded

in further materializations.62 That is, apparatuses are material-discursive practices-causal intra-actions through which matter is iteratively and dtiferentially articulated, reconfigurinn the material-discursive field of possibilities and impossibilities

in the ongoing dynamics of intra-activity that is agency. Apparatuses are not

bounded objects or structures; they are open-ended practices. The reconfiguring of the world continues without end. Matter's dynamism is inexhaustible, exuberant, and prolific.

-

The contention that apparatuses are productive of phenomena may be the

source of some discomfort for those who are accustomed to humanist and

antihumanist accounts. Humanist accounts understand this production as a

direct consequence of human actions, choices, intentions, commitments,

ideas, values, concepts, beliefs, presuppositions, goals, and the like.

Contrary to this view, I would argue that determinately bounded and propertied

human subjects do not exist prior to their "involvement" in naturalculrural

practices. ----->>> Gurdjieff human beings will immediately die without impressions (air few seconds, impressions none)

Objects are not already there; they emerge through specific practices.

(including the optics of the eye, specific neurological sites in the brain, and appropriate connections between them),

John Whitefield, "Eyes in Their Stars: Engineers Envy Brittlestar Bones' Built-In Lenses

---

it has become increasingly clear that the seemingly self-evidentiary nature of bodily boundaries, including their seeming visual self-evidence, is a result of the repetition of (culturally and historically) specific bodily performance. I

Language has been granted too much power. The linguistic turn, the semiotic turn, the interpretative turn, the cultural turn: it seems that at every turn lately every "thing"-even materiality-is turned into a matter of language or

some other form of cultural representation. The ubiquitous puns on "matter" do not, alas, mark a rethinking of the key concepts (materiality and

signification) and the relationship between them. Rather, they seem to be symptomatic of the extent to which matters of "fact" (so to speak) have been

replaced with matters of signification (no scare quotes here). Language matters. Discourse matters. Culture matters. There is an important sense in

which the only thing that doesn't seem to matter anymore is matter.

———

the human subject is the finite limit holding back the threat of infinite regress

matter comes to matter through the iterative intra-activity of the world in its becoming

All bodies, not merely "human" bodies, come to matter through the world's iterative intra-activity-its performativity.

——-

Human bodies do not preexist the world; but they are part of its open-ended becoming …

matter is substance in its intra-active becoming

——-

In traditional humanist accounts, intelligibility requires an intellective agent (that to which something is intelligible), and intellection is framed as a specifically human capacity. But in my agential realist account, intelligibility is an ontological performance of the world in its ongoing articulation. It is not a human-dependent characteristic but a feature of the world in its differential becoming. The world articulates itself differently. Furthermore, knowing does not require intellection in the humanist sense, either. Rather, knowing is a matter of differential responsiveness (as performatively articulated and accountable) to what matters. As such, agential realism goes

beyond both humanist and antihumanist accounts of the

knowing subject as well as recent insights concerning the knower as a

prosthetically enhanced human. Knowing is not about seeing from above or

outside or even seeing from a prosthetically enhanced human body. Knowing is a matter of intra-acting. Knowing entails specific practices through

which the world is differentially articulated and accounted for. In some

instances, "nonhumans" (even beings without brains) emerge as partaking

in the world's active engagement in practices of knowing. 21 Knowing entails

differential responsiveness and accountability as part of a network of performances. Knowing is not a bounded or closed practice but an ongoing performance of the world.

———

Discourse is not a synonym for language.>▪ Discourse does not refer to

linguistic or signifYing systems, grammars, speech acts, or conversations.

To think of discourse as mere spoken or written words forming descriptive

statements is to enact the mistake of representationalist thinking. Discourse

is not what is said; it is that which constrains and enables what can be said.

Discursive practices define what counts as meaningful statements.

————

The idea that skin conductivity is an indicator of emotional activity, coupled with our ability to create a scenario and a machine where we can produce a series of readable/changing numbers based on a body's co-presence with specific phenomena (a film or a performace, or a person asking them questions) is all part of the apparatus that creates the phenomena of our 'knowledge of the world

Michel de certau

———-

TH E BOU N DA RY O F AN APPA RATUS

Wireless computer and printer

What precisely constitutes the limits of the apparatus that gives meaning to certain concepts at the exclusion of others?

———

I th i n k the world is precisely what gets l ost i n doctri nes of representation and

scientific objectivity.

-DONNA HARAWAY, "The Prom ises of Monsters"

——-

This ongoing flow

of agency through which part of the world makes itself diff erentially intelligible to another part of the world and through which causal structures are

stabilized and destabilized does not take place in space and time but happens i n the making of spacetime itself.

In summary

In summary, the primary ontological units are not "things" but phenomena -dynamic topological reconfigurings/ entanglements/ relationalities/ (re)articulations of the world. And the primary

semantic units are not "words" but material-discursive practices through which (ontic and semantic) boundaries

are constituted. This dynamism is agency. Agency is not an attribute but the ongoing reconfigurings of the world. The universe is agential intra-activity in its becoming.

———————

Reality —–> making of spacetime itself.

Reality is composed not of things-in-themselves or things-behind-phenomena but of things-in-phenomena.'"

The world is a dynamic process of intra-activity and materialization in the

enactment of determinate causal structures with determinate boundaries,

properties, meanings, and patterns of marks on bodies. This ongoing flow

of agency through which part of the world makes itself differentially intelligible to another part of the world and through which causal structures are

stabilized and destabilized does not take place in space and time but happens in the making of spacetime itself.

———————

causality

Hence the notion of intra-action constitutes a reworking of the

traditional notion of causality.6

———————

Primer film

Film philosophy meeting ujniverse physics half way

Film philosophy and the fourth dimension: meeting posthuman physics half way

1. The theories of early Russian formalism in context with the onto-epistemology of early russian physisits and mistics ... Film montage

2. The telecine process analogue into digital ... Google research race on artificial intelligence and neuroscience ... What is consciousness ?

Perceptual plasticity: Florence chiew

La perturbadora belleza del no relato

I think is important to think that

In relation to new materialism you could go increasingly smaller or start understanding that perception has a plasticity that still unrecognised —-

Narrative can make sense and at the same time be more ambiguous, indeterminated, and incoherent —which is one of the central debated in the philosophy of science today.

The question is how to break the hegemonic, the mainstream and start perceiving all the impressions that we potentially could —- and this statement is partial unless I recognise it's inmediate onto-epistemological mass (Karen Barad iris van der tuin)

Yo en mi casa no tengo dormitoriio pero tengo una sala con el projector ... Y a veces lo dejo prendido sin sonido mientras trabajo en mi estudio .... En cuanto vuelvo y le ppngo sonido es un mundo chabacano, Lleno de cliches estupidos del mainstream ....

The 1980s debate on abstract Cinema—the representational and non representational of the

image--

Vortex and grid

Vkki Kirkby

Super duper

Simon Kirkby - language evolution

Compositional syntax

Iterated learning -- inheriting: genetic+ cultural network ...

Learning signals, sharing meaning

Post representation also implies a turn to ...on how to

Theorise subjectivity as events (a blackout, a meal, an imprisonment in chains, an experience of litter) as encounters between ontologically diverse actants, some humans, some not, although all thoroughly material.

Yo diría que la postrepresentacion implica un giro en la teorizacion de subjetividades como eventos, es decir, como encuentros entre actuantes ontológicamente diversos, algunos humanos, otros no (dígitos, impresiones etc), aunque todos ellos necesariamente materiales.

EL CINE ES OTRA COSA

Programa noviembre

Curadores invitados: Gabriela Golder y Andrés Denegri

EL CINE COMO TEORÍA DIRECTA

Una propuesta de *Luciano Zubillaga.

En los últimos años se ha desarrollado un nuevo campo donde el cine de artista y experimental, se mete directamente en los debates de la filosofía, la antropología, la política y la ciencia, reinventando lo que de manera apurada suele llamarse cine documental y las posibilidades mismas del lenguaje y la comunicación. Son formas de narrar que ya no son puramente estéticas, éticas o basadas en métodos conocidos, sino que más bien se mezclan; son formas mestizas, exploraciones onto-epistemológicas de la post-representación.

*Luciano Zubillaga es un artista argentino radicado en Londres. Creció entre Tucumán, Buenos Aires y Caracas, donde estudió filosofía y artes. En 1992 comenzó a estudiar en el Goldsmiths College (Universidad de Londres). En 2008 recibió el London Artists Film and Video Awards (LAFVA) del Arts Council England. Sus películas se han mostrado internacionalmente en diversos festivales y museos, entre ellos el Festival de Cine de La Habana, Festival de Cine de Ann Arbor, Armory Show, y Whitechapel Art Gallery. Es profesor titular de cine experimental en la Ealing School of Art, Design and Media (University of West London).

7/11 – 19 hs: The Citizens of the Wombs (Work in progress) de Ebadur Rahman

Duración: 84 min.

The Citizens of the Wombs (Los ciudadanos de los vientres) de Ebadur Rahman es una película estilo post 9/11 snuff film, una historia cinética del asesinato extra-judicial, del secuestro y la tortura desde un punto de vista múltiple, que explora la política de guerra contra el terror en el

sur de Asia y el cruce con otros temas contemporáneos.

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Vení al Moderno - Av. San Juan 350, San Telmo, Buenos Aires.

Simbolos del sombrero subjetividades intercambiables

Cariz material

———

DELEUZE, Gilles ,y Félix GUATTARI,1980. Mil plateaux

Subjetividades nómadas

vikki kirby: el language se estructural en binaries

Meta .... Experiencias inarticuladas

Pág. 89. El discurso indirecto abarca la totalidad del lenguaje.

El discurso directo es un fragmento de masa separada y nace del desmembramiento del agenciamiento colectivo; este siempre es el rumor de donde extraigo mi nombre propio, el conjunto de voces concordantes o no, de donde saco mi voz. Glosolalia.

Mi discurso directo sigue siendo el discurso indirecto libre que me atraviesa de parte a parte y que viene de otros mundos o de otros planetas...una capacidad de olvido que hace que uno se sienta inocente de las consignas que ha seguido y que después a abandonado, para acoger

otras.

_____

El cine como teoría directa

Una propuesta de *Luciano Zubillaga.

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El tema de la violencia y el trauma es tomado por Shona Illingworth para redibujar los paisajes fisicos y psicologicos de la memoria y la conciencia. Es un cine profundo en donde el sonido entrelaza geografias afectivas que se proyectan en contextos culturales difíciles. La pelicula de Ebadur Rahman tambien explora el tema de la violencia pero desde la perspectiva de la proliferacion de imagenes, el cruce de plataformas y el quiebre narrativo en el mundo de la postrepresentación. Finalmente, el tema de la postrepresentación se cruza con los debates del posthumanismo y deviene cuestionamiento de las lógicas binarias de la narración en una selección que incluye películas de Nelmarie du Preez, Minou Norouzi y una en colaboración con Carlos Ginzburg.

I am not interested in either A philosophy about film or philosophy through film. The Northamerican tradition of philosophy through film is of a more recent vintage than philosophy of film, which enjoyed significant development in the 1980s. Philosophy through film has flourished mostly since 2000, although there were a number of important forerunners who promoted the idea that film can contribute to philosophy, including Cavell (1979), Jarvie (1987),

Kupfer (1999) and Freeland (2000).

Not necessarily art as philosophy is require to produce philosophical ideas and questions. Or even ideas and questions at all. Can ideas and questions be delinked from the mind? Can the bodyknowing produce ideas and questions in a presensorial form? This intuition is art as direct theory. Can art as knowledge be disentangled from logicality and taxonomic drives and become a form of expandend presensorial intelligence. In this tradition of thought I would like to refer to the pioneering work of carlos Ginzburg, an argentine philosopher who works through art.

The fractal

The assamblage point

Bob crow

Álvaro García Linera

Vice President of Bolivia

Joseph Farrell wiki

2. Cosmopolitics and ecology ... Jane Bennett Nd Isabel stengers

The need to give agency to a non human super power that could destroy organic life on earth – what is called the threat from ...

I'm preparing my own submission for next year turner prize

In deference to the current vogue for photographic representation, it will be a 167 minute essay film where wilfully obscure (and muffled) dialogue will contrast with photo-realistic computer generated landscapes, all overlaid with some type of vague mysticism. Taken as a whole, this will demonstrate the transcendent power of emotion over the physical world.

I'm going to call it "Interstellar".

---

interaction

recent developments in science, philosophy, and political science.

The usual notion of interaction assumes that there are individual independently existing entities or agents that preexist their acting upon one another. By contrast, the notion of "intra-action" queers the familiar sense of causality (where one or more causal agents precede and produce an ef- fect), and more generally unsettles the metaphysics of individualism (the belief that there are individually constituted agents or entities, as well as times and places). According to my agential realist ontology, or rather ethico-onto-epis- temology (an entanglement of what is usually taken to be the separate consid- erations of ethics, ontology, and epistemology), "individuals" do not preexist as such but rather materialize in intra-action. That is, intra-action goes to the question of the making of differences, of "individuals," rather than assuming their independent or prior existence. "Individuals" do not not exist, but are not individually determinate. Rather, "individuals" only exist within phenomena (particular materialized/materializing relations) in their ongoing iteratively intra-active reconfiguring.

A specific intra-action enacts an "agential cut" (in contrast to the Cartesian cut—an inherent distinction—between subject and object), effecting a separation be- tween "subject" and "object" within the phenomenon. In particular, agential cuts enact a resolution within the phenomenon of some inherent ontological indeterminacies to the exclusion of others. That is, intra-actions enact "agen- tial separability"—the condition of exteriority-within-phenomena. So it is not that there are no separations or differentiations, but that they only exist within relations. Putting the point another way, phenomena are differential patterns of "mattering"—diffraction patterns dispersed across differently entangled spaces and times, or rather spacetimematterings. The notion of intra-action marks an important shift in many foundational philosophical notions such as causality, agency, space, time, matter, meaning, knowing, being, responsibility, account- ability, and justice.

It is perhaps worth noting that while Cartesian epistemology is built on the given-ness of a distinction or a Cartesian cut between subject and object, the epistemology of agential realism, or rather its entangled ethico-onto-episte-mology, goes to a set of prior questions. Agential realism does not start with a set of given or fixed differences, but rather makes inquiries into how differences are made and remade, stabilized and destabilized, as well as their materializ-ing effects and constitutive exclusions. Since cuts are understood to be enacted rather than given (it is the cut that makes the individual and not the other way around), all manner of questions regarding the nature of mattering come to-gether here—that is, questions of matter in the multiple senses of meaning, being, and valuing.

About the amoeba colonies: Slime molds (of which so-called social amoebas are classified as one kind) are amazing critters. They have the ability to morph from a seemingly uncoordinated group of genetically identical single cells to an ag-gregate "slug" with an immune system, muscles and nerves with ganglia (that is, simple brains) and other organismic functionality characteristic of multicel-lular species with different roles played by identical cellular units. So the very question of what is or isn't an "individual" is not a clear and distinct matter, and that seems to be precisely the scientific sticking point. The ques-tion of the nature of identity is ripe here; it's what's so spectacularly exciting from a scientific point of view. No wonder that social amoebas are taken to be model organisms in molecular biology and genetics for studying communica-tion and cell differentiation. Social amoebas queer the nature of identity, calling into question the individual/group binary. In fact, when it comes to queering identity, the social amoeba enjoys multiple indeterminacies, and has managed to hoodwink scientists' ongoing attempts to nail down its taxonomy, its species-being defying not only classification by phylum but also by kingdom. To at-tempt an explanatory model on the basis of individuals interacting with one another and their "environment" seems to miss something fundamental about the very nature of the organism. How can we expect the notion of an organism understood as an individual that is situated in a container we call the environ-ment to begin to speak to the

complexity of the intra-active reconfiguring of bodily boundaries that defines the slime mold's astonishing material existence?

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]Xu Bing then connects this to earlier (in and of themselves false) descriptions of Chinese as a universal language:

In 1627, the French thinker Jean Douet, in an essay titled "Proposal to the King for a Universal Script, with Admirable Results, Very Useful to Everyone on Earth," first suggested that Chinese was a potential model for an international language. The word "model" is important here because Douet does not limit this "universal script" to the form of Chinese characters per se. He instead focuses on the universal potential of the system of recognition upon which the Chinese language is based. Today, nearly four hundred years later, human communication has indeed evolved in the direction predicted by Douet. We have come to sense that traditional spoken forms are no longer the most appropriate method for communication. And, in response, great human effort has been concentrated on developing ways to replace traditional written languages with icons and images. For this reason, among others, humankind has entered the age of reading images.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]Karen barad

This account refuses the representationalist fixation on "words" and "things" and the problematic of their relationality,

advocating instead a causal relationship between specific exclusionary practices embodied as specific ma-terial configurations of the world

(i.e., discursive practices/(con)figurations rather than "words")

and specific material phenomena

V(i.e., relations rather than "things").

discursive practices/(con)figurations rather than "words") and specific material phenomena (i.e., relations rather than "things").

Outside of particular agential intra-actions, "words" and "things" are indeterminate

Meaning is not a property of individual words or groups of words but an ongoing performance of the world in its differential intelligibility.

The point is not merely that there are important material factors in addition to discursive ones; rather, the issue is the conjoined material-discursive nature of constraints, condi-tions, and practices.

All bodies, not merely "human" bodies, come to matter through the world's iterative intra-activity—its performativity. This is true not only of the surface or contours of the body but also of the body in the fullness of its physicality, including the very "atoms" of its being. Bodies are not objects with inherent boundaries and properties; they are material-discursive phenomena.

A posthumanist formulation of performativity makes evident the im-portance of taking account of "human," "nonhuman," and "cyborgian" forms of agency (indeed all such material-discursive forms)

Agency: intra active intentionality ?? No

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]ris van der tuin

[Simondon] links invention to an action of the future on the present. ...

The moment of invention is when the two sets of potentials click together,

coupling into a single continuous system. A synergy clicks in. A new

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practices in which the (non-)human material agents (clay, hands, pebbles, minerals)

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What is involved in such "quantum leaping"? What we are in fact talking about here is "the paradox that before" the clay and the thumb and the chisel, the pebbles and the river and the minerals, Goddard and his postcards and photographic and filmic equipment "entered into relation, the respective multifunctionalities were not in effect. They were nowhere. They are not to be found in the past. It is when the relation kicked in that they were determined, by that very event, to have been the potential for what has come", The potential thus comes from the future: "Invention is the bringing into present operation of future functions that potentialise the present for an energetic leap into the new". The explaining epistemologist can only bring two disparate systems "to the brink of relation" (De Boever et al. 2009: 40; emphases in original). Onto-epistemologically we would have to consider unavoidable leaps and the working together of "a multitude of forces" (Simondon [1958] 1980: 31). Such leaps, then, suggest that we have to think differently about the temporality of invention, just like we saw above.

_____

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Henri Bergson ([1889] 1913), has written about the assumptions of atomism with

regards to time and space. According to any atomist metaphysics, space is a container

and time is cut up in successive fragments. The fact that we do not treat these

assumptions as assumptions or their effects as effects, is because we are so used to

atomist metaphysics. Bergson has called it an intellectual as well as habitual routine.

One of the effects of atomism – experienced non-linear temporality gets out of sight

is what has dictated his own entire oeuvre (Bergson [1934] 2007: 88-9).

Transversing both traditional realism (positivism) and linguisticism, Barad (2003: 829) defines onto-epistemology as "the study of practices of knowing in being".

This chapter tries to demonstrate how the heightened attention for onto-epistemology, even if not labelled as such, in

creative research teaches positivists and linguisticists alike something about their

practices, whilst acknowledging that all these practices are at once specific in terms of the knowledge produced and generic in onto-epistemology.

onto-epistemological discoveries about the natural sciences:

We do not uncover preexisting facts about independently existing things as

they exist frozen in time like little statues positioned in the world. Rather,

we learn about phenomena – about specific material configurations of the

world's becoming. (Barad 2007: 90-1)

———-

Roland barthes degree cero of writing

Vorterex pergolini

Deleuze, Altered States and Film

By Anna Powell

Renascence perspective—>>> logocentric classification

Epistemologies of stasis that seek to poses the object and freeze the perpetual flow of matter

———

Apparatuses as performative mechanisms and protocols of work.???

In an agential realist account, apparatuses are specific material con ft,gurations,

or rather, dynamic (re)con ft,g urings o f the world throu.9h which bodies are intra-actively

materialized. That is, apparatuses are the practices of mattering through

which intelligibility and materiality are constituted (along with an excluded

realm of what doesn't matter). Or to put it another way, apparatuses are

material (re)configurings or discursive practices that produce material phenomena in their differential becoming. Phenomena are produced through

specific causal intra-actions involving multiple apparatuses of bodily production. Intra-actions are causal (but nondeterministic) enactments through

which matter-in-the-process-of-becoming is sedimented out and enfolded

in further materializations.62 That is, apparatuses are material-discursive practices-causal intra-actions through which matter is iteratively and dtiferentially articulated, reconfigurinn the material-discursive field of possibilities and impossibilities

in the ongoing dynamics of intra-activity that is agency. Apparatuses are not

bounded objects or structures; they are open-ended practices. The reconfiguring of the world continues without end. Matter's dynamism is inexhaustible, exuberant, and prolific.

-

The contention that apparatuses are productive of phenomena may be the

source of some discomfort for those who are accustomed to humanist and

antihumanist accounts. Humanist accounts understand this production as a

direct consequence of human actions, choices, intentions, commitments,

ideas, values, concepts, beliefs, presuppositions, goals, and the like.

Contrary to this view, I would argue that determinately bounded and propertied

human subjects do not exist prior to their "involvement" in naturalcultural

practices. ----->>> Gurdjieff human beings will immediately die without impressions (air few seconds, impressions none)

__

Objects are not already there; they emerge through specific practices.

(including the optics of the eye, specific neurological sites in the brain, and appropriate connections between them),

John Whitefield, "Eyes in Their Stars: Engineers Envy Brittlestar Bones' Built-In Lenses

_____

it has become increasingly clear that the seemingly self-evidentiary nature of bodily boundaries, including their seeming visual self-evidence, is a result of the repetition of (culturally and historically) specific bodily performance. I

_____

Language has been granted too much power. The linguistic turn, the semiotic turn, the

interpretative turn, the cultural turn: it seems that at every turn lately every "thing"-even materiality-is turned into a matter of language or

some other form of cultural representation. The ubiquitous puns on "matter" do not, alas, mark a rethinking of the key concepts (materiality and

signification) and the relationship between them. Rather, they seem to be symptomatic of the extent to which matters of "fact" (so to speak) have been

replaced with matters of signification (no scare quotes here). Language matters. Discourse matters. Culture matters. There is an important sense in

which the only thing that doesn't seem to matter anymore is matter.

———

the human subject is the finite limit holding back the threat of infinite regress

matter comes to matter through the iterative intra-activity of the world in its becoming

All bodies, not merely "human" bodies, come to matter through the world's iterative

intra-activity-its p e r f ormativity.

——-

Human bodies do not preexist the world; but they are part of its open-ended becoming ...

matter is substance in its intra-active becoming

——-

In traditional humanist accounts, intelligibility requires an intellective

agent (that to which something is intelligible), and intellection is framed as

a specifically human capacity. But in my agential realist account, intelligibility is an ontological performance of the world in its ongoing articulation. It

is not a human-dependent characteristic but a feature of the world in its

differential becoming. The world articulates itself differently.

Furthermore, knowing does not require intellection in the humanist

sense, either. Rather, knowing is a matter of differential responsiveness (as

performatively articulated and accountable) to what matters. As such, agential realism goes beyond both humanist and antihumanist accounts of the

knowing subject as well as recent insights concerning the knower as a

prosthetically enhanced human. Knowing is not about seeing from above or

outside or even seeing from a prosthetically enhanced human body. Knowing is a matter of intra-acting. Knowing entails specific practices through

which the world is differentially articulated and accounted for. In some

instances, "nonhumans" (even beings without brains) emerge as partaking

in the world's active engagement in practices of knowing. 21 Knowing entails

differential responsiveness and accountability as part of a network of performances. Knowing is not a bounded or closed practice but an ongoing performance of the world.

———

Discourse is not a synonym for language.>▪ Discourse does not refer to

linguistic or signifYing systems, grammars, speech acts, or conversations.

To think of discourse as mere spoken or written words forming descriptive

statements is to enact the mistake of representationalist thinking. Discourse

is not what is said; it is that which constrains and enables what can be said.

Discursive practices define what counts as meaningful statements.

The idea that skin conductivity is an indicator of emotional activity, coupled with our ability to create a scenario and a machine where we can produce a series of readable/changing numbers based on a body's co-presence with specific phenomena (a film or a performace, or a person asking them questions) is all part of the apparatus that creates the phenomena of our 'knowledge of the world

Michel de certau

THE BOUNDARY OF AN APPARATUS

Wireless computer and printer

What precisely constitutes the limits of the apparatus that gives meaning to certain concepts at the exclusion of others?

I think the world is precisely what gets lost in doctrines of representation and

scientific objectivity.

-DONNA HARAWAY, "The Promises of Monsters"

———

This ongoing flow

of agency through which part of the world makes itself differentially intelligible to another part of the world and through which causal structures are

stabilized and destabilized does not take place in space and time but happens in the making of spacetime itself.

In summary

In summary, the primary ontological units are not "things" but phenomena -dynamic topological reconfigurings/ entanglements/ relationalities/ (re)articulations of the world. And the primary semantic units are not "words" but material-discursive practices through which (ontic and semantic) boundaries

are constituted. This dynamism is agency. Agency is not an attribute but the ongoing reconfigurings of the world. The universe is agential intra-activity in its becoming.

———————

Reality —–> making of spacetime itself.

Reality is composed not of things-in-themselves or things-behind-phenomena but of things-in-phenomena.'"

The world is a dynamic process of intra-activity and materialization in the

enactment of determinate causal structures with determinate boundaries,

properties, meanings, and patterns of marks on bodies. This ongoing flow

of agency through which part of the world makes itself differentially intelligible to another part of the world and through which causal structures are

stabilized and destabilized does not take place in space and time but happens in the making of spacetime itself.

———————

causality

Hence the notion of intra-action constitutes a reworking of the

traditional notion of causality.6

———

Primer film

Film philosophy meeting ujniverse physics half way

Film philosophy and the fourth dimension: meeting posthuman physics half way

1. The theories of early Russian formalism in context with the onto-epistemology of early russian physisits and mistics ... Film montage

2. The telecine process analogue into digital ... Google research race on artificial intelligence and neuroscience ... What is consciousness ?

Perceptual plasticity: Florence chiew

La perturbadora belleza del no relato

I think is important to think that

In relation to new materialism you could go increasingly smaller or start understanding that perception has a plasticity that still unrecognised —-

Narrative can make sense and at the same time be more ambiguous, indeterminated, and incoherent —which is one of the central debated in the philosophy of science today.

The question is how to break the hegemonic, the mainstream and start perceiving all the

impressions that we potentially could -– and this statement is partial unless I recognise it's inmediate onto-epistemological mass (Karen Barad iris van der tuin)

Yo en mi casa no tengo dormitoriio pero tengo una sala con el projector ... Y a veces lo dejo prendidos in sonido mientras trabajo en mi estudio .... En cuanto vuelvo y le ppngo sonido es un mundo chabacsno, Lleno de cliches estupidos del mainstream ....

The 1980s debate on abstract Cinema-–the representational and non representational of the image-–

Vortex and grid

Vkki Kirkby

Super duper

Simon Kirkby - language evolution

Compositional syntax

Iterated learning -- inheriting: genetic+ cultural network ...

Learning signals, sharing meaning

Post representation also implies a turn to ...on how to

Theorise subjectivity as events (a blackout, a meal, an imprisonment in chains, an experience of litter) as encounters between ontologically diverse actants, some humans, some not, although all thoroughly material.

Yo diría que la postrepresentacion implica un giro en la teorizacion de subjetividades como eventos, es decir, como encuentros entre actuantes ontológicamente diversos, algunos humanos, otros no (dígitos, impresiones etc), aunque todos ellos necesariamente materiales.

EL CINE ES OTRA COSA

Programa noviembre

Curadores invitados: Gabriela Golder y Andrés Denegri

EL CINE COMO TEORÍA DIRECTA

Una propuesta de *Luciano Zubillaga.

En los últimos años se ha desarrollado un nuevo campo donde el cine de artista y experimental, se mete directamente en los debates de la filosofía, la antropología, la política y la ciencia, reinventando lo que de manera apurada suele llamarse cine documental y las posibilidades mismas del lenguaje y la comunicación. Son formas de narrar que ya no son puramente estéticas, éticas o basadas en métodos conocidos, sino que más bien se mezclan; son formas mestizas, exploraciones onto-epistemológicas de la post-representación.

*Luciano Zubillaga es un artista argentino radicado en Londres. Creció entre Tucumán, Buenos Aires y Caracas, donde estudió filosofía y artes. En 1992 comenzó a estudiar en el Goldsmiths College (Universidad de Londres). En 2008 recibió el London Artists Film and Video Awards (LAFVA) del Arts Council England. Sus películas se han mostrado internacionalmente en diversos festivales y museos, entre ellos el Festival de Cine de La Habana, Festival de Cine de Ann Arbor,

Armory Show, y Whitechapel Art Gallery. Es profesor titular de cine experimental en la Ealing School of Art, Design and Media (University of West London).

7/11 – 19 hs: The Citizens of the Wombs (Work in progress) de Ebadur Rahman

Duración: 84 min.

The Citizens of the Wombs (Los ciudadanos de los vientres) de Ebadur Rahman es una película estilo post 9/11 snuff film, una historia cinética del asesinato extra-judicial, del secuestro y la tortura desde un punto de vista múltiple, que explora la política de guerra contra el terror en el sur de Asia y el cruce con otros temas contemporáneos.

Entrada General 15 pesos.

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Vení al Moderno - Av. San Juan 350, San Telmo, Buenos Aires.

Simbolos del sombrero subjetividades intercambiables

Cariz material

———

DELEUZE, Gilles ,y Félix GUATTARI,1980. Mil plateaux

Subjetividades nómadas

vikki kirby: el language es ee structural en binaries

Meta.... Experiencias inarticuladas

Pág. 89. El discurso indirecto abarca la totalidad del lenguaje.

El discurso directo es un fragmento de masa separada y nace del desmembramiento del agenciamiento colectivo; este siempre es el rumor de donde extraigo mi nombre propio, el conjunto de voces concordantes o no, de donde saco mi voz. Glosolalia.

Mi discurso directo sigue siendo el discurso indirecto libre que me atraviesa de parte a parte y que viene de otros mundos o de otros planetas...una capacidad de olvido que hace que uno se sienta inocente de las consignas que ha seguido y que después a abandonado, para acoger otras.

———

El cine como teoría directa

Una propuesta de *Luciano Zubillaga.

En los últimos años se ha desarrollado un nuevo campo donde el cine de artista y experimental, se mete directamente en los debates de la filosofía, la antropología, la política y la ciencia, reinventando lo que de manera apurada suele llamarse cine documental y las posibilidades mismas del lenguaje y la comunicación. Son formas de narrar que ya no son puramente estéticas, éticas o basadas en métodos conocidos, sino que más bien se mezclan, son formas mestizas, exploraciones onto-epistemológicos de la postrepresentación. Esto implica un giro en la teorizacion de subjetividades como eventos, es decir, como encuentros entre actuantes ontológicamente diversos, algunos humanos, otros no (dígitos, impresiones etc), aunque todos ellos necesariamente materiales.

El tema de la violencia y el trauma es tomado por Shona Illingworth para redibujar los paisajes fisicos y psicologicos de la memoria y la conciencia. Es un cine profundo en donde el sonido entrelaza geografías afectivas que se proyectan en contextos culturales difíciles. La pelicula de

Ebadur Rahman tambien explora el tema de la violencia pero desde la perspectiva de la proliferacion de imagenes, el cruce de plataformas y el quiebre narrativo en el mundo de la postrepresentación. Finalmente, el tema de la postrepresentación se cruza con los debates del posthumanismo y deviene cuestionamiento de las lógicas binarias de la narración en una selección que incluye películas de Nelmarie du Preez, Minou Norouzi y una en colaboración con Carlos Ginzburg.

Bob crow

Álvaro García Linera

Vice President of Bolivia

Joseph Farrell wiki

2. Cosmopolitics and ecology ... Jane Bennett Nd Isabel stengers

The need to give agency to a non human super power that could destroy organic life on earth – what is called the threat from ...

I'm preparing my own submission for next year turner prize

In deference to the current vogue for photographic representation, it will be a 167 minute essay film where wilfully obscure (and muffled) dialogue will contrast with photo-realistic computer generated landscapes, all overlaid with sometype of vague mysticism. Taken as a whole, this will demonstrate the transcendent power of emotion over the physical world.

I'm going to call it "Interstellar".

---

interaction

recent developments in science, philosophy, and political science.

The usual notion of interaction assumes that there are individual independently existing entities or agents that preexist their acting upon one another. By contrast, the notion of "intra-action" queers the familiar sense of causality (where one or more causal agents precede and produce an ef- fect), and more generally unsettles the metaphysics of individualism (the belief that there are individually constituted agents or entities, as well as times and places). According to my agential realist ontology, or rather ethico-onto-epis- temology (an entanglement of what is usually taken to be thes eparate consid- erations of ethics, ontology, and epistemology), "individuals" do not preexist as such but rather materialize in intra-action. That is, intra-action goes to the question of the making of differences, of "individuals," rather than assuming their independent or prior existence. "Individuals" do not not exist, but are not individually determinate. Rather, "individuals" only exist within phenomena (particular materialized/materializing relations) in their ongoing iteratively intra-active reconfiguring.

A specific intra-action enacts an "agential cut" (in contrast to the Cartesian cut—an inherent distinction—between subject and object), effecting a separation be- tween "subject" and "object" within the phenomenon. In particular, agential cuts enact a resolution *within* the phenomenon of some inherent ontological indeterminacies to the exclusion of others. That is, intra-actions enact "agen- tial separability"—the condition of exteriority-within-phenomena. So it is not that there are no separations or differentiations, but that they only exist within relations. Putting the point another way, phenomena are differential patterns of "mattering"—diffraction patterns dispersed across differently entangled spaces and times, or rather *spacetimemotterings*. The notion of intra-action marks an important shift in many foundational philosophical notions such as causality, agency, space, time, matter, meaning, knowing, being, responsibility, account- ability, and justice.

It is perhaps worth noting that while Cartesian epistemology is built on the given-ness of a distinction or a Cartesian cut between subject and object, the epistemology of agential realism, or rather its entangled ethico-onto-episte-mology, goes to a set of prior questions. Agential realism does not start with a set of given or fixed differences, but rather makes inquiries into how differences are made and remade, stabilized and destabilized, as well as their materializ-ing effects and constitutive exclusions. Since cuts are understood to be enacted rather than given (it is the cut that makes the individual and not the other way around), all manner of questions regarding the nature of mattering come to-gether here—that is, questions of matter in the multiple senses of meaning, being, and valuing.

About the amoeba colonies: Slime molds (of which so-called social amoebas are classified as one kind) are amazing critters. They have the ability to morph from a seemingly uncoordinated group of genetically identical single cells to an ag-gregate "slug" with an immune system, muscles and nerves with ganglia (that is, simple brains) and other organismic functionality characteristic of multicel-lular species with different roles played by identical cellular units. So the very question of what is or isn't an "individual" is not a clear and distinct matter, and that seems to be precisely the scientific sticking point. The ques-tion of the nature of identity is ripe here; it's what's so spectacularly exciting from a scientific point of view. No wonder that social amoebas are taken to be model organisms in molecular biology and genetics for studying communica-tion and cell differentiation. Social amoebas queer the nature of identity, calling into question the individual/group binary. In fact, when it comes to queering identity, the social amoeba enjoys multiple indeterminacies, and has managed to hoodwink scientists' ongoing attempts to nail down its taxonomy, its species-being defying not only classification by phylum but also by kingdom. To at-tempt an explanatory model on the basis of individuals interacting with one another and their "environment" seems to miss something fundamental about the very nature of the organism. How can we expect the notion of an organism understood as an individual that is situated in a container we call the environ-ment to begin to speak to the complexity of the intra-active reconfiguring of bodily boundaries that defines the slime mold's astonishing material existence?

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] mouss e 34

~ Karen Barad

Intra-actions

recent developments in science, philosophy, and political science.

usual notion of interaction assumes that there are individual independently existing entities or agents that preexist their acting upon one another. By contrast, the notion of "intra-action" queers the familiar sense of causality (where one or more causal agents precede and produce an ef- fect), and more generally unsettles the metaphysics of individualism (the belief that there are individually constituted agents or entities, as well as times and places). According to my agential realist ontology, or rather ethico-onto-epis- temology (an entanglement of what is usually taken to be the separate consid- erations of ethics, ontology, and epistemology), "individuals" do not preexist as such but rather materialize in intra-action. That is, intra-action goes to the question of the making of differences, of "individuals," rather than assuming their independent or prior existence. "Individuals" do not not exist, but are not individually determinate. Rather, "individuals" only exist within phenomena (particular materialized/materializing relations) in their ongoing iteratively intra-active reconfiguring.

by AdAm KleinmAn

We have always thought the world was made of discrete objects, and interactions happened between individuals that existed prior to the exchanges. But what would we think if our frames of reference were disrupted by a new, convincing theory that asserts the exact opposite, namely that individuals exist because of the existence of given interactions: and, furthermore, that even matter exists as a phenomenon, i.e. as the materialization of relationships? Karen Barad, physicist, scholar of the philosophy of science and feminism, is the thinker behind Agential Realism, a theory that ultimately undermines not just the substance of matter as we know it, but also the dichotomies between nature and culture, animal and human, female and male, even problematizing the social practice of science and the nature of ethics. In this interview with Adam Kleinman, the scientist explains extremely complex concepts in an elegant, simple way, helping us to understand something more about nature and raising fascinating questions.

There are many ways to introduce Karen Barad. She holds a PhD in theoretical particle physics and has held a tenured appointment in a physics department. So it would be fair to say that Barad thinks about, and with, the atom. Likewise, she is currently a professor of feminist studies, philosophy, and the history of con- sciousness at the University of California at Santa Cruz. There, she is engaged in various interdisciplinary endeavors that consider such queer things as asking what we can learn—ethically speaking—from such strange social organisms as giant slime colonies that ooze under the soil beneath our very feet. More on that below.

You may be familiar with her books, such as 2007's Meeting the Universe Half- way: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning, which revisits the philosophical implications of Niels Bohr's theories of quantum indeterminacy in light of recent developments in science, philosophy, and political science.

But on the subject of introductions in the more colloquial sense, I was delighted to send Karen an email in early May to request the interview featured here. The reason for this invitation was quite simple, namely that her work has been such a key influence on us at dOCUMENTA (13). It has helped shape our thinking about the world, and our place in it and within it. I concluded my email by say- ing that it would seem amiss to not find some way to include her in this special issue of Mousse magazine. Fortunately she was kind enough to accept the invi- tation and joined with us to discuss her recent activities and forthcoming work.

adam kleinman: Karen, thank you for joining with us today. As you know, I am an "agent" of dOCUMENTA (13). It's a funny title, one that recalls exciting roles like that of a spy, or more banal functions like that of a retail clerk. An agent is also a member of a larger body—a coworker, so to speak. Your writings describe example after example of highly complex exchanges or co-workings, for instance a giant amoeba colony in Texas that sends and receives information across its various constituents that dif- ferentiate specialized roles within the

colony, including even self-sacrifices, apparently. You use the neologism "intra-action" rather than simply "in- teraction" to explain this kind of phenomenon. What is "intra-action"?

karen barad: The usual notion of interaction assumes that there are individual independently existing entities or agents that preexist their acting upon one another. By contrast, the notion of "intra-action" queers the familiar sense of causality (where one or more causal agents precede and produce an ef- fect), and more generally unsettles the metaphysics of individualism (the belief that there are individually constituted agents or entities, as well as times and places). According to my agential realist ontology, or rather ethico-onto-epis- temology (an entanglement of what is usually taken to be the separate consid- erations of ethics, ontology, and epistemology), "individuals" do not preexist as such but rather materialize in intra-action. That is, intra-action goes to the question of the making of differences, of "individuals," rather than assuming their independent or prior existence. "Individuals" do not not exist, but are not individually determinate. Rather, "individuals" only exist within phenomena (particular materialized/materializing relations) in their ongoing iteratively intra-active reconfiguring.

"Phenomena," in an agential realist sense, are the entanglement—the ontologi- cal inseparability—of intra-acting agencies. (Where agency is an enactment, not something someone has, or something instantiated in the form of an indi- vidual agent.) It is through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of "individuals" within the phenomenon become determinate and particular material articulations of the world become meaningful. A spe- cific intra-action enacts an "agential cut" (in contrast to the Cartesian cut—an inherent distinction—between subject and object), effecting a separation be- tween "subject" and "object" within the phenomenon. In particular, agential cuts enact a resolution within the phenomenon of some inherent ontological indeterminacies to the exclusion of others. That is, intra-actions enact "agen- tial separability"—the condition of exteriority-within-phenomena. So it is not that there are no separations or differentiations, but that they only exist within relations. Putting the point another way, phenomena are differential patterns of "mattering"—diffraction patterns dispersed across differently entangled spaces and times, or rather spacetimematterings. The notion of intra-action marks an important shift in many foundational philosophical notions such as causality, agency, space, time, matter, meaning, knowing, being, responsibility, account- ability, and justice.

It is perhaps worth noting that while Cartesian epistemology is built on the given-ness of a distinction or a Cartesian cut between subject and object, the epistemology of agential realism, or rather its entangled ethico-onto-episte- mology, goes to a set of prior questions. Agential realism does not start with a set of given or fixed differences, but rather makes inquiries into how differences are made and remade, stabilized and destabilized, as well as their materializ- ing effects and constitutive exclusions. Since cuts are understood to be enacted rather than given (it is the cut that makes the individual and not the other way

around), all manner of questions regarding the nature of mattering come to- gether here—that is, questions of matter in the multiple senses of meaning, being, and valuing.

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So the very question of what is or isn't an "individual" is not a clear and distinct matter, and that seems to be precisely the scientific sticking point. The ques- tion of the nature of identity is ripe here; it's what's so spectacularly exciting from a scientific point of view. No wonder that social amoebas are taken to be model organisms in molecular biology and genetics for studying communica- tion and cell differentiation. Social amoebas queer the nature of identity, calling into question the individual/group binary. In fact, when it comes to queering identity, the social amoeba enjoys multiple indeterminacies, and has managed to hoodwink scientists' ongoing attempts to nail down its taxonomy, its species- being defying not only classification by phylum but also by kingdom. To at- tempt an explanatory model on the basis of individuals interacting with one another and their "environment" seems to miss something fundamental about the very nature of the organism. How can we expect the notion of an organism understood as an individual that is situated in a container we call the environ- ment to begin to speak to the complexity of the intra-active reconfiguring of bodily boundaries that defines the slime mold's astonishing material existence?

ak: One of the pleasures I find in reading your work is how you syn- thesize perspectives out of seeming paradoxes. For instance you question how the moralist can condemn an "unnatural act" such as sodomy and at the same time call a transgressing person a "beast," even though a beast is part of nature. How do such dichotomies reveal frames of inclusion and ex- clusion in our knowledge and social structures? I believe you use the term "cut" to denote these anchor points.

kb: Before I address the core of your question, I just wanted to mention that I don't see my approach as one of synthesis. Rather than synthesizing different perspectives, I like to get in there and do diffraction experiments—that is, get my hands dirty and experiment with different differences, trying to get a feel for how differences are produced and how they matter. Reading insights through one another diffractively is about experimenting with different patterns of re- lationality, opening things up, turning them over and over again, to see how the patterns shift. This is not about solving paradoxes or synthesizing different points of view from the outside, as it were, but rather about the material intra- implication of putting "oneself" at risk, troubling "oneself," one's ideas, one's dreams, all the different ways of touching and being in touch, and sensing the differences and entanglements from within. In fact, touch currently has me in its

grip. I find it very fruitful to understand the history of physics as the history of an inquiry into the nature of touch. But now we are already feeling around the edge of the question you asked me.

Let's talk about cuts. The etymology of dichotomy (from the Greek διχοτομία, a cutting in two) already speaks of the genealogical dimension of the very no- tion of difference—that is, the fact that differences are made, not found, and that dichotomies derive from particular cuts. In other words, dichotomy's ge- nealogy asks after the genealogy of each specific dichotomy/cutting, thereby deconstructing the presumed given-ness of dichotomies, which is a fixture of our Cartesian inheritance. This is not to say that I want to reinforce the idea of

the binary. On uthe contrary, it's just that my diffractive methodology and ethi- cal sensibility is not to reject things out of hand, to put the old out to pasture, but to renew ideas by turning them over and inside out, reading them decon- structively for aporias, and re-reading them through other ideas, queering their received meanings.

The larger question of differences interests me a great deal. Quantum physics as well as feminist, poststructuralist, and queer theories have been inspiring coworkers in my efforts to think about the nature of matter and how differences materialize. According to my agential realist account, matter is not mere stuff, an inanimate given-ness. Rather, matter is substance in its iterative intra-active becoming—not a thing, but a doing, a congealing of agency. It is morpho- logically active, responsive, generative, and articulate. Mattering is the ongoing intra-active differentiating of the world. Intra-actions enact agential cuts, which are a cutting together-apart (that is, entangling-differentiating), as one move (not sequential acts). That may seem paradoxical, but it goes to the very nature of the agential cut, which cross-cuts itself. That is, it cross-cuts not only the no- tion of "itself" but even the notion of the cut itself.

For example, while the ontology of classical physics divides everything into the mutually exclusive categories of particle and wave, contemporary experi- ments directly challenge this ontology. In fact, there is now mounting empirical evidence that there are no inherently

bounded and propertied things that pre- cede their intra-action with particular apparatuses. It is only in intra-action that bounded and properties "things-in-phenomena" materialize—where "phe- nomena" (in the case of measurement intra-actions) are the inseparability of "things" and "apparatus es." That is, the larger apparatus in its particular mate- rial configuration enacts particular cuts that materialize determinately bounded and propertied "things" together with their "agencies of observation." Actually, it is not only matter in the sense of stuff that is materialized through intra-actions, but also matter in the sense of mattering or meaning. For ex- ample, a particular "apparatus"—that is, a particular set of material-discursive practices that materializes, say, particles, in this case—has the dual function of giving meaning to the notion of "particle" as well as participating in mate- rializing "particles," that is, determinately bounded things with determinate sets of particle properties (within the phenomenon). This is to the exclusion of resolving indeterminacies in a way that would make sense of and materi- alize "waves." That is, in the materialization of any particular phenomenon, some particular aspects, some meanings-things, are nonetheless indeterminate; that is, the materialization of phenomena always entail constitutive exclusions. Different intra-actions iteratively constitute different phenomena, and exclude others. (It's not often that physicists probe how meaning comes into existence together with their usual objects of study, but this astonishing insight comes from the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Niels Bohr.)

With remarkable resonance, feminist, postcolonial, queer, and critical race theories have called the liberal humanist notion of the subject into question. For example, gender is no longer understood to be an inherent attribute of the individual subject, but rather a reiterative doing through which the subject is constituted. As Judith Butler explains in Bodies That Matter, "The 'I' neither precedes nor follows this process of gendering, but emerges only within and as the matrix of gender relations themselves." (By the way, I don't see these theo- ries as analogous but rather as always already intra-actively co-constituted, and so diffractively (re)reading insights from different theories through one anoth- er has the potential to materialize remarkably insightful and productive patterns that dynamically shift, not over time, but in the making of spacetimemattering.)So in an important sense there are no anchors here, not in the sense of fixity. No fixed ground or place or even time, space, or matter. Rather, agential cuts are perhaps more akin to touchstones, as in something solid and tangible in their particularity, rather than anything as immobile/immobilizing as an anchor.

ak: Before we forget our friend the unnatural-beast, would you mind sharing what this kind of setup might mean in light of the so-called na- ture/culture divide? Does it hold the potential to radically reconfigure this fault line?

kb: The nature/culture divide is the bedrock for an impressive array of al- lied dichotomies (for example female/male, animal/human, primitive/mod- ern, natural/unnatural, real/constructed, substance/form, matter/spirit, physical/mental, stuff/meaning, innate/learned, given/made) and associated inequalities. I have explored some of the ways this dichotomy is enlisted in the

naturalization of morality, and moralism's dependence on this divide.

As Harry Jaffa, who holds an endowed professorship at Claremont McKenna College, puts it, "Sodomy is to be condemned because the rational ground of all morality is nature, and sodomy is against nature." Of course, the decision simply to set aside such a hateful discourse would be understandable, but it's illuminating to see just how the divide gets worked here. Where to begin? The woven set of associations—sodomy-condemnation-rationality-ground-moral- ity-nature—is stunning. The ground trembles just contemplating the magni-

tude of this assertion and the questions it raises. Whatever Jaffa's proclamation means, it is surely underwritten by a belief in the nature/culture divide. But what is the nature of nature such that it has the capacity to serve as the "ratio- nal ground for all morality"? And for whom? What is required of it? Who is included in the "all," in the universalizing aspect of this claim? Does it apply to all cultures? All natures, too? Or is nature excluded, so that the "all" is not really comprehensive? If nature is included, could it serve as its own ground for morality? Does nature have the capacity to be rational? Or is it simply the ground on which human pronouncements can be made? And if so, are these pronouncements not merely cultural creations, human fabrications, with at best some unspecified association with natural creations?

The ground is giving way, and we're just getting warmed up. Let's follow one fault line for a bit: What precisely constitutes the "nature" at issue in this mor- alizing assertion about the very grounds of morality? Surely when invoking the term "nature," Jaffa can't mean (nonhuman) animals and their behaviors,

since there is scientific evidence that hundreds of species engage in one form of another of homosexual activity, which is the usual way the term "sodomy" is construed (illuminating conflations notwithstanding) in these moralizing (and oftentimes litigious) pronouncements concerning "crimes against nature." What use will the ground be for the sapien descendent of Homo erectus if Mother Nature herself is queer? What if the ground is not made of bedrock but rather oozing slime molds and other protean forms that lack determinate identities? Slime molds or no slime molds, once the nature/culture divide makes plain its inherent instabilities, once it gives way, there's no stopping the aftershocks and subterranean shifts, the buildup of energy and the creation of new fault lines that disrupt, unsettle, and undermine even the most seemingly solid grounds. And once the very ground underfoot surges up, tsunamis and other forces of nature are unleashed in a radical reworking of its own ground. (Nature is far better at deconstruction than any cultural theorist!) What if instability, or rather the indeterminacy of in/stability, is the condition for the possibility of taking a stand? What if the very ground, the "foundation" for judging right from wrong, is a flaming queen, a faggot, a lesbo, a tranny, or gender-queer?

ak: On the topic of critters, you have included atoms as such. You even called them "ultraqueer"

in your text "Nature's Queer Performativity," which I have been referring to in the above questions. Recently I was happy to read the newly released and authorized version of that paper. Why do you consider atoms not only critters, but ultraqueer critters at that?

kb: Why do I consider atoms to be critters? I'm amused by fact that this question seems quite odd to me now. My gut response is, "Well, why wouldn't I?" If the very notion of identity has become unhinged, then what is the basis for taking the animate/inanimate divide as stable across all cultures and na- tures, or rather all naturecultures (a phrase that I am borrowing from my friend and colleague Donna Haraway)? While animal studies has been very effective in questioning human exceptionalism and troubling the (nonhuman) animal/ human divide, for the most part it has left unexamined the animate/inanimate binary. Another popular approach these days are neovitalist theories that take every-thing to be living, without necessarily asking after the ways in which par- ticular kinds of animate/inanimate distinctions come to matter for particular purposes of particular kinds of flourishing for particular beings. These are im- portant political and ethical questions that need a place in our theories if those theories are indeed thinking companions with a chance for life.

Now, to turn to your question about the queerness, or even ultra-queerness, of the atom: Opening with the evolutionary biologist J. B. S. Haldane's famous quote, "The universe is not only queerer than we suppose, it is queerer than we can suppose," Bruce Bagemihl, author of Biological Exuberance, writes that

the world is "teeming with homosexual, bisexual, and transgendered creatures of every stripe and feather." Citing the scientific literature on mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, fishes, insects, and other invertebrates, he writes: "Ho- mosexual behavior occurs in more than 450 different kinds of animals world- wide, and is found in every major geographical region and every major animal group." But even this extraordinary zoological catalogue of queer animals cov- ers only a small fraction of the universe. Even if we stick to the Earth, there are all kinds of critters that don't make the list, including all manner of nonanimal life forms (amoebas, plants, viruses) and the multitudinous forms of existence we deem "inanimate."

It is my contention that the world in its exuberance is far more queer than all the numerous citations to Haldane's quote seem to intend. In "Nature's Queer Performativity," I entertain the possibility of the queerness of one of the most pervasive of all Earthlings: atoms. I dub them "ultraqueer" critters due to the fact that their quantum quotidian qualities queer queerness itself in their radi- cally deconstructive ways of being. Indeed, given that "queer" is a radical

ques- tioning of identity and binaries, including the nature/culture binary, I explain, based on a detailed consideration of recent experimental findings, that all sorts of seeming impossibilities are indeed possible, including the queerness of cau- sality, matter, space, and time. Politically speaking, it has been and continues to be important that "queer" is not a fixed, determinate term. It does not have a stable meaning or referential context, which is not to say that it means any- thing anyone wants it to. "Queer" is itself a lively, mutating organism, a desir- ing radical openness, an edgy protean differentiating multiplicity, an agential dis/continuity, an enfolded reiteratively materializing promiscuously inventive spatiotemporality.

ak: Ethically speaking, if phenomena are seen as queer, what would such an understanding add to our intra-actions with them? I am drawn to a sen- tence, which, in that same essay, you put entirely in italics: "Responsibility entails providing opportunities for the organism to respond."

kb: Ultimately, the point is not the queerness of this or that critter, but the queerness of phenomena in their iterative intra-active becoming. The queer- ness of phenomena unsettles the presumed separateness of questions of being- knowing-responding. In other words, these various senses of mattering—on- tology, epistemology, and ethics—are not separate/separable considerations. Given that you asked me about ethics, let's focus on the way in which the fun- damental notion of responsibility is queered. According to agential realism, "responsibility" is not about right response, but rather a matter of inviting, welcoming, and enabling the response of the Other. That is, what is at issue is response-ability—the ability to respond. The range of possible responses that are invited, the kinds of responses that are dis invited or ruled out as fitting re- sponses, are constrained and conditioned by the questions asked, where ques- tions are not simply innocent queries, but particular practices of engagement. So the conditions of possibility of response-ability include accountability for the specific histories of particular practices of engagement. Much like our friend the ultra-queer atom, who is open to reconfigurings of spacetimemattering that signal the undoing of the metaphysics of individualism (including assumptions that fall under the heading "the metaphysics of presence"), the temporality of responsibility is not one's own. "Past" and "future" bleed into the "now" of the questioning. Presence is not a matter of a thin slice of now, but rather the hauntology of inheritance, inheriting the future as well as the past (a reference to Derrida). (See for example, my diffractive reading of the quantum eraser experiment in its possibilities for providing empirical evidence of hauntology and différance.1) The im/possibilities of response are not only conditioned by the specific practices of materialization of time but also of space, or rather of the entanglements of spacetimemattering.

This queering of responsibility marks a dis ruption of the usual framings of eth- ics that take human exceptionalism to be the unquestioned bedrock of analysis. In my agential realist account of mattering, responsibility is not an obligation that the subject chooses, but rather an incarnate relation that precedes the inten- tionality of consciousness. Responsibility is not a calculation to be performed. It is a relation always already integral to the world's ongoing intra-

active be- coming and not-becoming. That is, responsibility is an iterative (re)opening up to, an enabling of responsiveness. Not through the realization of some existing possibility, but through the iterative reworking of im/possibility. Responsibil- ity does not follow from any set of distinctions or individualist conceptions of the nature of the subject. Rather, responsibility flows out of cuts that bind. Since responsibility is not conditioned by any preordained determinate distinc- tions, such as that between human and nonhuman, the ethical response cannot be to merely widen the circle and allow in nonhumans as well as humans, or for that matter any other group of excluded Others. In fact, partly in an attempt to unsettle the recent a-bit-too-easy accommodations of the nonhuman into the usual human-centered stories, to get underneath the human/nonhuman ani- mate/inanimate divides, as it were, I have been thinking more and more about

and with the inhuman.

The inhuman is not the same as the nonhuman. To my mind, these terms speak to very different questions and different differences. While the "nonhuman" is differentially (co)constituted (together with the "human") through particular cuts, I think of the inhuman as an infinite intimacy that touches the very nature of touch, that which holds open the space of the liveliness of indeterminacies that bleed through the cuts and inhabit the between of particular entanglements. It is only very recently that I have dared to speak about this publicly. To come to a sufficiently robust understanding of the inhuman I found it necessary to give in to the gravitational pull, to let myself be drawn further into a deep ex- ploration of the intricate details of quantum field theory. I have been swimming around in and breathing quantum field theory for many years now, decades even. (My doctorate field of specialization was theoretical particle physics, or more specifically, quantum field theory.) This theory is so fantastically queer that it makes quantum mechanics (which is the more familiar, but limited, the- ory that travels under the general label "quantum physics") look utterly tame and unremarkable. Attending to the intricacies of quantum field theory takes an enormous labor, intense focus, patience, and humility. It is an awesome labor of love. I hope I am proceeding responsibly in a way that allows the response of the "between" that I am trying to gesture toward, even if it isn't possible to really "do it justice." (Doing justice is a profound yearning, a crucially impor- tant if inevitably unachievable activity, an always already inadequate attempt to respond to the ethical cry of the world.) Or, rather, perhaps I can put it this way: It is the very question of justice-to-come, not the search for a final answer or final solution to that question, that motivates me. The point is to live the questions and to help them flourish.

I'll leave you with a taste of things-to-come in the provocation that it may well be the necessity of facing our inhumanness, the inhuman that we are—that is, this infinite alterity in its material and lively indeterminacy that lives in, around, and through us—that will help us face the depths of what responsibility entails.2 For all our concerns with nonhumans as well as humans, there is nonetheless always something that drops out. But what if the point isn't to widen the bounds of

inclusion to let everyone and everything in? What if it takes sensing the abyss, the edges of the limits of "inclusion" and "exclusion" before the binary of inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, mattering/not-mattering can be seri- ously troubled? What if it is only in facing the "inhuman"—the indetermi- nate non/being of mattering and not mattering—that an ethics committed to the rupture of indifference can arise? What if it is only in the encounter with the inhuman, in its liveliness, in its gifting life and death its conditions of im/ possibility, that we can truly confront "our" inhumanity, that is, "our" actions lacking compassion? Perhaps it takes facing the inhuman within "us" before com-passion—suffering together with, participating with, feeling with, being moved by—can be lived. How would we feel if it is by way of the inhuman that we come to feel, to care, to respond?

Notes

1. For more details, see Karen Barad, "Quantum entanglements and Hauntological Relations of Inheritance: Dis/continuities, spacetime enfoldings, and Justice-to-Come," Derrida Today vol. 3, no. 2 (Nov. 2010): 240–68.

2. this "infinite alterity" that is integral to the very nature of the "human" comes through in the intricacies of quantum field theory. I can't go into all this here, but to give the reader's imagination a bit more to play with for now, a touchstone perhaps, I can offer this: What comes into play is the liveliness of the quantum nothingness, the inhuman animacy of the nothingness exploring itself, the materiality of the virtual exploration of im/possibilities that are quantized indeterminacies-in-action. I explore some facets of the quantum nothingness in "What Is the Measure of Nothingness? Infinity, Virtuality, Justice / Was ist das Maß des Nichts? Unendlichkeit, Virtualität, Gerechtigkeit" in doCUMeNtA (13): 100 Notes—100 Thoughts / 100 Notizen—100 Gedanken | Book No099 (english & German edition, 2012). For more details on the inhuman, see Karen Barad, "on touching: the Inhuman that therefore I Am," in differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies (forthcoming in 2012). the final paragraph of this interview is from this forthcoming paper.

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electron Microscopy Laboratory, texas tech University

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mousse 34 ~ Karen Barad

The final version of this chapter has been published as:

Iris van der Tuin (2014). 'On the Mode of Invention of Creative Research: Onto-Epistemology'. Material Inventions: Applying Creative Research. Eds. Estelle Barrett and Barbara Bolt. London and New York: IBTauris. 257-72.

ON THE MODE OF INVENTION OF CREATIVE RESEARCH: ONTO-EPISTEMOLOGY

Iris van der Tuin

The question How does creative research invent? precedes the question What are the inventions of creative research?, because the type of research under

discussion in this volume gives rise to important onto-epistemological considerations.

"Onto-epistemology" is a term of Karen Barad (2003, 2007), a theoretical physicist working in the field of gender and queer studies. Onto-epistemology tries to formulate how ontology and epistemology are intertwined. Just like the quantitative socio-economic historian who once told me I do not work according to an epistemology does in fact confirm some (naïve) epistemological notations, all explicit epistemological reflection has ontological presuppositions as well as ontologizing effects. This relationality works the other way around as well: all reflections on ontology have epistemological presuppositions as well as epistemologizing effects. Onto-epistemology wants to do justice to the immediate entanglement of ontology and epistemology and shifts what it means to do ontological or epistemological work. In short, it moves away from

"reflection". [redacted]

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Moving image as philosophy

Matter (thoughts, impressions and sensations) is the sedimenting historiality of practices / agencies

and an agentive force in the world's diff erential becoming. Becoming is not

an unfolding in time btit the inexhaustible dynamism of the enfolding of

mattering.

how do cinematic forms not only tell stories but also create descriptions of our actual lives?

a description has a multiplicity of forms –beyond syntagma– not necesarily capture by a story

not recording reality bu capturing life: more than representation or communication, the space between camera and the captured performers reflect a complex dispositif or even a teleportation lab. The spatiality of our everyday notions of past, present and future have been fundamentally de-centred as a result of twentieth century avant-garde art practice and the implications of quantum mechanics.

Direct Theory: against a pessimistic and suspicious tendency in contemporary cultural critique to insist that there is no outside of modernity and global capitalism.

searching for new/other epistemologies:

methodologies developed from the "decolonial turn"

visual materiality: against appropriation and interpellation, the project proposes a decolonial theory of writing and visuality that does not dichotomize writing from its material existence.

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[redacted]Viktor Shklovsky in his classic 1917 essay "Art as Technique" termed defamiliarization, is also the key strategy for producing the unreality of cosmic horror. Defamiliarization cancels the habituated meanings of the human world, and allows appearances to float free.

My first impression it's a good Spanish introduction to the transhumanist debate. I think it remains short in explaining your contribution and the overall influence of nietzsche in the entire debate ... It does connects the more mainstream debate to the foucault deleuze nikolas rose et all approach to biopolitics and global governance ... It does not go enough into the more critical

posthumanist –i.e. simondonian-stiegler tradition, nor accelerationists etc ... also it doesn't include examples from art as direct theory (peter pal Pelbart, Suelly rolnik or the type of seminars I am teaching at university of kent this semester :)

Cartas obre el humanismo, de 1946, Heidegger dirigiera al joven pensador francés Jean Beaufret. Sloterdijk definió la conocida Carta como la inauguración de un "espacio de pensamiento transhumanista o posthumanista" (Sloterdijk 1999)

Hay quienes piensan que el verdadero origen del concepto transhumanismo se encontraría en un texto de 1957 del biólogo humanista Julian Huxley –hermano del famoso escritor Aldous Huxley, y nieto del no menos célebre biólogo Thomas H. Huxley– titulado New bottles for a new wine, donde habría propuesto el término "transhumanismo" para impulsar la ideas según la cual el ser humano debe mejorarse a sí mismo, através de la ciencia y la tecnología, ya sea desde el punto de vistagenético o desde el punto de vista ambiental y social. Tomándonos entonces de este antecedente, y sintetizando lo expuesto en las miles de páginas que hasta la fecha se han escrito sobre este tema, se podría definir al transhumanismo como la posición de quienes creen que es posible provocar deliberadamente un "mejoramiento" (enhancement) de los seres humanos, con miras a alcanzar un estado superior, a veces llamado "transhumano", o incluso "posthumano".

Los transhumanistas ven la naturaleza humana, entonces, como una obra en desarrollo, un trabajo en progreso, que nos desafiaría a intentar su rediseño, conforme a una serie de antiguas aspiraciones de los seres humanos, que han estado presentes desde tiempos inmemoriales. Sería cosa de pensar, nada más y por ejemplo, en la búsqueda de la inmortalidad presente en el poema sumerio de Gilgamesh (ca. 1700 a.n.e.), o en el ejemplo paradigmático del deseo de volar que mueve a Ícaro y Dédalo, o en la idea medieval de creación del homúnculo, por citar nada más unos cuantos casos conocidos de pretensiones históricas de ampliación de las potencias de la humanidad (Bostrom 2005a). Nuestra actual condición, entonces, no debería considerarse forzosamente como el punto de arribo de la evolución, sino únicamente como una fase inicial suya, tras la cual debiesen venir tales mejoramientos, propiciados por el incremental saber de la ciencia y la técnica.

Los riesgos a los que aquí quiero aludir refieren principalmente a la connivencia no declarada y al ajustamiento interesado en que probablemente el proyecto transhumanista estuviera incurriendo con respecto a los fines de las sociedades occidentales, de disciplinamiento primero y de control luego, según han sido denominadas por autores como Michel Foucault (1975) o Gilles Deleuze (1999), respectivamente, y también por algunos de sus más directos seguidores contemporáneos (Esposito, Agamben, Rose, Miller, Fassin, Lazzarato y otros). En tal sentido, argumentaciones provenientes de la matriz de análisis de la biopolítica permitirían sospechar que el transhumanismo podría constituir una reiteración –claro que perfeccionada, sofisticada, consumada– de las formas históricas a través de las cuales el biopoder se ha instalado en Occidente moderno y ha devenido en un conjunto de prácticas de gobierno de los sujetos. Parte de los riesgos correspondería a la consolidación de una nueva escena de producción de las subjetividades –nuevas modalidades de crianza diría Nietzsche–, amparadas ahora en el saber biotecnológico e informático en curso de irrefrenable expansión. Dicho saber opera, como sabemos, definido por un ethos profundamente individualista; está enteramente determinado en cuanto a sus fundamentos por las leyes del mercado y su desarrollo solo es susceptible de producirse en un contexto de economía neoliberal globalizada.

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No parece irrelevante tener en cuenta en este punto, como lo ha hecho por ejemplo un autor contemporáneo como Didier Fassin, que durante mucho tiempo el cuerpo constituyó un punto ciego para la investigación social y política (Fassin 2005). Aunque en las últimas décadas, y sobre todo a partir de los trabajos de Michel Foucault, la tematización del asunto del cuerpo –entendido como el horizonte de despliegue de lo social y lo político– constituye hoy un pie forzado de la discusión. No obstante –cree Fassin–, aunque fecunda, esta apertura no habría abordado suficientemente un asunto capital como el de "los usos políticos del cuerpo" (Ibíd.). Ello se torna muy relevante para esta reflexión, sobre todo si se considera que en relación con el tema del transhumanismo, literalmente ese poder se manifiesta en la carne del individuo, a tal punto que no resultaría errado hablar de un verdadero fenómeno de in-corporación del poder. En tal sentido, como señala Fassin, en la época presente "el orden del mundo se inscribe en el cuerpo" (Ibíd.). En un sentido muy semejante, otro autor contemporáneo, el británico Nikolas Rose, también ha buscado entender y establecer el papel que las ciencias han jugado en la vinculación de la vida subjetiva e intersubjetiva con los sistemas de poder político (Rose 1990).

Entender los riesgos, por tanto, equivale a poner atención al posible proceso de sometimiento al que sus vidas llegarán a ser expuestas, más que solo a las expectativas de beneficio y mejora que supuestamente trae consigo la oferta transhumanista. Porque lo que la política es capaz de hacer con la vida de las personas no remite únicamente a un asunto de discursos biomédicos o de tecnologías (Fassin 2005). Tiene que ver con el modo real en que los grupos e individuos ampliados en sus capacidades serán tratados; según qué rendimientos se les exigirá responder socialmente; mediante qué criterios se evaluarán sus mejoradas vidas futuras, conforme a qué tipo de desigualdades y en ausencia de qué reconocimientos se les excluirá

(Ibíd.).

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How experimental film engage with self referenciality, autobiography but beyond space time historiography? traditional historiography

Action in front of a camera ... Bodies that look towards the camera

The space between camera and captured performers

Q: You mentioned earlier the idea that objects theorize. What happened when objects theorise with the use of sound and non linear narratives ?

I think this is a particular ser arch of art and experimental cinema in particular. There is a capture dispositif, a capture of something that, paraphrasing etienne s oreau, capturing that which has been supreseded that needs to emerge, become instaurated.

There is a technology of capture that responds to a specific logos.

Kenneth anger s poke of invocation and filmmaking as a weapon, I would add to captures another less visible multivers e.

Expanded cinema has somehow include the idea of expans ion in the fields of s eeing, perception and knowing. Beyond the possibility of language as syntagma as a regimented restricting and limited form of communication. I think critical thinking falls into the s ame trap wi language, speculative reas on needs the discours es of contemporary art and moving image in particular to freed from the limitations imposed by language structure. Als o when we speak about language we tend to refer to the structures of colonial language only, not mandarin or Nahuatl which have more plasticity and multiplicity of meanings.

Q: There is a polyphony of materials in your work. And how these materials are not organised according to a plot, like in classic film and TV, and in these work the priority is the expansion of these materials. How is the process of working differently, according to the work, the object own structures and hints?

I think of how misunderstood is the idea of narrative and communication. And how these notions have been hicjecked by a positivist colonial logic that denies the possibility of nonlinear, non historiographical narratives. I think it is even perverse the regime of linear narrative: the way that all of us immediately narrate our lives within a single plane of materiality.

In the film kokakolachickenwings Zairong xiang reads a poem that has no beginning and no end, and also in some works the references connect films together in a very organic way?

Maduhan societies live in obsolescence

what kind of spaces do you want to create with moving images ?

The sense of the real needs to be adapted to the contemporary. The staging as presence, the complexity of the present. Again the notion to expand telepathy, as performance, as a mode of collaborating in art, almost as if telepathy could be turned into a collaborative methodology. Thinking of the present, and how distracted I am, how fragmented and how influences multiply constantly, non stop. How to capture that. I think concepts like forms and methodologies become obsolete. It al lhappens in an instant. No procedures, proces es or protocols. All of them exist in linear time. But I do exist in the pres ent, otherwise it all becomes teletransportation. Archiving, documenting, explaining, it is all teletransportation. We want to teletransport the present, somewhere abstract and timeless. A very strong desire behind all visual / media technology

Q: What you are seaying brings me to the work you did with Carlos Ginzburg, Meta Selfie, in Piccadily Circus. This desire for sef portrait, this ironic gesture that repeats through the film brings me back to what are you saying about the capture of the present ...

We mentioned earlier a field of inmanence and how expanded telepathy appears as a method for artist collaboration that tap on a level of shared intersubjectivity which exists beyond words. Perhaps as an expansion of communication by language. Somehow mining the present even further. Can we quantify, teletransport arithmetically, digitally this complexity ?

Q: Now we are talking of LA Healing Times, this weird experiment that consists of capturing these healers energy with a video camera ?

————————-Q: How do you collaborate telepathically?

Telepathy has been a tool and method of collaboration within international visual art practice since the 1960s. The words telepathy and telethesia were coined simultaneously when Frederic Myers founded the Society for Psychical Research in London in 1882. However, telepathy names an experience of distant (tele) feeling (pathos) or ideas (thesia) found in all cultures. Telepathy and collaboration are tools that a number of artists reach for simultaneously attempting to share and/or transform subjectivity. This raises questions of the overlapping similarity between telepathy and collaboration.

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Since Fluxus and Conceptual Art there has been significant movement to incorporate telepathy as a collaborative tool.

Q: in kokakola you film the everyday, the cooking, the reading but at the same time there are strong statatements spoken by bots that entangle with many other elements, sounds, music ...

I think that voice is important. I will read the Android's voice:

the theme of the conversation was 'Instability-of-Human-Reason.'

this terrestrial friend of mine first expatiated on the kind of structure which, in his opinion,

the 'head-brain' has,

and in which cases and what manner various impressions are perceived by the other brains,

and how only after definite 'agreement' between all the brains, the total results are im-pressed on a head-brain.

"To every being, and also of course to me, it's quite easy to prove anything; all that is necessary to know is which shocks and which associations to arouse in the other human brains while one or other "fact" is being described.

Q: also the amazon cloud reference to contingency ... You are engaging with moving image as direct theory ..

Amazon cloud: "design for failure." refers to the idea that thinking can no longer be detached from the accidents (predicates) of the techno-logos. Again the idea of geometry, digitalization as the ultimate mode of teletransportation. Reason achieves its absoluteness and then... I think moving image can engage directly as speculative thinking without words as dominant and perhaps this has been constant research in my work.

Q from the audience: I think there is an invocation of the unconscious. I see a lot of work: different modes of capturing, images, sounds texts and voices. The complexity almost undo the rectangular screen, the format of film, it reminds me the work of Alexander Kluge but more unconscious, with a different kind of structure ...

I think it is very difficult to talk of a structure. If there are structures these have been created in the future, thousend years in the linear future. In the contemporary present everything is in a process as explained by Etienne Souriau (L'Instauration philosophique, 1939)

, there are no structures I always think of the challenge to individualist methaphisics in Karen Barad, Simondon's individuation, Hinton's Fourth Dimension to Ouspensky levels, they tend to converge in my mind. In fact the the Android's voice is inspired in a parragraph from Gurdjieff (G. Gurdjieff, Beelzebub's Tales to His Grandson, 1950)

In fact, I think I have come back to this book very frequently in my work. things to Come has few dialogues built from paragraphs in this book.

Final Question: Someone in the audience: I think the telepathic element has to do with a plane of immanence, that is shared. Suley rollnick mention o corpo vibratil (vibrating body) in relation to the potentiality of vulnerability. Almost like the same approach was initiated from different disciplines and they are all converging into a kind of rediscovery of the body hidden potencies.

The speech to text converter Parliament done

I am by the beach reflecting on a very busy year 2015. Perhaps the year that I travelled the most in my life: South Korea China, The Arab world and now in South America.

After my feature film things to come I am embarking in a new project full of hope and questions. Questions about Image and concept: the viability of moving image and sound to scape quantification, conceptualisation and the regimentation of language. Can art make visible the invisible?

These are primordial aspects of my work on film in place of theory.

How to capture the present in its complexity?

Perhaps as kunishi Uno has said 'what (film) producers is the genesis of an unknown body, one that we have in the back of our heads, thinking the unthinkable us the birth of the visible that is still hidden from the view

Sent from my iPhone

CIA talk after screening

How do you create? How you make a film? Is there a narrative structure?

How to work with sound, moving image and text as sculpture and not linear film. How to connect all these different languages. I don't think I have predetermined structures, protocols, nor specific or recurrent modes of working. I remember this question came up few times. I heard people saying that the film comes from a concept, an idea that contains it's beginning and end. Sometimes it's an atmosphere, a clue to follow a direction that excludes other directions. Then a path, a trajectory becomes visible. Something invisible becomes visible. There is an intuition which contains the whole film, not a mode of existence or a story but as a certain completion. I think concept is key world. All art is conceptual, but that no longer means very much. A concept that is both abstract and has some physical sensation, perception and intuition. It is a concept from the future that needs to be unmade, it needs to be deconstructed from the future into the present. The present as recurrent and multiple. It expands. In the future we are already in the cloud, all contingencies, variations have been uploaded. It is a very strong sensation in my creative engagement. I think this is why I can't talk about structure, or approach the creative process from a predetermined structure.

How the creative process becomes telepathy?

Someone in the audience: I think the telepathic element has to do with a plane of immanence, that is shared. Suley rollnick mention o corpo vibratil (vibrating body) in relation to the potentiality of vulnerability. Almost like the same approach was initiated from different disciplines and they are all converging into a kind of rediscovery of the body hidden potencies.

Coloniality: the geopolitics of knowing, of being

Con el 'in de descubrir la lógica perversa –que Fanon señaló– en el dilema 'ilosó'ico de la modernidad/colonialidad y la estructura políticay económica del imperialismo/colonialismo debemos considerar la forma de descolonizar la "mente" (Thiongo) y el "imaginario" (Gruzinski), es decir, los conocimientos y el ser.

Desde mediados de los años setenta, la idea de que el conoci- miento era también un instrumento de colonización y que por lo tanto la descolonización implicaba la descolonización del saber y del ser (esto es, de las ubjetividad)

Dussel en 1977 en el primer capítulo de *Filoso.ío de lo Uberación* ti- tulado "Geopolíticay 'ilos o'ía"

Gracias de Edgardo Lander, se agregó la esfera de la colonialidad de la naturaleza.

La matriz colonial de poder es entonces una estructura compleja de niveles entrelazados.

Control de la economía

Control de la autoridad Colonialidad del poder Control de la naturaleza y de los recursos naturales

Control del género y la sexualidad Control de la subjetividad y del conocimiento

La colonialidad del poder está atravesada por actividades y con- troles específicos tales la colonialidad del saber, la colonialidad del ser, la colonialidad del ver, la colonialidad del hacer y del pensar, la colonialidad del oír, etc. Muchas de estas actividades pueden agru- parse bajo la colonialidad del *sentir*, de los sentidos, es decir, de la *oeshtesis*. Tardíamente, en el siglo XVIII, la *oeshtesis* fue apropia- da por el pensamiento imperial y transformada en *oestético*, sen- timiento de lo bello y lo sublime. En el correr de los últimos tres siglos, lo sublime pasó a segundo plano y lo bello totalizó la estéti- ca y quedó limitada al concepto occidental de *arte*. En suma, colo- nialidad del poder remite a la compleja matriz o patrón de poder sustentado en dos pilares: el conocer (epistemología), entender o comprender (hermenéutica) y el sentir (*oesthesis*).

Quijano reconoce que los pensadores postmodernos ya habían criticado la noción moderna de Totalidad; pero esta crítica se limi- ta a lo interno de la historia de Europa y a la historia de las ideas europeas. Por eso resulta esencial la crítica a la Totalidad desde la perspectiva de la colonialidad y no solamente desde la crítica post- moderna. Ahora bien, es importante señalar que la crítica a la no- ción moderna de Totalidad no nos dirige a la post-colonialidad sino a la de descolonialidad. De aquí surge la segunda orientación, a la cual podemos llamar, *programático*. Quijano presenta la orienta- ción programática como un proyecto de *"desprendimiento"* o *"de-linking"*. En este cruce, entre lo analítico y lo programático de la colonialidad, la descolonialidad se distancia a la vez que subsume la crítica post-colonial.

Por ello resaltamos lo que Quijano conduye a'irmando que el desprendimiento (una manera de en- tender el vuelco descolonial) comienza en la descolonización del conocimiento:

La crítica del paradigma europeo de la racionalidad/modernidad es indispensable.

Para desprenderse de la matriz colonial del poder y de la lógica de la colonialidad acomodada en *pensée unique* (a la monocultura de la mente) es necesario instalarse en una epistemología fronteriza, y en alternativas A la modernidad (y no en modernidades alterna- tivas): esto es, el desprendimiento y el proceso de descolonización tienen por horizonte un mundo trans- moderno, global y

diverso. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]Todo lo que hay, incluidos nosotros mismos exige, por tanto, lo que Souriau llama una "acción instauradora". En la instauración empleamos a fondo aquello de que disponemos, nuestras más características capacidades tanto para hacernos nosotros mismos como para hacer el mundo. Los dioses, como decía Paul Valery, nos regalan el primer verso de cada una de nuestras composiciones, pero el resto es cosa nuestra, del resto hay que hacerse cargo.

Los modos de existencia

Porque instaurar es algo que sucede sólo distribuido en los diferentes modos de existencia y dentro de ellos, para Souriau es fundamental recuperar la noción de "modo". A estas alturas ya sabemos que esta es una de las herramientas más venerables del arsenal filosófico y una de las que más ha visto cambiar su definición misma a lo largo de los siglos. Con todo, es obvio que para Souriau los modos ya no son la mera variación del dictum, ni mucho menos predicados de la sustancia. Los modos escolásticos eran los que nos hacían pasar de "él come" a "él quiere comer", o "a él le habría gustado comer". Pero no es esa aquí la cuestión, ni hablamos de esos

modos.

Al igual que en esos mismos años estaban haciendo Hartmann y el mismo Wittgenstein -el mal llamado segundo Wittgenstein- los modos son ahora de orden ontológico y a la vez epistemológico, moral y estético... tramándose con ello una policotexturalidad, una multiplicidad de lógicas de sentido y acción que son capaces -eventualmente- de convivir, que se solapan y se articulan entresí o que también se ignoran y conspiran por excluirse...

Para Souriau se tratará de indagar en diferentes modos de existencia y sobre todo, como decíamos, de ver en qué medida, en qué grado existimos en uno u otro de ellos. Puesto que la preguntasobre la existencia, la pregunta de si algo o alguien existe, no debe contestarse con un sí o un no... sino con un más o un menos. Así esta mesa o mi propia persona existen en el modo de existencia de lo físico, pero -dice Souriau- en el modo de existencia de sus potencialidades, de su plena y más digna vida posible tanto la mesa como yo mismo –unos más que otros- estamos aún por hacer. Aun tenemos que lograrnos. Aun tenemos que hacer por acercarnos a eso que podemos ser y que nos haría mucho más dignos de nuestro ser que lo que ya, más o menos, somos.

Ese es el quehacer del filósofo, del artista y de cualquier ser vivo digno de ese nombre. Instaurar.

Esta instauración tiene tres grandes rasgos: libertad, eficacia y errabilidad, es decir:

Podemos hacer o no hacer lo que tenemos que hacer.

Lo que hacemos tiene consecuencias, siempre, sobre los trayectos de nuestra vida.

Esas consecuencias pueden acercarnos a lograrnos o pueden malogramos y echarnos a perder.

Queda con ello claro que instaurar, siendo un hacer disposicional, no es nunca un proyecto sometido a la voluntad y las impecables intenciones y designios de un ego todopoderoso, sino que se trata, más bien, de un "trayecto", un trayecto de determinaciones progresivas -como dicen Latour y Stengers- donde vamos "inventando", es decir, encontrando las pistas que de alguna manera teníamos que encontrar. El verdadero agente y en esto Souriau se adelanta tres pueblos a los estructuralistas que tan poco y tan mal le entendieron, no es ni el objeto ni el sujeto, sino el concreto modo de relación que emerge a través de ambos, apoyándose en la intervención disposicional de uno y en la posición repertorial del otro, modulándose desde lo

efectivo a través de lo posible y lo necesario.

Souriau: intenta construir una filosofía modal pero al hacerlo comete el mismo error que toda la tradición aristotélica: olvida incorporar al par potencia-acto, al juego posible-efectivo, la noción de necesidad. No una necesidad metafísica o causalista, obviamente, sino una necesidad estrictamente interna, capaz de dar cuenta de algo tan básico como la autopoiesis en sus diferentes niveles: el teleomático, el teleonómico y el teleológico. Habrá pues que seguir

investigando. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

1. Surrealism's Revisionist Reading of Freudian Psychology

Things to come + predatory + animations (7mins)

What happens if an object theorizes using sound, the senses and non linear narratives?

2.performance

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Society_for_Psychical_Research !!!

Stills + Schneemann's Meat Joy

3 decolonial

Logic impressions 1 ++ add stills at the end ewha coffee shop !!!!!!

1.

Android voice:

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Examples from performance:

3-Schneemann's

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collaborators went into a trance-like state of body/mind and individual subjectivities fused into one big meat joy and spirit joy. Movements became synchronized with the chain of saus-ages and dead animals circulating in and around between the bodies like telepathic umbilical cords. The bodies of individuals were blurred into an ecstatic, erotic and occult-like bond with live and dead meat.

The orgies of both Schneemann and the activist/terrorists worked to shatter individualism and monogamy, and to create a new group-based countercultural identity in which the boundaries of bodies and minds are violated, overlapped

1-Abramoviç, Abramoviç/Ulay and Australia

Abramoviç/Ulay's collaborated not just as physical bodies, but as psychical, emotional and transformatively energetic bodies, consciously choosing to develop extrasensory perception, aural awareness, hallucinations and telepathic communication.

Charles Green, "Group Soul. Who Own the Artist Fusion?", in Third Text 18 (2004): describes

Abramoviç/Ulay's collaboration Nightsea Crossing (1981-1986) in which they collaborate with a Tibetan monk and an Aboriginal elder/shaman, ethically "invited empathic projection into an alterna-tive space by telepathic senses." empathy is facilitated by telepathy.

2-yoko Ono

Yoko Ono saw that emotion, psychic vibrations and telepathy were in-itially criticised as being outside the dominant Cageian aesthetic of chance. She says: "In those days, in Fluxus, it was not 'cool' to use anything that had to do with the human psyche. I think I am the first one who used ... 'ke-hai' (music of pure vibration created by the human psyche)."According to Stiles, Ono was "criticised for being too emotional, dramatic and uncool".

Schneemann's more recent work from the 1990s titled Vespers in-volved collaboration with her telepathic cat.

4. Susan Hiller's *Sisters of Menon* (1972-1979) involved unexpected work with an invisible psychic force and powerful collective female solidarity in 1972.7 This was Hiller's first experience of automatic writing and it erupted spontaneously while she worked on her "Draw Together Project" (1972), a postal art event in which artists from around the world tried to transmit images to each other telepathically. The "sisters" took over Hiller's drawing and inscribed their own words including "no men" when Hiller's partner David Coxhead tried to join.

5 Another form of telepathic collaboration occurs in Joseph Beuys' col-laborations with animals, such as the iconic work How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare (1965), which suggests a form of telepathic performance dialogue with a dead rabbit.

latin america / venezuelan avant garde el techo de la ballena (whale's roof) that mixed surrealism and revolutionary politics ... in music in argentina: gilp improvisation group from the city of La Plata

ii synaesthesia, expanded telepathy and bypassing syntagma

3. Direct theory

For around two decades, arts and humanities departments have dealt with a proliferation of different models and debates intended to map and consolidate the relationship between theory and practice. These discourses have produced manifold configurations such as practice-as-research; practice-based; practice-led; mixed-mode research practice; and practice through research, amongst others.

i am interested in practices in which theory is to be found within the object, the process, or the practice itself. I will propose that when theory and practice do not mediate between—but instead co-produce—each other, an elixir might be found; that is, when theory and practice are consubstantial we have theory that is equal to the creative work and creative work no longer

judged by theory, judgement slows down. These issues are at their most pressing when the theory needs the sensibility of the political, social, philosophical and aesthetic all at once. Perhaps it also requires something else ...

Stan brackage streams of the mind.

Back to the idea of complexity of the human body (different centres, critical neuroscience, nikolas rose), it's relation as part of organic life on earth ... We requires a technology that enhance rather than simplifies it's possibilities for connectiveness

questions:

What happens if an object theorizes using sound, the senses and non linear narratives?

- Where and how might the consubstantiality of theory and practice take place?

- Is theory to be found in the material practice, the experienced form, the process of making, or in the composition of these parts?

- Is self-reflexivity to be found in the ruptures, breaks, juxtapositions, and spaces in form and content?

- What happens if an object theorizes using sound, the senses and non linear narratives?

- What happens if no distinction can be found between the component affects and percepts,

and concepts?

Sent from my

iPhone [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Seoul final

A

Haunted media

Jeffreys conce

The Saint of televisión in Brasil is well known for being a medium and using telepathy ..

Telepathy and film where invented in the same decade ...

1. Alien cartography / moving image as direct theory /

The streams of the mind / arguing in place of philosophy / how this arguing might change?

(1) It has recently been the center of discussions at a congress organized by Arsenal – Institute for Film and Video Art in collaboration with the Film Institute at the Berlin University of the Arts taking place at Akademie der Künste in Hanseatenweg, Berlin between October 10th to 14th, 2012.

Surrealism's Revisionist Reading of Freudian Psychology

According to Ferdinand Alquie, in The Philosophy of Surrealism, the Surrealists sought to explain the physical world by plumbing its depths, by attempting to "penetrate into what has more reality than the logical and objective universe." For the Surrealists, this ultimate reality resided behind the veil of surface appearances, and was linked intimately with the world of the dream. According to the Surrealists, when dreaming, the sublime essence of life speaks by way of the soul's agitation, through the appearance of obsessive, instinctual feelings and desires. For the Surrealists, the dream contains meaningful symbolic representations, and its analogical method of communicating knowledge through association as opposed to cause and effect (logic) is best approximated within the aesthetics of film.

Initially Breton thought "nonsense" poetry held the potential to reach the heightened state of Surreality. Reading poetry created by means of random chance was thought to relax the rational faculties and cause the rigid barrier between conscious and unconscious states to dissolve. However, as Jean Goudal reasons in his 1925 article, "Surrealism and Cinema," Breton's theory is flawed because he begins from an erroneous notion of language. Since all forms of written and verbal communication operate within the logical rules of grammar, it is therefore impossible to access a primordial realm of pre-linguistic thought by way of poetry, no matter how bizarre or creative it is, for as Goudal writes, "The complete repudiation of logic is always forbidden to language." Since we rely on the logical structure of grammar to understand it, the nonsense poetry of Breton degenerates into an incomprehensible babble. This is not so, according to Goudal, with the medium of film.

Cinematic images hold the potential to bypass the logical grounds of language and to achieve what Breton's poetry could not. Due to the rapidity of the film's images, the logical mechanism--which tries to explain the images through memory--does not have time to be engaged. Cinematic meaning occurs in an altogether different manner from that of the literary domain. In the cinema, the mind is working to connect images. As opposed to forming representations of what is observed, a process grounded in language, cinematic ideas are formed through association. The power and immediacy of cinematic imagery thrusts the force of its communication beyond the purely logical or discursive functioning of reason, and so film speaks the language of the dream. Thus, the Surrealists embrace the cinema's potential for channeling the omnipotent and authentic dreamlike mysteries of life. It is ultimately film that engenders the Surreal experience that Breton first describes in Manifestoes of Surrealism, wherein he claims that this enlightened state, the encounter with a "superior reality," manifests the authentic grounds of the physical world. In this moment of truth's awakening, the mind does not consciously or actively grasp the "resolution of the two states of dream and reality;" rather, through the experience of film, which facilitates their communion, the role of human reason is "limited to taking note of, and appreciating, the luminous phenomenon."

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ii synæsthesia, expanded telepathy ... the bypassing of the regimented possibilities of syntagma ... have been one of the central themes, inquieries of the avant gardes and contemporary arts.

3. Direct theory

Back to the idea of how theory / philosophy is changing

The analogy with the self and how our notions of the self are changing as well ...Barry Dainton self - philosophy in transit ...

So what happens when our notions about ontology (the logic of Being) , henology (the logic of the One) are challenge by other logics, the logic of music (popular with the first avant gardes), algorithmic logic, decolonial logic / other paradigms of existence: sumak kawsay –the rights of organic life on earth–

This final part of these streams of the mind short films, start with some shots of my latest film kokakolachickenwings where an Android voice in the style of Optimus Prime says:

the theme of the conversation was 'Instability-of-Human-Reason.'

this terrestrial friend of mine first expatiated on the kind of structure which, in his opinion,

the 'head-brain' has,

and in which cases and what manner various impressions are perceived by the other brains,

and how only after definite 'agreement' between all the brains, the total results are im-pressed on a head-brain.

"To every being, and also of course to me, it's quite easy to prove anything; all that is necessary to know is which shocks and which associations to arouse in the other human brains while one or other "fact" is being described.

For around two decades, arts and humanities departments have dealt with a proliferation of different models and debates intended to map and consolidate the relationship between theory and practice. These discourses have produced manifold configurations such as practice-as-research; practice-based; practice-led; mixed-mode research practice; and practice through research, amongst others.

i am interested in practices in which theory is to be found within the object, the process, or the practice itself. I will propose that when theory and practice do not mediate between—but instead co-produce—each other, an elixir might be found; that is, when theory and practice are consubstantial we have theory that is equal to the creative work and creative work no longer judged by theory, judgement slows down, then something else occurs. These issues are at their most pressing when a theory needs the sensibility of the political, social, philosophical and aesthetic all at once. Perhaps it also requires a creative approach to neurosicience, digital architectures etc

Stan brackage, a north american abstract filmmaker, spoke of hypnogogic close eye vision and streams of the mind.

Back to the idea of complexity of the human body (different centres, critical neuroscience, nikolas rose), and it's relation as part of organic life on earth ... We requires a technology that enhance rather than simplifies it's possibilities for connectiveness

questions:

- Where and how might the consubstantiality of theory and practice take place?

- Is theory to be found in the material practice, the experienced form, the process of making, or in the composition of these parts?

- Is self-reflexivity to be found in the ruptures, breaks, juxtapositions, and spaces in form and content?

- What happens if an object theorizes using sound, the senses and non linear narratives?

- What happens if no distinction can be found between the component affects and percepts, and concepts?

.. in some posthuman cosmologies

the moon is the outer darkness

it feeds and fattens on the earth's organic life

like a huge electromagnet that is sucking out its vitality

but certain energy having finished its work on one plane creates a wormhole ...

B: what it all means ?

Z: Nature watches over life just as we, people,

feed, and take care of our animals ...

and make their life as comfortable as possible

Z: in the same way Nature takes all measures

to ensure that we shall live without seeing the terror ...

and live longer

and then, when we are required ...

It slaughters

us [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Jeannette Ehlers

Superdiversity, connectivity and decoloniality of the mind

What is left after diversifying all diversity? Unfortunately: again the autonomous individual, the cornerstone of our neo-liberal societies. An illusionary subjectivity that stands in the way of every relationality.

To provoke processes of aesthetic disobedience, challenging the hegemony of postmodern aesthetics, shifting the geography of knowing and sensing, on local and international level from the perspective of its historic alterity.

(RE)FRAMING THE VOCABULARY IN PERFORMING ARTS IN FLANDERS

Joachim Ben Yakoub & Fabian Barba

19-11-2015

English articles

Longreads

(Re)framing the vocabulary in performing arts in Flanders

Decolonize the mind! Researcher and activist, Olivia Rutazibwa, introduced the proposition in Belgium during a TED talk in 2011. It spread like wildfire and various stakeholders in civil society engaged with this challenging invitation. Ngugi wa Thiong'o stated in his homonymic book 25 years ago already that it is required that opression – and liberation - are expressed in one's own terms and language. Artist and activist Jamila Channouf coupled the action to the words and officially buried the Dutch words "allochtoon & autochtoon", with a collective funeral to launch the 'Ghent Spring' (2013), an artistic grass roots movement. Backed by the decision of newspaper De Morgen to eradicate the same two words, she delineated the terms in which the debate would be conducted in Ghent and partly in Flanders too with this performance in public space. She offered us a first step towards the decolonization of our imagination. As a following

step we propose to re-examine 5 words central in the vocabulary of the performing arts today in Flanders today: superdiversity, talent development, canon, contemporary and performance. Before we start with the analysis of these 5 key concepts, we will elaborate shortly on why this process of decolonization is so necessary in Flanders and even more so in the field of performing arts.

In its most explicit and formal manner, in most regions of the world history is almost liberated from colonialism as a historical process of foreign invasion and permanent occupation. Officially, colonial time is 'over', but 'coloniality' as a power-structure is definitely not. Sociologist Aníbal Quijano defines this specific form of power as political, social and cultural relations of domination. As a logic of domination, coloniality is still widespread and accounts for the continuous opression of different cultures and their imagination. As stated by political philosopher Achille Mbembe in Sortir de la grande nuit, while colonizing Africa, Europe was also auto-colonizing itself, its structures of knowledge and being. In Belgium too this phenomenon is still very much present. This is tangible for people on the darkened side of our society, but it is also true for the privileged population. As Olivia Rutazibwa stated in her TED-talk: "the mindset that made it possible for us to have the colonies is still very much alive and is very much present in our societies today. It makes discrimination and racism not only possible, but also acceptable and invisible."

To take the suggestion by Thiong'o seriously, namely that decolonization requires expressing oneself in one's own terms, everybody should accordingly become aware of the colonial violence that protects our lifestyles, and of the way in which this colonial violence finds its justification in knowledge division and categorization we have internalized through our education and other knowledge systems. It is about time that we become aware of the need to listen to and to enter into dialogue with the voices that are too often implicitly silenced. Coloniality is deeply entangled with Modernity. Postmodern critiques, as valid as they are in different domains and perspectives, do not manage to address this deep entanglement. We are still dumb, deaf and blind to the historically installed difference, because we do not embody it. We cannot imagine an exterior, let alone an alternative to modernity, therefore we cannot hear the voices of the oppressed that are grounded in non-modern genealogies. The sphere of arts and aesthetics today is for these same reasons trapped in the same logic. The arts – and the performing arts in particular - have been especially sensitive to topics like diversity and discrimination in Belgium. Much more than other spheres in society, there is a form of critical thinking about these themes. The locus of enunciation, the place where we stand historically and culturally, however, remains grounded in postmodern critical thought that has its limits and blind spots.

Decolonization is a possible way out of this (post)modern fata morgana: as a process that starts from the subjectivity of those who are living in its shadows of modernity, healing from the humiliations and the wounds of coloniality, it sheds light on what is outside of the global

totality. Set up as generous gifts from within the structures that continuously reproduce the same (post)modern discourse, diversity and emancipation processes are doomed to fail. They systematically ignore the quest of the outsider for ways to cure the colonial wounds, overcome imperial subjugation, and interconnect the multitude of subordinate histories and their related subjectivities.

As political philosopher Walter Mignolo suggests, 'delinking' is the condition that determines the direction of possible processes of decolonization. This disconnection is decisive to re-articulate our bottom-up understanding and way of standing in the world. Throughout this process, that which has been kept silence becomes audible, that which has been obscured visible once again. It is a fundamental rethinking of our subjectivities in a non eurocentric way, that leaves our individualism far behind, and makes space for new communalities and ways to re-existence.

Superdiversity

Shortly after black Sunday in 1991 a multicultural, bottom-up approach to diversity was proposed to acknowledge the plurality and sovereignty of cultures and visions on the world gainst the universalistic and eurocentric excess in society at large . This also happened within the artistic context: the different sensibilities to engage oneself in artistic forms were affirmed. At the same time multiculturalism was strongly criticized for its cultural relativistic and essentialist pitfalls. A general and global political recuperation further hollowed out the discourse of multiculturalism, followed by the political deathblow in the form of a consensual political statement of "the failure of multiculturalism". This statement paved the way for hitherto dormant nationalist, populist and conservative powers. Critique on this turn was preventively sidelined with the sole argument of 'political correctness' and 'patronizing'.

As a way out of this obscure trap the layered concept of "superdiversity" was proposed as a new paradigm to encompass the complexity of diversity. It emphasizes the diversification of diversity in the global era, with its new digital communication technology and renewed mobility. As conceived by its founder, social anthropologist Vertovec, superdiveristy is understood as a dynamic interplay of variables among an increased number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, trans-nationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified individuals with a migration background. Though we acknowledge indisputably the benefits of the new proposed paradigm (inter alia to update the western gaze by an internal fragmentation through and awareness of diversity in diversity) we question its ability as a countervailing power. What is left after diversifying all diversity? Unfortunately: again the autonomous individual, the cornerstone of our neo-liberal societies. An illusionary subjectivity that stands in the way of every relationality.

This academic and super-relativistic proposal lacks any grounding. It is adopted by organizations, institutions and political parties, not by activist or artists, because it stands in the way of new

connective dynamics, politicization and movement. Superdiversity might surely be a handy tool to understand (a part of) reality but to change this same reality, we need to dare reconsidering new relational subjectivities and political communalities. The decolonial option surpasses classical nationalist and religious divides, brings together the fundamental social and cultural political questions and relates different movements in a pluriversal process towards a horizon where different worlds are possible.

Talent development

Talent development is a term from the business industry that originally designated a function within human resource management aimed at improving the performance of individual workers. Slowly but surely it is also becoming a trending proposition in performing arts in Flanders to address the need to engage with the potentialities of new artists with a migration background operating in the margins of the performing arts circuit. Talent development in the performing arts is directed to the disenfranchised urban youth that did not connect to the regular theater circuit, the different recognized art schools, and the formal executive performing art institutions and networks, but still develop their own artistic strategies autonomously in the margins of formal institutions. Different theaters and workspaces would engage in processes of talent development to catch up with the creative energy of a growing urban diversity in a context of accelerating globalisation. The premise with initiatives of talent development is that the produced art works lack a certain aesthetic and quality, but still originate in some talent that could develop in a certain direction. When artists are systematically addressed in terms of a certain shortage of talent that could be developed and when this development discourse is systematically applied to disenfranchised groups with a migration background, often with roots in colonized countries, an alarm-bell should go off. Despite the classical Western idea of development – Bildung - having been declared dead several times in the last decades, it pervasively persists in the form of subjectivation of the required but seldom explicitly enunciated qualities in contemporary performing arts, that in this way reasserts its moral, cultural and artistic superiority. We tend to forget that development is deeply ingrained in the ideals of modernization, which holds western democratic structure as a universal model for others to follow and emulate. Colonial thinking echoes in the linearity of development discourse, that according to anthropologist Arturo Escobar depicts us as "advanced" and "progressive", and the other as "backward", "degenerate" and "primitive". Talent development, as a discursive construction that with the best intentions wants to help emancipate the urban youth in the artistic sector, is doomed to fail, because with every approach it unintentionally reproduces an under-developed reflection of itself.

The challenge here is to decolonize the institutional structures and organizations in performing arts engaged in talent development, first and formost the different workspaces and theatres

involved in production and participation. It is time to invest in real processes of change, form a consciousness of the violence of organizational structures and architecture, and their underlying aesthetic judgments, on the base of the lived experience and in the terms of the ones who are excluded and suppressed from its different functions.

Canon

The term 'canon' denotes a totality of art works that have been accepted as the most important and influential in shaping our sensible understanding of the world. The canon sets the established standard, defines what can be thought of as archetypal and what can be considered worth striving for, and delineates the list of artworks considered to be of the highest quality. The canon is a dynamic and ever-actualized notion, established by a network of artists, programmers, curators, critics, public and funding committees.These often elitist networks ultimately control the field of representation of what is considered as qualitative art and what not. They determine what is presented as a model and precedent in relation to which other works of art are going to be judged or considered. As stated by Walter Mignolo and Rolando Vázquez, modern and postmodern aesthetics represent the philosophical and theoretical ground from where the canon legitimizes itself. This normative self-legitimation enables the implicit disdain, rejection and even erasure of other forms of aesthetics. Artistic movements in the global South and in the local urban margins are challenging the eurocentric boundaries of the canon by making the diversity of forms, stories and histories that have been silenced and forgotten tangible again. These movements have the potential to decolonize the canon through the unraveling of the hegemonic discourse. In this optic we not only need to pose the question what topics have been excluded thus far, and how this has shaped the world we live in. We also need to delink from the known normative points of reference, by continuously accentuating the limits of the eurocentric canon through practices of aesthetic disobedience. By the narration of alternative stories, and the rediscovery of new forms, we build up new representation fields that find their way to a multiplicity of possibilities.

Contemporary

For the performing arts, as for contemporary art, the contemporaneity of a work is - next to its 'universality' - one of its most cherished values. We are not going to engage in the perils of universalism, as this has already been quested in depth within well-known post-modern critique. Instead what we ask is who defines that contemporaneity and where? This becomes important if we consider that most of the artistic work that falls outside of the eurocentric canon, might be perceived as anachronistic: as something that is already done, a remnant of the past, something that is 'passé'.

To clarify the discussion it is useful to distinguish four different interpretations of the term 'contemporary'. We can understand it as (1) belonging to the same chronological - physical -

present, (2) as being responsive to the context in which the artist works and lives, i.e., as a critical attitude towards established conventions and the status quo, (3) as an imperative to innovate or simply (4) as a genre.

A common pitfall is to conflate these four meanings into one, for instance 'contemporary dance'. One reclaims for oneself all of these understandings, denying them to other artistic genres and practices. This is of extreme importance if we consider the global reach and internationalisation of the performing arts. Who decides where and for whom what is contemporary and what not? Which other temporalities are excluded by this narrowing operation, which other ways of inhabiting time are reduced into mere anachronisms and thus dismissed and made invisible?

The second problem lies in the need for constant innovation, which betrays the modern understanding of temporality as progress: as a singular, linear and unidirectional development towards the Future. This historicist conception of Time has been criticized by postmodern thinkers and taken up by performance artists in Europe, through the renewed interest drawn by re-enactments. From other loci of enunciation however, there is always a decolonial option that embodies a different politics of time, one that rescues memory as a site of struggle, one that involves the possibility of turning ones back to the future and inhabiting the past. As stated plainly by sociologist Rolando Vazquez: "the rescue of memory is not a conservative movement, the possibility to experience the past is not essentialist, but rebellious."

Performance

Everybodyworking in the field of performing arts might agree that 'performance' as an artform has a great potential to reflect upon the world we live in. Most of the problems we have briefly touched upon so far, could be the theme of a performance. Nevertheless, we might easily recognize that performance in performing arts is not a universal practice. It is important to recognize its limits, not only geographically, but also at the level of its potentialities. Performance is based on the illusion of 'the individual self', as a construction that one can constantly enact and re-enact. Central in this understanding is the relativity, fluidity and multiplicity of 'the self' and the construction of identity that can be subjected to a performance on stage.

Performance hides and silences in this way the historicity and relationality (and thus the privileges) behind this ever moving self - it sometimes even erases it. The black box is instrumentalized as a free, a-historical and neutral space where one can perform multiple identities. The stage as a free space positions oneself outside all power relations. The stage then cuts its modern history from its surface and flattens its consciousness and experience of reality and constrains it to the presence, in function of future possibilities and ideals. It hides as such its (post)modern delineation and inherent processes of in- and exclusion. Performing arts need not

to close into oneself, but has to become aware of the colonial violence they can so easily perpetuated due to its privileged position within global networks of cultural "exchange."

For performers that consider themselves active agents in their history of oppression there is nothing relative about performance. Its is a relational and embodied process that directs the way to re-existence through the re-mediation of history, a healing process that engages with a certain memory. The embodiment of these histories of oppression is not enacted or re-enacted, but a lived experience. When decolonizing performance, what happens on the stage is understood as an embodied process, that uncovers the veil of universalism an privileges of the black box. Performance in this sentence has the ability to provoke processes of aesthetic disobedience, challenging the hegemony of postmodern aesthetics, shifting the geography of knowing and sensing, on local and international level from the perspective of its historic alterity.

Bio

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Fabián Barba works as a dancer, choreographer and researcher. His work focuses mainly on the legacy of colonialism in dance practices.

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(4)7 [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

The completion of reason is the multiverse

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Rowlands

Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, Stiegler

Clark and Chalmers (2001) take this one step further than the case of simple cognitive extension, they posit that the mind itself, rather than just certain cognitive processes, is extended.

Algorithmicgovernment

Immediacy - no mediation

Systematic actualisation

Pure functionality of fluidity

No individuals but dividuals

Project and trajectory have been replace for functionality immediacy (gps)

We can do without perspectives and cuatrocento point of views

Antione picon at Harvard - the smart city

Documentation is done globally no personal data

Language , algorithm animals humans and the capacity of suffering, joy, the silence of death the utterance of suffering can not be digitise

Organilogy of law

Bernard Stiegler

Libidinal economy

Protention / retention

Neganthropy

Invention of money = putting arithmetic in your pocket

Infinite speed

Technology of transdividuatiion |= individuation

Calculation - the pharmacology of calculation

Noetic philia=love=trans individuation

Creativity individuation negative entropy -->

Practical organology

www consortium Spring conference

We have to affirm reason --> against xxi capitalism

Practical organology:

Toxic organon can become a curative one

To produce new types of pharmaco

Negative protaction = melancholia

Walpole street

W5 5aa

Space = | time --> an organology of speed

Topologies: Epistemologies of the south

Boaventura de Sousa Santos

http://www.tate.org.uk/context-comment/video/topology-epistemologies-of-the-south-video-recordings

maps: multiplicity of .. scales projections and simbologizations

cartography of suffering

the epistomology of blindness ... western science = visuality dominance... the imperial epistemology needs to be change from its dominant vector --the technologies of space time visuality

philosophy and theology the first victims of science

sociology of absence

individual and the community

disctitntion between secular and sacred

touching – one of the sense we're disable

infinite experiences of the world

the ecology of knowledge

the problem of democracy and human rights

the stupid dsictintion of body and soul Spinoza

Suely Rolnik

beyond colonial unconcious

drive = life potency

tension that is not dialectical is

topological [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

IMMANENT THEORY

For around two decades, arts and humanities departments have dealt with a proliferation of different models and debates intended to map and consolidate the relationship between theory and practice. These discourses have produced manifold configurations such as practice-as-research; practice-based; practice-led; mixed-mode research practice; and practice through research, amongst others.

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questions:

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- What happens if an object theorizes using sound, the senses and non linear narratives?

- What happens if no distinction can be found between the component affects and percepts, and

concepts? [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Approaching telepathy as practices collaboration

the politics of desire and love:

maria eugenia borsani ed, decolonial exercises in this south. subjectivity, citizenship, interculturality and temporality

walter mignolo, decolonizing being and knowing

Barry Daintons elf - philosophy in transit

Tecnopositivist —Anti-object philosophy – post phallocentric binaries

Film montage, Pyodorov, Russian cosmism

Esoteric movement, oupensky Et G cosmologies and present day transhumanism

Sumak kawsay / climate change / occupy movement

Film And avant garde art movements

Avant garde / surrealism (anti Freud !) / abstract cinema / direct theory / neoliberal rhetoric

Film was hijacked by the desires of European humanism to conquered and rationalise/control the world

neoliberal rhetoric

Using deleuze and G concepts and appropriations of war machine and nagual and tonal we could say that a decolonial option should aim for a 'higher deterritorialization': in both cases one thinks the relation between 'world' (constituted mean-ing) and 'earth' (the plane that renders

such constitution possible but also fragile). And a step further: what kind of relation is this ? At least is a very unequal one (as Isabel stengers may say)

Direct Theory -- in film there is an element of affection that involves the body, the cinema ceremony of viewing as a communal event / same as performance. Film cannot be entirely computable, digitally decomposed, comodifiable data. it requires telepathy, telepathy expanded, the paranormal, communal empathy, synesthesia ...

_____

... but theory of what exactly ?

Science, technology of what ?

1. tools / methods of collaboration within international visual art practice since the 1960s

2. thinking / sensing / prehension / intuition / communication / telepathy / telethesia / sincronicity

3. decolonial science and technology

_____

i.

This second part explores telepathy as a tool and method of collaboration within international visual art practices ince the 1960s. The words telepathy and telethesia were coined simultaneously when Frederic Myers founded the Society for Psychical Research in London in 1882. However, telepathy names an experience of distant (tele) feeling (pathos) or ideas (thesia) found in all cultures. Telepathy and collaboration are tools that a number of artists reach for simultaneously when attempting to share and/or transform subjectivity. This raises questions of the overlapping similarity between te-lepathy and collaboration,

Telepathic collaborations are recognised as having important cultural value and providing crucial insight into how art works as a knowledge discipline of shared subjectivity.

Telepathy and col-laboration share the ability to multiply and share subjectivities.

Telepathy is more aligned to the realm of dreams, imagination, per-ception and spiritual enlightenment (and even psychosis); whereas col-laboration is more aligned to professional exchange, bureaucratic tasks, factional empowerment, strategic coordination (and even conspiracy).

Telepathy, as ecret and hidden affect, accompanies a wide rainbow range of affects that arise within or are channeled into the collaboration and/or the artwork.

Telepathy is not confined to anthropomorphic collaboration, and it can be activated as an animated matrixial "glue" or force within and between ghosts, animals, aliens and all the cyborg and spiritual bodies of avatars, gods and ancestors.

Since Fluxus and Conceptual Art there has been significant movement to incorporate telepathy as a collaborative tool.

Examples from performance:

0-luciano et Carlos Ginzburg / mirtha dermisache Heraclitus performance that started my awarenness on contemporary posibilities of telepathey

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asemic_writing

1-Abramoviç, Abramoviç/Ulay and Australia

Abramoviç/Ulay's collaborated not just as physical bodies, but as psychical, emotional and transformatively energetic bod-ies, consciously choosing to develop extrasensory perception, aural aware-ness, hallucinations and telepathic communication.

Charles Green, "Group Soul. Who Own the Artist Fusion?", in Third Text 18 (2004):

Abramovic/Ulay's collaboration Nightsea Crossing (1981-1986) Conjunction

with a Tibetan monk and an Aboriginal elder/shaman/painter, ethically "invited empathic projection into an alterna-tive space by telepathic senses." empathy is facilitated by telepathy.

2-yoko Ono

Yoko Ono saw that emotion, psychic vibrations and telepathy were in-itially criticised as being outside the dominant Cageian aesthetic of chance. She says: "In those days, in Fluxus, it was not 'cool' to use anything that had to do with the human psyche. I think I am the first one who used ... 'ke-hai' (music of pure vibration created by the human psyche)."According to Stiles, Ono was "criticised for being too emotional, dramatic and uncool".

3-Schneemann's

Schneemann's Meat Joy (1964) worked with group telepathy in the sense that the collaborators went into a trance-like state of body/mind and individual subjectivities fused into one big meat joy and spirit joy. Movements became synchronized with the chain of saus-ages and dead animals circulating in and around between the bodies like telepathic umbilical cords. The bodies of individuals were blurred into an ecstatic, erotic and occult-like bond with live and dead meat.

The orgies of both Schneemann and the activist/terrorists worked to shatter individualism and monogamy, and to create a new group-based countercultural identity in which the boundaries of bodies and minds are violated, overlapped

Schneemann's more recent work from the 1990s titled Vespers in-volved collaboration with her telepathic cat.

4. Susan Hiller's *Sisters of Menon* (1972-1979) involved unexpected work with an invisible psychic force and powerful collective female solidarity in 1972.7 This was Hiller's first experience of automatic writing and it erupted spontaneously while she worked on her "Draw Together

Project" (1972), a postal art event in which artists from around the world tried to transmit images to each other telepathically. The "sisters" took over Hiller's drawing and inscribed their own words including "no men" when Hiller's partner David Coxhead tried to join.

5 Another form of telepathic collaboration occurs in Joseph Beuys' col-laborations with animals, such as the iconic work How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare (1965), which suggests a form of telepathic performance dialogue with a dead rabbit.

11. latin america / venezuelan avant garde el techo de la ballena (whale's roof) that mixed surrealism and revolutionary politics ... in music in argentina: gilp improvisation group from the city of La Plata

ii synæsthesia, expanded telepathy and bypassing syntagma

From visual art performance to moving image

Surrealism, Abstract cinema and direct theory

Surrealism's Revisionist Reading of Freudian Psychology: Surreal Film and the Dream by J. M. Magrini 2009

Freud and André bretón

According to Ferdinand Alquie, in The Philosophy of Surrealism, the Surrealists sought to explain the physical world by plumbing its depths, by attempting to "penetrate into what has more reality than the logical and objective universe." For the Surrealists, this ultimate reality resided behind the veil of surface appearances, and was linked intimately with the world of the dream. According to the Surrealists, when dreaming, the sublime essence of life speaks by way of the soul's agitation, through the appearance of obsessive, instinctual feelings and desires. As the world's life-force manifests, the imagination and memory form significant representations, or artful simulacra in motion. For the Surrealists, the dream contains meaningful symbolic representations, and its analogical method of communicating knowledge through association as

opposed to cause and effect (logic) is best approximated within the aesthetics of film.

Initially Breton thought "nonsense" poetry held the potential to reach the heightened state of Surreality. Reading poetry created by means of random chance was thought to relax the rational faculties and cause the rigid barrier between conscious and unconscious states to dissolve. However, as Jean Goudal reasons in his 1925 article, "Surrealism and Cinema," Breton's theory is flawed because he begins from an erroneous notion of language. Since all forms of written and verbal communication operate within the logical rules of grammar, it is therefore impossible to access a primordial realm of pre-linguistic thought by way of poetry, no matter how bizarre or creative it is, for as Goudal writes, "The complete repudiation of logic is always forbidden to language." Since we rely on the logical structure of grammar to understand it, the nonsense poetry of Breton degenerates into an incomprehensible babble. This is not so, according to Goudal, with the medium of film.

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.... then abstract cinema Harry Smith, john and James Whitney (specially James)

doris lessing mentioned that narrative was hijacked by european

iii. gurdjieff's ubjectivity theory

Gurdjieff influential in circles of the avant garde both in the us and Latin America

Gurdjieff story of babel - the biblical account : but rather than speaking about language he speaks of human reason as lacking !

iv. luciana parisi

Parisi L (2012) Contagious Architecture: Computation, Aesthetics, and Space. MIT Press

v. Against neoliberal rhetoric in aesthetic, science, philosophy and technology: decolonial option and the planet

I want to finish with a final dialogue in my film things to come about decolonial cosmologies

_____

Beuys

Hillier

Carolee Schneemann

Like Schneemann, members of the activist terrorist group Weather Underground, in operation

from the 1960s to the 1980s, also famously en-gaged in self-liberating and group bonding sexual orgies. The orgies of both Schneemann and the activist/terrorists worked to shatter individualism and monogamy, and to create a new group-based countercultural identity in which the boundaries of bodies and minds are violated, overlapped

Plastique fantastique

A fascinating approach to telepathy is found in Gurdjieff theory of the subject

1. Thinking should be liberated from reason, syntagma and Eurocentric humanist technologies

2. A renewed interest on diverse modes of thinking / sensing / prehension / intuition, telepathy and telethesia form part of a current wave of media theorists and a body of work that, on the surface, seems to undertake an impossible task: human thought acquiring nonhuman perspective

3. These art and philosophical traditions Should be the foundation of a new decolonial science and technology -- a complete delinking from humanist traditions of science and philosophy

The iching is at the heart of a new understanding of cybernetic architectures that are

prehension is "the process by which an actual entity confronts infinite data... and by which it thereby invests and reprograms the actual field of potentiality" (266).

chance, randomness, and complexity as integral to a new paradigm of speculative thought

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]Surrealism

's Revisionist Reading of Freudian Psychology: Surreal Film and the Dream by james m. Magrini 2009

Freud and André bretón

According to Ferdinand Alquie, in The Philosophy of Surrealism, the Surrealists sought to explain the physical world by plumbing its depths, by attempting to "penetrate into what has more reality than the logical and objective universe." For the Surrealists, this ultimate reality resided behind the veil of surface appearances, and was linked intimately with the world of the dream. According to the Surrealists, when dreaming, the sublime essence of life speaks by way of the soul's agitation, through the appearance of obsessive, instinctual feelings and desires. For the Surrealists, the dream contains meaningful symbolic representations, and its analogical method of communicating knowledge through association as opposed to cause and effect (logic) is best approximated within the aesthetics of film.

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In The Rebel, Camus argues that the Surrealists' "metaphysical rebellion," embodying a strange hybrid of aesthetics, asceticism, mysticism, and Marxism, led to the eventual demise of the movement, which was originally conceived by Breton as an aesthetic revolution for overturning modern political and social values. Camus claims that in the 1930s, when the Surrealists chose sides, between politics and poetics, Breton opted for the latter, and with his move away from Marx and toward Rimbaud, a position that favored mysticism and asceticism over committed activity, Breton drifted from the stance adopted in his first manifestos, wherein claims to change the world rang loudly, and, in doing so, Breton "demonstrated that Surrealism was not concerned with action, but with ascetic and spiritual experience," at a remove from the realm of practical activity.

According to Freud, the purpose of an organized society is threefold: (1) to protect the human from nature's onslaughts; (2) to help control the human's self-destructive instincts; and (3) to

create conditions that enable humans to pursue ecumenical goals and ideals. Freud believed that the potential for a thriving society begins with the harmonious integration and organization of the three psychic systems.

unlike Freud, the Surrealists do not seek to quell, control, or "cure" the tumultuous agitated activity of the unconscious, for they believe that such a task as Freud conceived it is impossible. Rather, they look to the unconscious in order to unlock the secrets of the material world, viewing unconscious activity, and, what is most important, the general functioning of the id, as representing the interface between the authentic metaphysical grounds of materiality and the human's waking existence.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Individualist metaphysics and universal aspirations (knowledge)

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Wun yi shu

Memorias ajenas (foreign memories)

Santa Clara ... Patron saint of television

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Viktor shklovsky art as technique:

"Art may exist that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the stone stony. The puerpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as they re percieved and not as they are known. The technique of art is to make objects unfamiliar, to make forms difficult .. Because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]Seoul - posthuman

Bellamy forde

1I serve the probation on my previous job

2. 3 Month probation come out

The job not review after a year

3.. Make sure that is Continuous service

4. They can let me go by giving me 3 month notice.

History of consciousness Uni cal Santa Cruz

Dear Zai: subi el trailer y el lunes lo mando al Barcelona L'alternativa film fest ... Draft synopsis abajo a ver que te parece:

Conceived originally as a conversation with philosopher Zairong Xiang for an introduction to Zubillaga's film Things to come, KKCW developed into as elf contained movie about decolonial thinking moving image, cocking, eating and the problem of Eurocentric technologies of visión, taxonomizing and communications.

Co directed by Z.XIANG

https://vimeo.com/128976307

Password: KKCW

_____

Things to come:

My first work in progress screening encountered two interesting filmmakers in the audience ... One who eas to become my editor and the other who was in fact one of my performers (or pure coincidence, cut of reality, intersubjectivity?!)

Z: filmmaker

Ygor: filmmaker and editor

The idea of telepathy immediately was brought up by Z ...he is a 20 years old filmmaker and spoke of dimensions and telepathic communication between layers ...

Ygor –also in his 20s– inmmediatly concur and final wanted to be the editor of the film ...

_____

and general disciplinarian and straitjackets rules of syntax.

Change fiction for film .. Techs of vision

Decolonize bodies minds perseptions

Decolonial thinking moving image / languages –>> straitjackets, as disciplinarian ways / anti-syntagma /

Andre bazin

Production of monsters - Donna Hathaway

Scott Bacchus book : the argument

So I guess that's the transformation that I'm talking about. Instead of looking at languages as straitjackets, as disciplinarian ways in which I have to behave, I'm taking what is more useful, what is more truthful to the kinds of things that I want to convey, to the kinds of materials that I want to share. And so I've been doing it, and I mean this might not be in perfect Spanish or it might not be in perfect English. But when we write we're not concerned about matters of mastery or dominion or power. When we write, we're talking about a deeper sense of communication, a deeper way of getting in contact with other human beings. So that's what concerns me right now. That kind of possibility.

Mind affects

Body non objectual functions affects again

Law of yangta

Scan guilt

Verbal Language, moving image and telepathy

Approaching telepathy from a decolonial and metahumanist perspective: moving image as direct theory. By Luciano Zubillaga

Moving image as philosophy

Within avant garde art traditions the notion that experimental film can bypass the regimented possibilities of language and dualistic logic has been a recurrent idea (1).

How can experimental films operating at the intersection between humanities and science "argue" in the field of posthuman philosophy?

2.

The changing notion of self

Arthur Rimbaud - Letter to Georges Izambard; Charleville, 13 May 1871

Yo es otro

Je est un autre.

I is another.

The regimented possibilities of the syntagma ....

The regimented possibilities of language —

William boroughs and jean luc goddard in film socialism got rid of all the verbs .. Tarzan English

Decolonial option:

Madina Tlostanova - Enrique Dussel

Walter mignolo -pluriversality

1.

Gurdjieff's Hamolinadir

Android voice:

the theme of the conversation was 'Instability-of-Human-Reason.'

this terrestrial friend of mine first expatiated on the kind of structure which, in his opinion,

the 'head-brain' has,

and in which cases and what manner various impressions are perceived by the other brains,

and how only after definite 'agreement' between all the brains, the total results are im-pressed on a head-brain.

"To every being, and also of course to me, it's quite easy to prove anything; all that is necessary to know is which shocks and which associations to arouse in the other human brains while one or other "fact" is being described.

3.

Castaneda's the Tennant

4.

Asemic writing

Writing Degree Zero (original title: Le degré zéro de l'écriture) is a book of literary criticism by Roland Barthes (1953)

Barthes ends the book on a literally Utopian note:

"Feeling permanently guilty of its own solitute, it [literary writing] is none the less an imagination eagerly desiring a felicity [bonheur] of words, it hastens towards a dreamed-of language whose freshness, by a kind of ideal anticipation, might portray the perfection of some Adamic world where language would no longer be alienated."[7]

Asemic writing is a wordless open semantic form of writing. The word asemic means "having no specific semantic content." With the non specificity of asemic writing there comes a vacuum of

meaning which is left for the reader to fill in and interpret. All of this is similar to the way one would deduce meaning from an abstract work of art. The open nature of asemic works allows for meaning to occur trans-linguistically. An asemic text may be "read" in a similar fashion regardless of the reader's natural language. Multiple meanings for the same symbolism are another possibility for an asemic work.

Some asemic writing includes pictograms or ideograms the meanings of which are sometimes, but not always, suggested by their shapes. Asemic writing, at times, exists as a conception or shadow of conventional writing practices. Reflecting writing, but not completely existing as a traditional writing system, asemic writing seeks to make the reader hover in a state between reading and looking.

Asemic writing has no verbal sense, though it may have clear textual sense. Through its formatting and structure, asemic writing may suggest a type of document and, thereby, suggest a meaning. The form of art is still writing, often calligraphic in form, and either depends on a reader's sense and knowledge of writing systems for it to make sense, or can be understood through aesthetic intuition.

Asemic writing can also be seen as a relative perception, whereby unknown languages and forgotten scripts provide templates and platforms for new modes of expression.

Influences on asemic writing are illegible, invented or primal scripts (cave paintings, doodles, children's drawings, etc.). But instead of being thought of as mimicry of preliterate expression, asemic writing may be considered to be a postliterate style of writing that uses all forms of creativity for inspiration. Other influences on asemic writing are xenolinguistics, artistic languages, sigils (magic), undecipherable scripts, and graffiti. Asemic writing occurs in avant-garde literature and art with strong roots in the earliest forms of writing.

Some Artists and Writers who have done asemic work (please feel free to post others who might be of interest)

Henri Michaux (author, Alphabet)

Cy Twombly

Letterisme - Isadore Isou proposed the poem of the future will be purely formal and devoid of semantic content (visual poetry - literally)

Brion Gysin (collaborations with William S. Burroughs in particular - collage)

Abstract Expressionists - look at Jackson Pollock

Max Ernst (book: Maximilliana: The Illegal Practice of Astronomy (great title)

Roland Barthes (semiotic literary theorist - Writing Degree Zero is a classic)

Ok As we were saying before and I translate now because we were talking in Spanish ...

Moving image is its elf documentary

The idea of fiction is brutish unidimensional and anchored on Eurocentric universal projections of control,

the autonomy and superiority of the mind,

the cult of the star and the idea of the individual genius

and supported by a mentality of exploitation at the heart of the arts, media and entertainment industries.

And perhaps I am missing something ...

Individualist metaphysics and universal aspirations (knowledge)

In mandarin I doesn't exist

Confusio

Tao te chin Lao tsu

Tao (The Way) that can be spoken of is not the Constant Tao'

Arthur Rimbaud - Yo es otro

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Intra-action vs individualist methaphisics

Cósmic models with no big bang

Wun yi shu

Memorias ajenas (foreign memories)

Santa Clara ... Patron saint of television

Possibilities of space time (barad,) / dimensions (Russia) / pedro paramo

Time is always forward .. The future .. A projection in the future ... How, what when always in the future

Psicodélic 1960s – carving eternity (slow down of time) into a present spacetime : Castaneda's the tenant ...The art of dreaming

extended mind hypothesis (EMH) and La comida decolonial option y las impresiones

La atmósfera, los sentidos, las formas de pensar, geography, food

Los intestinos de Buda ... Wise buda

El camino del corazón ... The way of the warrior

Cocacola chicken wings

Si comemos chicken wings podremos alguna ver volar ?!

Rodrigo labiola

Hombo forum

Ayraw wasy intercultural people's university Ecuador

Raul antelo

Los tigres del norte grupo mejicano

José rebasa elsewhere

Convento monjas franciscanas entre sao paolo y río de Janeiro ...

El lenguaje más allá del sentido

Je e un otre

Rimbaud

1. Babel ruinas / accumulation / ruins of time

2. Dimensions - lines - levels - onto epistemology ... Queer feminism and decolonial options

Because we think through line, it's very difficult for us to think of a border.

3. Intuition / telepathy / syntagma ... I ching

Giorgio Sergio

41 mins ·

Intuition is a direct communication with something broader inside and outside of us.

The less is the reasoning that stands between us and that other broader part of us, and the more the communication is clear and direct.

Intuition is fast and doesn't come through effort.

Intuition is light and loves to dance in our hearts. ☆

Conversetion piece

4. Industrias culturales - decolonial option

Typical question at Oberhausen: Is the love affair between the art world and the film world a happy one? And will it last?

This question assumes and ignores the colonial grip, ignores the regimented modes of thought and atmospheres at play in cultural industries at the center of financial capitalism...

A film about the Eurocentric colonial grip of the cultural industries (art and independent film scene)

Undoing euro-logocentric / taxonomizing / ethnographic grip

Impressions (affect?) / logic (phalo?)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

José Argüelles

discusses this possibility in his book Time and the Technosphere.

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Íntersubjectivity and telepathy

Politics of Telepathic Collaborations, the 60s, the 80s and Now | Jacquelene Drinkall

Collaborations in Modern and Postmodern Visual Arts | Jacquelene Drinkall The paper investigates the relationship between telepathy, collaboration and politics in conceptual and contemporary art. Conceptual artists and theorists Larry Miller, Carolee Schneeman, Yoko Ono, Joseph Beuys, Jean Jacques-Lebel, Marina Abramovic all worked with telepathy in their collaborative practices in the 60s and early 70s. They worked with telepathy and collaboration to deal with issues of abuse trauma, the repressed feminine, the alchemy of social sculpture, guerrilla revolt and the fusion of mysticism and Marxism. Theorists such as Rosalind Krauss and Lisa Blackman enable further examination of conceptual and body art through an appreciation of the value of telepathy, via psychoanalysis and affect theory, for understanding aesthetic and communicative transmission and contagion. Blackman's notion of self that extends beyond the individual's body is crucial. Also key is Krauss' connection between post-mediumism and the narcissism of telepathy in technologically mediated performance. Further, the paper looks at the late/post-conceptual telepathetic collaborative tendencies and relationship between conceptual artists Robert Filliou, Arakawa and Imants Tillers, as well as discourse connecting the telepathy of Tiller's with that of Abramovic/Ulay's collaboration in the 80s and 90s. This leads into an examination of past and recent discourse about Tillers' subsequent collaboration with indigenous Australian artists Gordon Bennett and Michael Nelson Jagamara. Post-colonial theory of William Du Bois reflects on the relationship of psychic and political states. Finally, the paper looks at contemporary artists, 90s – 00s, such as Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger, Jane and Louise Wilson, Gianni Motti and various ways they have connected telepathy to

intersubjectivity, collaboration and crowd consciousness. Younger Australian artists Ms&Mr, Veronica Kent and Sean Peoples and Gabriella Mangano and Silvana Mangano could be seen to be consolidating a nexus between telepathy, collaboration and narcissism. How is it possible, or indeed necessary, to locate these young Australian artists within an emerging genealogy of the politics of telepathic collaboration? How does their love extend to the social? Jacquelene Drinkall has lectured in a range of full-time, sessional and casual positions at Canberra School of Art at Australian National University; College of Fine Arts at University of New South; Design Lab, Faculty of Architecture at University of Sydney; and School of Creative Arts at James Cook University. She holds a PhD in Art History and Theory, Masters by Research in Visual Art and a BA in Visual Art (Painting). Jacquelene has received many awards and grants such as Curriculum Refresh grant; NAVA grant; two COFA Student Art Prizes; an Artspace residency; a Cite International des Arts Paris residency; Australian Postgraduate Award; Marten Bequest; Telecom Travelling Scholarship; Janet Johnston Award; two AGNSW awards; University Medal; and she was a 7 time finalist and 5 time exhibitor in the NSW Helen Lempriere Travelling Art Scholarship.

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Sri Aurobindo's Radical Social Vision: the Possibility of Telepathic Utopia

Tristan Gulliford • 3 years ago • 31 Comments

"The

greatest future triumph of the thinker will come when he can persuade the

individual integer and the collective whole to rest their life-relation and

its union and stability upon a free and harmonious consent

and self-adaptation, and shape and govern the external

by the internal truth rather than to constrain the inner

spirit by the tyranny of the external form and

structure."

~ Aurobindo

Ghose, The

Synthesis of Yoga

Aurobindo Ghose (also known as Sri Aurobindo) was a Bengali mystic and political activist who wrote about political and social theory, philosophy, religion, and spiritual poetry. Some of his major works are The Synthesis of Yoga, The Life Divine, Secrets of the Vedas, Essays on the Gita, The Human Cycle, and The Ideal of Human Unity. The latter of these works, in which Aurobindo deals with social concerns and presents a philosophical ideal of what a future idealized society should be, will be the focus of this article. I will analyze Aurobindo's projections of what would constitute an ideal society, and compare this with the real-life scenario of Aurobindo's ashram, and the existing commune of Auroville in Puducherry, south India. My goal is to lay out a theoretical picture of what a future society might look like if Aurobindo's views, methods, and practices, were applied on a wide scale, and formed the basis of a spiritual ethics of social action. Since this is unlikely to ever actually occur, this paper will be speculative, in the vein of a "thought experiment" to use

a popular term. The major technique, or ability, which would form the basis of this utopian society based on Aurobindo's thought is the power of telepathy—the sharing of thoughts at distance between people without external verbal communication.

At the beginning of The Ideal of Human Unity Aurobindo writes "while it is possible to construct a precarious and quite mechanical unity by political and administrative means, the unity of the human race, even if achieved, can only be secured and can only be made real if the religion of humanity, which is at present the highest active ideal of mankind, spiritualises itself and becomes the inner law of human life" (Heehs, 1998, 148). This passage strikes a chord with me, and I feel that Aurobindo's conclusion is correct—the unification of the human race in a peaceful and constructive manner will necessarily utilize a means of government, forms of social communication, and of religion and personal ethics, which seeks to find and establish a common ground of humanity and equality. Within our current mode of society and governance we have all kinds of codified hierarchies and insider/outsider distinctions. Our current political system is based on the ideological division of supposed binary opposites; there is left wing/right wing, Democrat, Republican, and something else on the periphery of that called "Independent." There is a division between the wealthy who more easily wield the tools of political

power, and the disenfranchised poor who cannot afford lobbyists and do not generally have their views and needs well represented within our current political system. In this way, political power is often consolidated into the hands of the few, the affluent, and those families who have traditionally held political positions for the past centuries. This divisive and complicated system seems to do the opposite of what Aurobindo sees as the ideal, which is to create a psychic and spiritual unity of humans that subsequently informs and substantiates government.

In the preceding passage Aurobindo presents us with the intriguing position that the "religion of humanity" must "spiritualise itself and become the inner law of human life." What does this mean? What is the distinction Aurobindo is making here between religion and spirituality? I read this to mean that the "religion of humanity" i.e. the outward forms of religious expression we see as churches, mosques, synagogues, temples, etc. needs to turn inward and become personalized, "spiritualised," within the experience of the individual themselves. Aurobindo's term "inner law" means a divinely inspired intuitive understanding of ethics. This would mean no more external religious interpretations of truth, and no more political interpretations of truth would be required. No "authorities"

beyond ones own self would be relied upon for definitions or boundaries of reality. In Aurobindo's words from The Synthesis of Yoga, "internal truth" would "shape and govern the external," "rather than constrain the inner spirit by the tyranny of the external form and structure." Is this possible? What would the implications be? How could this kind of self-knowing governance come about?

In Aurobindo's writings he saw the future state of governance as probably having one or two possible organizations, "there is likely to be either a centralised World-State or a looser world-union which may be either a close federation or a simple confederacy of the peoples for the common ends of mankind. The last form is the most desirable, because it gives sufficient scope for the principle of variation which is necessary for the free play of life and the healthy progress of the race" (Heehs, 1998, 151). Aurobindo believes that a World-State or one-world government would inevitably become stagnant, monolithic, and unresponsive to the needs of the people; the triumph of the World-State government would be "the triumph of the idea of mechanical unity or rather of uniformity" (Heehs, 1998, 152). In contrast, Aurobindo thinks that "a centralised socialistic State may be a necessity of the future, once it is founded, but a reaction from it will be equally an eventual

necessity of the future" (Heehs, 1998, 152). However, both of these efforts will be ultimately futile—or rather, impermanent—attempts to solve the problem of governance and social responsibility. Aurobindo saw this happening in great cycles of social change which were inevitable because of the systemic organization structures of these forms of government. He writes, "the greater its pressure [to control peoples' lives], the more certainly will it be met by the spread of the spiritual, the intellectual, the vital and practical principle of Anarchism in revolt against that mechanical pressure. So, too, a centralised mechanical World-State must rouse in the end a similar force against it and might well terminate in a crumbling up and disintegration, even in the necessity for a repetition of the cycle of humanity ending in a better attempt to solve the problem" (Heehs, 1998, 152).

Why are these forms of government destined to fail, or become inadequate, according to Aurobindo? That is because they are based on formations of external truth, social symbols, and arbitrary divisive distinctions rather than an organic psychic unity of humanity which in itself gives rise to government. Aurobindo saw the latter as an undreamt political possibility which could possibly form the basis of a future government and social system. In The Ideal of Human Unity Aurobindo writes,

> The saving power needed is a new psychological factor which will at once make a united life necessary to humanity and force it to respect the principle of freedom. The religion of humanity seems to be the one growing force which tends in that direction; for it makes for the sense of human oneness, it has the idea of the race, and yet at the same time it respects the human individual and the natural human grouping. But its present intellectual form seems hardly sufficient. The idea, powerful in itself and in its effects, is yet not powerful enough to mould the whole life of the race in its image. For it has to concede too much to the egoistic side of human nature, once all and still nine-tenths of our being, with which its larger idea is in conflict (Heehs, 1998, 152).

This is a remarkably insightful passage about the status of modern religion. Aurobindo views the "religion of humanity" (which I take to mean the religions of humanity) as a positive force for human unity, but one that is ultimately still mired in the dualistic world of egoistic concerns and externally based distinctions. He comments that the egoistic side of human nature is in conflict with the larger idea of human unity which religion seeks to promote and facilitate. We can see how political hierarchies and religious hierarchies both create insider/outsider

distinctions which necessitate different levels of political empowerment.

If we would like to critically define the current status of our Democracy in realistic terms, we would probably be forced to conclude that American government is not, in fact, a Democracy, but rather a Republic, or a "representative Democracy," which, unfortunately has become increasingly less and less "representative" and increasingly oppressive of personal freedoms rather than supportive of them. Recent legalization of previously illegal and invasive wiretapping spy procedures upon unsuspecting citizens is only one of many examples of the development of an authoritarian surveillance and police state which has seems to have become the trend in American government (1). To be even more specific about definition in light of the facts, we might conclude that American government is actually a corporate oligarchy, in which an elite group of financially powerful corporate interests dictate public policy and political decision from behind the scenes. The industry of political lobbying by wealthy corporations is hardly a secret, but the real implications of this for the power structure of American politics is not well understood. With the recent removal of corporate restrictions on campaign funding, the veil of influence that corporations exert over American politics is now even more

transparent (2).

Acknowledging that this is in fact the case,

we might then accurately define American political system as a

Fascist oligarchy. Here I am adopting the incendiary term "Fascist"

with well-thought intent. I mean this designation of "Fascist" in

the sense that the Fascist Italian dictator Benito Mussolini meant

when he said, "Fascism is the merger of corporate and state power"

as was described in the Fascist manifesto published in Il Popolo

d'Italia on June 6, 1919 (3). With the recent corporate "bailout"

under the heading of the Troubled Assets Relief program (TARP) in

which billions of taxpayer dollars went directly into the pockets of

formerly wealthy banks, and many blatant and documented mis-uses of

this money, the corruption of the state in terms of the influence

military-industrial complex and Wall Street upon American politics,

the "merger of corporate and state power" to use Mussolini's

phrase, has never been more evident (4). The concerns of Aurobindo

are quite relevant to our current political landscape.

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political salvation, according to Aurobindo, lies in the

establishment of psychic unity which has its grounds in religious

truth, but would also be different from current religious

understanding. Towards the end of The Ideal of Human Unity Aurobindo describes what this might look like.

A spiritual religion of humanity is the hope of the future. By this is not meant what it ordinarily called a universal religion, a system, a thing of creed and intellectual belief and dogma and outward rite. Mankind has tried unity by that means; it has failed and deserved to fail, because there can be no universal religious system, one in mental creed and vital form. The inner spirit is indeed one, but more than any other the spiritual life insists on freedom and variation in its self-expression and means of development. A religion of humanity means the growing realisation that there is a secret Spirit, a divine Reality, in which we are all one, that humanity is its highest present vehicle on earth, that the human race and the human being are the means by which it will progressively reveal itself here. It implies a growing attempt to live out this knowledge and bring about a kingdom of this divine Spirit upon earth. By its growth within us oneness with our fellow-men will become the leading principle of all our life, not merely a principle of cooperation but a deeper brotherhood, a real and an inner sense of unity and equality and a common life (Heehs, 1998, 154).

Aurobindo stresses the point that this

unity would not be based in a system, or a creed, or belief, or ritual. These are the things which traditionally constitute religion. As Aurobindo points out, by and large the project of religion has failed, if its attempt has been to help humanity realize its divine unity. Aurobindo's solution is for us to realize that there is "a divine Reality, in which we are all one."

———>>>>>>This understanding would necessarily transcend the boundaries of nationality, race, religion, economics, because its source is deeper than any of these more superficial traits of humanity. Getting to the spiritual source of humanity is where we would find the basic commonality and real oneness which, if properly understood and communed with, could possibly foster a

————————>>>>>>>>>>>prevalent psychic unity among all humans. For this to truly happen, the realization would have to be based in a mystical-type consciousness of non-duality.

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————————>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>This psychic unity would be grounded in a level of communication deeper and more primal than verbal language. To accomplish this humanity would have to evolve a capacity for consistent telepathic communication.

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While this may seem like

a bizarre or radical conclusion, there is actually a strong basis for

this concept within Aurobindo's life and practice. Telepathy is

thought to be one of the siddhis, or magical powers, which may be

gained from following a spiritual path such as Tantra. Some of the

siddhis mentioned in Hindu literature may be relevant to the modern

scientific term "telepathy." In The Lives of Sri Aurobindo,

historian Peter Heehs writes,

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Following an ancient tradition,

Aurobindo spoke of eight siddhis: two of knowledge, prakamya and

vyapti; three of power, aishwarya, ishita, and vashita; and three of

the body, mahima, laghima, and anima. The siddhis of knowledge

constitute what is known in the West as telepathy. The siddhis of

power are applications of will by which one mind can influence

another. The siddhis of the body overlap with the next chatusthaya,

the quaternary of the body (Heehs, 2008, 240).

Traditionally it is thought that with

enough concentration and practice, one could develop and perfect the

use of these types of powers. Certainly Aurobindo took these ideas seriously in his own practice. Aurobindo even documented the progress of his meditative and vigilant spiritual practice in the "Record of Yoga," a journal which he kept. Heehs writes of Aurobindo's partial mastery of these powers, "By 1911 he was able to report that he could 'put himself into men and change them,' that he 'had been given the power to read men's characters and hearts, even their thoughts' (here he added: 'but this power is not yet absolutely complete'), that he could guide action 'by the mere exercise of will,' and that he was 'in communication with the other world' (adding that this was 'yet of a troubled character')" (Heehs, 2008, 242). There are several stories of Aurobindo's attempts to directly influence reality through the force of his psychic will, and even encouraging other people to do this as well (5). Yet Aurobindo's attempts were not entirely successful; for the most part he was only partially successful in these types of experiments. However, in the context of understanding these siddhi powers and how Aurobindo conceived them, we may better understand Aurobindo's "ideal of human unity" and how he might have pictured the future development of humanity in the areas of politics, religion, society, and the spiritual self.

Aurobindo believed, as was the tradition surrounding siddhis, that any person regardless of class, race, nationality, or status, could, with proper discipline and attention, develop these kinds of siddhi powers as a natural result of spiritual practice. In this understanding we could consider that perhaps these powers are currently latent within the whole of humanity, accessible, but usually only explored by certain gifted and focused people such as Aurobindo. This means that at the present time only a small few of humans are able to use these sorts of powers. However, with proper training and practice, anyone could learn to master these forms of extra-sensory perception and mental extension.

This makes sense in terms of Aurobindo's cosmology: we could consider that these siddhi powers are an aspect of the latent, yet omni-present foundation of the "supermind" or "supermental intellect" which Aurobindo describes as the trajectory of human consciousness towards a teleological end of ultimate psychic unification (6). Perhaps the ability of telepathy would be a consequential result of the "descent of the Overmind" that Aurobindo described. If Aurobindo's premise is true, and our individual minds are immersed in some kind of larger, more integrated, more informed, "supermind" of which we are individualized manifestations, and this "supermind"

is actively creating and influencing us towards an end of psychic unity, we might conclude that eventually these siddhi powers could become a natural and everyday part of human life. The most important of these, within the context of Aurobindo's argument for psychic unity and self-governance, are the siddhis associated with telepathy and the sharing or extension of mental functions between minds: prakamya and vyapti.

What is telepathy? In Telepathy and Clairvoyance: Views of Some Little Investigated Capabilities of Man Dutch professor W.H.C. Tenhaeff, former Director of the Parapsychological Institute of the State University of Utrecht writes that telepathy is "the receipt in one's mind of thoughts that emanate from the consciousness of another person" (Tenhaeff, 1957, 23). According to Roger Luckhust's book, The Invention of Telepathy, (Oxford University Press, 2002) the term "telepathy" was coined in December 1882 in the first volume of the house journal of psychical research: 'we venture to introduce the words Telaesthesia and Telepathy to cover all cases of impression received at a distance.' My first chapter tracked the preconditions for the emergence of this object within the perturbations of scientized modernity in the 1870's, working with the insight that 'the place of knowledge lays down the conditions for the appearance of the objects

of science, for their validation as real, and for the terms on which they are knowable'. (Luckhurst, 2002, 60).

To construct a more modern definition for "telepathy" as it has come to be understood we might say something like "

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————————>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>mental impression, cognition, and information exchange at a distance, sometimes between two or more individual minds." However, as Aurobindo noted, there had already been a philosophical system for describing this type of "psychic action at a distance" for centuries before the term was coined by scientists in 1882: the siddhis had long since been noticed, and well documented within the religious and mystical literature of Hinduism. Westerners scientists like Frederic Myers who were interested in telepathy and similar evidences of extra-sensory perception and psychic ability, were studying phenomena which had already been fairly well understood, and even mastered by advanced practitioners of Tantra, for thousands of years. Aurobindo himself can be counted as an example of this tradition, although technically he was not a Tantric.

One comparison that could be made of Aurobindo's

model would be with the Western philosophical idea of the

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as developed by authors such as Russian geochemist Vladimir Vernadsky

and the French Jesuit priest Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (7). The

noosphere is conceived of as a layer of thought-energy which envelops

the planet in a similar manner as our atmosphere does, but in an

immaterial sense. Scientists have identified many energetic layers

which surround and envelop the earth (even though we may not be able

to directly perceive them), including the bio-magnetic layer produced

by the earth's core, layers of radio waves, sound, light, gravity,

the

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————————>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Van Allen belt of charged plasma, and many other forms of

radiation (8). Some people have taken seriously the idea that the

mental substance of human thought might form a "layer" of energy

which could theoretically be tapped into and accessed. The "Akashic

record" is one such concept found in the literature of the occult

(9). Research from the Global Consciousness Project carried on by the

Institute of Noetic Sciences has tried to suggest a method for study

of the collective information patterns within the whole of human consciousness. A statement on their website reads:

The Global Consciousness Project, also called the EGG Project, is an international, multidisciplinary collaboration of scientists, engineers, artists and others. We collect data continuously from a global network of physical random number generators located in 65 host sites around the world. The archive contains more than 10 years of random data in parallel sequences of synchronized 200-bit trials every second. Our purpose is to examine subtle correlations that may reflect the presence and activity of consciousness in the world. We predict structure in what should be random data, associated with major global events. When millions of us share intentions and emotions the GCP/EGG network data show meaningful departures from expectation. This is a powerful finding based in solid science.

Their idea is that important global events which imprint the collective psyche could be correlated with statistical shifts in random number generators. Eventually they hope to be able to read this data and even develop it as a predictive tool.

One could argue that the Internet,

particularly in the form of recent social networking websites, is

already functioning as a

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————————>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>crude pseudo-telepathic superstructure of

human thought and information exchange. José Argüelles

discusses this possibility in his book Time and the Technosphere.

Argüelles argues that the technosphere, meaning the Internet and

the externalized technological communications network, may be a

pre-cursor to the development of an organically and biologically

integrated telepathic network which would link all of the minds on

the planet together into a single planetary consciousness or perhaps

a diverse, multi-faceted group consciousness (10). Observing how the

technological evolution of computing has made incredible, almost

unthinkable, leaps and bounds in the past fifty years, we could

imagine that in the next two hundred years there will be some amazing

developments in information technology. The trend in information

technology seems to be the development of an increasing personal

intimacy and information exchange between geographically distanced

groups of people, using the machines as the interface, and an

increasing trend to embed our personalities and habits within the

external technological infrastructure of the Internet through social networks, etc. The end result, which may already be partially visible, seems to be the establishment of a collective personality based on the information, perceptions, and input of individuals—all mediated by technologies which are becoming increasingly integrated to be compatible with the biological system of the human body.

In modern science there is still an ongoing and heated debate amongst scientists as to the validity of such psychic powers, or psi, as the psychic energy is sometimes called. The institutions of science have unfortunately been extremely squeamish about approaching these kinds of phenomena. The reason is probably because the necessary conclusions of the truth of psychic phenomena, particularly things like telepathy and clairvoyance, would directly undermine the established materialist view which is the fundamental and indispensable foothold and basis of modern science. For scientists to include psychic phenomena into the conventional view of what human is, they would need to rewrite much of the known science relating to human mental functioning to include the reality that the human spirit is somehow able to transcend the boundaries of the material world in a way which is still, on the whole, not comprehensible by current science.

However there are examples of intrepid scientists who have dared to breach this experimental ground. Some scientists such as Dr. Dean Radin and Dr. Charles Tart, have dedicated their careers to ask some of these questions, and studying the effects of psi in a laboratory setting (11). There has also been considerable interest in psychic abilities within the studies of the governmental intelligence agencies such as the CIA, which has conducted numerous projects to study psychic ability, and use trained psychics to carry out various tasks related to intelligence gathering (12). The "paranormal" as it is called is an area of science which seems to frighten and disconcert many mainstream scientists, but in the future it could become a promising area of scientific study. As Sir Cyril Burt writes in the preface to The Mind Readers: Some Recent Experiments in Telepathy,

During the last few decades, current beliefs in almost every branch of science have undergone a revolutionary change. The little we think we understand turns out to be but a fraction as compared with what still defies our comprehension. No longer therefore need we feel unduly perturbed by new facts or new phenomena undreamt of in Horatio's philosophy or in Tait and Thomson's physics. The plain duty of the scientist is neither to reject nor to neglect

these seeming oddities. Only by concentrating on the rare and elusive clues that indicate cracks and inadequacies in the orthodox doctrines of today can genuine progress be achieved (Soal, 1960, 14).

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suspect that once this field of study is finally reviewed by mainstream science in a reasonable and sensible way, much new data about the experience of psychic phenomena and the immaterial components of human consciousness might be learned. Until then, phenomena like telepathy are relegated to fringe science and the pages of religious and mystical literature such as the tradition of Sri Aurobindo. Yet if we consider this assertion that some individuals can develop means of communication that is more internalized, more deeply originated and deeply felt, than verbal communication—as Frederick Myers, Dean Radin, Charles Tart, Teilhard de Chardin, and Aurobindo Ghose have suggested—what would be the conclusions of this? If this ability could be trained and developed into a global communications network, what implications might there be for future forms of political and social organization?

I can imagine a world in which children are taught from

birth and encouraged to develop their psychic and spiritual powers, in terms of dreaming, telepathy, etc. If these educational programs were successful perhaps a basic commonality of thought and mental substance could be achieved, maybe similar to Aurobindo's concept of the

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————————>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "supermind" directly manifest and utilized as the primary means of communication. Writing and texts would become secondary to the direct experience of telepathic transmission. Within this mental superstructure, true Democracy, i.e. self-governance, could be more easily achieved. The general organization might function like this: autonomous communes, telepathically linked, which define for themselves their own rules and behaviors, without any nation states, or religions, to dictate the norms of behavior and social communication. This would be similar to Aurobindo's concept of a future "loose world-union" or "confederacy" of states. This might be along the lines of Marshall McLuhan's concept of the "global village" which he saw as a possible future of social organization (13). Howard Bloom's book The Global Brain might also describe what this kind of social organization could resemble (14). This form of organization might also resemble Gandhi's idea for India's ideal form of government,

resembling the tribal village councils of olden times (15).

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can imagine a kind of telepathic council of all citizens of a "global village" or autonomous communes, where they would gather to make decisions, based not only on materialistic rationalization and logic, but also emotional empathy and deep, experiential understanding of others and their needs. This would be an implicitly ethical system, based on intuitive ethics which would be debated and formulated by each "global village" or autonomous communes eparately. If someone broke the ethical rules there would not be a system of punitive and psychologically damaging prison or physical punishment, but rather an expulsion and social ostracization similar to the village councils described by Gandhi. In effect, the social punishment would be that if you can't get along with your peers, you have to find another place to live and another group of people who you can get along with. This form of social punishment might prove to be more effective than the currently disappointing failure of punishment "rehabilitation" which is the methodology employed by the current U.S. prison system. Basing a society on cooperation and inclusiveness rather than competition and social hierarchies could be helpful in solving some of our modern problems.

For real-life examples of how this

form of society could actually play out, we can look at existing

communes such as Auroville, and how they are organized and function.

To get a sense of the ideals of the township of Auroville we can examine their

charter, presented by Auroville founder Mirra Alfassa, also known as "The Mother,"

with whom Aurobindo lived in his ashram. This charter, given at the

inauguration of Auroville in 1968, consists of four main points:

1. Auroville belongs to nobody

in particular. Auroville belongs to humanity as a whole. But to live

in Auroville, one must be a willing servitor of the Divine

Consciousness.

2.

Auroville will be the place of an unending education, of constant

progress, and a youth that never ages.

3.

Auroville wants to be the bridge between the past and the future.

Taking advantage of all discoveries from without and from within,

Auroville will boldly spring towards future realisations.

4.

Auroville will be a site of material and spiritual researches for a living embodiment of an actual Human Unity (Auroville.org).

Auroville, also called the "City of Dawn" is designed in a manner that is fitting of Aurobindo's personality: its rules are permissive, open, tolerant, but the dedication to spiritual work and community building is strong, following the example of Karma yoga. There is a strict application process and several levels of residence or membership within the community, entailing different privileges and responsibilities. Leadership roles are shared amongst different people at different times. The population is remarkably diverse, with more than 2,000 permanent residents coming from over 40 countries (16).

A section of the Auroville website titled "Toward a Human Unity" applies Aurobindo's philosophical views to the modern circumstances of Auroville. They describe a new "truth-consciousness" which will evolve human society toward a "spiritual age of humanity."

This 'spiritual age of humanity' then will

represent a transformation in the nature of man as momentous as the appearance of the thinking mind on earth. In the same way as for millennia the mind was the centre of our life, so, in the new age opening for humanity, or 'supra-mental' age, the soul will become the centre of all life and activities. A new stage in the evolution of man has already begun; a new consciousness, higher than the mind, a truth-consciousness, as Sri Aurobindo said, in which the dualities, hesitations and limitations of the mind and the greed and blindness of the ego will no longer exist, has already started to appear, and all the upheavals and convulsions that are at present so painfully tearing our earth are the outward signs of this evolutionary crisis. This new consciousness is already at work in the atmosphere of the earth: we can connect with it, we can call it in ourselves, we can use it to transform our entire nature and consequently the world in which we live. It is in this wide and far-reaching sense that Auroville is dedicated to human unity. All are invited.

While Auroville and Aurobindo's vision are worthwhile ideals, the commune may have not always lived up to the concept of "a living embodiment of an actual Human Unity." Auroville is a functional and vibrant commune, but it is still far from the vision of a telepathic utopia.

Aurobindo himself realized that this process of

"descent of the supramental force" was actually a gradual and slow process which was not likely to manifest in terms of an overnight revolution. Rather, over a period of time, the higher consciousness would form and crystallize itself within matter, and transform it. This became increasingly clear as Aurobindo became older. Peter Heehs writes in his biography,

Sri Aurobindo's

task, as he visualized it, was to prepare a 'step forward which the evolution of the earth-consciousness has still to make.' For a while he thought that he could accomplish the task in a relatively short time. Asked towards the end of 1932 whether the supermind would descend 'within a decade,' he replied, 'I don't know about the date—dates are things that one ought not to fix too rigidly; but I certainly hope we won't have to wait for a decade! Let us be more sanguine and put the beginning of the decade and not the end as the era of the Descent. It is more likely then to make haste.' He remained generally sanguine for a year or two more. In November 1933, after noting that 'the supramental has not descended into the body or

into Matter,' he added: 'it is only at the point where such a descent has become not only possible but inevitable.' And ten months later: 'The supramental Force is descending, but it has not yet taken possession of the body or of matter—there is much resistance to that. It is the supramentalised Overmind Force that has already touched, and this may at any time change into or give place to the supramental in its own native power.' But by the end of 1934 it was becoming clear that the process would take much longer than anticipated. 'The descent of the Supermind is a long process,' he wrote that October, 'or at least a process with a long preparation, and one can only say that the work is going on sometimes with a strong pressure for completion, sometimes retarded by the things that rise from below and have to be dealt with before further progress can be made' (Heehs, 364).

And this task has yet to be completed.

Aurobindo's teleological model is describing a deeply recurring pattern in reality which could be described as "spiritual evolution." Not only the evolution of the individual, but the evolution of the whole planet and the structure of human consciousness. Will this evolution involve a further individualization of consciousness, or the shift towards a more cooperative, shared consciousness that could be mediated through

telepathy? Time will tell, but certainly efforts such as Auroville and other communes are fledgling attempts at the kind of shared consciousness or "spiritual religion of humanity" described in the writings of the modern mystic Sri Aurobindo.

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Photo: Auroville, an "experimental" township in Viluppuram

district in the state of Tamil Nadu, India near Puducherry in South

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Comments

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rajajuju ▪ 2015 years ago ▪ 0 karma

return of the mahasiddhas

It seems odd that you would emphasize the cultivation of siddhis so heavily without any mention of the "intermediate zone" - which was a term coined by Aurobindo to describe the often treacherous transitional period from the "ordinary" to the "supernatural".

Robert Anton Wilson would often make mention of "chapel perilous". It is not exactly the same thing, but the sentiment is close enough.

These matters are not to be considered lightly, and I would urge a significant amount of caution when dealing with anything which is beyond the boundaries of consensus agreement. Fear is the mind-killer, but then again the litany of the bene gesserit isn't quite the same as a bedtime story.

reply

Daruma ▪ 2015 years ago ▪ 0 karma

If the culture of the

If the culture of the civilization which adapted this novel form of amplified hypercommunication was not deeply rooted in the awareness of their bodies, then the results would by a dystopia of abundant confusion and ignorance. Billions milling about like insects communicating in a synthetic hive mind, a colony of human beings brought under a false mind created by the dark alchemy of science.

The furthering of our separation from the earth and ourselves. Its sad because it has already begun, its at a critical point, and as time goes on the confusion deepens and our awareness gets stifled by an excess of information at the detriment of our ability to see the whole of the problems we have created as a species.

Allowing consumer capital to be the driving force of our economic engines has led to the intellectual decline of people, this increases as time goes on. We have all the information we could possibly need at our fingertips. We are all geniuses because we have access to google. But

what is happening to the condition of our minds ability to maintain a concentrated state of awareness, to be able to reason with depth and insight, not just recite facts and reference from else where. Are we becoming synthetic? Do we want this?

There is an opening for technology to transition from the consumerist insect colony behavior model and into a new sphere of human experience, but at the same time retaining our natural bodies, and natural earth. Without external mental pollution flooding in. Don't you think there would be errors in a complex networking system that transmitted thought and vision from people to people? It would be chaos, not utopia. Thats our natural brain state. Chaos is creativity. Balance is the ability to find the center from any position, and restabalize.

The mimicry of natural biology is what will bring us to the next stage of our evolution. Integration and synergistic use of already existing organisms put into process at the cellular level. Mycellium plastics and entire structures grown from the reprogrammed coral cells. If the individuals and banks which held the current wealth realized how fast breakthroughs would occur if they funded biomimicry, we would be headed towards lilly pad ocean cities, breathing hyperoxygenated air. In a dense environment of living organisms who's evolution we guide to harmonize with the continuing propagation of the planet, as well as with the goal (root ideal) of the civilization being the seeding of other earths with life.

Its sad however that everything that is created or produced is done almost solely with the goal of producing more profit, to produce more profit. With the goal of creating wealth number one, people have suffered through the ages. It never will stop, it is a false evil system created by the machiavellian pharoah architects of the system. Its not that people do not try to 'fight' the system, its just that the mechanisms which will always keep it in place are: 1. Ignorance, and 2. Violence.

Its easy to goad confused people into violence when they are told other poor people are the reason they are that way. Setting the spark of human emotion is done with ease by the powers that be, just show us a few clips on the TV. A false flag attack on the anniversary???

The Babylon matrix is here to fall, but its decline will be unders moke and mirrors, people still don't realize the dire situation we are in. War is near undeniable as climate change continues.

There are no easy short term solutions, sans alien interventions... A telepathic network might be plausible after the dark ages. After the transition and the transformation. The air of confusion will permeate the times, but the neo-gaian realization will grow in proportion with that confusion until there is collective recapitualization of the respect and power of nature; realized by our inherent state of being on the earth as such.

A psychedelic network of meditators and visionaries is necessary for a proto network of telepathy. All we have to do is focus on the same thing during the full lunar phase in order to slowly create it as a meme in the collective subconscious. The neo-gaian realization is that of a culture which has placated the ego, and given volition to the spirit.

What is the spirit? The essence of the processing of things. I am not just here being, I am the process of being unfolding, any time I attempt to assess where or what I am, that is a relative and partial assessment. This is why a word like love or unity, is not a true meditation. What must be realized is the state of mind in a trance state which is transcendant of the ego and receptive to the subtle vibrations of things. When one realizes this, one feels inside ones skin and body, and the ambiance of ones environment- the spirit of things. This is the feeling which anchors ones body to the earth, and is the first realization of true experience in human form.

True experience being the full realization of the potentials of the human nervous system to have synchonitic accordance, with the circadian mechanisms of the earth and its geomagnetic effect on the body. When this occurs it is known in the blood and nerve. In ones heart and mind, it is something felt. Touch is the most immersive and most intimate form of sensory intake, it is unecessary for your brain to first process, it is right to the motor nerves and instantaneous. Natural mind.

When and how we get into these states are many. But the lunar civilization must every cycle endeavor to create the meme of the neo-gaian realization. Our ideals as realized sentient human organisms populating the earth and our rights theirin, and the direction we want our species and planet to go, as people who see our true natures being coopted into the machinery of nihilism that is the modern industrial state. Meme the subconscious until were home again on the earth and have realized the illusions our egos gave power to.

The vision must be radical to succeed, the butterfly has to flap its wings in other dimensions. Thats the potential of natural telepathy through use of psychedelics by a collective brought together through digital communication with focused intention. A broad focus is more necessary than a narrow one with specific results. This is because Im talking about dreaming and the collective subconscious, fringe tangibles, for fringe dwellers to experiment with. Others know not of these practices. These are subtle oscillations, and they take time, a long time. And even after the new civilizations inception, and dark ages of the transitional period are printed in history books; it will still be necessary to dream the world into existence.

reply

rajajuju • 2015 years ago • 0 karma

Signs and Wonders

"These things, when they pour down or come in, present themselves with a great force, a vivid sense of inspiration or illumination, much sensation of light and joy, an impression of widening and power. The sadhak feels himself freed from the normal limits, projected into a wonderful new world of experience, filled and enlarged and exalted; what comes associates itself, besides, with his aspirations, ambitions, notions of spiritual fulfilment and yogic siddhi; it is represented even as itself that realisation and fulfilment. Very easily he is carried away by the splendour and the rush, and thinks that he has realised more than he has truly done, something final or at least something sovereignly true.

This is in fact an intermediary state, a zone of transition between the ordinary consciousness in mind and the true yoga knowledge. One may cross without hurt through it, perceiving at once or at an early stage its real nature and refusing to be detained by its half-lights and tempting but imperfect and often mixed and misleading experiences; one may go astray in it, follow false voices and mendacious guidance, and that ends in a spiritual disaster; or one may take up one' s abode in this intermediate zone, care to go no farther and build there some half-truth which one takes for the whole truth or become the instrument of the powers of these transitional planes, - that is what happens to many sadhaks and yogis."

—Sri Aurobindo, The Riddle of the World

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Rogertoth ▪ 2015 years ago ▪ 0 karma

yoga

This is totally new concept, I dont thinks o all country follow this type of radical s ocial vis ion. This will be good for medical science. Custom Cabinets

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Thanks for this, it gives me

Thanks for this, it gives me good idea and inspirations. Thanks.

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I just had telepathy today

I just had telepathy today -- here's the details:

http://fulllotus qigong.blogspot.com/2011/12/was-it-full-lotus-telepathy-amazing.html

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baron_barnaby ▪ 2015 years ago ▪ 0 karma

new music video

That is

new music video

That is really great

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This legislating strikes a

This legislating strikes a chord with me, and I consider that Aurobindo's section is correct-the uniting of the frail VCP-410

vie in a irenic and rehabilitative fashion module necessarily apply a

agency of regime, forms of sociable communicating, and of faith and

individualized motive, 350-001

which seeks to reason and pioneer a unrefined secure of humankind and

equation. Within our incumbent property of elite and organization we

make all kinds of 642-813 codified hierarchies and insider/outsider distinctions.

VCP-510 || 640-802

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Nicolas revoc

War machine: creates newsingularspace times

The canival methaphisics

The schizo: Suffering privilege

Biopower vs biopotency

To welcome the becoming minor minor of everyone

Nitzche ... Extemporaneous : the new clash with the present ... Gap, distance with the present

The border between desirable and unimaginable

Suspension on the progression of time - contraction of time and space / absolute velocity

Post fordism —->> hypertime

Explosion of time - time is out of joint

Value—>> Hours vs invention force (can not be measure, the value of things

Time exceeded the possibility of measuring it

Matter of singularities vs individuality

Pre-individual (Matter of singularities)//Simondon (trans individual, the comon)

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PPP Afterall

What Is the Contemporary?

Mignolo:

Mario Blaser

http://waltermignolo.com/on-pluriversality/

If a pluriverse is not a world of independent units (cultural relativism) but a world entangled through and by the colonial matrix of power, then, it a way of thinking and understanding that dwells in the entanglement, in the borders, is needed. So the point is not to "study" the borders, very fashionable today, while at the same time "dwelling" in a territorial epistemology, would imply that you accept a pluriverse some place out there that you "observe" from some place else outside the pluriverse.

To do so it is necessary to maintain the territoriality of the disciplines grounded on the imperial epistemology of modernity. Thinking pluritopically means, instead, to dwell in the border. Dwelling in the border is not border-crossing, even less looking and studying the borders from the territorial gaze of the disciplines. Today "borderstudy" became fashionable, even in Europe. Scholars studying borders are in general not dwelling in them. Who dwell in the border are the migrants from Africa, West Asia and Latin America, mainly. That's what I learned from Anzaldúa. Chicanos and Chiacanas are migrants and queers, migrants or not, are always dwelling in the border.

I think the impact that Local Histories / Global Designs was writing in inhabiting the border not just observing and describing it. I revealed in the preface to the second edition (2012) that the argument was a rewriting of Hegel's philosophy of history inhabiting the border. So that border epistemology became the way, as in Buddhism, or the method, as in Western sciences, social or not, of decolonial thinking and doing. A key point to move away from the trap that distinguishes theory from praxis. Reflexive praxis is, instead, the motu at Amawtay Wasi. Why, because the very education project is built on border epistemology. The overall world-sense is Indigenous and Andean cosmology, not rejecting Indigenous European cosmology but embodied it in Andean cosmology.

Border thinking is why take the effort to combine the body with writing, writing with the

body and not just in the body, combine the heart with the mind, senti-pensar (feeling-thinking) as they say in Ecuador .In the In the Darker Side of Western Modernity i returned to the idea of pluriversality connecting it with the idea of multiverse in Humberto Maturana's epistemology. The multiverse is for Maturana a world of truth in parenthesis while the universe is a world built on truth without parenthesis. Uni-verality is always imperial and war-driven. Pluri and multi verses and convivial, dialogical or plurilogical. Now pluri- and multi-verses exists independent of the state and the corporations and it is the work of the emerging global political society, e.g., the sector of society organizing themselves around specific projects once they/we realize that neither the state nor the corporations have room for multi- or pluriverses.

While "multi and pluriverses" characterizes the making of the global political society, in the realm of the state and the corporations the vocabulary is that of "multipolar world." The multi-polar world of today has been opened up by the economic growth and political confidence of China's inter-state politics, together with the BRICS and the growing economies and politics of Indonesia and Turkey, the Latin American states in Mercosur following the leadership of Brazil, member of BRICS countries. When Vladimir Putin "stole" Barack Obama menace of invading Syria, it was evident that the unipolar world that made possible the invasion of Iraq is not longer in place. And it seems obvious also that Putin's chess move was possible because of the support of BRICS alliance of which he is the current chair. Thus, I would like to use pluriverse in the sphere of decolonial projects coming from the global political society (desracializing and depatriarchalizing projects, food sovereignity, economic organization of reciprocity and definancializaiton of money, decolonization of knowledge and of being, decolonization of religion to liberate spirituality, decolonization of aesthetics to liberate aesthesis, etc., etc., etc.) and multi-polarity in the sphere of politico-economic dewesternization, lead states projects.

— Peter Pál Pelbart

Peter Pál Pelbart presents a series of theses to undermine the covert demands

of Enlightenment modernity

Two centuries ago, Immanuel Kant wrote an article in response to the question 'What is the Enlightenment?' 1 His reply was categorical: the Enlightenment is humankind's emergence from its minority

And yet, is it not clear that these demands of maturity, seriousness and responsibility come with a surreptitious expectation of obedience, bondage and submission?

Was it not this majoritarian terrorism that Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari fought against throughout their work and revealed as the standard of the white-rationalist-urban-European-consumerist-male, that figure who, despite being far from the numerical majority of the planet's population, imposes itself everywhere as a measure, in philosophy or in the media, in politics or in the clinic, in economics or aesthetics?

The schizoid, the nomadic and the deterritorialised are all ways of escaping the hegemony of this pattern

Deleuze replied with great irreverence to Antonio Negri's question about winning the majority: how to win the majority is a totally secondary problem in relation to the advances of the imperceptible.4 Against a rational, communicative, humanist majority; against a desire to become the majority, Deleuze and Guattari proposed not the dependent minority criticised by Kant, but a myriad of minor becomings, short circuits, slippages, lines of escape and detours.

The object of clairvoyance is reality itself, a dimension of reality where its empirical contours are extrapolated in order to better grasp its potential, entirely real albeit not yet unfolded. Like Samuel Beckett's exhausted insomniac, what the fortune teller sees are intensities — not the future, the dream, the ideal, or the perfect project, but forces in the process of redesigning reality. 5

the abduction of the commons.

Within this context, wealth and influence represented an assault upon the conditions of contemporary cognitive production, which increasingly requires free sharing of the commons

But what represents a veritable assault is the expropriation of the commons: the attack and systematic impoverishment of the source and very material of the contemporary — communal life.

Recently, Maurizio Lazzarato....

What is always at stake for Deligny is not the Whole, but the rest. In 1948, Catalan psychiatrist François Tosquelles wrote a strange medical thesis titled Le vécu de la fin du monde dans la folie: Le témoignage de Gérard de Nerval (Experience of the End of the World in Madness: The Testimony of Gérard de Nerval). 9

'To be contemporary means in this sense to return to a present where we have never been.' 12 But a greater obstacle haunts us: the frenzy of the future. As Straub emphasises, 'the present time, stolen from us in the name of progress, is going by and is irreplaceable ...that they are ransacking human feelings like they ransack the planet ... that the price people must pay, whether for progress or well-being is far too high, unjustifiable.'13 Hence, his curious concept of the political film: 'Militant films trap people into emergency again. And we are in an emergency situation: it's the outcome of the system that invented gas chambers.' 14

Another dimension of time is necessary — one that is not expressed by urgency.

Chronos — time as measurement, the fixing of things and people, the development of a form and direction — there is another time, Aion :

outpouring of forked, non-metric, non-vibrating, fluctuating time we sometimes see in psychosis, in dreams, in catastrophes, in large and in microscopic ruptures, whether collective or individual.

The time is out of joint!!! How to conceive a time free of movement, returned to itself, therefore unplanned, non-directed

time cease to be circular or linear in order to open itself up as a multidirec-tional plurality, a temporal rhizome or Borgesian proliferation. If that which some call 'hypertime'

We do not yet know which becomings move through us nowadays; or in which directions we perceive (only barely) what they leave behind — the sheds skins that we regard with some astonishment, scarcely imagining that was us yesterday. I am talking about doctrines, modes of organisation, political representation, ways of life, ways of thinking, ways of being

the contemporary context, given its complexity, elicits more oblique, diagonal, hybrid and floating positions. Other lines of conflict emerge. In politics and culture, this may lead to a revision of the function of negativity itself. According to Negri:

In modernity, resistance is an accumulation of forces against exploitation that come to be given a subjective determination through a prise de conscience. In postmodernity, none of all this. Resistance appears as a diffusion of singular behaviours of resistance. If resistance accumulates, it accumulates extensively, in circulation, mobility, flight, exodus, desertion ... the sense of rebellion is endemic. [...] Rebellion is neither a punctual event nor is it uniform; on the contrary, it traverses the expanse of the common and diffuses itself in the shape of an explosion of behaviours of singularities that it is impossible to contain. 16

we find ourselves subverted, taken in movements of de-subjectivation that announce other possibilities of non-majoritarian existence.

Think of the assistants, subalterns and unfinished beings that circulate in Kafka's worlds as messengers — of the crucial role they play, even if they remain inconspicuous. In a conversation with his friend Max Brod about contemporary Europe and the decadence of humanity, Kafka comments: 'We are nihilistic thoughts, suicidal thoughts that come into God's head.' Brod thinks of the gnostic world, of a perverse God and culpability, but Kafka smiles and replies: 'Oh no, our world is just a bad mood of God, a bad day of his.' To which Brod asks: 'Then there is hope outside this manifestation of the world that we know?' And Kafka contends: 'Oh, plenty of hope, an infinite amount of hope — but not for us.' 17

the hope is in those unfinished beings whose ambition was 'to use up as little space as possible

But that which Benjamin, and sometimes Kafka, call 'salvation', Deleuze and Guattari call 'escape'. It is not about freedom, they insist, but about taking flight.19

How many styles or genres or literary movements, even very small ones, have only one single dream: to assume a major function in language, to offer themselves as a sort of state language, an official language ... Create the opposite dream: know how to create a becoming-minor. 20

In Deleuze and Guattari, however, this attempt to formulate and learn processes of becoming-minor spans the most diverse fields: science, urbanism, architecture, anthropology, even politics. Yet, in Deleuze, the people — understood as the becoming-minor or becoming-people — is a people still to come. Above all, 'this people and earth will not be found in our democracies. Democracies are majorities, but a becoming is by its nature that which always eludes the majority.' 21 Representative democracy, the rule of the majority, conflicts, the big political theatre... For how long will we live under the sign of this dramatisation, which becomes more and more intolerable every day? The Deleuzian definition of the people implies that becoming-minor is a prerogative of all and each of us, and not of any one minority: 'Everybody's caught, one way or another, in a minority becoming that would lead them into unknown paths if they opted to follow it through.' 22

Perhaps being contemporary, in its critical dimension, entails going through this narrow pass.

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The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture

edited by Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal

Cornell University Press, 468 pp.

(#) Parentheses indicate footnote number

TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY RUSSIA IS RICHLY EXPLORED IN THIS collection of fifteen far-ranging essays. As now, it was a time of a great explosion of knowledge in many areas: scientific, medical, technical—and the occult. But, as Gurdjieff told his groups then, "People of Western culture put great value on the level of a man's knowledge but they do not value the level of a man's being and are not ashamed of the low level of their own being. They do not even understand what it means. ... If knowledge gets far ahead of being, it becomes theoretical and abstract and inapplicable to life, or actually harmful...brings new troubles and calamities which were not there before."(1)

The late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries in western Europe and in Russia were periods of great political and social upheaval. The occult came into vogue, flourishing in the spiritual emptiness left by nineteenth-century industrialization, materialism, rationalism, and positivism,(2) as well as in the lack of fulfillment people felt in institutionalized religion. Political events in Russia heightened this trend, and the occult played a strong role in prerevolutionary Russian culture.

Artists, writers, poets, philosophers, lay theologians, psychologists—all were drawn to and explored (and mined) the occult, beginning with the French occult revival of alchemy, the Kabbalah, and magic. Educated Europeans of the time read French, as Paris was the cultural capital of the West, and Russians followed the trends set there (crows trying to be peacocks, as

Gurdjieff explains (3)). Also popular were the new occult doctrines of Spiritualism, Theosophy, and Anthroposophy. The doctrine of Spiritualism (that the dead continue to exist and specially gifted mediums can communicate with them), its huge popularity cutting across all classes, entered into the highest circles in the royal courts of England, Germany, and Russia. Theosophy and Anthroposophy, appealing to the intelligentsia, were both eclectic attempts to reconcile science and religion. Russians combined these new doctrines with occult beliefs and practices indigenous to Russia, such as shamanism, and the apocalypticism and messianism that were part of their cultural heritage.

Also playing a strong role was Satanism, as Kristi A. Groberg shows in "The Shade of Lucifer's Dark Wing." She recounts how Symbolism, the dominant aesthetic of Russia's so-called Silver Age, basing itself on the occult idea of correspondences and using subtle suggestions and subliminal associations, was the main carrier of this idea. Says Groberg, 'The Symbolists' rebellious 'underground' Satanism was a way to reject society's values, but it was also an excuse for exciting and unusual forms of self-indulgence." In the opinion of one observer, "such extreme self-affirmation was, plain and simple, the demonic 'wish to be gods.'" The Goth lifestyle of present times seems too direct a correspondence. Let's hope the same societal end is not presaged.

The Spiritual Becomes Materialized

While most Russians attracted to the occult were apolitical and felt alienated from the existing political order, many occultists fell in with political activists, united in their opposition to the czarist rulers of the time. Once in power, the Bolsheviks, and later the Soviets, took the occult into their political culture, with the influence continuing on into the Stalin era. The Bolsheviks "adapted occult ideas, symbols, and techniques to political propaganda. ...Stalinist political culture treated Stalin as a master magician and recycled the occult conspiracy theories of the prerevolutionary right."(4)

The idea of secular progress had been brought into the occult in the 16th century, during the Renaissance, by Paracelsus, the Swiss-born, German occultist and physician. In late imperial Russia, as demonstrated in "Fedorov's Transformations of the Occult" by George M. Young Jr.,(5) Nikolai Fedorov (1828/29-1903) transformed or "Fedorivized" the occult, greatly influencing Russian and Soviet culture through his admirers, among them Tolstoy, Dostoevsky

and Gorky.(6) Fedorov's theme was the literal, physical resurrection of all the dead to life, "not only as cientific possibility but a moral duty...to be accomplished by human ingenuity and effort." Science should turn its aim to creating a world that could accommodate this vast population. In advocating genetic engineering, the colonization of space (so all the resurrected dead would have a place to live), solar energy, climate control, irrigating Arabia with Arctic icebergs, cloning, prosthetic organs, prolonging human life, and improving human health until immortality is universal, Fedorov "set the agenda for Soviet science."(7) (We might say, for modern science as well.) Besides taking the occult solidly into the material, Fedorov took ideas at will, citing no sources for them, as he believed ideas should be common property and belonged to no individual.

Fedorov located the ancient source of lost power and knowledge in the Pamirs, not Atlantis. According to Young, it was "long after Fedorov, [that] George Gurdjieff (who probably did not know Fedorov's work) set much of his Meetings with Remarkable Men in this very region."(8) Believing the desolate Pamirs to be the lost Garden of Eden, Fedorov's goals included an Anglo-Russian archaeological expedition to the Pamirs to, among other things, reclaim the wasteland and restore the Garden. Although his remedies were often extreme, one of Fedorov's more interesting beliefs was that humanity was creating worldwide a debauched playground, which he called "pornocracy." His ideas live on today in Russian Cosmism, which is an anthropocentric philosophy and cosmology popular in Russia. Based on the idea of microcosm and macrocosm, it also contains elements of UFOs and the like. Michael Hagemeister, describing this eclectic movement in, "Russian Cosmism in the 1920s and Today," notes that "cosmism's underlying belief in the omnipotence of science and technology is rooted in the idea of the magic power of (occult) knowledge."

Psychology's Occult Origins

That astrology is the source of astronomy, and alchemy of chemistry, is well-known. However, it is not generally recognized that modern psychology grew out of the occult, investigating subjects associated with the occult such as hypnosis, mental telepathy, and the interpretation of dreams.(9)Hypnosis and thought transfer became subjects of study for the psychologists in the early part of the century. Occult ideas were discussed and researched in positivistic, scientific terms. Today, the occult and psychology have blended—modern occultism has a psychological orientation.

As described in "The Magic of Words: Symbolism, Futurism, Socialist Realism" by Irina Gutkin, the Symbolists looked to the occult for ways to attain immortality, to transcend time and space. They felt themselves, like magicians, to be on a higher plane than others, the Symbolist being the "possessor of a secret knowledge behind which stands a secret act" [symbols being the communicative units of a new language], "but he looks at this secret, which only later turns out to be universal, as his own."(10) [emphasis added] Once owned, that knowledge becomes a material to be used by anyone, including despots.

In Stalin's time, the official aesthetic of Socialist Realism, in which the arts were to regulate the psychological processes of the masses, systematized and incorporated these techniques. At Party congresses, for instance, it was standard practice to chant the Supreme Leader's name or a slogan such as "Lenin lived, Lenin lives, Lenin will live!" These rituals, suggesting the casting of a magic spell or the invocation of the gods, had the effect of hypnotizing the audience and inducing ecstatic frenzy.(11) Rebellious, and aiming to not repeat the errors of the previous generation, each generation creates its own errors.

Present-day Interest in the Spiritual

Although in every age there are people who are interested in the occult, as a popular phenomenon occultism occurs during periods of political, cultural, and social upheaval, when the resultant confusion evokes renewed interest in a spiritual quest. Not surprisingly then, there is today a revival of the occult in Russia, with the same doctrines circulating once again, as Holly DeNio Stephens details in "The Occult in Russia Today." She tells of a great interest in the ideas of Gurdjieff and "his disciple" Ouspensky. (In all other essays, Gurdjieff and Ouspensky are put on the same level—Ouspensky was an "associate of Gurdjieff"; they developed "two new occult systems," involving "Oriental religions and yogic practices.") Ten years ago in Russia their names were known only to those interested in philosophy or the occult; today, they are recognized by everyone. And their teachings "have become a way of life for many people. ...Russians are actively seeking to learn more about these men, and to understand their ideas." Would that they, as might we all, learn from the mistakes of this century.

Notes

(1)In Search of the Miraculous, p. 65.

(2) Positivism emphasizes facts, empirical research, and methodology.

(3) Chapter XXXIV, "Russia," in All and Everything, First Series.

(4) The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture, pp.1-2

(5) For a more detailed study of Fedorov, see George Young Jr.'s, Nikolai Fedorov: An Introduction (Belmont, Mass. 1979) and "Toward the New Millennium: Ideas of Resurrection in Fedorov and Solver," in Russian Thought after Communism: The Recovery of a Philosophical Heritage, edited by James P. Scanlan (Armonk, New York, 1994).

(6) Gorky, while disowning it, was interested in the occult, particularly thought transference and hypnotic suggestion, which "promised great power to influence public opinion." Chapter Eleven, Mikhail Agursky's "An Occult Source of Socialist Realism: Gorky and Theories of Thought Transference," pp. 247-272.

(7) Ibid, p. 11.

(8) Ibid, p.182. Apparently regarding Gurdjieff's book as only a fable, this is a spectacular instance of seeing things topsy-turvy.

(9) This of course was the title of Freud's first major work, The Interpretation of Dreams, in which he remarked on "the brilliant mystic Du Prel," a German Spiritualist. In her introduction, Ms. Rosenthal cites a number of references that establish the links between the occult and modern psychology.

(10) Ibid, p. 226.

(11) When these same practices became a part of American politics would be interesting to know.

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Pure Language 2.0: Walter Benjamin's Theory of Language and Translation Technology

Mathelinda Nabugodi

Walter Benjamin once proposed that the "history of every art form has critical periods in which

the particular form strains after effects which can be easily achieved only with a changed technical standard–that is, a new art form." ("The Work of Art" 118). Technological innovation does not simply improve on existing art forms, but is capable of generating new art forms by offering new media for artistic creation. But before he starting thinking about art forms and technology, Benjamin was thinking about art forms and language. His 1921 essay "The Task of the Translator" is an attempt to conceive of translation as a form of art; an art form, moreover, whose unique concern is what happens when one language passes into another. "Translation is a form" is the founding premise of Benjamin's essay (254), by which he means to say that translation is form of artistic writing alongside poetry rather than as econdary derivative of literary art. If we merge Benjamin's contention that translation is an art form with his later argument that the history of art forms cannot be separated from the technical standards of their time, the question arises whether the introduction of machine translation, a radically changed technical standard for the practice of translation, creates what is, in effect, a new linguistic art form.

"The Task of the Translator" opens with a discussion of "the appreciation of a work of art or an art form" (253). Benjamin's main argument is that the appreciation of art does not rest on interpreting its content to derive a moral or lesson from it. Art is not primarily about communication: "No poem is intended for the reader, no picture for the beholder, no symphony for the audience" ("The Task" 253). While art is clearly meaningful for the person enjoying it, its primary intention is not to inform, instruct, or even delight this person. Only after this overture into non-intentional aesthetics do we encounter translation proper: "If the original does not exist for the reader's sake, how could the translation be understood on the basis of this premise?" (Benjamin, "The Task" 254). The counterintuitive argument that the translation does not exist for the sake of the reader who does not read the original language is Benjamin's first step in establishing translation as an art in its own right. His second step is an exploration of the repercussions that viewing translation as an art has for our conception of the translator–whose task Benjamin is out to define: "Just as translation is a form of its own, so, too, may the task of the translator be regarded as distinct and clearly differentiated from the task of the poet" ("The Task" 258). More or less all previous theorization of this task has been directed towards establishing how the translator best communicates the original's meaning in the receiving language, be it word-for-word or sense-for-sense; this is, in Benjamin's eyes, a futile procedure whose best possible outcome is the "inaccurate transmission of an inessential content" ("The Task" 253). Translation should not seek to communicate the meaning of the original because the communication of its content is not in the least essential to our appreciation of it.

Therefore, no translator needs to concern himself very much with what the original means, or

so Benjamin claims. Rather the translator's work should "ultimately serve the purpose of expressing the innermost relationship of languages to one another" (Benjamin, "The Task" 255). Benjamin also terms this a "suprahistorial relationship between languages" that consists in the fact that "in every one of them as a whole, one and the same thing is meant. Yet this one thing is achievable not by any single language but only by the totality of their intentions supplementing one another: the pure language" ("The Task" 257). Benjamin's famous concept of "pure language" invokes an amalgam of all the languages of the world, and it is precisely this aggregate language that is the medium in which the translator should work. The relationship between languages can naturally never be experienced in a single language, and it is precisely for this reason that translation, which passes "from one language into another through a continuum of transformations" (Benjamin, "On Language" 70), is uniquely situated to reveals this relationship. But, of course, no translator can possibly be expected to tackle all the languages of the world in a single work of translation and in practical terms the task of the translator is somewhat provisional: he or she only marks the intersection of two languages in the vast linguistic mass which is the sum total of all languages, the pure language.

It is here that modern computing enters the picture—the introduction of computer memory suddenly makes the grand goal of placing all the world's languages in a single continuum much more practically viable. After all, computer memory can achieve that which no single human can, namely to store and retrieve previously unimaginable masses of linguistic information in multiple languages. Could we not see these linguistic databases as a technological approximation of pure language, made possible by the massive memory capacity of modern computing? And furthermore, since online translation tools use precisely these vast stores of linguistic material in order to produce translations—does this not imply that online translations are quite literally powered by pure language? Certainly the ideal that many translation programmers work towards is to make all the world's languages mutually translatable at the click of a button, thereby technologically overcoming the curse of Babel that necessitates translation in the first place.

To clarify the relationship between languages encapsulated in pure language, Benjamin introduces a distinction between what is meant, das Gemeinte, and the manner of meaning it, Art des Meinens. In Benjamin's own example the French word pain and the German word Brot are two manners of meaning bread: they are merely different ways to denote the same object—bread.

The three words pain, Brot, and bread are thus all related in the sphere of pure language because they all mean "one and the same thing," even if they mean it in different manners. The various words of the world's different languages show the myriad ways in which the same thing may be meant and the translator should seek to show in his own language the manner in which other languages mean (Benjamin, "The Task" 261). In other words, the translator should not simply translate the words pain or Brot as bread, but show that bread means differently in French and German. For instance, the German word Brot incorporates the shorter word rot—meaning the colour red. This is mirrored in the sound of the English bread that likewise rhymes with the colour red. Such a relationship between bread and redness is, however, wholly absent in the French equivalents pain and rouge. This may appear nonsensical, because we do not think of red as related to bread—except that sometimes we do, for instance when reading Charles Reznikoff's poem "The bread has become moldy:"

The bread has become moldy

and the dates blown down by the wind;

the iron has slipped from the helve.

The wool was to be dyed red

but the dyer dyed it black.

The dead woman has forgotten her comb

and tube of eye-paint;

the dead cobbler has forgotten his knife,

the dead butcher his chopper,

and the dead carpenter his adze.

The "bread" of the first line echoes in the "red" of the fourth line, whereas the allusion to dyeing wool anticipates the dying, or indeed the four already dead who populate the second stanza: woman, cobbler, butcher, carpenter. Dyed red, died red, dead. But also dyed black, which is, of

course, the colour of death, and perhaps also the colour (dye) of the eye-paint that the dead woman has forgotten. Perhaps Reznikoff is also alluding to the superstition that the person who places shoes on a table (as cobblers do) risks death to a family member, the butcher of course more explicitly deals with death in his vocation, whereas the carpenter may well use his adze to manufacture coffins. The sonic metamorphosis from moulding bread to red to dead is clearly central to the poem's thematic development of death and decay: Reznikoff consciously employs the manner of meaning—the relations between bread and red, dyed and dead—in the English words that he selects for his poem. Benjamin sought to expand this characteristically poetic mode of attending to the manner of how words mean to encompass translation as well. It follows that for him the form, Art des Meinens, is more important in translation than the content, das Gemeinte, because it is the manner of meaning that is unique to that other language, whereas what is meant is ultimately the same in all languages. The translation, then, should reveal not what the original is about, but its manner of meaning.

"A real translation is transparent; it does not cover the original, does not block its light, but allows the pure language, as though reinforced by its own medium, to shine upon the original all the more fully" (Benjamin, "The Task" 260). This transparency not only reveals in the receiving language how the foreign language means, but also, conversely, underlines the unique manner of meaning found in the original. The only hands-on advice that Benjamin offers in the entire essay is that the desired transparency of translation "may be achieved, above all, by a literal rendering of the syntax which proves words rather than sentences to be the primary element of the translator. For if the sentence is the wall before the language of the original, literalness is the arcade" ("The Task" 260). The sentence, with its linear progression of words that builds up into a meaningful utterance, is the non-essential and hence obstructing element in the work of a translator. In reading a sentence we are drawn to what it communicates at the expense of the manner in which it means, its construction as it were. To fulfil the task of translation, one must disregard what the foreign text is about, and instead decompose its sentences into their building blocks, words and grammatical relations, and then transfer these relations—these foreign manners of meaning—into one's own language through a literal rendition of the syntax.

It is here that translation engines come into their own: they are as excellent at literalism as they are bad at communicative interpretation—in machine translation the meaning-laden significance of the literary text is lost and the text becomes nothing more than a task to resolve. In generating a translation, the online engine, unlike the human translator, approaches the original language merely as form, a code to be decoded and recoded (in fact, machine translation arose out of the code-cracking technology used during the Second World War). While the human translator has to struggle against the hermeneutic imperative to interpret what he reads, the

machine goes straight for the syntactical relations between words, finds their dictionary equivalents and jumbles together a sentence that is, more often than not, heavily indebted to the word order of the original language. This approach prioritises the meanings of individual words over sentences or phrases–which also explains the clunky and unidiomatic nature of such translations. (However, in recent years, Google's translation engineers have pioneered a wholly statistical approach to online translation that makes do without dictionary definitions and relies solely on the size of Google's database of linguistic samples.) Incapable of operationalizing the reader's understanding of what the original would communicate, machine translation truly lets meaning plunge "from abyss to abyss until it threatens to become lost in the bottomless depths of language" as Benjamin approvingly says of Hölderlin–the only translator whose work he unreservedly embraces in his translation essay (262).

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Hölderlin's translation practice–that perhaps not wholly fortuitously sought to counter enthusiasm in art with a strict concept of mechane–seems to anticipate "the world according to Babelfish, a place where meaning sometimes seems to show up only by coincidence, and information frequently declines to show its face at all." The words are Julian Dibbell's and come from his blog post "After Babelfish," where Dibbell invokes the spirit of Benjamin's theory of translation to assert that "we certainly can say that where, throughout its history, translation has veered between the two extremes of license and literalism, seeking at its best a middling compromise, Babelfish manages the unprecedented feat of attaining both extremes simultaneously. As an algorithmic process it is rigidly literal, with not a single degree of freedom in it, and yet in its effects it wanders wildly adrift of its original text." In accordance with Benjamin's dictum about the literal rendition of the syntax, it is precisely by staying senselessly faithful to the syntax and the individual words of the original that the translation engine plunges us into the depths of language where meaning is lost: "In this pure language–which no longer means or expresses anything but is, as expressionless and creative Word, that which is meant in all languages–all information, all sense, and all intention finally encounters a stratum in which they are destined to be extinguished" (Benjamin, "The Task" 261). Benjamin describes this extinction of meaning in celebratory terms as an "emancipation" from the communicative, non-essential aspects of language: only when language no longer communicates is it purely language.

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Dibbell was one of the first people (if not the first) to recognise the elective affinity between Babelfish and Benjamin's theory of translation. To illustrate his argument, Dibbell uses the Babelfish translation engine to translate a poem by William Butler Yeats back and forth into Portuguese until it stops altering. Having let the machine "settle into a final draft" he then compares it to the experimental writing of Mallarmé, Khlebnikov, the Dadaists, Surrealists and

William Burroughs, with rather unfavourable results: "Babelfish makes even the hard core of the literary avant-garde look tepid and palely meaningful." So Dibbell. Yet in "Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia" Benjamin also has something to say of the members of the "literary avant-garde" that Dibbell dismisses as tepid in comparison to Babelfish translations. In their works, Benjamin writes, "language seemed itself only where sound and image, image and sound, interpenetrated with automatic precision and such felicity that no chink was left for the penny-in-the-slot called 'meaning'" ("Surrealism" 208). Of course, the poet's task is different from the translator's, yet both of them are obliged to use language so that it no longer communicates meaning. And if Benjamin commends Dadaist poetry for employing "automatic precision" to create a "'word-salad'" containing ... every imaginable kind of linguistic refuse" ("The Work of Art" 119), then why should a translation be condemned for doing the same?

Dibbell translates his poem back and forth until the translation stops altering. A comparable idea has been conceived by the creators of the webpage www.translationparty.com. Its raison d'être is to translate English sentences back and forth into Japanese until "equilibrium" is reached. The concept of equilibrium is fairly unheard of in traditional translation theory, which conventionally agonises about various degrees of equivalence (a concept that Benjamin emphatically rejected). In fact, equilibrium only makes sense as a concept when one has access to the kind of instant, constantly altering, back-and-forth translation that only machines can provide. "Equilibrium," in this sense, is digital to the core. As the translations between Japanese and English appear in front of the viewer's eyes, meaning is visibly being extinguished with every back-translation until the engine hits upon a sentence that does not change in its back-translation. The process of the two languages being brought into equilibrium, made to touch and inflect one another, is made visually manifest and often with poetically evocative outcomes. For instance, the first three lines of Reznikoff's poem, that already in the original effuse a haiku-like simplicity ("The bread has become moldy / and the dates blown down by the wind; / the iron has slipped from the helve"), is pared down to a sparse imperative: "Bread mouldy. Has become. Reduce the Helve iron wind."

Matthew Battles has written a fictional report, "I After the Cloudy Doubly Beautifully," on the discovery of an Übersetzungsmaschine in the heavy suitcase that Benjamin was carrying on his fateful attempt to cross the French-Spanish border. Inspired by Dibbell's piece, Battles develops the idea that Benjamin's translation theory lends itself to machine translation. However, not content with translating back and forth between a language pair, he takes a psalm by Milton on a tour through all the languages covered by the machine: "English to French to German to Portuguese to Spanish and back home to English." The result is acutely unreadable: the psalms opening sentence "Bless'd is the man who hath not walk'd astray / In counsel of the wicked, and

ith' way / Of sinners hath not stood, and in the seat / Of scorners hath not sate" is transformed into "Bless ' d é human beings, em avocats that moinhos you conseils misdirected ' athd não véem or bad and do ith ' do innershath não caught and not scorners hath do assento, em ordem for não to satisfer itself." Nonetheless, the procedure is clearly ambitious: Battles does not rest satisfied with letting two languages pass through one another, but aims to encompass a greater chunk of the totality of languages that Benjamin termed "pure language" than any merely bi-lingual translation can ever hope to do.

This may be a somewhat flippant way of approaching Benjamin's theory of translation and it would be easy to argue that the examples I have given you are mere surface similarities that have nothing substantial to say about Benjamin's thought or about the art of translation. The first and foremost reason for this may be found already in the opening paragraph of Benjamin's essay that dismisses the communicative element in art. Communication is, on the other hand, the primary (profit) motive behind machine translation. Prominent machine translation scientist Franz Josef Och, who is also the creator and head of Google translate, emphasises precisely the spread of information as the main goal of his research. In an interview from 2010 he says: "The language barrier is really a very big problem for communication. ... The idea is, can we with the help of technology and machine translation—can we break down the language barrier? So that anyone can access any information—any text out there—independent of the language" (Sarno). It is precisely the communication of information that Benjamin saw as the "inaccurate transmission of an inessential content" ("The Task" 253).

Och's statement may well indicate the dividing line between the art of translation and machine translation, at least in terms of Benjamin's theory. Of course, we may disregard the intentions of Google translate's creator, just as we disregard those of the literary author in analysing his work. However, it is not wholly gratuitous that the figure of the creator appears here—even if we accept that Babelfish and Google translate may, against the intentions of their programmers, be capable of producing avant-garde translations, the reason why we do not consider these to be works of art may reside in the fact that they are not intentionally created. The crucial difference between Hölderlin's Sophocles translation and a version by Babelfish is found in the abyss that separates one of the most skilled artists of the German language and a code-breaking machine, no matter how sophisticated. The fact that a poem is created, that every word is deliberately and carefully chosen, is perhaps the most decisive characteristic of poetry. On the other hand, recalling the 19th century arguments that photography could never become an art because a technological apparatus had replaced the hand holding the brush, may suggest that it is premature to dismiss the creative potential of translation machines just because no person does the actual translating. It may seem implausible to think of a poet who will write texts

deliberately for processing on online translation engines or texts that employ such translation as part of their genesis—but this is in fact what Battles has done as "I After the Cloudy Doubly Beautifully" is now included in his published short story collection The Sovereignties of Invention. Just as today's painters cannot ignore the existence of photography, so today's literary translators may do well to keep online translation engines in mind when working at their task.

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Comments are closed.

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http://www.anthonyblake.co.uk/BeelzebubIndividuals.html

Further observing the conditions of life on the Earth he noticed that the average duration of human life was steadily diminishing. To investigate this phenomenon he made a fifth descent, this time to Babylon. While in Babylon he found the learned beings of the time occupied with

the burning question of whether man had a soul or not. At that time, all kinds of confusions concerning human possibilities and morality were rampant. He made the acquaintance of a sympathetic learned being, Hamolinadir, and was present when this being abandoned the superficial reasoning current at the time.

Beelzebub also came across the Society for Adherents of Legominism and much enjoyed their Saturday performances of the time theatre. This society had been founded by Pythagoras and Kanil-El-Norkel, who happened to meet in Babylon, and became a society devoted to the transmission of real knowledge to future generations.

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[redacted]https://larvalsubjects.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/interior-nature-plant-art-design-architecture-living-room.jpg

Mel Y. Chen's Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect

http://darkecologies.com/2014/04/12/levi-r-bryant-first-impressions-on-onto-cartagraphy/

Andre Gunder Frank*S* amir Amin

De-linking

Of course, this is not just a project for activists in the North - far from it. The theory for which Amin is most famous that of 'de-linking'.

De-linking means countries of the periphery withdrawing from their exploitative integration in the global economy. In a sense it is de-globalisation, but it is not a form of economic isolation - something which African socialist leaders too readily fell into. Rather it means not engaging in economic relationships from a point of weakness.

Amin argues that Southern countries should develop their economy through various forms of state intervention, control of money flowing in an out of their financial sectors and promoting trading with other Southern countries. Countries must nationalise financial sectors, strongly regulate natural resources, 'de-link' internal prices from the world market, and free themselves from control by international institutions like the World Trade Organisation. Whatever problems come with nationalised industries, it is the only possible basis for a genuinely socially controlled economy going forward.

After 30 years of being told that their problems would be solved by exporting more, privatising their natural resources and liberalising their financial sectors, many developing countries would today do well to heed Amin's advice. Instead, too many countries have bought into a de-politicised narrative which posits ideologically loaded terms like 'good governance', 'poverty' and 'civil society' carefully disguising questions as to how poverty happened, what interests governance serves, or the legitimacy of organisations claiming to speak on behalf of the dispossessed.

Amin does not believes that the 'rise' of China, India and other emerging economies has in any way broken the power of the oligopolies, in fact that power has only become more concentrated. But there have been important changes. Imperialist powers have realised competition between themselves is not helpful and have created a sort of collective imperialism which is expressed through institutions like the WTO and IMF.

Capitalism, 'a parenthesis in history'

Capitalism is experiencing a profound long-term crisis to which Amin believes it has no solution short of political barbarism. He describes this form of capitalism as 'senile'.

This crisis is characterised by an increased dependence on finance, which means less and less money is being made from productive activities, and more from simple 'rent'.

————>>>>>It is a far more direct means of stealing wealth from the majority of the world. The accompanying form of politics means that democracy has been reduced to a farce in which people are spectators in an elite drama - that is when they're not fulfilling their proper role of consuming.

————->>>>>>>Capitalism necessarily requires an ongoing process of dispossession so that it can accumulate and continue to expand. Capitalism could not have developed without the European conquest of the world - the availability so many 'spare' resources was vital. The safety value for many of those dispossessed from European land was the 'new world' which allowed mass emigration - though of course others died in droves, witness the Irish potato famine.

So as much as many of the dispossessed might aspire to the lives of those in advanced capitalist countries, it is simply not possible. Nor can traditional Marxists be correct when they say capitalism is a necessary stage on the path to socialism - a view which Amin describes as 'Eurocentric'.

Industry cannot incorporate more than a small fraction of humanity, but it does require the resources that that humanity depends upon. So the only way that capitalism can move forward is through the creation of a 'slum planet' - a sort of 'apartheid at the world level'. Amin sees the dispossession of the peasantry across the peripheral countries will become the central issue of the twenty-first century.

This is one reason why Amin see the role of the peasantry in the South – almost half of humanity after all – as key to determining the future. The strength of movements around food sovereignty, against land grabbing and supporting the rights of indigenous peoples, give support to this theory. But for Amin, agriculture is not merely a big opportunity, the existence of the peasantry presents capitalism with an insurmountable challenge.

Amin believes the road to socialism depends on reversing this trend of dispossession meaning, at national and regional levels, protecting local agricultural production, ensuring countries' have food sovereignty and de-linking internal prices from world commodity markets. This would stop the dispossession of peasants and their exodus into the towns.

Only this revolution in the way the land is seen, treated and access can lay the basis for a new society. This also means ditching the idea of 'growth' as it is spoken about today and by which all world economies are judged, which really benefits only a minority of the world population. The rest of humanity is "abandoned to stagnation, if not pauperisation".

The long road to socialism

Perhaps this makes Samir Amin sounds rather idealistic in his approach, but this is far from true. Amin explicitly rejects the idea of a '24 hour revolution' - a single insurrectionary act which ushers in a period of socialism. Indeed he accepts there may well be a need to use private, even international capital, in order to diversify Southern economies. The important thing is control. For this reason Amin also refuses to use the phrase "socialism of the 21st century" focussing on the need for "the long route of the transition to socialism".

But that's not to say there have not been significant victories. Interestingly, Amin is less interested in developments in Latin America, which he believes contain risks of repeating the mistakes of many national liberation movements on the 1950s and 60s in becoming a form of "popular statism".

Amin is more interested in Nepal as an possible future model to look towards. He also sees the Chinese revolution as an incredibly significant event in directly challenging the basis of capitalism and in the struggle for democratic socialism, most especially in its "abolition of the private property of land" and the formation of powerful communes and collectives.

Amin's somewhat romantic view of the Chinese revolution is certainly challenging to Western sensibilities, but his underlying view that the formation of democracy must go beyond a narrow political project, and that peasants - and especially women - through collective organisations, might be better placed than Western individualists to define a really progressive vision of democracy needs to be properly taken on board by activists.

Enlightenment

Perhaps Amin's central thesis is somewhat obvious, but it's often forgotten - that a true revolution must be based on those who are being dispossessed and impoverished. But he goes further in undermining the assumption that any thinking emerging from the South will lack enlightenment, or that a lack of enlightenment should be excused.

He believes the Enlightenment was humanity's first step towards democracy, liberating us from the idea that God created our activity. He has caused controversy in his utter rejection of political Islam. This ideology, embedded for example in Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, obscures the real nature of society, including by playing into the idea that the world consists of different cultural groups which conflict with each other, an idea which helps the centre control the peripheries.

Amin's view is that organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood, with their cultural and economic conservatism, are actually viewed positively by the US and other imperialist governments. And he doesn't limit his critique to Islam either, launching similar criticism on political Hinduism practiced by the BJP in India and Political Buddhism, expressed through the Dalai Lama.

Creative Marxism

Samir Amin decribes himself as a 'creative Marxist' - "to begin from Marx but not to end with him or with Lenin or Mao" - which incorporates all manner of critical ways of thinking even ones "which were wrongly considered to be 'alien' by the dogmas of the historical Marxism of the past."

These views are surely more relevant today than when Amin started writing. A creative Marxism takes proper account of the perspective and aspirations of the truly dispossessed in the world, break out of historical dogmas and rejects attempts to stick together a broken model, but equally sees the impossibility of overthrowing this model tomorrow. Fortunately Amin seems more prolific than ever - and well worth the read.

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[redacted]Thus Spoke Zarathustra:

The soul is as mortal as the body. But the knot of causes in which I am entangled recurs and will create me again. I myself belong to the causes of the eternal recurrence. I come again, with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with this serpent - not to a new life or a better life or a similar life: I come back eternally to this same, selfsame life, in what is greatest and in what is smallest, to teach again the eternal recurrence of all things (Z: 3, "The Convalescent", 333).

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[redacted]

[redacted]Animacies Mel Chen

Published: 2012

Pages: 312

Illustrations: 20 illustrations

Sales/Territorial Rights: World

Series: Perverse Modernities: A Series Edited by Jack Halberstam and Lisa Lowe

investigates the blurry division between the living and the dead,

transgression of modern disciplinary categories

Description

In Animacies, Mel Y. Chen draws on recent debates about sexuality, race, and affect to examine how matter that is considered insensate, immobile, or deathly animates cultural lives. Toward that end, Chen investigates the blurry division between the living and the dead, or that which is beyond the human or animal. Within the field of linguistics, animacy has been described variously as a quality of agency, awareness, mobility, sentience, or liveness. Chen turns to cognitive linguistics to stress how language habitually differentiates the animate and the inanimate. Expanding this construct, Chen argues that animacy undergirds much that is pressing and indeed volatile in contemporary culture, from animal rights debates to biosecurity concerns.

Chen's book is the first to bring the concept of animacy together with queer of color scholarship, critical animal studies, and disability theory. Through analyses of dehumanizing insults, the meanings of queerness, animal protagonists in recent Asian/American art and film, the lead in toys panic in 2007, and the social lives of environmental illness, Animacies illuminates a hierarchical politics infused by race, sexuality, and ability. In this groundbreaking book, Chen rethinks the criteria governing agency and receptivity, health and toxicity, productivity and stillness—and demonstrates how attention to the affective charge of matter challenges commonsense orderings of the world.

About The Author(s)

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The Protagorean Presumption and the Posthuman (Part Two)

By Richard Iveson

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Okay, so here is the promised second part of the long draft of my paper dealing with Tom Tyler's CIFERAE and Vilem Flusser & Louis Bec's Vampyroteuthis Infernalis.

Part Two: The posthuman future: Eating Well

Belly Out! The movement of mouth and anus

As with Kant and his imaginary Venusians, Flusser must first of all separate the vampyroteuthis from "mere" animals and, moreover, must do so without contradicting his ideology of

evolutionary teleology which preserves the pinnacle of creation for humanity alone. Hence, Flusser notes right at the start that the skull capacity of the vampyroteuthis "exceeds our own" (5). In what is a dogmatic first move of human exceptionalism, this pseudo-scientific wielding of "skull capacity" already ensures that neither humans nor vampyroteuthis' might be mistaken for a mere animal.

Unlike Kant's Venusian, however, the vampyroteuthis is not unknowable. Indeed, for Flusser, if his analysis is to avoid the transcendental delusion and thus remain "in" the world of a "co-being," the vampyroteuthis cannot be "entirely alien to us" (5). A large part of this familiarity, it should be noted, concerns the construction and legitimation of the vampyroteuthis as as uitably "proper" (that is, non-animal) model of the human. Hence, the abyss between the vampyroteuthis and the human is "incomparably smaller than that which separates us from extraterrestrial life" (5). As the distance between the human and itself, this abyss is incomparably smaller, too, than that which for Flusser divides "we (humans)" from "we (animals)."

Nevertheless, if we are to remain within the world, the vampyroteuthis must evolve.

Sharing a common ancestor and thus a number of "deeply ingrained memories," "we" belong to the "same game" of life (6). Furthermore, their subsequent paths of evolution, in mirroring each other perfectly, thus constitute, supposedly each for the other, a compressed record of evolutionary suppression and sociopolitical repression. Here, then, the contours of "the human" are seen to emerge in contrast to an "outside," the construction of which presupposes the very knowledge of the human that it then claims to reveal. Put simply, despite plumbing the blackest ocean depths with its bone-crushing pressure, the vampyroteuthis – this "animal" who is not an animal – begins and ends with the (same) human.

Putting this aside for the moment, Flusser's tale of reflected evolution nonetheless offers a number of provocative observations ranging across a variety of disciplines. Firstly, in being composed entirely of superimposed suppressions, every "organism" is therefore an event of stratified memory. As such, and not a little paradoxically, "human personality" – for Flusser the experience common to the tēlos of creation itself – finds itself reduced to "muscle cramping and individual posture" (28).

This mirroring of stratified suppressions is no mere trope. Rather, the human and the vampyroteuthis have literally turned their faces away from each other. Arbitrarily taking as a starting point the horizontal axis of the cipherous "four-footed" animal, Flusser describes how the cephalopod turns ninety degrees clockwise, her face curling downwards, towards the anus. The human, by contrast, turns ninety degrees anticlockwise, her face moving upwards, away from the anus, until, ultimately, she stands erect, liberating her hands.

These mirrored trajectories reflect an evolutionary "choice" between mouth and anus, that is, between digestive system and nervous system – the proto-human "chose" the former, the proto-vampyroteuthis the latter. Later, the path of the vampyroteuthis diverges once again, refusing a potential future of exoskeletons, antennae, and multiple legs in favour of a downwards "migration" – towards the anus – of the sensory and tactile organs. "Cephalopods are, then, our antipodes: elevated intelligent abdomens, unelevated brains" (18).

Precisely because she is the antipode of the human, however, the vampyroteuthis must be similarly exceptional. Hence, in order to establish an abyssal distance between her and other, mere "animal" mollusks, Flusser writes how, in a way analogous but opposite to human beings, the vampyroteuthis "unwound its mollusk coil into a perpendicular line" (23). In other words, the vampyroteuthis has, like the human, "straightened up." Tellingly, for straightening in this way, Flusser awards the vampyroteuthis a hand or, at least, part of one: uncoiling, she becomes "an open palm, touching and absorbing the world to fill its elevated stomach" (23). Hence, with this movement hand and mouth become one. With these analogous hands, the one grasping and the other absorbing, both humans and vampyroteuthis' have, writes Flusser, surmounted their animality, estranged from earth and sky respectively (23).

Here, then, both the human and the vampyroteuthis have transcended evolution. At the same time, however, both are also the result of "the blind chance of the 'game of life'" (25). As "analogously alienated" from the animal realm, how might we understand this? Why the insistence upon a biological understanding of "analogy," when what defines the human and the vampyroteuthis is the fact they alone are "superbiological" beings? Despite their place at the summit of evolution, Flusser argues that humans and vampyroteuthis' are both "poorly programmed" beings whose analogy is entirely coincidental, that is, the utterly arbitrary result of blind chance (25).

Paradoxically, Flusser is thus attempting—somewhat desperately—to hold on to a reductive sociobiological "explanation" of "life" whilst simultaneously positing the human as an exceptional supra-biological being who has in some way transcended the "game of life." Moreover, it is precisely this alienation from "much of [biological] life's domain" that authorises its reflection in the figure of the vampyroteuthis—a figure similarly definable, in contrast to other animals, by its banishment from life. Both human and vampyroteuthis are, in other words, somehow the result of "life's" programming and thoroughlyunnatural beings defined by lack, that is, by their shared lack of life. Here, then, we disclose once more that age-old schema, that of the "original sin of human genesis, the difference that marks its manifest destiny" (Kirby "Human Exceptionalism on the Line").

Returning to consider their reflexive relations, Flusser follows Wilhelm Reich in arguing that there are in fact only two fundamental attitudes toward life, love, and war, attitudes dependent upon the mouth-anus relation. On one side, in bending backwards to distance mouth from anus, the human adopts a militant "chest out!" position, a position with a tendency towards rigor mortis and the armoured status of insects. On the other side, in bending forwards to bring mouth and anus closer together, the vampyroteuthis adopts the "belly out" position of the Buddha, a position tending towards love and selflessness and softness. The human, then, is militant and moribund, associated with death (thanatos), while the mollusk is libidinous, generous and soft-bodied, associated with love (eros).

At this point, however, Flusser takes Reich to task for failing to predict the emergence of the vampyroteuthis, understood as a further, "post-animal" stage of development. For Reich, the vampyroteuthis should represent the ultimate triumph of love over death. However, in taking a further step, the vampyroteuthis rejects the dialectical synthesis of mouth-anus and so, unfurling its palm in an explosive release of bioenergetic force, rejects "a state of total love in the direction of total death" and is thus a being that, "despite devouring its own anus, is the most bellicose of all living creatures" (29).

Eating Well: Shock and doubt

The body of the vampyroteuthis, we thus discover, is an open palm tending in the direction of total death. As the antipode of the bipedal human, it remains for Flusser to ask, given that a negative model (total death beyond total love) now exists, what does this "mean" for "our" (human) world? Ultimately, as we shall see, it opens up a vision of the human utopia as permanent orgasm. Flusser begins, however, by posing the question in specifically Heideggerian terms. Two models of Dasein, he claims, "extrapolated from the 'same' environment, have come crashing together: paradise and hell," and it is this which "provides the groundwork for a dialogue" (35). The point of contact of this dialogue, if that is indeed what it is, is between the hand and the tentacle; an analogy that in turn produces a wholeslew of analogous pairings.[i] Flusser embarks upon this dialogue by outlining what can be best described as an imaginary phenomenology of tentacular engagement.

First of all, the vampyroteuthic world is neither visible nor apparent; rather, it isrendered so by the vampyroteuthis' own lights. Consequently, the two worlds—the light and the dark, air and water—are perceived through entirely different methods. While the human world is firm, requiring that human animals "have to 'undergo' it—perambulate it—in order to grasp it," the world of the vampyroteuthis is fluid, requiring the vampyroteuthis to "take hold" of the world as it flows past (38). Hence, humans actively comprehend their world as static and established, while vampyroteuthic comprehension is at once passiveand impassioned. The vampyroteuthis, in other words, comprehends what "happens upon it" as opposed to what one happens upon, with the result that humans have problems, while vampyroteuthis' have impressions (39).

These analogous phenomenologies serve to define their respective cultures. Objects, as problems, must be moved out of the way. Hence, human culture is "an activity aimed against stationary objects, a deliverance from established things (from natural laws)" (39). By contrast, objects perceived as free-floating entities that one "happens-upon" results in a culture of incorporationunderstood in both its simple and psychoanalytics enses. Vampyroteuthic culture, that is to say, is "an act of discriminating between digestible and indigestible entities" (39). In other words, "culture" for the vampyroteuthis is always a question—both literal and symbolic—of eating well.

The external world, writes Flusser, as a reflection of sunlight off of things, only ever appears to human beings and, as such, it can deceive us. Human beings, he continues, imagine they must penetrate this "veil of light" in order to disclose the eternal truths that only ever appear

improperly in the "things" of our world (39).[ii] Hence, writes Flusser, human animals are "born Platonists" who only belatedly become Kantian and so escape the delusions of realism. More precisely, as we shall see in a moment, Flusser's born Platonists are in fact born into the Republic.

The vampyroteuthis, by contrast, "irradiates" a world of perfect darkness with her own point of view. Phenomena, in other words, are engendered by her bioluminescent organs, resulting in an external world that "cannot deceive because it is a self-generated deception" (39, emphasis added). The vampyroteuthis, that is, is never duped into seeking eternal truths hiding behind appearances. Never the dupe of realism, the vampyroteuthis is rather "a born Kantian" for whom Plato comes later.

In addition, the hand-tentacle and handle-suck analogy reveals further philosophical alignments. Insofar as human sexual organs are only indirectly connected to the hands and eyes, the human brain often receives contradictory sensory information that must be resolved into "empirical experiences" (40). As such, the human brain doubts, the human world is dubious, and thus the human animal is a doubting Cartesian. The sexual organs of the vampyroteuthis, meanwhile, are "partially located" on the tentacles and are, like her eyes, "directly connected to its brain" (40). Flusser does not, however, explain just how such a contact might be "direct" insofar as any such connection is necessarily a mediated relation. Instead, for Flusser any such contact simply "ought" to be immediate, that is, according to pre-existing framework that already presupposes an oppositional relation; in this instance, the opposite of human indirection. For the vampyroteuthis, then, all phenomenological impressions – understood as simultaneously tentacular, optic, and sexual – are said to arrive already processed and thus unified, making contradiction impossible. As a result, writes Flusser, the world of the vampyroteuthis "is not doubtful but surprising ... an unbroken stream of Aristotelian shock" (40).

For the surprised Aristotelian vampyroteuthis, then, the information flow is explicitly and directly libidinal, whereas for the Cartesian human this same information flow is habitually shrouded by conceptual distance. The human animal encounters the world indirectly, by handling it; the vampyroteuthis encounters the world directly, through sex. Passivity, as the world rushes past, is in this way transformed into passion (41).

Conceptual orgasm and sexual syllogism

Such an unceasing and direct stream of creative Aristotelian shock is necessarily identical with the vampyroteuthic body, which thus exists in a state Flusser describes as both "artistic ejaculation" and "permanent orgasm." Here, however, several problems with Flusser's account quickly become visible, all of which are related to vampyroteuthic time or, rather, to the absence of any engagement regarding questions of vampyroteuthic temporality. Indeed, Flusser a priori analogical schema here clearly displays its limitations. While the opposite of (human) time according to such a schema can only be (nonhuman) nontime, this would inevitably make of the vampyroteuthis an in-finite being existing outside of the temporal universe—thus causing Flusser to fall prey to the very "transcendental delusion" he seeks to guard against.

Returning to the twin questions of orgasm and time, Flusser begins with artistic ejaculation, stating that the unbroken stream of shocked surprise "overwhelms" the vampyroteuthis, he writes, causing chromatophores in the skin "to contract and emit coloured secretions" (64). This moment of clenched emission is, he continues, "an artistic orgasm during which its [sic] colourful ejaculations are encrypted into vampyroteuthic code (64, emphasis added). The question, then, is how might an unceasing and unbroken stream of impression(s) that is identical with embodiment give rise to an ejaculatory moment of orgasm?

How, in other words, given the unending nature of creative vampyroteuthic shock, can the event of orgasm be delimited? In later deeming this unceasing stream to be that of "permanent orgasm," Flusser only further highlights the problem: how, in the midst of orgasm, can one experience—that is, punctuate—a (singular) orgasm, artistic or otherwise? Does vampyroteuthic Dasein consist of one long orgasm, or an infinite series of overlapping orgasms? Moreover, if one's entire existence is orgasm, might one not also say that such an existence is, by definition, never to experience an orgasm? Here, the organisational priority of Flusser's reflexive schema not only creates these problems, but also requires that Flusser shy away from producing a vampyroteuthic Being and Time.

Interestingly, the text's status as a fable carries with it a tendency to invalidate necessary questions such as these. Fables, after all, are not supposed to be "realistic," and yet, the

possibility or otherwise of an existence indistinguishable from orgasm is the very question this "fable" sets out in all seriousness to explore. Indeed, its centrality becomes obvious once we consider that the human analogue of the vampyroteuthic orgasm is the concept. We also begin to perceive a certain Nietzschean inter-text or hypertext that haunts Flusser's fable.

First of all, the concept-orgasm opposition implies an equivalent vampyroteuthic temporality: according to Flusser, the movement of the syllogism constitutes the "time" of the concept, a temporal movement that finds its analogue in vampyroteuthic copulation. For the human, in other words, the syllogistic process forms – or ejaculates – a concept, whereas for the vampyroteuthis copulation ejaculates – or forms – a colour-coded orgasm. Moreover, given that vampyroteuthic Dasein "is" orgasm, do human animals therefore exist only "in" concept? In other words, are humans only insofar as they are conceptual? And is this one continuous conceptualisation, or its opposite? Are concepts, in opposition to orgasms, punctual, overlapping or identical? Finally, in opposition to the flow of Aristotelian shock and artistic ejaculation, is the conceptual Dasein of the human therefore necessarily inartistic?

With unwitting irony, according to Flusser the libidinal durée of the vampyroteuthic Dasein represents nothing less than a critique of the limits of reflection, and thus of a certain kind of conceptual objectivity. In contrast to the human who always perceives, and thus conceives, of the world within her own reflection, the vampyroteuthis, insofar as she emits light, thus "delineates the darkness into rations before they are conceived," therefore marking out her reason as preconceptual (47). She thus perceives things rationally first, in order to subsequently comprehend with her tentacles what the "light-reason has already rationalized" (47). Moreover, insofar as the sexual organs of the vampyroteuthis simultaneously function as organs of sense, any concept abstracted from the "illuminated cones" of preconceptual reason is thus already sexualised and gendered (47).

Such a movement of vampyroteuthic comprehension, however, clearly requires some form of spacing or discretisation – and thus distancing – to serve as the a priori condition for any perception of time. Such a discretisation, moreover, instead of making every contradiction disappear, rather guarantees the impossibility of any such perfect immunity from potential contradiction. At the very least, the temporality of vampyroteuthic comprehension seriously undermines Flusser's claim that the vampyroteuthis experiences the unceasing libidinal flow of information immediately, that is, in a perfectly transparent form which, in being identical with her very existence, can never take flight in unexpected directions nor drift into alien contexts and registers.[iii] Take, for example, the argument that every vampyroteuthic concept is

gendered a priori. Even before being abstracted, writes Flusser, every proto-concept has alreadybeen moulded into its particular shape by the sociopolitical crucible that engenders it. As such, Flusser's preconceptual conceptual gendering can in factonly emerge from within an enormous network of deeply enmeshed relationships. Abstracted from out of this endless, orgasmic durée of experience, the vampyroteuthic concept thus necessitates a leap into what can only be an utterly discontinuous domain. Indeed, enlarging the notion of language in "On Truth and Lie" to include the tropological functioning of any and all perception and affection, that is, of any filtering of information whatsoever, Nietzsche shows that each and every such leap – every production of sense of whatever stripe or species – is necessarily a translation[übertragung].

Leaving aside this hugely problematic notion of unmediated perception for a moment, might anything be salvaged from the notion of a prior "gendering" of concepts? Firstly, it is clear that, for Flusser, gender is reducible to a simple either-or: either male or female, with no thought for bisexed, intersexed, or multiply-sexed bodyings. According to Flusser, this pre-gendering of concepts equates to a philosophy of physicality, that is, a dialectic of bodies withcopulation as initial contradiction and orgasm as its sublation – such sublations-copulationsthereafter serving as models for perceiving phenomena. For the vampyroteuthis, then, philosophy is copulation while, for Flusser, philosophy is the Hegelian dialectic. Moreover, while humankind in general negotiates contradiction with "cold logic" and syllogisms, for the vampyroteuthis negotiation is coitus, with orgasm as its successful resolution (42). Unsurprisingly, however, in once again starting from an unthought – and thus dogmatic – opposition (male-female), Flusser is constrained to "disclose" nothing but one more simplistic mirror-image: the libidinal "first" philosophy of the vampyroteuthis presupposes its mirror in human psychoanalysis, just as human philosophy presupposes its reverse in a vampyroteuthic history that begins with Freud and ends with Pythagoras.

In a sense, then, Flusser follows Nietzsche in arguing that concepts are just "empty husks," preliminary to all thinking. The huge difference, however, concerns the fact that, for Nietzsche, the formation of such concepts is definitive of life in general, whereas for Flusser it is the defining factor guaranteeing human exceptionalism. This difference is, once again, the difference between reflection and diffraction: the difference between gender as an either-or and gender as the production of singular bodyings. Only with the latter, I would suggest, might the production-undergoing of conceptual relating take on something of the orgasmic. Without it, conceptual gender difference never moves beyond a simplistic recognition of the fact that gender impacts upon the received sense of concepts. First, though, we must reflect on this psychoanalytic mirror which, according to Flusser, reveals the importance of vampyroteuthic

reflection.

Republic of squid: democracy and cannibalistic animality

The vampyroteuthis, argues Flusser, can tell "us humans" something very important about ourselves and our history, namely that human animals have suppressed the sexual in favour of the digestive. The specifically human way of handling objects, he suggests, is exemplary in its privileging of the digestive, while human sex finds itself reproduced as both "animalistic and ahistorical" (49). Furthermore, writes Flusser, the suppression of sexuality originates in the male fear of female rebellion. Hence, to disclose the secret libidinal history of humanity, to sexualise the entirety of perception and affection, is at once to challenge institutional patriarchy, to disclose masculine insecurity at the base of societal order, and to open the space for a specifically feminine deposition. This notion of the "feminine" is, I would suggest, best understood through Nietzsche's engagement with Ariadne, and especially by way of the readings offered by Derrida in Éperons and "Otobiographies."

Staying with Flusser, ahistorical conceptual arrestation gives way to an historical suppression of the female by the male who, having initially relied upon greater physical strength, thereafter institutionalises this suppression by posting border guards at the body's various orifices, with the mouth occupying the prime position. Interestingly, within the mouth of the vampyroteuthis one finds a gland that, secreting "a paralyzing poison," arrests the flow of incoming information, a spacing that produces intelligible forms to be communicated later (51). The delineation and arrestation of form is, in other words, a poison that passes by way of the mouth. Such, then, is the question of eating well. Central in this regard are the key psychoanalytic concepts of incorporation, introjection, and ingestion.

The vampyroteuthis, writes Flusser, absorbs the world, that is, she incorporates it. Humans, by contrast, contemplate the world. Whereas the vampyroteuthis hates the world, the human loves it, an opposition that manifests itself in the desire of the human animal to experience the vampyroteuthis, and the desire of the vampyroteuthis to swallow the human. It is not by chance, then, that for Flusser the analogue of human reason is the vampyroteuthic dream, and

that the critique of pure reason is analogous to vampyroteuthic psychoanalysis. To bring all these factors together, we must go all the way back to the beginning of human history (and therefore into the future of the vampyroteuthis). We must, in other words, return to (or ultimately arrive at) the ideal Republic of Plato. Therein, we find an intensely dramatic portrayal that begins with the male fear of female rebellion and, through the digestive repression of sexuality moving by way of the mouth, ends with the institutional posting of orificial guards. Further, we begin to get a sense of the political implications of Das einexperienced as permanent orgasm.

Of course, whatever the particular form of political utopia to which the vampyroteuthis may aspire, it will necessarily represent an anti-Republic insofar as it is libidinal through and through and, as such, is in a strict, humansense unthinkable. It is perhaps this same unthinkability that compels Flusser, as a "born Platonist" (and thus coupled with some form of bizarre genetic determinism), to restage the ancient Republic whilst claiming for it a radical act of "unshrouding." As we shall see later, however, what these Emperor's New Clothes ultimately reveal are simply the limits of a reflexive methodology.

According to Plato, if the Republic is to endure then creaturely desire must be suppressed at its root. Such desire is for Plato characteristic of the labouring animal body – a lowly group which, in times of crisis, comprises nonhuman animals (who either labour with their bodies or labour through their bodies), women (whose labour is all too literal), and male slaves (waged or otherwise). Bereft of the salve of reason, the members of these groups are unable to control what is both the beast of the body and the body of the beast, thus wallowing shamelessly in incest, bestiality, and cannibalism. Not by chance, this figure of the beast rampaging through the domestic arena follows on directly from Plato's claim that the "equal freedoms" characteristic of democracy, in being shared also by women and by domestic animals, constitutes both origin and symptom of imminent tyranny. Hence, insists Plato, the labouring animal body must be a priori "tamed" through the force-feeding of an institutional "Guardian." Indeed, for Plato creaturely desire overlaps largely – and is at time identical with – the "urge" or "instinct" for democracy.[iv]

Moreover, should just one labouring, desiring body – whether for corporeal pleasure or for democratic order – be left free, the rulers of the Republic risk letting loose a cannibalistic animality. For Plato both the labouring body and the democratic instinct must be enslaved beneath the "best," the proper instrument of which is, quite simply, the mouth, described by Plato as that through which the necessary enters and the best exits. The best thus exits but

never enters the mouth, is never ingested or digested, but rather, in being installed through other orifices, penetrates and places within the body an external guardian of the Law to take the place of sleeping reason. The feminine labouring body, in short, must incorporate the Law as both foreign and determining, "set free" only once the cannibalistic instinct that is revolution is imprisoned within a further crypt. Without this enforced incorporation, the feminine gives rise to an orgasmic rebellion pursued through a newly-libidinal animal body utterly consumed by desire.

In Flusser's account, meanwhile, we discover that the female vampyroteuthis is physically larger than the male (thus inverting the human "might is right" origin of our patriarchal socius) and, as a species, possesses a "somewhat unnerving" reproductive system, its libidinal saturation demonstrated by sheer number of penises, "clitorises," and secondary orifices (20). Moreover, and far from coincidentally, political freedom for the vampyroteuthis is cannibalism. Ultimately, the promise underpinning the detailed reconstruction of vampyroteuthic society, history, and culture is located here, as the libidinal mirror-image of the Republic and thus the negation to be negated.

What "shape," therefore, does an encounter with the vampyroteuthis promise? Transferred to the abyss, the human plane becomes a vampyroteuthic volume, with space replaced by a realm of coiled tension (42), and the eternal, geometric Platonic forms replaced by Nietzschean mutability and revaluation, that is, by an ever surprising (Aristotelian) plasticity of impression. As we have seen, humans "desire" an experience of the vampyroteuthis, whereas the vampyroteuthis desires to swallow humanity. Nevertheless, it is just such a contact that underpins Flusser's utopian project: it is precisely on the surface, that is, where sea meets sky, that the bland, veneered, Apollonian human world must encounter the energy-laden, brutal, orgiastic and Dionysian world of the vampyroteuthis.

Here, then, vampyroteuthic "culture" becomes a posthuman Birth of Tragedy, and the vampyroteuthis a posthuman figure. On the one side, we find Captain Picard's (imperialist, rationalistic) quest for experience, his "hands-on" approach ("all hands on deck"), compared to the vampyroteuthis-Borg's quest for incorporation (i.e., swallowing, assimilation). Such is a specifically Nietzschean Borg, divested of its (Platonic) geometric rigour (of its cube ship), her sepia ink-sculptures always already fluid. The "hive-mind," we recall, is the highest evolutionary form, yet here its eternal fixed geometry is replaced by an orgiastic fluidity of form experienced as passion, as an explosive uncoiling releasing vast amounts of repressed sexual energy.

Lastly, with Flusser's final "analogy" of truth and lie, Nietzsche's own "On Truth and Lie" is revealed as the secret text of the "orgasmic, orphic, and artistic" vampyroteuthis (53). For this, however, we must first understand the peculiarly glandular forms of historicity and communication characteristic of the vampyroteuthis.

Historicity, Language, and Short Circuiting Artefacts

Here, the vampyroteuthis shares much with Bernard Stiegler, arguing that humanity rests far too heavily upon its inanimate mnemonic crutches. As a result of this "blunder," human history can never be "genuine" insofar as it can never be "properly intersubjective" (50). However, whereas Stiegler argues that the danger concerning the transfer of human knowledge onto "psychotechnologies" is the defining characteristic of our current information age, Flusser, by contrast, suggests that all of human history is a failure, presumably because human history has always contained this tendency for exporting information onto mnemonic aids. While this is indeed the case (and not only for human animals), what Flusser regards as a "properly" intersubjective and thus genuine history sounds suspiciously like a romantic return to some mythical notion of "oral history."

That aside, the intersubjectivity of the vampyroteuthis is particularly interesting insofar as the media of transmission are the glands, making vampyroteuthic history "a glandular history, a history of secretions" (50-51). This glandular historicity, moreover, in being opposed to human historiology, represents a constitutive difference, thus allowing Flusser to (apparently) maintain a traditional human exceptionalism based upon possession of second-order language. I parenthetically mark this "difference" as mere appearance, as Flusser himself insists that vampyroteuthic displays of colour in fact constitute a chromatic language that is intraspecific, one that gives "outward expression to the inner thoughts" (51). It remains to ask, of course, not only how such a language is not a "language," but also as to how such "inner thoughts" might themselves be formulated if the vampyroteuthis lacks a "proper" language and, indeed, how one could ever tell a "proper" language from an "improper" one. Once again, Nietzsche's notion of translation offers a timely corrective on this point.

The issue of vampyroteuthic language is further complicated by the introduction of further "communication" glands. A second gland, for example, renders the sender of a given message transparent and thus invisible to its recipient(s). This form of transmission, suggests Flusser, inevitably reminds us of certain ideologically-overdetermined "aspects of our current media" such as radio and television (21). Moreover, writes Flusser, both of these ways of communicating, the chromatic and the ideological, constitute a cognitive rape – a claim with clear implications for our own technocratic media society. The importance Flusser gives to, and immediately distances himself from, this overtly masculinist claim is marked by the fact that it is on this subject alone that the vampyroteuthis is given its critical voice directly in the first-person singular (albeit in italics), simultaneously raising the question of whether she speaks as a critic or as a normalizer.

As a species, and having first checked any unit of received information against the species' existing information pool, the vampyroteuthis then widely disseminates this new information, which in turn is stored in the memories of other vampyroteuthis' (52). This, argues Flusser, is vampyroteuthis history: a continuous dialogue ensuring "that the sum of available information will only and ever increase" (52). Once again, the question of memory is at the centre. As well as being "the central problem" of historical evolution, memory, writes Flusser, is "also the central problem of art, which is essentially a method of fabricating artificial memories" (61). In his own voice this time, Flusser again parodies the human tendency to transfer its memories to impermanent "cultural" artefacts, which thereafter come to shape human experience and thought in its entirety (62). It is, in the end, the very materiality of such artefactual objects that constitutes the downfall of human (art) history: objects resist being transformed into memories, a resistance which, in an ever-expanding feedback loop, comes to be recorded in other artificial memories. This feedback loop, suggests Flusser, is "art history" (63). In a startling, indeed uncanny, presentiment of Stiegler's argument (and somewhat contradicting Flusser's earlier claim to an ahistorical tendency), Flusser describes present-day humans as having come to "live as functions of their objects," forgetting that such artefactual objects are supposed to function only to record and share acquired information (a sharing Stiegler terms a "long circuit") (63). Instead, continues Flusser, humans become absorbed by the objects themselves, allowing these objects to "absorb their existential interests" (63) (a reversal that for Stiegler constitutes a literally brain-numbing "short circuit"). As a result, artefactual objects cease being communicative media and become their opposite, "namely, barriers that restrict human communication" (63).

Finally, there is a fourth method of glandular communication: the sculpting of ink to produce sepia self-portraits in addition to "countless other forms that are indecipherable to us" (52). Despite this indecipherability resulting from an inevitable formal species barrier, argues Flusser, we must nevertheless assume that the vampyroteuthis broadcasts information through these sepia clouds. This, I would say, is equally inevitable. Flusser, however, is quick to reject any comparison with human-produced artworks for two reasons: first, there is the ephemerality of the cloud; and, second, because the "information communicated with these clouds is exclusively intended to mislead its receiver" (52). These reasons, however, simply cannot be maintained. First, a large number of human-produced artworks are at least as "ephemeral" as a dissipating sculptural form (indeed, it can be argued that the very notion of art's work is that of a singular, ungraspable event). Second, given the indecipherability of the information communicated as a result of the species barrier, how is it possible to judge the exclusivity of the attempt to mislead? Further, is it even possible to guarantee that every receiver of a form will be deceived?

Leaving this aside, this ink-producing gland (the "diverticum"), in common with all the others, explicitly "facilitates lying" (52). Put simply, the history – both historicity and historiology – of the vampyroteuthis is an (art) history of deceit. Further, deceit and memory are the key terms of a vampyroteuthic critique. Whereas falsehood is the opposite of human truth, for the vampyroteuthis "truth" is already a lie, and hence its opposite is rather dishonesty (53). Flusser is here making an extremely important point: vampyroteuthic culture, as "deceit, pretense, and falsehood," is necessarily "a culture of art" (53) – a point that clearly reveals their Nietzschean chromatics. Such a Nietzschean, vampyroteuthic thinker thus philosophises not in order to proceed from falsehood to truth, but "in order to lie ever more completely" (53).

In this inverse world, the entirety of cultural artefacts, of history and philosophy, thus constitute "a peculiar type of cryptography that is not meant to be decrypted" (52). Instead of our peculiarly human culture of "truths," in the world of the vampyroteuthis decryption only ever yield further deceptive encryptions that, at its most elemental level, "mask the demonic predator's will to power" (53, my emphasis). Along with reading Being and Time as the point of origin and departure of the Dasein), we could thus profitably consider Nietzsche's "On Truth and Lie" as the secret text of its decryption-encryption – a decryption that only ever encrypts and deceives.

Deceit, together with memory, thus forms the key terms of a vampyroteuthic critique. It is a critique, however, which only goes so far. To begin with, rather than challenging the most traditional of humanisms, Flusser simply extends – albeit in a restricted form – the

"superbiological" exceptionality of humankind to the fabulous vampyroteuthis. Further, this extension is no extension at all: as the negative model of the human, that is, as that which the human has repressed in becoming human, we never leave the human for even a moment. In this way, Flusser in fact reiterates the most basic of humanisms, relegating all nonhuman and nonfabulous animals to the Heideggerian realm of "merely biological" automatons, that is, of genetically determined machines. Such a move, as is increasingly being recognised, brings with it a variety of particularly noxious consequences – consequences that Tyler's focus on pragmatism ultimately renders meaningless.

Before returning to Tyler, however, let us first consider the specifically vampyroteuthic solution to the "laughable" error that is human art and history. Firstly, we recall, the vampyroteuthis represents a code for deciphering our posthuman future, although such a claim is nullified somewhat by her indecipherable and deceptive encryption. Secondly, on the meta-level, the production of such beasts – not, in other words, that of sepias culptures but rather that of the species itself – represents a methodology "superior" to that currently practised within the hard sciences insofar as it allows for an otherwise shrouded humanity to "recognize an art of a different sort" (63). What, then, is revealed regarding this new, "post-scientific" art form?

Vampyroteuthic art, writes Flusser, is "not burdened by the resistance of objects ... but is rather intersubjective and immaterial" (63). We thus understand the refusal of the status of "artwork" to vampyroteuthic sculpture: rather than producing artworks, which are, by definition, mediated, the vampyroteuthis instead imparts data immediately into the brain of its auditor. The human, in short, struggles against the stubbornness of materials, whereas the vampyroteuthis struggles against the stubbornness of her fellow vampyroteuthis'. However, the very notion of transmission necessitates a material substrate. For something to be sensed, in other words, there must be a physical manifestation for perception, as mediated, to take place; a mediation which can always be misinterpreted, distorted, and even forgotten. Unfortunately, then, Flusser's "new" art depends upon an impossible idealism of intersubjectivity. If the human wholly loses herself in material objects, then so too is the vampyroteuthis precisely because she is wholly concerned with the sharing and transfer of knowledge.

Curiously, the "immateriality" of vampyroteuthic idealism is described in the most material of terms: upon experiencing the Aristotelian "creative shock" of something new, the vampyroteuthis is forced to reorganize her memory, a reorganisation that permeates her entire body, causing her to orgasm and her chromatophores to emit coloured ejaculatory secretions. Here, then, the definitive im-mediate and non-material transmission is a display that takes place

across and through the animal's entire body in a frenetically coloured expression of orgasm. An orgasm, moreover, which, across distance and time, attracts a mate into an orgiastic coupling that is at once dialogue and transfer of information. Significant too in this context is Flusser admission that he is unsure as to how this new information "infiltrates" – a term already suggesting contamination – the "common vampyroteuthis conversation" (64).

Flusser is clear, however, as to the mode of this infiltration: rape. Irrespective of gender, the penetrating vampyroteuthis forces her auditor to store immaterial information. Here, the human-vampyroteuthis opposition turns full circle: tired of objects, humans too have "created media that have enabled us to rape human brains ... have built chromatophores of our own – televisions, videos, and computer monitors that display synthetic images – with whose help broadcasters of information can mendaciously seduce their audiences" (67). Ultimately, then, Flusser's "superior methodology" – consisting of the "invention" of a mirror-image human in symbolic animal form – very much holds to the generic tradition of the fable: we end, as we begin, with the human. Despite appearing to be what Eduardo Kac on the back cover describes as "a pioneering exploration of uncharted territory in the realm of animal cognition, philosophy, and art," as claims on the back cover, we discover instead that the distance travelled by Vampyroteuthic Infernalis is very small indeed.

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[redacted]The Lessons of Anthropomorphism

This enclosure of and within the traditional genre of the fable inevitably re-raises the vexed question of anthropomorphism. Flusser, we recall, regards the ever-more-subtle categorising of biological entities as being merely a vulgar anthropomorphism, one that reflects only the spatial hierarchy of a specificallyhuman disgust. Anthropomorphism, as Tyler tells us, presupposes knowledge of a uniquely human trait, as Flusser's charge clearly shows. This presupposition, however, raises two problems. First, it presumes we know what it is to be human when we don't and, second, it infers that any such trait is uniquely human when in fact any number of extraterrestrial visitors, for example, may arrive tomorrow to disqualify each and every such inference.

More importantly, the charge of anthropomorphism is at once a charge of narcissism and, as such, is always an accusation. As Tyler argues, however, it is an accusation that, at the very moment of its utterance, inevitably turns an about-face. In what is a bravura display, Tyler shows us that, rather than belonging to those who "yield to the appeal of anthropomorphism" (63), narcissism in fact belongs to those who believe in the existence of anthropomorphism, thus wielding it always with an implicit accusation. Regardless of whether one condemns or commends anthropomorphism, in other words, to wield such a charge requires that one already accepts thepossibility of a uniquely human trait. Without this belief, the charge of anthropomorphism simply refuses to make sense.

How then, as she returns our gaze, do we stare Flusser and Bec's infernal squid in the face, as if from a mirror? Unsurprisingly, we find ourselves caught within its infinite regress: to condemn Flusser's vampyroteuthis as an example of anthropomorphism in the hugely problematic form of a generic fable of moral education, to decry her exemplary exploitation as a reductive, cipherous product of anthropocentric hubris, is to accept the very possibility of human exceptionalism such a charge aims to disrupt. And, of course, the sheer complexity of the world of the vampyroteuthis is unique in the annals of Western philosophy. Perhaps, then, the truth of Flusser's short, fabulous text is that of an important and timely warning: one cannot cease polishing the mirrors so easily. Inventive figures of posthumanism and radical posthuman figures can never emerge on the heels of accusations and dismissals.

So, then, what of the distance traversed by the Vampyroteuthic Infernalis? Precisely because of the reflective way of proceeding, Flusser presupposes and (thus) inevitably "reveals" a fixed human position. This does not, however, deny the possibility of tracing a diffractive movement

through the text. To this end, Karen Barad suggests that we need a method "attuned to the entanglement of the apparatuses of production, one that enables genealogical analyses of how boundaries are produced rather than presuming sets of well-worn binaries in advance" (29-30). As beings of perception and affection, we are, and will forever remain, prone to the specifics of narcissistic blinding, and none more, or less, than Louis Bec's SQuID.

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[redacted]Typewriters, Technozooseriotics, and Superconducting Quantum Interference Devices

Such questions, as we have seen, a priori concern language, writing, and the plastic art of creation. In a later paper, Louis Bec makes the interesting claim that the vampyroteuthis is in fact a writing set: enclosing "a transparent pen and a sac of sepia ink; its body is the case" (Bec "Squids, Elements of Technozooseriotics," n.p.). The vampyroteuthis is, in other words, a machine for writing (literally, une machine à écrire – a typewriter). A machine, moreover, for writing extremes and for writing in extremis in that the vampyroteuthis is also an extremophile. Extremophiles are microorganisms who thrive in environments previously thought impossible to support any life – environments without oxygen and light, for example. Here, while the vampyroteuthis remains a reflection of the human, she is no longer an image of universal humanity. Instead, she diffracts light onto specific human animals who have been transformed into prototypical extremophiles – not yet properly "other," but never or no longer human either.

The vampyroteuthis, then, is an extremophile insofar as she survives in the immense pressures of the ocean depths. Specific humans, too, are extremophiles insofar as they survive under immense pressures elsewhere. For example, writes Bec,

take the thousands of women and children in Mailuu-Suu searching for welded nickel in light-bulb shells in dumps of a factory located on terrain where uranium was previously mined – there are prototypical extremophiles among us, trying to survive in a maximally toxic and radioactive environment where the atmosphere is laden with a surplus of glass powder, to boot (n.p.)

Clearly, the notion of "exception" reflected by the vampyroteuthis-as-extremophile has changed. No longer mirroring the universal exceptionalism of the (allegedly) superior human species, the vampyroteuthis now shows us an image of a certain human animal who is exceptional only by virtue of the extreme conditions imposed upon her survival. Admittedly, this is to move beyond the questions specific to Vampyroteuthis Infernalis. Nonetheless, Flusser's text is, as any text outlining a methodology must be, explicitly preliminary, that is to say, it attempts to open new directions for thought that go beyond itself. As such, to do it justice is to ask what, if anything, does the fabulous analysis of vampyroteuthis society offer for those animals forced into extremophiliac survival? An extreme politics, or a politics of the extreme? We shall return to this in the next section.

In addition to being a squid, a writing set, an extremophile, and a typewriter, the fabrication of the vampyroteuthis is also an attempt at evolution toward a more integrated, perhaps even vampish, posthuman future. Such a squid, writes Bec in the later text, is a SQuID: a Superconducting Quantum Interference Device. Focusing on this occasion on the Loligo vulgaris mollusk, Bec suggests that the mollusk's "chromatophoric and bioluminescent communication codes" renders her "simultaneously a semaphoric and a techno-cephalopodic object" (n.p.). Here, Bec takes an important step forward, one that moves beyond the earlier text co-authored with Flusser: he digitizes these cutaneous codes with "the aim of setting up a 'dialogue' ... by using an artificial skin to manipulate the chromatic and formal parameters involved" (n.p. check all Bec quotations). Once again, we find the appeal to "dialogue," but things are very different now, the focus being not on the fable but on the fabulous: any attempt at genuine dialogue depends a priori upon specificities, that is, the diffracted materialities that are specific "worlded" configurations of matter, energy, and information.

In a positive coda to the vampyroteuthis of Flusser, Bec thus embarks upon the fascinating project of "technozoosemiotics," aiming at the creation of digital interfaces of transduction and transcoding areas between kinaesthetic and paralinguistic systems, and of strings of signs that might possibly be intelligible between different living and artificial species. The notion of transduction is absolutely central: by way of Gilbert Simondon, the term refers to the

emergence of entirely new beings. A transductive being, in other words, is one in which the "elements" of her/his/its unheard-of combination do not precede their relating, but rather can only be discerned retrospectively. The terms constituting the relation, in other words, do not exist prior to their relation.

Ultimately, argues Bec, the project of technozoosemiotics aims at "laying the basis for a communication continuum for the alive." All of this is extremely interesting although it is difficult to understand, given this description, why, at the very last minute, Bec restricts his "continuum" to that of the alive. Unless, that is, Bec intends a complete transformation of the very notion of "alive-ness" – a transformation that is, I would argue, both timely and urgent.[v] To this end, writes Bec, the "alive no longer appears as a material, autarkic unity, but as part of a network in which it forms an integration point for energy and above all for information" (n.p.).

Why the vampyroteuthis? Why the squid? As "surplus information interfaces," writes Bec, squids "provide the means of approaching the 'why' of ecosystemic information surplus processing, as well as the methodological and instrumental 'how'" (n.p.). Put another way, the squid socius bears with it the potential for transductive creation, "located at the intersection of multiple exchanges which link it to all the components of its biomass and of the natural and technological environment it constructs by producing a heterogeneous information surplus" (n.p.). However, insists Bec, this surplus "must be processed by devices, by constellations of a syntactic and semantic nature that are irrevocably linked to the world of species itself" (n.p.). It is here, with such alien yet resolutely material constellations, that a dialogue may finally emerge.

Politics, Freedom, and the Posthuman: Utopias

Returning to Flusser's book, we recall our earlier question as to what, if anything, the analysis of vampyroteuthis society offers those animals forced into the extremities of, and by, global capital. Once again, Flusser is careful to exempt the human-vampyroteuthis from the animal realm, this time on the old Aristotelian basis of politics. According to Flusser, the "superorganism" that is an ant society, for example, is composed of biological, rather than

social, agents; each specific ant functioning merely as a cell functions in an organic body. This relation of ant and cell is, of course, an analogical relation, ensuring that ant society as a whole operates according to biological and not political rules. Ultimately, however, the analogy does not convince: a group of ants do not compose, from birth to death, a bounded organ only released upon literal decomposition, but are rather a number of individual entities capable of joining or leaving this or that group for a limited time span. Far more accurate would be to say that ant society is a networked society.

Flusser, however, requires this notion of a bounded organ in order to reserve politics – and thus freedom – for humans and vampyroteuthis' alone: to "speak of politics," he writes, "is to speak of freedom" (56), and most immediately of freedom from biological constraints. By contrast, ants, like cells, have "sacrificed their freedom" in becoming a superorganism and an organ respectively (56). Unwittingly, no doubt, Flusser is thus suggesting that explicitly political ant societies necessarily existed at an earlier stage on their evolution. Ignoring these political proto-ants, Flusser instead stages yet another form of analogy, that of isomorphism. As a consequence of sacrificing freedom in becoming a superorganism, a new freedom is created, "namely, that of the superorganism and the organism" (56).[vi] The emergence of the superorganism, in other words, brings with it a specific form of (dialectical) freedom.

Nonetheless, the unacknowledged politics of the proto-ant offers a disquieting interpretation of freedom. Freedom, we have seen, exists only insofar as biology has not yet fully encroached upon life. Hence, freedom "is a provisional stage in the tendency of evolution toward socialization and death" (56). One is here reminded of Freud's death drive, forever seeking a "return" to a primordial, inorganic stasis. Properly provisional – perhaps proto-beings on evolutionary par with the individual ant – humans and vampyroteuthis' are, for now, "free individuals" (56). It is a freedom, however, which is increasingly under attack by society as a whole, insofar as such societies "are becoming ever better organized and thus ever more conscious of biological regulations" (56). Here, we begin to perceive the direction of Flusser's critique, one that treads a well-worn path indeed: humans, along with their oceanic dark half, are "in danger of becoming ... like ants or bees" (57). Global capitalism, it would seem, ultimately serves evolution by way of the biologization of the social, disposing of individuals as it replaces them with mere cells. This is, of course, a huge oversimplification – an oversimplification aided above all by its unthinking recourse to ciphers in the guise of other animals.

Between biological society and the free individual, however, stands the family, and it is this

"central social phenomenon" that the vampyroteuthis can, claims Flusser (and by way of analogy, ofcourse) help us to understand. An understanding, moreover, which will in turn shed light on the differences between, and certain implications of, equality and fraternity as organising principles. Every vampyroteuthis, first of all, is atwin, one of a pair ofsimultaneously hatched individuals that are "interrelated according to agenetically predetermined hierarchy" (57). Human siblings, meanwhile, are also hierarchized, but this hierarchy, writes Flusser, is largely culturally determined. As such, for humans to advocate for equality over fraternity, or vice versa, would be to agitate "for or against historical contingencies" (57). The vampyroteuthis, by contrast, has no such freedom as if she "should take the side of equality over fraternity, it [sic] would be agitating against its own biological condition" (57). Fraternity, in other words, is, for the vampyroteuthis, synonymous with society, and thus to favour equality would be at once antibiological and antisocial.

Hence, continues Flusser, if we take "political activity" to mean any attempt at changing a given societal structure, then vampyroteuthic politics is necessarily "synonymous with anarchy" insofar as it "would represent the attempt to abolish, outright, its [sic] iniquitous social structure" (57-58). Such a socialstruggle is, however, impossible, simply because there is no society, but only ever biology: being genetically determined, there can be no change in social structure but rather only the unattainable vampyroteuthic ideal of anarchic, fraternal strife. Here, a number of unanswered questions impose themselves: Given a rigid and complete genetic determination, how might such an ideal arise? And how does the biologized vampyroteuthis – the water-borne reflection of the narcissistic human – thus differ from ant society? Or from thecoup de gráce of global capitalism?

At this point, Flusser attributes to vampyroteuthic twins an older/younger fraternal hierarchy, and yet, given they are said to hatch simultaneously, on what basis can such a hierarchy be determined – whether than determination is genetic or social? This is especially problematic, insofar as it is precisely in terms of brotherhood that Flusser claims the human is able to "relate" to the vampyroteuthis, that is, "at least since Freud … or, perhaps, evers ince there have been Big Brothers" (??). In itself, this is a somewhat odd reference to call in support of an older-younger hierarchy – in addition to the totalitarian subtext (and in the absence of the more obvious reference to the French Revolution), Freud (and the French Revolution) in fact posits fraternal strife over equality rather than in response to a (biologically or culturally) imposed hierarchy.

Things get even more confusing once the familiar oppositional analogy cranks up. Less familiar,

however, is the opposition Flusser poses between equality and fraternity. Comparing vampyroteuthis politics to our own, he argues that "all of our political activity is likewise directed against our biological condition, against biologically predetermined inequalities" (58). But what are these apparently "natural" (i.e., genetically determined) inequalities? The answer is unclear – differences in physical strength perhaps? While this would accord with a patriarchal culture based upon a fear of female rebellion, it is nonetheless an extremely reductive definition of political activity. Ultimately, how such inequalities resulting from the scarcity of resources, or from the inability to control the means of production, or simply from the exploitation of labour-power that is the motor of capitalism, how these are at base "biological" is unclear, although to suggest such would be to suggest that starvation as a result of resources carcity or economic downturn is, at base, both "natural" and inevitable. While Flusser is quick to note that, unlike the vampyroteuthis, "our biologically predetermined inequalities also have a large and overlying cultural component" (58), this in fact changes nothing. Indeed, the problem comes down to the unthinking opposition between determined-nature and undetermined-culture – a binary opposition that simply cannot be maintained.

Specific to human politics, then (a redundancy insofar as, for Flusser, politics is always and only human), is the striving to change the "cultural superstructure" (58). Such a "freedom" means that human animals are equipped with the ability to imagine Utopias "in which even our biological constraints are done away with" (58). However, by suggesting that all political activity is a deluded attempt to change the superstructure – the ideology – that necessarily leaves intact a (here biologically-determined!) economic infrastructure, we thus take a huge step backwards into the vulgar materialism of certain early Marxist theory. Indeed, such activity aimed at an epiphenomenal superstructure is simply a limited version of, in grand terms, the posing of an (by definition impossible and equally epiphenomenal) ideological Utopia. What, also, can one make of the fact that Flusser is himself proposing an explicitly utopian solution, albeit by way of analogical methodology? Such a mirror as the vampyroteuthis provides, rather than meeting at the surface of sea and sky, falls instead into infinite regress.

As vampyroteuthis society is a "datum" rather than a "factum," that is, a given and not a product, the vampyroteuthis is incapable of comprehending a Utopian imaginary (58). Vampyroteuthic politics, if there could be such a thing, is necessarily a violent act against her own biological "nature." But then, asks Flusser in a further dizzying twist, does this not also describe human politics: "Are not those who defend nature – those who defend such natural "realities" as race, the dominion of mankind, even ecological balance – somehow betrayers of the human Geist?" (58). Indeed, but why, if inequalities are biologically determined, are "realities" placed in scare quotes? And, if political activity is a deluded attack on the

superstructure, how can this equate to the human spirit or Geist? There are numerous, proliferating confusions here which, it becomes clear, are simply placed so as to allow Flusser to propose his own Utopia as a "third way" between human and vampyroteuthis.

Human political activity, writes Flusser, is freedom as an – as yet unresolved – dialectic, with the self-assertion of the individual on one hand, and the needs of society on the other. For the vampyroteuthis, however, there is no dialectic of political freedom insofar as he (seeing as we are talking always about fraternity and never about sorority) is "biologically necessitated to recognize the hierarchical rank of its [sic] brother" (58). How this "rank" is established is, as we have seen, unclear – it would seem to suppose that both vampyroteuthis twins are in a position of a lower rank toward each other and thus the very undoing of both hierarchy and equality. Nonetheless, Flusser states that for a vampyroteuthis to become free, the only option is to dispose of biological necessity by disposing of his twin. Vampyroteuthic freedom, then, is fratricidal cannibalism: "the right to devour its [sic] kin" (58-59). Interestingly, Flusser notes the parallels between the vampyroteuthic and the liberal conceptions of freedom, but only so far as to point out their analogy: phylogenetically threatened much more by the anthill, that is, "by absolute socialization," vampyroteuthic politics is as a result "far more antisocialist than ours" (58). Instead of a Utopian Imaginary, vampyroteuthic liberalism is "the denial of its biological condition" (59).

We remain, nonetheless, in the realm of opposites: vampyroteuthis cannibalistic antisocialism constitutes a "hate movement," whereas "our hymenopteric socialism represents a 'love movement'" (59). Vampyroteuthic liberation arrives as "brotherly hatred," human liberation as "a sacrifice of individual freedom to our beloved brother – an anthropomorphizing error on its part, a myrmecomorphizing error on ours" (59). This is not, however, to suggest that human society is thus loving and lovable. Indeed, the opposite is the case: vampyroteuthis behaviour reveals "a lovable and loving being" while human behaviour "is defined by universal hatred, by the universal struggle for survival – one against all" (59). Given the organizing nature-culture dichotomy, we should not be surprised by this recourse to the bellum omni contra omnes [war of each against all], the "naturalistic fallacy" which Donna Haraway acutely describes as "the mirror-image misstep to transcendental humanism" (When Species Meet 79). In Flusser's version of the traditional paired human-animal and culture-nature binaries, "love, the recognition of others, and orgasm" (59) constitutes the "natural state" of vampyroteuthic Dasein who, only in overcoming her animality in order to become a cultural being, thus learns to hate. The human, by contrast, only learns to love by overcoming her animality (59).

Clearly, then, Flusser is simply reiterating the age-old nonsense of a mythical state of nature, of the war of one against all, that has so often been employed to mark a humanist, or at least anthropocentric, vulgate. Indeed, Flusser then makes the all too common, all too humanly exceptional further move of naming this "overcoming" of "animality" as nothing less than Geist or "spirit" in a clearly Christic move which, just in case we missed it, Flusser highlights by noting that in "Judeo-Christian terms, vampyroteuthis behaviour might be said to approximate 'sins against the spirit'" (59). Here, then, we further experience the inherent limits of analogical methodology.

Flusser, as a dialectic human, reaches his prearranged or, at least, presupposed goal, that is, the possibility of positing a Utopia which, thanks to reflection, has of course been there all along. We must not forget, he writes, "that the vampyroteuthis stands on its head [a phrase inevitably replete with Marxian resonances]: its hell is our heaven, its heaven our hell" (59). While the fratricidal, cannibalistic anarchy of the vampyroteuthis is nothing less than a vision of hell for the human animal, such anarchy nonetheless "represents an inaccessible heaven of freedom" (59). By contrast, the inaccessible human heaven of a loving socialist utopia is for the vampyroteuthis "a hellish anthill" (60). Here, at last, we reach our own analogical, dialectical heaven-to-come. "Is there not a third possibility, a middle road, a tertius gaudens?" (60).

Indeed there is, writes Flusser, and, moreover, "it is not difficult to find" (60). It is, quite simply, the heaven of the dialectic: "a Geist that is both human and vampyroteuthis" (60). Of course, such a Geist is for Flusser always that of the human, insofar as the vampyroteuthis is nothing more than an inverted human, a human stood on its head, and thus the dialectical utopia is nothing more than resolving the "good" and the "bad" sides that already exists in humanity alone. As Flusser says, we are already vampyroteuthis, otherwise we could never recognize "aspects of its heaven and hell" (60). The vampyroteuthis and the human are the absolute – and thus inaccessible given our human-vampyroteuthis impurity – poles of humanity and, if "we could encounter both sides simultaneously, the question of heaven and hell, of good and evil, would be no more" (60). In fact, Flusser continues, this would be the end of all questions, and thus of Geist: such is the risk we take to encounter our hellish side, to "face the vampyroteuthis eye to eye" and thus "behold ... our own reflection, above all the reflection of our grotesque political folly" (60). Vampyroteuthic entanglement, in short, is the condition of our very exceptionalism.

Ultimately, however, the "grand risk" that is run by encountering the vampyroteuthis is no risk at all. Flusser's utopian "third way" simply reiterates a fable of Kantian tolerance – humans, we

recall, are "born-Platonists" who must learn to become Kantian, the third way being simply the forever-deferred sublation of the individual-social dialectic understood as a Regulative Idea. This is, in short, a disappointingly inevitable conclusion – especially given its professed utopian aim of permanent orgasm, earlier described as explosive release – to a text that, producing such a fabulous other animal, promises so much more. How different things might have been, however, should Flusser have chosen not reflection, but diffraction? And more, such a diffraction through such fabulous other animals would have no need of fabled invention, as such animals already impact upon our every move.

Our Posthuman Future

As we have seen, contact underpins Flusser's utopian project of the third way: the meeting of the bland, veneered, Apollonian human world with and the energy-laden, brutal, orgiastic and Dionysian world of the vampyroteuthis. Here, in an echo of Heidegger, Flussers pells out the anthropocentrism organising his entire project. All roads, he writes, inevitably lead only to the human: "the specific point of departure"—be it genetics, biology, psychology, cultural studies—is "more or less irrelevant," as "each of these differently equipped vehicles will begin to encounter one another soon after they have submerged below the surface" (69). Ultimately, any separation of "depths" into oceanic and psychic is ultimately superficial, as they "are one and the same abyss" (70). The depths of the sea and the depths of the (human) ego will encounter one another, "as though in a mirror" (70).

Such is the promised utopia of reflection, the paradoxical paradise of the mirror and its sublation. Despite all the talk of abysmal depths, Flusser requires only a mirrored surface – such is the (simplified) promise of the dialectic. Thus, we need not submerge in order to provoke the vampyroteuthis' emergence, as the vampyroteuthis in turn emerges "to lure our submergence" (70). Moreover, depth itself must be annulled: the vampyroteuthis has already emerged, sending out expeditions of her own "in the exploits of Nazism, in cybernetic thinking, in works of logical analysis, and in certain theological texts" (70). In every case, however, insofar as she exists amid immense pressures, when she reaches the surface she emerges "with the effect of a bomb" (70). Hence, it is not the vampyroteuthis who "annihilates our surroundings but rather the sudden release of the pressure that confines it [sic]" (71). As a result, the vampyroteuthis

should only be allowed to surface with caution, raised "slowly and carefully" in order "initiate a dialogue with it [sic] in the clear light of day" (71). Since the Enlightenment onwards, however, "[u]nilateral efforts to 'depressurize' and humanize others" have repeatedly failed (71, my emphasis). Perhaps such failures are guaranteed by the very light of day – with everything already so weighted toward the human, should we not rather be snorkelling?

Utopia Dreaming

The vampyroteuthis, writes Flusser, emerges as a composite figure "from aquaria (roughly), from tales of sea monsters (mythologically), from our nightmares (psychoanalytically), and from the events of recent history (ideologically)" (74). She has also emerged "from our Utopian conceptions of a "New Man" (vom Neuen Menschen) – as hatred become love, as permanent orgasm [my emphasis], as the realization of Dasein, as selflessness toward others" (74-75??). While I would suggest that the dangers of such a project is precisely that of falling ineffectually into infinite regress, for Flusser, unsurprisingly, the dangers we must look out for en route are rather twin, that is, "two opposed dangers, each reflecting the other" (72): "the Scylla of anthropocentric arrogance" that might condescend to "save" the vampyroteuthis on one hand, and on the other "the Charybdis of nostalgie de la boue, that is, the ingenuous willingness to reconcile with it" (72). These twin figures are all too familiar, however, redolent of utopian projects already a century old, requiring as they do "simply" the maintenance of a "precarious balance" between that ancient couple: the rational and the instinctual. A balance maintained by an "open human engagement" willing to expose the "whole of our humanity" (72, emphasis added).

To this end, and despite the earlier refusal of all disciplinary boundaries residing just below the surface, science as "currently practiced," that is, as the rational par excellence, is therefore ruled out straight away on the basis that scientific "objectivity" fails to take into account "the great complexities of humanity" (72, emphasis added). Interesting in the light of what has been said here about Flusser's analogical method and the limits of reflection, Flusser argues that anything science – biologists and "mythologists" in particular – "can tell us about the vampyroteuthis will necessarily resemble an autopsy of a lifeless body" (73). By contrast, what Flusser offers is only ever a reflection – a reasoning and instinctive intuiting – of the human as already produced.

Science is not entirely discounted, however. Remembering the necessity of precarious balance, Flusser turns to fables which, "like the one in hand," must inevitably rely on the products of science, as only then can we "hope to orient ourselves in the darkness of the abyss" (73). Science and fable must thus form a dialectical pairing to be sublated in future texts (texts such as Vampyroteuthis Infernalis, presumably). Here, the specific task of science is to "allure[e] the vampyroteuthis to emerge without, at the same time, allowing it to swallow us whole" (73). Here, Flusser's project comes very close, albeit indirectly, to that of Tyler's, while remaining nonetheless a typical object of the latter's critique (in a brief parenthesis, briefer even than this, Flusser notes how he is "leaving aside, for now, the tenable assertion that the sciences produce nothing but fables" (73)).

Despite an apparent and specific dismissal, Flusser almost immediately rehabilitates biology as being of an unmatched importance in the creation of the New Man. This importance is because it "provides us with an almost mythical model of life's unrealized possibilities," one that enables us to perceive "a share of the universal potential that has lain dormant within us" (73). At the same time, of course (always remembering the "precarious balance" of deferred sublation), "the same biology ... cannot be allowed to run rampant" (74). Perhaps biology generally, and genetic manipulation specifically, is so important because only biology bears the promise of explosive, artistic release understood (somehow) as permanent orgasm. Meanwhile, this same threat of explosive orgasm perhaps explains why biology must be simultaneously discounted as unimportant. As such, let us, in conclusion, return, with Flusser, to Tyler and the becoming-feral of the animal cipher by way of a reworking of the evolutionary meme.

Animals, Analogy and Pragmatism

Language, as Tyler makes clear, cannot be reduced to the word. This is a point that cannot be made often and strongly enough when it comes to engaging rigorously with other animals. In the context of a program of radical pragmatism, Tyler returns to the important notion of the meme, as originally proposed by Richard Dawkins first in The Selfish Gene (1976), and then again in The Extended Phenotype (1982). Memes, suggests Dawkins, are the replicators

ofcultural transmission. Ranging from hand gestures and catchphrases to clothing fashions and the manipulation of pottery, memes function on the cultural level in the same way as genes constitute the replicators of genetictransmission. Such memes, Dawkins writes, spread from "brain to brain" in "just the way that a virus may parasitize the genetic mechanism of a host cell" (cit. Tyler 186). A meme is, in short, "a kind of cultural virus that is passed, often unwittingly, from one individual to another" (186).

As with genes, argues Dawkins, the "fitness" of any given meme depends upon three things: longevity, fecundity, and copying fidelity. First, for as long as a particular cultural artifact is both used and recognized, it will endure. Second, if it is to endure, that is, to be repeatedly replicated, a given meme must not only be recognized upon reception, but it must also be readily duplicated. It must, in short, be iterable. Lastly, upon iteration a meme must repeatedly produce (largely) faithful duplications – a hand gesture, to take Tyler's excellent example, should it "diverge too far from the norm is in danger of becoming no more than an ostentatious scratching" (187).

Being displaced in space and time, every replication – or reiteration – of a given meme is, however, necessarily imperfect, and it is these imperfect imitations, ormutations, that account for the cultural evolution of memes.[vii] However, as Dawkins notes, the question remains as to who, exactly, benefits from any given mutation, since there must be somesort of beneficiary if we are to account for the replication of a "mutated" meme in terms of "fitness" – which is not, as Dawkins is quick to point out, to suggest an identity of a mutated meme with a mutated gene in bestowing "some kind of survival advantage on their carriers" (188). Rather, asuccessful mutilated meme is one that is, quite simply, "good at replicating"–an ability that is absolutely indifferent to any benefit or risk that might accrue to its host (188). This, moreover, leads Dawkins to suggest that a "successful meme evolves as it does because it is advantageous to itself" (188). Of course, Dawkins is by no means attributing consciousness to memes but, rather, is reiterating at the cultural level his now well-known theory of theselfish gene such as it functions at the genetic level. Hence, "just like genes, memes can be considered 'selfish' replicators in the sense that they compete 'ruthlessly' with one another in the 'meme pool' that is their environment" (188). With this, however, we abruptly find ourselves once again dependent upon a "natural" genetic model based upon the myth of a universal struggle for survival – of the one against the all – which, as we have seen, has all too often been employed to mark out the human animal as an ontological exception.

This should not surprise us, however, given that, as Tyler notes, the relation ofgene to meme is

therefore that of analogy – a methodology which, as we have seen, is fraught with problems of unthought presumption. Indeed, in Dawkins' later Platonic formulation, the difficulty of reflection becomes plain to see: the meme, argues Dawkins, is ontologically divided between its Idea, on the one hand, and its imperfect empirical instances on the other. The meme, in other words, is divided into quasi-immortal genotype and potentially infinite individual phenotypic effects, that is, between immortal germline and mortal cells or between perfect suprasensory form and imperfect material copies. With this, Dawkins ultimately de-claws his earlier, potentially radical theory. As Tyler points out, we are now no longer considering the actual trait or artifact, but rather a meme-infected (human) individual who then "manifests in a mode of behaviour or the production of a concrete object" (189). The meme, in short, is no longer a question for the pragmatist, but is now a matter of reflection: the memetic artifact now reflects (human) knowledge or competence, rather than being itself a performative practice.

Through a reading of Derek Gatherer's critique of Dawkins, Tyler thus seeks to rescue memetic theory from the liberalism of its founder and so restore to it its innovative potential. Following Gatherer, Tyler argues that what for Dawkins are merely "phenotypic effects" are in fact the memes themselves. The practice, in short, is the meme. Such concrete practices or functions, "subject to a wide range of mechanisms of replication, mutating, sifting, and selection," evolve as the world worlds – "immersive activities, developing and transforming within particular environments" (190). Such is indeed, as Tyler contends, "a supremely practical, pragmatically cogent understanding of the meme" (190). Moreover, it offers a great deal in terms of a specifically Nietzschean practice, this despite Nietzsche's own – admittedly misplaced – hostility towards Darwin's evolutionary theory.

In a superb move, Tyler then takes the survival and success of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection as a "matchless example" of the practice of memetic evolution (191). Here, we should recall too that, for Flusser, the "unmatched importance" of biology resides in its providing of an "almost mythical model of life's unrealized possibilities" (73). Darwin undoubtedly offered a significant contribution to this "almost mythical" model, not only regarding the transmutation of species, but also insofar as he "contributed to a transmutation of the very concept of species too" (202). As such, argues Tyler acutely, the concept of "species" is itself part of the pragmatic "meme complex" of evolutionary theory in the sense given to the term by Gatherer, that is, as "composed of cultural events, behaviours, and artifacts" (202). The success Darwin's evolutionary theory, in other words, "has depended on its utility, ease of replication, and of course on the selection pressures of its environment" (202). As a meme, however, and this is Tyler's point, "Darwin's theory did not need to be true; it simply needed to replicate"– with the example of Darwin's finches, bloodsucking or otherwise, demonstrating

precisely this point.[viii]

Most important, however, is that the pragmatic emphasis on knowledge conceived as a practice offers an alternative not only to realism and relativism, but also to the positing of reflection in that, as practice, it already demands adiffractive methodology, inherent in the notion of perspectivism. Consequently, knowledge as practice necessarily becomes open-ended.

While the question of what, or rather who, might have emerged differently in Flusser's molluscular genealogy is of course moot, such a diffractive memetic thinking nonetheless offers a great deal to a rethinking of "life" and, in particular, of its conceptual limits. Hence, whereas Dawkins claims that memes are "by and large" the province of humans alone, Tyler shows that Dawkins' own work in fact "concede[s] the existence of nonhuman memetic practices," most notably in birdsong (206). It is here that the value of pragmatism generally, and of the meme in particular, manifests itself most clearly. With representationalism, for example, questions aimed at a dismissal of the nonhuman inevitably arise: do birds know something when they sing, or is it simply a mindless parroting? Here, one sees all too clearly how certain methodological frameworks serve to foreclose entire realms of potential discussion. As Tyler writes, the impulse to enquire after knowledge that makes a certain practice possible is a purely "representationalist inclination" (208). It is, in other words, an urge, often deeply ingrained but entirely contingent, to view knowledge as a reflection of the world; an urge that defines Flusser's entire project.

In his vampyroteuthicgenealogy, and despite avowing its impossibility (an impossibility itself providing the impetus behind the "new" genre of biological fable), Flusser remains intent on "polishing the mirror" in the hope of revealing – or constructing – an ever-more-accurate representation of the human Dasein. For the realist, writes Tyler, "knowledge tells us about the world, the object of knowledge, while for the relativist it tells us about the worldview of the knower" (208). Vampyroteuthis Infernalis, by virtue of its Heideggerian anthropocentrism, is an attempt both realist and relativist. In this resides its contradiction, the consequence of analogical method and a priorirepresentationalism.

Pragmatism, by contrast, has no need of knowledge understood as "an entity distinct from the world it represents" (208). Knowledge is of the world, taking its shape "under the pressure of external stimuli" and as "an immediate, immanent element of the environment itself" (208).

Taking the example of memetic birdsong above, eminently pragmatic questions concern themselves not with metaphysical exclusion, nor with imaginary oppositions such as "nature" and "culture," but rather with various modes of activity, that is, of practises or ways of being together within the world.

Ultimately, and this is precisely the value of Tyler's text, pragmatic epistemology does away with the noxious productions of humanism and of all the various anthropocentric denials. It does this, quite simply, by rendering such claims irrelevant. No polemic is required, no statements of ideology need be professed, and no utopian predictions are necessary. Rather, the world is that within which beings of all size, scope and scale interact insofar as they do, and no further arguments are necessary other than those concerning how we act, that is, what we do, when it comes to our nonhuman and human others. Nor is it enough simply to extend – whether to a greater or lesser extent – the number of species who "count." Rather, for the pragmatic memeticist, the evaluative anthropocentrism underlying such extensions is not only unnecessary but, more importantly, it is simply bad philosophy or, put another way, bad practice.

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Notes

[i] These include activity-experience (41); day-night (41); reason-dreams (41); conceptual-orgasmic (41); pure science-pure sex (48); plane-volume; contemplative-orgasmic; Platonic forms-Nietzschean mutability (42); Apollonian-Dionysian; love-hate (43); critique of pure reason – psychoanalysis (41 & 48); truth opposed by lie – truth (as lie) opposed by dishonesty (53); Darwin-Schopenhauer (53)

[ii] Here Flusser follows Heidegger in equating "truth" with "unveiling" as aletheia.

[iii] In a further, ironic twist, Flusser's very notion of "preconceptual reason" depends entirely upon the unremarked shift from one sense of the term "ratio" to another (initially defined as reason, this is silently supplanted by the sense of ratio as ration).

[iv] This reading focuses on a section from the Republic and also, regarding the mouth, on the

Timaeus. Also, see my papers "Cannibals and Apes" and "Plato Between the Teeth of the Beast," first presented at the London Conference for Critical Thought in 2012 and, in a greatly extended version, at the London School of Economics on 11th February 2014. Both papers can be accessed atwww.zoogenesis.wordpress.com

[v] See my own work at CCCS, at Derrida Today, etc.

[vi] Flusser does, however, acknowledge the possibility of politics betweenindividual anthills.

[vii] On the deferring and differing that is inherent to every iteration, see Derrida's Limited Inc.

[viii] And, notes Tyler acutely, at the expense of Darwin's painstaking work with domestic pigeons in what is yet one more example of both the impossibility of, and the ideological commitments to, maintaining a wild-tame distinction

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About Richard Iveson

I have just been awarded a three-year Postdoctoral Research Fellowship in the Centre for Critical and Cultural Studies at the University of Queensland, during which time I will continue work on my large project provisionally entitled Machine Lover of Jacques Derrida: Writings of the Posthuman. I have a PhD from Goldsmiths College, University of London; my teaching and research interests include animal studies and animal liberation; continental philosophy (with focus on Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida); posthumanism; cultural studies; biotechnology and cyberculture; post-Marxism; political activism; pedagogy and the university; SF and the trope of the fantastic. Currently I am working on one paper entitled "'Whether There is Life or Not': Triangulating Matter with Derrida, Meillassoux, and DeLanda"; and another that presses diverse texts by Vilem Flusser, Louis Bec, and Tom Tyler into a disclosive – and perhaps explosive - dialogue.

[redacted]

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[redacted]In October 2013 I took part in 'Voices, Memory, Forgetting', an interdisciplinary event organised by the Hearing the Voice project in partnership with the Memory Network. The day investigated the role of memory in situations of emotional distress and creative transformation, specifically in the context of voice hearing. My argument in this blog contribution will be that voice hearing can be approached as a modality of remembering, or sometimes forgetting, in the context of cultural theory, philosophy, and radical insights developed by the Hearing Voices Network.

I want to start by reproducing two paragraphs from my current book, Immaterial Bodies: Affect, Embodiment, Mediation (Sage, 2012), which situate my own interests in memory and voice hearing.

Listening to Voices: An Ethics of Entanglement

My academic and intellectual interests were informed by my own experiences of growing up with a mother who hears voices. I was aware at a very young age of the power of psychiatry, having experienced my mother being sectioned and hospi-talized cyclically, and witnessing her reliance, since the age of 18, on a repeat prescription of Largactyl. In times of crisis this did nothing to lessen the distressing voices that she heard. I had a rich fantasy life as a child, and my mother's voices and delusions became part of my world. As with psychosis, the distinction between fact and fiction was blurred in my own experiences of my mother's voices. I responded to her accounts and engagement with them as real, as real as they were for her, and as meaningful communications. There were patterns to her voices, particular voices visited each time, particularly her granny who offered comfort and reassurance, and other voices which were more abusive and distressing. These voices also had a pattern and rhythm and became familiar interlocutors. I have and always felt that I got to know much more about my mother and her life when she was psychotic. What was confusing to me at a very young age was why her experiences then were not listened to and not considered as having any meaning. They were predominantly to be suppressed by drugs and electroconvulsive therapy. The voices were ignored, silenced and for-gotten as she returned to a far from acceptable version of normality.

My encounter with psychiatry was to return as a teenager when my mother, prompted by her psychiatrist, suggested that I might have genetic counselling. I had already read all the books on psychiatry in my local library and was aware of an established narrative: that if you have one or two parents with mental health difficulties (read 'illness') you have a higher chance of developing mental illness (read 'difficulties') as 'it', whatever 'it' was, could be passed on genetically. This narrative had terrified me as a teenager and I can remember when I reached my 25th birthday feeling palpable relief that I had managed to escape, not my mother's experiences, as I had felt deep depression and anxiety about my own potential 'risk', but the 'psychiatric system'. I had, however, been told by a counsellor I saw whilst doing a psychology degree that I prob-ably would not finish the degree as I had 'a lot of trauma in my life'. She recommended that I saw a male psychiatrist who was also a vicar. I declined and went on to get a first-class honours degree. I tell this story because my PhD, which I went on to do in the early 1990s, was very much driven by my own anger and sense of injustice at the biogenetic model within psychiatry. However, my experiences and motivations were written out of the PhD. It was presented as an academic study, informed primarily by the historical approach to the human sciences developed by Michel Foucault and extended in the context of psychiatry and the

psychological sciences by Nikolas Rose – what he refers to as the 'psychological complex'.

I subscribe to the view that voices are modalities of communication – they have something meaningful to say. They communicate something about the singularity of the person's own life and the situatedness of that life within specific socio-historical and geo-political settings. This view and approach to voice hearing I have always been convinced about and this was confirmed to me during my PhD research in the early nineties where I met and collaborated with those who set up and shaped the very early beginnings of the Hearing Voices Network in Manchester. This Network provided support, inspiration and new practices, encouraging voice hearers to become experts of their own experience and to develop techniques where they might start to listen – to what were often painful, abusive and distressing voices. The HVN quickly established that building alliances and comradeship with other more positive voices, which many voice hearers experience as comforting and reassuring – acting much like good friends – helped the voice hearer to confront traumatic pasts and histories; to remember the un-representable, perhaps. Regarding my Mother's voices I have carrier bags upon carrier bags of her writings over the years voluminously produced when she has been hospitalized. She writes her voices obsessively, over and over, and you can very clearly start to see patterns, regularities, re-turns and the way in which distinctions between fact, fiction and fantasy become blurred – I will return to this point later.

In my latest book and development of my engagement with voice hearing I have started to think about the relationship between trauma, memory and forgetting and have been inspired by the work of two French psychoanalysts who work in the area of the intergenerational transmission of trauma, Francoise Davoine and Max Guadilliere, and the work of the American cultural theorist, Grace Cho, who also grew up with a Mother who hears voices and asks the question; what does it mean to listen with and through another's voice? I want to say something about this work and why I think it is so important.

Grace Cho recounts an experience of growing up with a Mother who had moved to America as a GI bride after the Korean War. Her Mother never spoke about her migration story – it was shrouded in secrecy and silence. What did speak about the life her Mother never spoke about were her Mother's voices. As Cho recounts, she discovered there was a common story in women who migrated to America from Korea as GI brides. Their stories were told in particular places – by social workers and psychiatrists, where the common narrative was of the women's movement from rural poverty in Korea to psychosis in America. On the basis of this fact – a fact found in social work literature – Cho invites us to listen with and through another's voice to hear the traumatic histories which have been silenced, marginalized, covered over and become transmuted into voices – voices which haunt the next generation. To do this she combines fact, fiction and fantasy in her own re-telling, which I think is an important strategy and one I am developing in my current work. This invitation (to listen with and through another's voice) is one we can also find in the work of those interested in the intergenerational transmission of trauma, such as Davoine and Gaudilliere. In their book, History Beyond Trauma, they suggest that trauma that can't be expressed (perhaps because it is not socially acknowledged or sanctioned – they particularly focus on the trauma of the first and second world wars, for example) can be communicated through embodied forms – voices, for example, which speak what cannot be spoken. These traumas can thus be passed on across generations. In this sense, voices might be considered modalities of forgetting and potential modalities of remembering (of restoring social links, which have been broken). They can help us to remember and understand forms of inequality and oppression and traumatic histories, which some people are forced to carry, and who often break down with the unbearable burden.

I want to finish by sharing an example of a voice hearer's story who participated in a video documentary I made in 1997. The documentary was called Inside Looking Out; Personal Perspectives and includes Ron Coleman, who was central to the shaping and founding of the HVN in the UK. He gave a lecture to my undergraduate media and communication students at Goldsmiths, University of London, which we filmed for the documentary. Coleman titled the lecture, 'Feeling FINE', where FINE stood as an acronym for Fucked Up, Insecure, Neurotic and Emotional! As a self-titled 'ex-paranoid schizophrenic' he recounts the multiple voices he hears, including the voice of the priest who abused him when he was an altar boy as a child. The process of remembering this traumatic history has been long, arduous, painful and complicated, as attuning to the voices as modalities of remembering is not an easy practice. It extends beyond the efficacies of a self-present, conversant subject.

In the documentary we hear another voice hearer tell a painful story of a traumatic history, which became sensationalized in the press at the time. He was a psychiatric nurse who had

made a suicide pact with his partner after discovering he was HIV positive (he was terrified of his family finding out). At that time, in the mid to late nineties, an AIDS diagnosis was considered a potential death sentence and gay men were repeatedly considered objects of fear, danger and loathing. They were made to carry the fantasy projections of those who discriminated against people with different sexualities. He felt unable to live this and tried to end his life after hearing voices telling him to kill himself. He was unsuccessful, although his partner did kill himself, and he was subsequently pilloried in the press, which linked his supposed instability to homosexuality more generally. The voices were transmutations of social histories that increasingly are being forgotten, and this historical document testifies to what voices can carry and communicate as traces, fragments and echoes of trauma and memory – individual and collective.

This is another example of why it is important to recover social links that have been broken; to begin to link up the traumatic histories of some of those hearing voices, with social histories that haven't been told or which are only told in particular ways (through particular sanctioned narratives and authorized archives, for example). As I argue in my book, these histories are always a mix of fact, fiction and fantasy. This is what I learnt from my Mother's voices and the carrier bags which hold these traces to be re-animated in the present. Surely we all live our lives through a blurring of fact, fiction and fantasy – isn't this how memory works? Re-animating the stories that voices communicate, finding ways to listen with, to and through another's voice(s) opens up to the complexities of memory and forgetting, and the challenges of what I call mediated forms of perception. Voices as modalities of remembering are articulations of how the past is always very much in the present. The question of how to listen to voices and what techniques and technologies of listening we might employ is a subject that I hope might stimulate further discussion in this blog.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]Videofilosofia - Maurizzio Iazzarato

Add hito steyerl book and front of screening

Hip 3 proposes a recontextualisation of Eduard small experimental film direct theory.

How can we argue (as moving image posthuman philosophy) in relation with cybernetic logics of communication ... Atmos ferric non linear moving image Has the great potential to develop new non logic languages to that approach and better communicate with orders beyond the syntagma (direct theory)

Human Logic needs not just context but atmospheres to matter ('make sense') in the cybernetic posthuman world of communication... This is central to the development of telepathic technologies

.....

How we aregue in more open forum philosophical debates across humanities and science should be an interest of practice based academic work to survive ... In one word we need rock stars like braidotti ... Maybe not the right forum for this !

What are the connecting points between theories on text and artists mov image

——/-

Mid length and feature format video works !!

Move from question 2 to 1: working at the intersection between humanities and science?

Add Sarah Turner

—/

Indeed it is about sloterdijk

Alien cart: telepathic voices and alogaruthmic montage

In a similar operations to chows entanglements between theory, literature and film, moving image research can incorporate aural, corporeal and digital presences

Moving image mapping of modes of cognition in culture

—-

Minou propo and hito

It is about spaces of entanglement between theories, objects and modes of though in digital media

HC this research bring about a more critical understanding of objects, bodies and theoris in digital media

HC this research advance in our understanding of a theory that produces entanglements and reconfigurations more than representations?

Walter mignolo critique. Is important in relation to his contribution about how visual hegemony has subjected mores mbody forms of communication (quechuas) and in co-relation to Blackman emphasis on corporeality. This aspect redefines moving image work that incorporate subtle uses of sound and speech.

Finally Maurizzio lazzarato

This is crucial if we want to understand Authorship and singularity in the space of the digital archive. How the curatorial functions of algorithms articulate the orders of visibility in archives, libraries and the web.

David lapuyad

Deleuze, los movimiento aberrantes

El triángulo rosa

Eric allies París 8

Asleep 3

White noise Box

Brownian motion Sound

Time dilation - loss of simultaneity

Um célebre paleontólogo da linguagem, Leroi-Gourhan, disse praticamente tudo o que é essencial a respeito da relação gesto-linguagem-cérebro já nos anos de 1950. A sua tese pode ser lida deste modo: o homem se desenvolveu entre dois espelhos, um do gesto técnico e outro da fonação, que constituem uma "tecnicidade" bipolar, cujo resultado foi a formação de dois pares funcionais (mão-ferramenta e face-linguagem). A atividade motriz (da qual a mão é o agente perfeito) e a atividade verbal são inseparáveis. Não existem dois fatos tipicamente humanos (a linguagem e a técnica), mas somente um fenômeno mental, fundado neurologicamente nos territórios cerebrais conectados e que se expressa conjuntamente através dos corpos e dos sons. A mão libera os músculos faciais da preocupação de se assegurar a nutrição e permite a constituição dos mesmos músculos como órgãos da fonação.

mão-ferramenta e face-linguagem ///// técnica e da linguagem

Time and space

O simbolismo gráfico goza de uma certa independência em relação à linguagem fonética: o conteúdo dele é expresso nas três dimensões do espaço (a imagem), enquanto a linguagem fonética se expressa somente na dimensão do tempo. A imagem possui uma liberdade multidimensional que sempre falta à escrita.

Nestas condições, se estabelece um equilíbrio que é uma espécie de paralelismo: o gesto interpreta a palavra e esta comenta o grafismo. Em seguida, a pluralidade de formas de pensamento (gráficas e linguísticas) e seus respectivos paralelismos são perdidos. Esta perda é descrita por Leroi-Gouhan como "subordinação" da mão à linguagem através da especificidade do simbolismo gráfico da escrita, que submete o pensamento por imagens ao pensamento

linguístico. A partir do momento em que o grafismo, na escrita, não é mais que um modo de registrar o desenrolar do discurso, assiste-se a um empobrecimento dos modos de expressão multidimensionais e de criação que caracterizavam a produção dos símbolos gráficos (trata-se do "aleatório das imagens associadas" que caracterizava as formas arcaicas de escrita, cujos traços ainda encontramos nas línguas chinesa e japonesa). Desaparece, pois, o paralelismo verbal-gráfico: o homem dispõe de um único dispositivo linguístico, instrumento de expressão e de conservação de um pensamento – cada vez mais canalizado na lógica do intelecto que a linguagem contém. Da coordenação entre linguagem gráfica e linguagem verbal (e das formas de pensamento ligadas a elas), passa-se à subordinação da primeira à segunda.

Leroi-Gourhan nos sugere que no capitalismo, com o desenvolvimento das tecnologias das imagens ("o registro mecânico das imagens" que traz à tona o conceito benjaminiano de "reprodução"), passam a existir as condições para uma restituição do pensamento multidimensional, já que o grafismo não é mais subordinado ao dispositivo linear da escrita alfabética.

"máquinas que cristalizam o tempo"

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Colectivo Arkhé

BIM artists

Within moving image works, I'm interested in the works that use sound as the guiding reference for the image. Sound is an important element within experimental moving image traditions. The logic of sound has been a clear reference to counterbalance the visual and textual traditions of

western philosophical thought (mignolo)

The practice led research will have an important impact on how we imagine theory in the future would be. How archives would be organised and disciplined in the context of complext taxonomies based not only on text but also by the art documentary, audio visual moving image themselves.

Lazareto paulait small

I'm interested in the context more that. The content. In a world where audiovisual argumentation proposes new forms of engagement with the wold of objects and multiple realities (human and posthuman)

I'm interest on how text interact with moving image in the vast spaces of digital archives. I'm interest in working with both the Brit library and the bfi lib. How editing, cataloging and indexing operate in a digital domain where the logic of the algorithm is now abstract, infinite and undetermined rather than binary (parisi)

How would per formative audiovisual methods encounter performative writing ?

Moving image Archives are organised and disciplined on the bases of complext taxonomies based on text

art documentary, experimental moving image

What is Philosophy?

Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari

Verso, 1994

The proliferation ofsubjectivitivities in the capitalist world and how this new subjectivities produce other forms of concepts that could be labeled as human, anti human and posthuman

Contribution to

artistic research,

an aesthetics of resistance

transformation of artistic research into an academic discipline.

addresses the institutionalization of artistic research as being complicit with new modes of production within cognitive capitalism: commodified education, creative and affective industries, administrative aesthetics, and so on. Both perspectives agree on one point: artistic research is at present being constituted as a more or less normative, academic discipline.

Can an academic discipline be defined by non linear, undefined and milatidemensional concepts based on moving image and performance

Aesthetics of Resistance is the title of Peter Weiss' seminal novel, and he establishes a genealogy of aesthetic research, which is related to the history of emancipatory struggles throughout the 20th century.

complex procedures of investigation, such as the cine-eye, the cine-truth, the biography of the object or photomontage

In 1940, Hans Richter coins the term film essay or essay film as capable of visualizing theoretical ideas.

The proposal that luciano intends, is an investigation in both directions. I would add a third direction and problematise the production and circulation of subjectivity by images and

It is no coincidence that many of the practices mentioned here have been dealing with classical problems of documentary representation from very different perspectives: its function as power/knowledge, its epistemological problems, its relation to reality and the challenge of creating a new one. Documentary styles and forms have forever grappled with the uneven mix of rationality and creativity, between subjectivity and objectivity, between the power of creation and the power of conservation.

It is no coincidence either that many of the historical methods of artistic research are tied to social or revolutionary movements, or to moments of crisis and reform. In this perspective, the outline of a global network of struggles is revealed, which spans almost the whole 20th century, which is transversal, relational, and (in many, though far from all cases) emancipatory.

Moving image and Art practice as research and multilingual concept

Artistic Research as Translation

>>>>>>> alien cartography !!!!

1. Contribution to artistic research and the continuing search for an aesthetics of resistance. transformation of artistic research into an academic discipline

2. The proliferation of images in the capitalist world and the crisis of subject / object configurations

how this new subjectivities produce other forms of concepts that could be labeled as human, anti human and posthuman

3. But also how this expansion of academia reconfigures the spheres of philosophy, logic, language and communication and eventually how science accommodates these new onto-epistemiologal possibilities

>>>>>>>>>>

Moving image as direct theory (direct concept): thinking beyond language philosophy. Entanglements and Re(con)figurations

By Luciano Zubillaga

————>>>>>>>thinking beyond language philosophy

: Moving image as direct theory (direct concept): thinking beyond language philosophy. Entanglements and Re(con)figurations

By Luciano Zubillaga

Michel de Certau (1997) How is Christianity Thinkable today? in The Postmodern God, Blackwell publishers

Moving image as direct argumentation in philosophy

i. Introduction

This research project is motivated by my long term interest to create new connections between moving image and philosophy:

1. Moving image. The practice and distribution of experimental moving image and cinema beyond the xx century model of commercial entertainment, representation and cinepsychoanalysis: film as performative theory. Bypassing its dependency on linear theory and the limitations of language: syntagma discipline and horizontal causality.

2. Philosophy. Philosophy beyond the linguistic turn, the crossover between feminism and non-western approaches to philosophy and to theoretical physics have lead me to open up urgent questions about the possibilities of the entire time-thinking apparatus and the hegemony of language in philosophy.

What is the relationship between these two ideas? What is the relationship between film and theory? These ideas have been dominated by interpretations and allocations of meaning that are marked as linear (according to linguistic discourse) and imply one-dimensional bridges between the semiotic of two worlds. In contrast, my interest lies in the possibility that film itself can be theory, arguing in place of a text and by means of other communication processes (non-verbal but discursive) and contextualised within the current contemporary turn to affects. What are the connecting points between text-based theory and film theory that is not a theory of film,

but theory itself, albeit precisely as film?

What is the relationship of these discussions to current debates on new materialities (Barad, 2007). If film itself is theory, what consequences does this have for the conception of theory as such? Is this the beginning of different onto-epistemological lines of communication and enquiry? All these questions originated from moving image practice will directly contribute to a wider debate about the reconceptualisation of physical reality (time and space apparatuses).

The central component of this research is the production and distribution of moving image that works as direct theory. By applying moving image practice directly to critical thinking, this research project will contribute to and extend debates on key ethical and philosophical dilemmas working through moving image philosophy within both art and research academic contexts.

ii. Research Context

For the last twenty years there has been a renewed interest in moving image work, including film essays, artists and experimental films, finding a platform, outside the media entertainment and broadcast television environment, through gallery and museum networks. Much development and variation can be sited in how artists and filmmakers approach the use of moving image as a creative, political, and philosophical means for art and documentary production (1). Traditionally these works have been referred to as experimental films, and more recent found categorization with terms such as 'documentary-style' works, artists' film & video, or new documentary.

Innovation in documentary practice, as viewed by both film and broadcast industries, seems to focus its interest on a user oriented democratisation of content. Locating audience interaction as a place where the viewing experience is autonomised, and making a case for the spectator in a position of authorship.

Meanwhile the fine art sector has made headways, providing a platform and context in which

moving image artists working with the documentary medium freely utilize actuality as material, exercising their individual approach to a postrepresentational practice, with many hybrid forms coming into existence, both in form and presentation methods.

Through my own practice, and through critical engagement with the works of other artists in this field (2), I am observing a reconfiguration of boundaries in terms of applied methodologies, in the pursuit of dissemination, funding and new aesthetics. Likewise, social activists, media theorists and philosophers are exploring complex performative based work that has moved away from the domain of text (3). What can be speculatively said about potential transformations in terms of methodology and argumentations practices as a result of this process of migration for both film and philosophy? How is this growing desire to exist in both fields going to affect the way we make, view and define this type of work in the future? How this interdisciplinary migration affects the wider geopolitical and cultural sphere?

iii. Brief review of current literature and practice

I have produced a number of films that function as direct theory (4), works which are labeled as essay film, artist film or experimental cinema for lack of more accurate forms of definition. These works have been shown in galleries, museums and festivals.

My current film practice under the generic title Alien Cartography further relinquish the boundaries of control within the process of film making: celebrating the collision of representation, participation and abstraction. Another logic, where performers, sounds and voices navigate time and space as a sculpture (an ambiguous and undetermined one). Here politics bridge to metaphysics, to the multiverse of language. In terms of technology, digital recording blends with analogue apparatuses, and viceversa. Bellows, old medium format lenses with 5K recording and mobile phones. Visual and narrative ambiguity has always been present in my work.

The source of inspiration in my work intuitively comes from contemporary music (5). Although text appears as a secondary element, the results shall always emerge as a certain narrative arousing in the viewer's mind. Within avant-garde traditions music triggers an other logic of montage (Rees, 2000), bypassing the regimentation of the syntagma (Barthes, 1957). A moving

image (sound, image, performance) that is always vulnerable and subcortical. A cinema of montage and at the same time modular, interchangeable and never fixed by horizontal causality.

To address this new theoretical possibility, I initiated a performance and curatorial project titled Film as Direct Theory, as part of Buenos Aires Museum of Modern Art programme Cinema as Something Else ("el cine es otra cosa") (6). It has grown from a one off screening event to a year programme of screening works that sit on the confluence point between moving image art and philosophy. I have also presented a video paper on theory of international relations and world politics at a recent Posthumanist conference in Greece (7), and will participate in the next conference on Posthumanism in Seul 2015.

iv. Research methodology and questions

A research methodology will develop from both, my current practice as an artist and future editions of Film as Direct Theory, which will include guest curators, artists' talks, a symposium, and web resource with transcripts, and video documentation.

Therefore, Alien Cartography and Film as Direct Theory will be my primary research vehicles to answer the following questions:

1. What are the underlying political, financial & social conditions that may have facilitated the surge of moving image as an alternative form of argumentation? What are the new funding sources, business models that support this alternative use of film?

2. Within current debates on posthumanism, biopolitics and science, what are the philosophical implications in terms of changing notions of self, subjectivity, causality and logocentrism ?

3. What are the philosophical and ethical concerns of the use of film as direct object of academic production ?

4. What can be said about spectators experiencing these works as part of a collective viewing experience, versus as olitary encounter with the text ? Public debate versus s cience or specific knowledge versus s ingular knowledge.

The themes put forward by thes e questions aim to activate a dialogue between experimental moving image practice and current developments in the field of theoretical phys ics (Barad. 2007), neuropsychology (Conway, 2006), within the onto-epistemological framework provided by the posthumanities (Braidotti, 2013). This connection can certainly build the foundations of a new form of thought, making available to critical theory the contributions and instruments developed by moving image in more than one hundred years (montage, s uperimpos ition, multiple perspectives etc.).

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Ray of creation

The relation of All Galaxies to the Absolute is less clear, because we cannot really visualise the Absolute. Indeed, we must remember that our visualisations of all these Worlds are only very partial projections. We do not even see the Earth as it sees itself. We usually visualise the Planetary world as a small collection of spherical bodies in orbit around the Sun, but we have very little conception of its objective cosmic nature. (For instance, in a higher dimension of time, the orbits themselves would become solid bodies, spiraling around a moving Sun. And it is difficult to imagine the nature of the electromagnetic interactions on this level.) Perhaps the distinction between satellite and inclusion relationships is merely an artefact of our limited

intelligence, and would dissolve with the application of correct scale.

In this diagram, the fundamental data about the universe gathered by science, and specifically the principal cosmic entities that modern astronomical observation has marked out, are arranged in a manner coherent with ancient metaphysical principles about humanity's actual place in the scheme of creation. The reader is referred to chapters 5, 7, and 9 in In Search of the Miraculous for an explanation of this diagram, but the point to be emphasized here is that, at the deepest level, the human mind and heart are enmeshed in a concatenation of causal influences of enormous scale and design. A study of the Ray of Creation makes it clear that the aspects of human nature through which one typically attempts to improve one's lot are without any force whatever within the network of universal influences that act upon man on earth. In this consists man's fundamental illusion, an illusion only intensified by the technological achievements of modern science. Man is simply unable to draw upon the conscious energies passing through him, which in the cosmic scheme, are those possessing the actual power of causal efficacy. Man does not and cannot participate consciously in the great universal order, but instead is tossed about en masse for purposes limited to the functions of organic life on earth as a whole. Even in this relatively limited sphere—limited, that is, when compared to man's latent destiny—mankind has become progressively incapable of fulfilling its function, a point that Gurdjieff strongly emphasized in his own writings. This aspect of the Ray of Creation—namely, that the "fate of the earth" is somehow bound up with the possibility of the inner evolution of individual men and women—resonates with the contemporary sense of impending planetary disasters.

"The Ray of Creation" in the teaching of Gurdjieff: The Absolute is the fundamental source of all creation. From the Absolute the process of cosmic creation branches and descends (involves) according to an ordered sequence of increasing complexity and density, following the law of the octave. The universe as a whole comprises countless such branchings from the Absolute; this particular diagram represents the "ray" containing our planet earth.

How are human beings to change this state of affairs and begin drawing on the universal conscious energies which they are built to absorb but which now pass through them untransformed? How is humanity to assume its proper place in the great chain of being? Gurdjieff's answer to these questions actually circumscribes the central purpose of his teaching—namely, that human life on earth may now stand at a major transitional point comparable perhaps to the fall of the great civilizations of the past and that development of the whole being of man (rather than one or another of the separate human functions) is the only thing that can permit man to pass through this transition in a manner worthy of human destiny.

But whereas the descent of humanity takes place en masse, ascent or evolution is possible only within the individual. In Search of the Miraculous presents a series of diagrams dealing with the same energies and laws as the Ray of Creation, not only as a cosmic ladder of descent but also in their evolutionary aspect within the individual. In these diagrams, known collectively as the Food Diagram, Ouspensky explains in some detail how Gurdjieff regarded the energy transactions within the individual human organism. As in the Ray of Creation, the Food Diagram arranges the data of modern science, in this case the science of physiology, in a manner that subsumes these data naturally within the immensely vast scale of ancient metaphysical and cosmological principles. Again, the reader is referred to Ouspensky's book, the point being that humanity can begin to occupy its proper place within the chain of being only through an inner work with the specific intrapsychic energies that correspond to the higher energies in the cosmic order and which within the individual human being may be subsumed under the general term attention. The many levels of attention possible for man, up to and including an attention that in traditional teachings has been termed Spirit, are here ranged along a dynamic, vertical continuum that reaches from the level of biological sustenance which humans require for their physical bodies up to the incomparably finer sustenance that they require for the inner growth of the soul. This finer substance is termed "the food of impressions," a deceptively matter-of-fact phrase that eventually defines man's unique cosmic obligation and potentiality of constantly and in everything working for the development within himself of the divine attributes of devotion to the Good and objective understanding of the

Real.